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Abstract 
Music at the turn of the twenty-first century has expanded in new, previously 
inconceivable directions, many of which espouse a newfound freedom from dominant models of 
beauty and aesthetic excellence. From this musical space, vital new musical practices are 
emerging from composers such as John Zorn, Diamanda Galás, and Merzbow; however, because 
their music is so utterly unconventional, existing critical tools are failing to lead toward a greater 
understanding of the meaning created through the music. This interpretive lacuna has compelled 
the present study, which seeks to create a discursive space along with appropriate critical tools to 
help scholars and listeners better understand new streams of radical music from the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century. 
The radical music of John Zorn, Diamanda Galás, and Merzbow presents special 
hermeneutic challenges to anyone who endeavors to find meaning within their aggressively 
alienating expressive languages. To this end, I propose a multifaceted, multi-perspectival 
approach that is grounded the hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and the psychoanalytic 
theory of Jacques Lacan, but that also emerges organically from the exigencies of the works 
under consideration. Across case studies on Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, I demonstrate how a 
hermeneutic approach can uncover comprehensible musical meaning even when confronting the 
extreme expressive languages of these composers. Ultimately, I hope to provide a model for 
future investigations into musical meaning to help elucidate the work of other radical composers. 
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Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
 Music at the turn of the twenty-first century has expanded in new, previously 
inconceivable directions. As the hegemonic power of the Western art music canon declines, the 
advent of postmodern sensibilities has given rise to a diffraction of musical styles. The 
abundance of recordings and historical research has created a flattening of history into a 
perpetual present where centuries of music from around the world are available to inform and 
inspire composers. This, along with the thoroughgoing skepticism toward metanarratives that is 
the ineluctable essence of the postmodern turn, has created a unique freedom from a dominant, 
unified model of aesthetic excellence. Some of the emerging streams of music continue to fall 
into the familiar categories of art music and popular music, but there are a number of streams 
that not only refuse to fit within this binary, but also actively work to demonstrate the limitations 
of convention as it pertains to music. 
In this dissertation, I examine three such streams of radical music by John Zorn, 
Diamanda Galás, and Merzbow. I define radical music as a broad class of aural expression that 
transgresses the common codes of a given culture. The transgressions may range from the 
aesthetic to the social to the political to the ethical, but the class of all radical music composers is 
united by a desire to break boundaries and question any and all levels of cultural praxis. The 
disruptive efficacy of radical music is powered by a phenomenon that I call “expressive noise”—
a metaphysical essence that contains the kernel of transgression inherent in radical music. 
Expressive noise cuts across distinctions of taste, style, and any other convention as it ruptures 
the outer conceptual shell that encompasses music. 
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 I hold that there is great value in the exploration of the extreme states of a given 
phenomenon. The process of investigating the periphery of musical practice leads to two things: 
first, it provides a way to reconceptualize what is already familiar, and second, it allows us to 
expand our conceptions of music in new directions. The pluralism of John Zorn demonstrates the 
limitations of divisions between musical hiererachies of value, as well as musical styles; the 
vengeful anger rendered aurally explosive by Diamanda Galás exceeds its aesthetic frame, 
bursting forth from the speaker to create real ototoxic anxiety; and the revolutionary sonic 
explorations of Merzbow pose ontological queries, the likes of which music has not faced since 
Cage. Each of these composers uses radical means to transgress the borders of culture, society, 
and aesthetics, and although each of them may have very different reasons for doing so, they are 
united by their dedication to musical anti-foundationalism.  
  Because radical music is intrinsically alien, arriving at our ears in a manner that is 
unfamiliar and often discomforting, it compounds the normal problem of interpretation, and thus 
we must explore new approaches to musical understanding if we are to understand it at a level 
beyond a simplistic attack on normative values. My central objectives are to create a discursive 
space along with appropriate critical tools so that we may understand new streams of radical 
music from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. I begin with the premise that when a 
given music is sufficiently removed from acknowledged traditions of Western music, the 
existing critical models no longer pertain and it becomes necessary to find new approaches to the 
task of hermeneutics. To this end, I propose a multifaceted, multi-perspectival approach that is 
grounded the hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques 
Lacan, but that also emerges organically from the exigencies of the works under consideration. 
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Thus far, critical approaches to composers such as Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow have 
tended to fall into two camps: the first favors a sociocultural approach either interpreting the 
music with respect to its sociocultural context, or avoiding interpretation in favor of a more 
objective, ethnographic approach that mostly documents what the practitioners say about 
themselves; 1  the second is a phenomenological approach similar to Pierre Schaeffer’s 
acousmology where the sound is considered as a decontextualized thing-in-itself.2 In the case of 
the former, the scholarship has difficulty discussing the specifics of the musical actuality of the 
work, while in the case of the latter, the scholarship turns a blind eye towards crucial issues of 
context and meaning. By contrast, at the heart of my study is a deep engagement with the music 
of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, where I address not only the failure of any existing hermeneutics 
to confront a growing body of radical music that exists outside the purview of either Western art 
music or popular music, but also a way forward so that we might welcome it into the 
musicological discourse. My goal is to conduct a synthesis of my hermeneutic readings with an 
ethnoaesthetics of radical music—a confluence of interpretation and the aesthetic conceptions 
indigenous to radical composers.  
There is a growing body of literature on the music I describe as radical, but many of the 
scholars examining this music are coming from a field other than musicology—a point I will 
elaborate on in subsequent chapters as part of my literature review. This is true of Galás, whose 
coverage consists mainly of music journalists and countercultural critics, and this is especially 
true of Merzbow, whose limited coverage exists mainly within the realm of sound theory and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the extreme end of this approach, we find Miller, whose editorial voice is all but mute. Paul D. Miller, 
ed., Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
2 Schaeffer’s ideas on a “reduced listening,” where sounds are appreciated solely for their timbral actuality 
are outlined in Pierre Schaeffer, Traité des object musicaux (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966). 
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cultural studies, although David Novak’s recent ethnography of Japanese noise music is a 
welcome exception.3 The academic literature on Zorn is starting to grow, but again, the majority 
of published material on Zorn comes from music journalists instead of musicologists and 
theorists. With one monograph and a small handful of dissertation chapters that consider Zorn, 
much remains to be said.4 Granted, those outside of the musicological discourse may find it 
intimidating (or possibly useless) to discuss music with any sort of specificity or precision, but is 
that not why the field of musicology exists? Is our field not one of experts trained in the obscure 
art of musical discourse? If so, it is disappointing that a thriving body of music would go almost 
unnoticed by the very field charged with studying it. The field of contemporary radical music 
seems to have fallen between the still-persistent art music/popular music divide, containing 
elements of both, while fitting within neither. The present study seeks to rectify this situation by 
proposing a new approach to musical hermeneutics that will help introduce radical music into the 
musicological discourse while providing a new toolset for future scholars of radical music. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 David Novak, Japanoise: Music at the Edge of Circulation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). 
 
4 Zorn’s name is mentioned in a number of books, but he is rarely the focus of a chapter or article. Often, 
his name appears in a list of composers associated with postmodernism or he is mentioned in passing. Cf. numerous 
chapters in Judy Lochhead and Joseph Auner, Postmodern Music / Postmodern Thought (London: Routledge, 2002); 
Jonathan D. Kramer, “Beyond Unity: Toward an Understanding of Musical Postmodernism,” in Concert Music, 
Rock, and Jazz since 1945, ed. Elizabeth West Marvin and Richard Hermann (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 1995); Susan McClary, Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
Sources that offer an extended engagement with Zorn include: John Brackett, John Zorn: Tradition and 
Transgression (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); John Brackett, “Magick and Mysticism in Zorn’s 
Recent Works,” in John Zorn: Tradition and Transgression (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Gordon 
Dale Fitzell, “Time-Consciousness and Form in Nonlinear Music” (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 
2004); Ellie M. Hisama, “Postcolonialism on the Make: The Music of John Mellencamp, David Bowie, and John 
Zorn,” Popular Music 12, no. 2 (1993): 91-104. 
Finally, there are a number of scholarly interview chapters dedicated to Zorn: Cole Gagne, “John Zorn,” in 
Soundpieces 2: Interviews With American Composers (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1993); Edward Strickland, 
“John Zorn,” in American Composers: Dialogues on Contemporary Music (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991); Ann McCutchan, “John Zorn,” in The Muse that Sings: Composers Speak About the Creative Process 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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2.0 Background 
 I will begin by offering a brief commentary on what I term radical music and expressive 
noise that prefigures a fuller exposition that will follow in chapter two. From there I will provide 
some background on Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, along with the respective works that I will 
examine in chapters three through five. Next I will conduct a survey of the musicological 
discourse surrounding music and meaning with special attention devoted to hermeneutic 
approaches to musical understanding. Finally, I will present a brief outline of the hermeneutic 
that I will develop in detail in chapter one.  
2.1.0 Radical Music 
Where the standards of conventional music and culture have been transgressed beyond a 
certain threshold, where our analytical and interpretive approaches cease to yield meaningful 
results, where the very boundaries of the concept of music are pushed to a breaking point, there 
we find radical music. It transgresses standards, pointing to a beyond of music and of musical 
experience, and in doing so, radical music forces us to ask fundamental questions about the 
nature of music and art.  
 I have chosen to call this music “radical” for a number of reasons. The designation 
“experimental music” carries the unfortunate connotation that the composer is presenting some 
sort of outcome of a musical test rather than a fully formed, intentionally designed work of art.5 
The label has also been used as a synonym for non-academically affiliated twentieth century 
modernists like John Cage, Henry Cowell, and Lou Harrison. 6  Along similar lines, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cf. Edgard Varèse quoted in Arnold Whittall, Music Since the First World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 198. 
 
6 Cf. Michael Nyman, Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 1-30; Amy Beal, New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero 
Hour to Reunification (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 2. 
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designation “avant-garde” has also been used to refer to a specific period of history—the 
“historical avant-garde” of Andreas Huyssen7—and to differentiate between institutionally 
supported avant-gardists and non-institutionally-supported experimentalists.8 Avant-garde, as a 
term, also carries an evolutionist connotation implying that the art is merely at the forefront of 
what will eventually become “après-garde.” If radical music aligns with a historical period, it 
coincides with the postmodern turn during the latter decades of the twentieth century and 
extending into the foreseeable future of the twenty-first century. Like the so-called 
experimentalists, radical composers tend not to be affiliated with academic institutions and are 
not overly concerned with trying to situate their music in relation to the Western art music 
canon.9 Unlike avant-garde composers, it is less that radical composers are ahead of the curve 
and more that they have transcended the curve.  
 Radical music is a heterogeneous category with wildly divergent intentions and aesthetic 
manifestations. There are, however, eight general features that are often found in radical music. 
While these eight features are not strict requirements, they represent eight of the most common 
features shared amongst the diverse group of radical composers. There is no minimum criterion 
for assessing the radicalism of a given work, but most radical music touches on at least a few of 
these features. Moreover, there are degrees to which any of the following features pertain to a 
given composer, and these degrees are subject to change either over the span of one’s career or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986), vii. 
 
8 From this distinction we find that beyond matters of institutional support, avant-gardists tend to see 
themselves at the forefront of a musical teleology (e.g., Boulez, Stockhausen) while experimentalists tend to see 
themselves as rebels deviating from the tradition (e.g., Cage, Partch, Cowell). David Nicholls, “Avant-garde and 
Experimental Music,” in The Cambirdge History of American Music, ed. David Nicholls (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), ff. 519. 	  
9 The relationship of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow to institutional support systems will be explored in more 
detail in chapters three, four, and five, respectively. 
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from work to work. For instance, Galás’s oeuvre encompasses works of aesthetic extremism 
alongside (bizarre, but less radical) covers of blues, gospel, and jazz standards. Similarly, Zorn 
has had to self-finance many of his projects, but he has slowly gained recognition and now 
receives orchestral commissions and prestigious fellowships.10 
1) Radical music is intrinsically transgressive on many fronts, including general 
aesthetics and fundamental musical conventions, such as the seemingly formless 
displays of musical abjection found in Galás’s early work.  
2) Radical music is extreme. There is durational extremism from Merzbow’s fifty-CD 
Merzbox to the tiny vignettes of Zorn’s band, Naked City; there is sonic extremism 
from the piercing screeches of Galás to the nearly silent work of Francisco Lopez; 
there is sociopolitical extremism from the bitter fascistic parodies of Throbbing 
Gristle to Merzbow’s Dadaist critiques of the art establishment. 
3) There is usually an important conceptual component that is transgressive in nature, 
often in a political sense. Zorn rails against the musical establishment, while Galás 
creates scathing critiques of social injustice around the world. Unlike the general 
transgressive spirit of radical music, these conceptual components pertain to issues 
specific to a given work. 
4) It is rare for radical composers to have any sort of conventional institutional support 
such as a professorship, a major record label contract, or orchestral commissions. 
They are often self-sustaining artists who rely on media sales including CDs or 
digital downloads, often released through either boutique labels catering to like 
artists, or through their own self-managed and self-financed record labels. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Amongst other commissions, Zorn received a commission from the New York Philharmonic and 
composed Orchestra Variations: Leonard Bernstein in Memoriam in 1998. He was also named a MacArthur Fellow 
in 2006. 
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5) Timbre is often of central importance, supplanting traditionally omnipresent musical 
features such as melody, harmony, and rhythm. In Zorn’s Astronome, for instance, 
the voice is used in an entirely non-verbal capacity, thereby leaving timbre as the 
only sonically concrete element to discuss.  
6) Radical music tends to exist as recordings that cement the composer’s exacting 
specifications in a definitive edition rather than as scores requiring the interpretation 
of a musician. Even when the composers are not also the performers, they typically 
oversee the recording and production of their work.  
7) Radical music often involves cultural hybridity. Often times this cultural hybridity 
pertains to intercultural borrowing, but in the case of radical music, the artists are 
sometimes multinational citizens with roots in a number of cultures, thereby 
rendering questions of a singular origin problematic.  
8) The radicalism of the sonic elements is magnified by equally radical extra-sonic 
elements. Whether it is the controversial album art of Zorn or the incendiary, 
profanity-ridden interview of Galás, or the themes of bondage and domination of 
Merzbow, there are supporting elements that enhance the transgressive power of the 
music.  
9) Radical music often uses space in a particular manner. Sometimes this involves a 
total sonic saturation of space, other times it involves almost imperceptibly quite 
sound that blends with one’s listening environment, and yet other times, this 
involves multichannel, spatialized sound. 
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2.1.1 Expressive Noise 
 Noise is a widely used and poorly defined term. A survey of its usage reveals that it can 
mean just about anything from ugly sound to sound that is subjectively annoying to the total 
class of all sounds of which music is but a particular variety. Sometime noise is a pejorative and 
sometimes noise is commendatory. The noise of John Cage, for instance, is latent beauty waiting 
to be discovered by those who have blinded their ears to it, while the noise of Whitehouse is an 
antagonistic sound bomb meant to shock by virtue of its thoroughgoing hideousness.  
 First, it is important to clarify that noise is not necessarily synonymous with “non-
music,” for most definitions of noise involve a subjective component, or at least involve some 
sort of intentional circumscription designating the sonics in question as an expressive act. Within 
contemporary discourses of noise, there are six main conceptions: acoustic, communicative, 
subjective, symbolic, transcendent, and phenomenological. Acoustic noise can be defined 
straightforwardly as an irregular waveform. Communicative noise is defined as a corruption of 
signal or content—a source of interference. Subjective noise is that which one finds repulsive as 
judged by any criteria that one wishes and may potentially encompass any sound at all. Symbolic 
noise creates a metaphor out of noise, using it to represent a concept such as rebellion, chaos, or 
the future. Transcendent noise is conceived as the source of all sound and can be filtered through 
cultural codes into that which we recognize as music. Phenomenological noise is defined through 
the experience that it provides, whether it is a numbing of sensation due to an oversaturation of 
activity or a total sensorial domination. Of these six categories, communicative noise is one most 
likely to be used to refer to non-musical sound, for a corruption of signal could, in some cases, 
be introduced unintentionally, thereby falling outside of the realm of the intentional artistic 
expression. 
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 It is crucial to understand the paradoxical nature of noise. If noise is intrinsically 
anarchistic, what happens when we begin to accept noise as legitimate art? Merzbow is often 
referred to as a “noise musician,” but by accepting his work as “noise music” we strip it of its 
transgressive power. This is why I believe that the sundry attempts to redeem noise are 
misguided, for it is only when noise retains its full power of transgression that it is most 
effective. Noise may be an expressive sonic act, just like sound that we can more easily 
recognize music, but it demands different categories and a different mentality than more 
conventional music does. For this reason, I conceive of noise and music as opposite poles on a 
continuum of intentional, artistic sonic expression, with noise existing as that which moves away 
from musical convention. Noise cannot be subsumed by what we conventionally recognize as 
music.  
  Here, I am defining music as an intentional, aesthetic sonic expression that carries the 
implication of some level of convention that allows music to be recognized as such by an at least 
marginally aware listener from the culture in which the musical expression originates. 
Expressive noise, then, is also an intentional, aesthetic sonic expression, but it is one that 
deviates so thoroughly from musical convention, that a conventional musical mentality no longer 
pertains. Expressive noise is a phenomenon that exists on a continuum of intentional, aesthetic, 
sonic expression, but it resists assimilation by conventional music and points to a beyond of 
musical convention. I have avoided the term “noise music” because it allows us to hear noise 
merely as a particular and weird style of music, whereas truly transgressive noise is something 
else altogether. Expressive noise implies artistic intent, but it also creates an oppositional 
relationship to music. With respect to radical music, expressive noise is a source of transgressive 
power that a given composer may use to varying degrees. Thus, a composer like Merzbow would 
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be at the far end of the noise-music continuum, while a composer like Zorn would be somewhat 
closer to the musical end of the continuum. 
2.2.0 John Zorn 
 Turning now to the composers of radical music, we find a diverse, ever-expanding 
number of composers who could be considered radical. While my selection of Zorn, Galás, and 
Merzbow is partially due to my personal preference, they are also important figures in radical 
music at the turn of the century. Beyond the weight of his massive oeuvre, John Zorn (b. 1953) is 
an indefatigable advocate for radical streams of music through his record label, Tzadik, his non-
profit performance venue, The Stone, his series of books collecting the essays of contemporary 
composers and musicians, Arcana: Musicians on Music, and his mentorship of composers and 
musicians in the New York City “Downtown” scene in the Lower East Side of Manhattan. His 
sphere of influence continues to expand, especially with composers and musicians who are not 
academically affiliated. The stylistic pluralism of Zorn’s work is wide reaching, and his refusal 
to honor traditional distinctions of aesthetic taste and musical class exposes the irrelevancy of the 
traditional canon in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 Considering the depth and breadth of Zorn’s oeuvre, the selection of a single work is 
difficult. I could have selected an album by Masada and looked at the collision of free jazz and 
klezmer scales; alternately, I could have chosen to write on Chimeras (2003) comparing Zorn’s 
approach to serialist chamber music with Pierrot Lunaire—the work from which Chimeras is 
derived; or I could have looked at issues of indeterminacy versus authorial control in Zorn’s 
game pieces like Cobra (1985) or Xu Feng (first recorded in 2000). These are but three examples 
that would have led to very different analyses and interpretations. 
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In chapter three, I focus on Zorn’s vocalise opera, Astronome (2006). It is a 44-minute 
journey into a mystical world of darkness and alchemy led by vocalist Mike Patton as he 
screams, mumbles, wails, squawks, and incants nonsense syllables, all suggesting an ancient pre-
linguistic ritual. Patton is supported by Joey Baron’s vicious percussion and Trevor Dunn’s 
thunderous bass, which is often distorted to the point that clear pitch is no longer discernible. 
Deafening cacophony gives way to menacing ambience, jarring rhythmical passages turn into 
lyrical strains that almost suggest melody, and just when the listener begins to feel a sense of 
musical stability, everything changes and the music is off to new territory. Astronome is a 
disconcerting and sustained attack on the senses, possibly surpassed only by Merzbow’s even 
more extreme musical language. Right from the opening explosion of bass and drums, the aural 
crucible that is Astronome never allows the listener to rest or ease into peaceful complacency. 
I have chosen to examine Astronome for a number of reasons: first, the work combines a 
number of Zorn’s themes including aesthetic extremism, madness, and the occult; second, the 
work pays tribute to Antonin Artaud, Edgard Varèse, Aleister Crowley, and Richard Foreman—
all major influences on Zorn’s aesthetic sensibilities; third, the work employs one of Zorn’s 
original compositional schemes—the file card composition, which involves the creation and 
arrangement of musical “scenes” in a filmic manner; fourth, the work exemplifies Zorn’s refusal 
to accept distinctions of “high art” and “low art,” as he explores operatic composition within a 
heavy metal idiom; and finally, Astronome was chosen out of necessity.  
It is a piece that stands out as one of the most inscrutable of Zorn’s works due to its scale 
and its refusal to allow the listener the comfort of any form of stability or recognition. While 
there are critical models that may suffice, at least in a limited capacity, for the interpretation of 
works grounded in more convention (of course, when we are discussing Zorn, the idea of 
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convention is somewhat ludicrous), Astronome belongs to a special class of Zorn’s compositions 
that is extremely arcane and difficult—precisely the sort of radical music that my hermeneutic is 
designed to accommodate. The emergence of works like Astronome has created the exigency that 
led me to develop a new method of musical hermeneutics.  
2.2.1 Diamanda Galás 
Diamanda Galás’s (b. 1955) oeuvre does not match the volume of Zorn or Merzbow, and 
she is not the figurehead of an extensive aesthetic movement. Yet, her importance is found in the 
sociopolitical components of her music as she rails against injustice. Her artistic voice has been 
particularly important in three areas: first, she has worked in the realm of radical feminism, and 
her music shows a commitment to deconstructing normative gender politics both within Western 
and non-Western societies; second, her scathing critiques of the sociopolitical and religious 
intolerance of homosexuality were prominent during the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, and those 
themes continue to inform her work today; and third, she has been an outspoken voice for the 
recognition of the Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. Maniat lament 
traditions fuse with blues and spirituals to mourn the victims of hatred and violence, and 
extended vocal techniques mix with her confrontational theatrics to avenge their pain through her 
sonic ferocity. 
In chapter four, I examine Wild Women with Steak Knives (1982), which Galás describes 
as “a homicidal love song for solo scream.”11 The work begins with an explosion of glossolaliac 
utterances with wild panning around the stereo soundstage; the voice isn’t immediately 
identifiable as human, and when we do begin to recognize the timbre of the voice, we struggle to 
determine if the utterances are a foreign tongue, or if they’re nonsense; we are taken aback at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This description is found on the 1989 repressing of The Litanies of Satan, although it was not present on 
the initial release. Diamanda Galás, The Litanies of Satan, Y Records Y 18, 1982, phono disc. 
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shrill, piercing timbre, and we attempt to discern the temperament of the sounds—are they angry, 
are they sad, are they simply manic? All of this within the first few seconds of listening, and yet 
we’re no closer to any answers, for very little can prepare us for the barrage of vocal calisthenics 
that Galás has in store for us. This disorienting, disconcerting effect will last long into the 
work—our ears simply do not allow us to adjust to the aural peculiarities of Wild Women 
easily—and that is a major part of the efficacy of the music. 
I have chosen Wild Women because, like Astronome, it is one of the most extreme works 
in the career of a composer/performer who is already dedicated to aesthetic extremism. On the 
surface, it is barbarous and impenetrable, and one could easily make the mistake of experiencing 
it for the timbre alone. There is, however, much more to it than unusual timbre. We must read the 
sonics alongside the radical exhortation of feminine power that Galás was espousing at the time 
of its composition, just as we must understand her vocal gymnastics and microtonal delivery as a 
convergence of Maniat lament, bel canto style, and modernist extended techniques. An 
understanding of the way these musical and textual features intersect and contribute to the 
greater whole is the key to unlocking the mystery of Wild Women. Where score analysis fails, 
where cultural analysis only gives us half of the picture, and where pure timbral analysis reduces 
the work to a simplistic vocal exercise, a multi-perspectival hermeneutic offers solutions. Thus, 
like the case of Astronome, I have selected Wild Women because the interpretive difficulty of the 
work demands it. 
2.2.2 Merzbow 
 Merzbow (b. 1956) is widely regarded as the foremost composer working in the field 
known as “noise music.” For more than three decades, he has been raising questions about the 
nature of music and noise through his work. In much the same way that Cage asked the listener 
15	  	  
to reconsider the boundaries between music and silence, Merzbow asks the listener to reconsider 
the boundaries between music and noise. Where Cage investigated the role of the composer 
through his explorations of indeterminacy, Merzbow investigates the boundaries of sound from a 
position of intentionality and control. His work forces the listener to confront a music that has no 
recourse to harmony, form, melody, rhythm, or virtually all other features that were considered 
important and necessary elements of music until the mid-twentieth century. Even Varèse’s 
“Liberation of Sound” still maintains the importance of form and rhythm.12 In Merzbow’s work, 
we confront the margin between music and non-music. 
 There is a specious notion that all of Merzbow’s work sounds the same, but as I see it, his 
oeuvre actually breaks down into four rather distinct phases based on both his instrumentation 
and his production techniques. More detail on the phases of Merzbow’s oeuvre will follow in 
chapter five, where I conduct an examination of three representative works, each from different 
phases. Although the idea of choosing archetypical works from a discography that includes 
hundreds of distinct releases is a bit ridiculous, one finds that there are often exemplary 
recordings that lead to subsequent, more peripheral recordings based on any range of factors, 
including the use of a particular production technique, instrument grouping, thematic idea, 
conceptual approach, sample set, or even sonic material borrowed and reworked for a new 
recording. These touchstone works then lead to a series of more peripheral and derivative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Edgard Varèse, “The Liberation of Sound,” in Perspectives of New Music 5, no. 1 (1966). 
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works.13 I have selected the following works for analysis and interpretation: Ecobondage (1987), 
Pulse Demon (1996), and Karasu: 13 Japanese Birds Part 4 (2009).14 
 Ecobondage finds Merzbow at the beginning of his career exploring the use of found 
sounds, field recordings, makeshift instruments, samples, percussion, and damaged electronic 
equipment. The work feels more like an extension of Cagean experimentalism than the sort of 
wall of distorted feedback that would later define the classic “Merzbow sound.” It is here, 
perhaps more than anywhere else, that the influence of Kurt Schwitters is felt, insofar as 
Ecobondage is essentially an assemblage of so-called ugly and junk objects. Pulse Demon 
represents the apotheosis of Merzbow’s second phase, which is marked by his use of the EMS 
Synthi A, a modular analogue synthesizer, and heavily treated feedback. Where there is some 
semblance of a connection to the experimental tradition of Cage in Ecobondage, all of this has 
been erased by Pulse Demon, which takes Merzbow as far as possible from sound that one could 
easily recognize as music. This opens up discussions of the relationship between noise and 
music, and Georges Bataille’s concept of eroticism and transgression. Karasu is one part from 
Merzbow’s thirteen-CD series based on Japanese birds, and it reflects his growing interest in 
animal rights and veganism. Here we find Merzbow combining his unique style of feedback and 
distortion with computer-based production and live percussion that is reminiscent of his early 
explorations of rhythm. During Merzbow’s fourth phase, his passionate arguments against 
animal cruelty mark an interesting development because unlike his previous work that was, in a 
manner of speaking, absolute music, his music now has a distinctly political program. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For example, when Merzbow created Ecobondage (1987), the raw materials gave rise to at least three 
albums, including Enclosure/Libido Economy (1987), Vratya Southwards (1987), and Fission Dialogue (1988). 
Similarly, Merzbow generated so much material using the instrument collection and general tone of Music for 
Bondage Performance (1991), that he would later fill twelve CDs, later released as the box set, Merzbient (2010). 
 
14 With the exception of Ecobondage, these records also have the benefit of being relatively easy to find 
either on CD or as MP3s through online merchants like the iTunes Store or Amazon.com 
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development opens up a discussion of the nature of musical meaning because we are asked to 
hear a plea for cultural reform in a sonic expression that still sounds, on the surface at least, like 
a barrage of formless noise. These three works occasion different discussions regarding noise 
and music, the meaningfulness of aesthetic boundaries and the results of their transgression, the 
intelligibility of an art that may seek to be unintelligible, and the experience of the listener who 
must decide how to confront a radical new form of potentially dangerous sonic expression. 
2.2.3 Radical Composers and Radical Music 
There may be some dramatic differences between Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, but they 
are united as late twentieth and early twenty-first century artists exploring the boundaries of 
music, each pushing the art form in new, radical directions. They share a commitment to the 
deconstruction of hegemonic powers. Born within three years of each other, their careers have 
followed similar trajectories, each coming into their own in the late 1980s when postmodern 
mentalities were in full swing. They are composers of their time, embodying a spirit of pluralism, 
Zorn with his stylistic fusions, Galás with her cultural mixtures, and Merzbow with his mélange 
of Japanese culture and Western aesthetic theory. All three are also particularly good examples 
of the awesome potential of postmodern art; far from creating the sort of tiresome postmodern 
works that are based on the principle of ironic juxtaposition for its own sake, Zorn, Galás, and 
Merzbow practice a critical postmodernism. The polyvalence of their work serves not to create 
humor out of unlikely pairings, but to create new modes of thought by exposing the limitations 
of metanarratives across a broad spectrum. 
A great deal of scholarship since the postmodern turn has dealt with the “deconstruction” 
of social, political, cultural, and ethical structures, but one of the failings of this trend is that 
often there are few answers provided. It is far easier to simply tear down a structure than to 
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propose a superior alternative. Post-structuralism is itself a new structuring system that, at its 
best, initiates a reminder that we are always already operating within structuring systems. The 
benefit to this reflexivity is that it prompts us to try to think beyond the structure in new and 
creative ways so that we are no longer beholden to its powers of definition and delimitation. If, 
for instance, Zorn was just the bad boy destroyer of cultural values that the mainstream 
journalists claim he is, then his work would not be all that interesting.15 After all, countercultural 
artists have been creating culturally irreverent work since the 1960s. Rather, the critical 
postmodernism practiced by Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow not only has a deconstructive 
component, but goes further to suggest that we consider the structural periphery—the outer 
regions of conceptual nebulae where innovation and change occurs.  
Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow are also largely united in their status as outsiders with respect 
to the spectrum of institutional support. David Nicholls attests to the importance of the 
distinction between avant-garde composers who hold “an extreme position within the tradition” 
and experimental composers whose music exists completely outside of the tradition because 
when considering “institutional support, ‘official’ recognition, and financial reward,” the 
connection to tradition is a meaningful advantage to the avant-garde composer.16 Even if the 
situation is no longer a simple binary between insider and outsider, Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow 
tend to be farther toward the independent end of the spectrum than most of the composers 
situated more within the art music milieu. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Journalists do not appear to use this “bad boy” label as a pejorative, but it is derived from a limited 
understanding of what Zorn does. I believe the transgression of his music goes much deeper than the shock of 
cultural irreverence. Francis Davis, “‘Zorn’ for ‘Anger’: The Composer John Zorn Likes Being the Bad Boy of New 
Music,” The Atlantic Monthly, January, 1991: 97-100. 
 
16 David Nicholls, “Avant-Garde and Experimental Music,” in The Cambridge History of American Music, 
ed. David Nicholls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 518. 
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 The reasons for this are probably as ideological as they are pragmatic. There are many 
issues at play, including the alleged supremacy of (and pervasive preference for) the Western art 
music canon, the tendency of certain institutional structures to exert influence over its members, 
the desire for total artistic freedom, and a Romantic notion of the composer as autonomous 
artistic genius. These issues often intersect in complex ways. Radical composers often avow the 
importance of artistic freedom at all costs, and staking out a space of independence can be as 
much about the presentation of a certain artistic persona and ideology as it is about avoiding 
institutional restrictions. 
While it is clear that the practical issues of marketing and sales potential are restrictive 
forces within commercial institutions, it is less clear that academic institutions are similarly 
restrictive, at least in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; however, even if 
academic institutions are increasingly permissive of potentially controversial artworks, there are 
other hindrances toward radical composers, such as the usual requirement of academic 
credentials and participation in academic music discourse in general. Philanthropic institutions 
are even more ambiguous because even though one can point to certain controversial exceptions, 
such as Andres Serrano’s creation of the Piss Christ with funds awarded by the National 
Endowment for the Arts, they too have certain practical concerns. The NEA, for instance, has 
faced numerous attacks from political conservatives and moralists, and when one surveys the list 
of musically conservative (or at least conventional) organizations receiving NEA funding in the 
twenty-first century, it is difficult to believe that there is not a connection between political 
pressure and the desire to avoid controversy by favoring less radical artists.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Arts.gov maintains a searchable database of grant winners from 2000 to the present, and the latest grant 
announcement is representative of the type of projects that tend to receive funding. “National Endowment for the 
Arts—2013 Spring Grant Announcement,” accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://arts.gov/sites/default/files/ArtWorksMarch2013CouncilByDiscipline.pdf. 
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Ultimately, radical composers may wish to express a romanticized conception of 
themselves as heroic outsiders, but the ideology behind their position does not negate the 
practical issues. Commercial institutions are concerned primarily with profitability and are 
unwilling to risk supporting radical composers. Academic institutions may support radical works 
of art, but none of the most prominent radical composers have the sort of academic musical 
training that would qualify them for a professorship at a typical American university. 
Philanthropic institutions may occasionally award a grant to a composer like Zorn or Galás, but 
these are exceptional occurrences and do not constitute a long-term support system. 
Fortunately, the lowering costs of production and the increasing ease of dissemination 
have created an alternative way for composers to sustain themselves with a greater degree of 
independence. Where Merzbow once ran his own record label out of his home, issuing hand-
dubbed cassette tapes in editions of fewer than fifty, he can now record CDs and sell them to an 
increasingly global market through sites like Amazon.com. And, of course, it is certainly 
advantageous that these alternative avenues toward economic independence coincide with the 
ideology of artistic autonomy. 
With respect to the spectrum of institutional independence, there is variety within these 
three composers. Merzbow is the most independent insofar as he primarily releases albums on a 
very small scale through ephemeral boutique labels that allow him total artistic control over the 
end product. Although he does perform live (mostly within Japan), these occurrences are rare 
and do not constitute any sort of meaningful income. For the majority of her recording career, 
Galás has had the benefit of a contract with Mute, a small independent record label that was 
particularly important in the 1990s for its electronic music releases; however, because labels of 
this size can rarely offer much in the way of a recording budget, it is not a viable means of 
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income. In effect, she has accepted the financial limitations of a small label for the freedom to 
create uncensored, politically incendiary work. Beyond the digital downloads and art objects for 
sale through her website, Galás supports herself by performing her blues covers, which in turn 
allows her to create works in the more radical style that she is forced to self-finance.18 Zorn is the 
most complex because on the one hand, he rejected the support of niche labels like Nonesuch on 
the grounds of artistic freedom and on the other, he has now gained enough recognition that he 
receives chamber and orchestral commissions, as well as fellowships and grants. Significantly 
though, these commissions and grants tend to lead to less radical works inasmuch as they often 
use standard notation and are scored for instruments common to the symphony orchestra. For all 
of the success he has won, Zorn still requires the support of his independent label to finance his 
most radical projects. Moreover, his label, Tzadik, is hardly a traditional record label with its 
egalitarian profit sharing scheme that helps to minimize the importance of marketability and 
sales potential.19   
Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow are particularly successful examples of the sort of relative 
institutional independence that has only recently become possible. In fact, their generation was 
one of the first to realize the possibility of a career supported by CD sales alone. As of 2012, 
Zorn has released almost one hundred and fifty CDs of his own music on his Tzadik label, and 
that total does not include any of the many recordings he has done for other labels before the 
Tzadik era. Merzbow’s discography is even more unmanageable with more than three hundred 
individual releases spread across many boutique labels that cater to extreme forms of music. 
Zorn and Merzbow are probably not becoming wealthy from their CD sales, but it provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Khatchig Mouradian, “An Interview with Diamanda Galas” in Aztag Daily April 8, 2004, accessed 
October 29, 2013, http://headoverhat.blogspot.com/2007/06/interview-with-diamanda-galas.html. 
 
19 Michael Goldberg, “John Zorn,” BOMB 80 (2002). 
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sufficient financial support to allow them to continue creating music without relying on grants or 
academic support. Galás tends to compose at a slower rate, and her discography is much smaller, 
but she generates income through the online shop on her website, where she sells CDs, digital 
downloads, and various art objects. In a sense, this is the patronage model of the new millennium 
where artists can supplement CD sales by selling limited edition art objects to their most loyal 
supporters.  
2.3.0 Music and Discourse 
Let us now turn to the current state of musical discourse. The transition toward so-called 
new musicology in the latter part of the twentieth century has opened up an array of new 
approaches to the understanding of music, but as progressive as these new methodologies are, the 
majority continue to function best when confronting music that exists within the conventions of 
Western music, and Western art music in particular. 
Although the idea of the Western art music canon is currently in a state of deconstruction, 
we are still feeling the ideological effects of the old paradigm that considered the primacy of 
master composers and master works to be axiomatic. Thus, even if we are aware of the 
ideological effects of canon from studies by William Weber20 or Katherine Bergeron,21 there is a 
tacit assumption that if one is to prove the efficacy of one’s proposed theory, it must be tested on 
a work widely held as a standard of excellence. I agree with Robert P. Morgan22 that canons are 
quite useful, so long as they are approached critically and I would add that they are useful for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 William Weber, “The History of Musical Canon” in Rethinking Music, ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark 
Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17-34. 
 
21 Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman, Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
 
22 Robert P. Morgan, "Rethinking Musical Culture: Canonic Reformulations in a Post-Tonal Age," In 
Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons, edited by Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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creating a space for a discursive formation, because they constitute a set of reference points from 
which one can situate various discursive statements. If one is aware of the ideological effects of 
canonicity and approaches them critically—especially when creating new canons—this should 
forestall the hegemonic potential of these canons. 
 In sum, I do not wish to argue against the idea of a canon, per se, and indeed I could 
describe certain works as canonic within the radical music milieu. I merely wish to show that it 
has been a limiting assumption in musical hermeneutics thus far. We must replace the canon with 
canons, plural, and we must understand them as a necessary convenience without allowing them 
to offer unified aesthetic prescription. 
Even when moving beyond the canon, as many scholars have done, there often remains a 
connection to convention that tends to inhibit the interpretation of radical music. This is not 
necessarily a fault of the various approaches toward musical understanding. Because most 
artistic expressions occur within a field of conventional cultural practice, broadly defined, it 
follows that a successful methodology should function within these conventions as well. It makes 
little sense to devise a musicological methodology that pertains only to single works because the 
relationship between individual works is a vital component of the work’s ability to create 
intelligible expression. The depth and breadth of these conventions has slowly expanded, and 
where musicology had been concerned first and foremost with canonical works and composers 
of Western art music, we are now freer to examine the work of non-canonical composers, jazz, 
and a range of popular styles; however, even as the discipline allows for a greater range of styles 
permitted, most of the methodologies continue to apply most efficaciously to music that does not 
deliberately avoid convention to the extent of radical music. 
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When looking specifically at radical music, some conventional methodologies can 
contribute to a greater musical understanding, at least in a limited capacity. A historiographical 
approach, for instance, will help to trace lines of influence in terms of music, aesthetics, and 
ideology. An ethnographic approach will help explain how various pockets of radical composers 
and participants conceptualize and practice their own work. A cultural approach will help 
elucidate the context of the particular sonic expression, at least in its originary context. These are 
all worthwhile techniques for greater musical understanding, but they also tend to 
circumnavigate the sonic core of radical music without being able to penetrate in toward the 
meaning behind the sonic particulars of the work. 
Granted, the above methodologies are not necessarily intended to speak to the same level 
of sonic detail that we find in a hermeneutic study. A historicist study, for example, may explain 
how a certain composer was influenced by a certain idea while composing a certain work all 
while leaving a detailed analysis of the work to an analytical or hermeneutical study; however, 
even when specific musical details are beyond the scope of a study, there are two factors that 
allow the omission: first, the study can refer to familiar musical reference points to give the 
reader a sense of musical grounding, even without hearing the actual work under investigation; 
and second, the study can assume a general familiarity with Western musical practices, which is 
often sufficient to make a compelling argument. By contrast, a historicist study of a radical work 
can point only to difference without specificity because the radical work does not follow enough 
conventions to make sense without substantive musical detail, of which it is very difficult to 
speak, especially when certain seemingly fundamental features like melody, harmony, and/or 
rhythm may be nonexistent. 
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To use a concrete example, David Novak’s recent ethnography of Japanoise (a particular 
variety of noise music practiced in Japan) is invaluable for its insights into the historical and 
cultural context of a radical stream of music; however, Novak’s purpose is not to offer detailed 
interpretations of particular works, recordings, or performances, and when reading his accounts 
of the aural experience of Japanoise, he paints the experience in vivid detail, but without the sort 
of sonic specificity that leads to a detailed interpretation.23 Where his goal is ethnographic, mine 
is hermeneutic. 
The only traditional approach to musical understanding that offers almost nothing to the 
interpretation of radical music is an analytical approach. Pieter C. van den Toorn and David 
Lewin may uncover interesting formal elements in certain types of music, and these discoveries 
may lead to a fuller appreciation of the work at hand, but they are utterly dependent upon a 
musical score to subject to analysis, and thus they are inappropriate for a musical stream that 
rarely uses notation.24 The same can be said of Kofi Agawu’s semiotically grounded interpretive 
methodology because it is so completely dependent upon a written score that follows enough 
internal conventions to ensure its interoperability with other works of the same style.25 Agawu 
may create inspired interpretations of canonic works with his semiotic method, but it is 
inappropriate for my purposes. 	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24 For a particularly impassioned defense of syntactical pitch analysis against ‘new musicology,’ see Pieter 
C. van den Toorn, Music, Politics, and the Academy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Lewin does 
not even address the issue of musical meaning and jumps right into analysis, as if its inherent expository value was 
somehow self-evident; see David Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation: Four Analytic Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). Elsewhere, Lewin describes stage direction in “classical musical theater” as entirely 
contingent upon an analysis of the score, which ostensibly holds all the keys not only to interpretation, but to 
realization. See David Lewin, “Musical Analysis as Stage Direction,” in Music and Text: Critical Inquiries, ed. 
Steven Paul Scher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 163-176. 
 
25 Kofi Agawu, Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music (Oxford: Oxford University 
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 Analytical methodologies notwithstanding, each of the above approaches supplies 
important answers to parts of the question of radical music, but they can only ever contribute a 
partial meaning because they are derived from certain premises intrinsic to their methodological 
goals. In every attempt to gain musical understanding, meaning—always multiple and 
plentiful—becomes narrowed in accordance with the internal logic of a given system,26 and it is 
my intent to keep the realm of potential meaning as broad as possible, to find the most 
convincing aspects from each of the above practices, and to create a coherent synthesis. My aim 
is closely related to what Clifford Geertz calls a “thick description,” or “a multiplicity of 
complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, 
which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which [we] must contrive somehow first 
to grasp and then to render.”27 I intend to take a multifaceted approach drawing from Ricoeur’s 
ontological hermeneutic philosophy, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, sociocultural criticism, and 
the discourse on experimental music to arrive at a thick interpretation. 
2.3.1 Previous Work on Musical Hermeneutics 
 What happens, then, when there is no score, no harmony to analyze, no discernible 
pitches? What happens when the music diverges from convention so totally that connections are 
virtually impossible to envisage, save for a purely intellectual reading of these artists (ostensibly) 
rebelling against a socio-historical tradition? What happens when the frame is broken and the 
work spills out into unexpected and unpredictable directions? It is telling that most every author 
who attempts to write about this sort of radical music spends time commenting on how difficult 
it is to write about such a practice. These studies, almost always written by scholars outside of 	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27 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 10. 
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music academics, tend to focus on sociocultural context,28 phenomenology,29 or the sound’s 
status as non-music,30 usually to the exclusion of the others. 
 Even if I am not satisfied with any of the available interpretive approaches proffered by 
musicologists with respect to their applicability to radical music and expressive noise, they 
provide an important point of departure, having tested various avenues of exploration. I intend to 
find the most relevant and useful theoretical components so as to build on the work already done. 
Almén and Pearsall’s edited volume, Approaches to Meaning in Music is a great summary of the 
state of hermeneutics in musicology.31 Similar to my position, Byron Almén32 and Jann Pasler33 
have both written on the importance of a multifaceted hermeneutic, working towards a sort of 
thick description. Both find meaning to be contingent not only on syntactical pitch analysis, but 
also on the sociocultural conditions both at the time of composition and at the time of the 
experience of the listener.  
 Lawrence Kramer has been exploring hermeneutics over the course of many monographs 
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Blink of an Ear: Towards a Non-Cochlear Sonic Art (New York: Continuum, 2009), 109-128. 
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Sonic Art (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985). 
 
31 Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall, Approaches to Meaning in Music (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006). 
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and he is an important figure in the postmodern turn in musicology, 34 especially insofar as he 
argued for the importance of contextual reading in place of the metaphysics of presence implied 
by Romanticist ideology. From Music as Cultural Practice (1990) to Interpreting Music (2011), 
Kramer’s conception of musical hermeneutics has expanded from a system that is still largely 
dependent upon a published score to a more generalized hermeneutic that is ostensibly applicable 
to a wide variety of music not limited to the common practice repertoire that Kramer admittedly 
favors. At the time of this essay, his latest book contains his most philosophically abstract 
statement on interpretation and seeks to frame musical hermeneutics in the terms of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur (although Ricoeur is never mentioned and there is no direct evidence 
that Kramer has read him). Kramer sees interpretation not as a discovery of singularly correct, 
hidden, author-intended meaning, but as a dynamic engagement between the listener’s present 
and the work’s past.35 The work’s truth is propositional rather than demonstrative. These are all 
points that I will argue in chapter one through the more philosophically centered work of 
Ricoeur. Kramer’s theories of interpretation, however, tend to be most effective when 
confronting a work of common practice music that follows certain conventions. Even when 
discussing such a meta-conceptual idea as deconstruction, he uses Beethoven’s sixth string 
quartet as an example. Kramer’s hermeneutics may indeed have something to offer 
unconventional music, but it is quite difficult to discern what that might be given his narrow 
range of application. As illuminating as his analyses might be, his hermeneutic functions most 
effectively with conventional music.  
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35 Cf. Kramer’s eleven theses on interpretation in Lawrence Kramer, Interpreting Music (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011), 7-11. 
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 In a similar way, Robert S. Hatten’s overall perspective on musical hermeneutics is 
excellent, but the more musically specific he gets, the more his hermeneutic relies on convention. 
He writes, 
The task of musical hermeneutics, while far from stable, is best accomplished if 
anchored in the style that interpretation itself helps reconstruct. While ranging 
widely in search of relevant cultural meanings, the interpreter must also recognize 
that the work of art creates its own, often insulated world—and if the work is 
successful, it may in turn deflect cultural meanings toward its own ends.36 
 
Like Kramer, this view is generally consistent with Ricoeur; however, his applications reveal 
limitations because of their reliance on the presence of a score that can analyzed and a musical 
work that follows enough conventions to be coherent while exhibiting the power of musical 
expectations.37 While Hatten’s approach to hermeneutics is surely advantageous for common 
practice music, his method does not pertain when faced with works of radical music. 
 Jenefer Robinson’s anthology, Music and Meaning, contains an interesting variety of 
philosophical approaches, although they are not always successful.38 For example, Marion A. 
Guck defends the fundamental idea of musical metaphor against strict formalists, and her 
concept of comparative and ascriptive metaphors is an interesting step toward a reconciliation of 
formal analysis with musical affect; however, in doing this, her metaphors become quite general. 
The shape of an arch may be evident in the score that she considers, but what is gained from 
declaring the arch to be the main comparative metaphor? Does this mean that the work is about 
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arches, and if so, what does that mean?39 Although the issue of metaphor is crucially important in 
musical hermeneutics, Guck’s essay uses a more limited conception of the power of metaphor 
than one finds in Ricoeur. 
 In the same anthology, Fred Maus proposes another novel way in which one may 
reconcile the objectivity of musical analysis with the subjectivity of musical experience.40 By 
conceiving of an “imaginary agent,” one can transpose affective concepts onto the notes of the 
score, leading to a consideration of musical structure as dramatic structure. Maus’s results are 
compelling, but as with virtually all approaches to musical hermeneutics thus far, Maus’s 
hermeneutic is dependent upon both a musical score and a work that follows enough conventions 
that one may discern its dramatic characteristics. 
A common problem with existing approaches to musical hermeneutics is that a program 
is a requisite feature. At very least, a reference to a culturally established body of symbolism is 
necessary. Raymond Monelle investigates topic theory exploring hunting, the military, and 
shepherds—each widely circulated cultural icons—looking at relationships between musical 
signifiers and their topical signifieds.41 While this is an interesting approach for common themes 
expressed with enough conventionality that they may be recognized as such, it fails when 
confronted with very abstract topics that do not have strong roots in a culturally established 
semiotic system. Granted, radical music is not always above and beyond the power of cultural 
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signification, but it often ventures into unfamiliar significations that resist a conventional 
interpretation. 
Although Richard Taruskin does not set out to create or explain a theory of musical 
hermeneutics, he does offer some comments on their nature and value. Referencing Gadamer, 
Taruskin avows the importance of recognizing that meaning is constructed by the interpreter in 
the present, and he defends the subjective nature of interpretations, for even though they are 
subjective, they can still be subject to evaluation.42 Although he perhaps overstates his case by 
claiming that Russian music in the twentieht century is perhaps the most polyvalent, most 
interpretively complex body of music in existence, he is successful in demonstrating the 
importance of musical hermeneutics, especially in his application to composers like 
Shostakovich whose music has given rise to such wildly divergent, and opportunistic, 
interpretations.43 Overall, he points out that even though hermeneutics does not lead to the same 
sort of truth-evaluable conclusions as we find in musical analysis, we should not shy away from 
the necessarily subjective interpretations of musical hermeneutics because there are still varying 
degrees of argumentation and cogency that can differentiate between good and bad 
interpretations.44  
Finally, and most importantly, we come to the work of Roger W.H. Savage who offers a 
post-postmodern meta-critique of music criticism where he argues that, although the Romantic 
ideology of absolute music has been justly deconstructed by cultural musicologists,45 musical 	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works have now become so shackled to their cultural context that it is difficult to conceive of a 
work creating any sort of emergent meaning in the present, and thus their affective power is 
greatly diminished.46  One of Savage’s most important contributions is his application of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as a way to speak to the affective dimension of music—an issue that he 
believes has all but vanished from current trends in musicology that are almost exclusively 
concerned with socio-historicizing readings of works. 47  A longer discussion of Savage’s 
arguments will follow in chapter one, as his novel transposition of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
philosophy to the domain of music makes an important contribution to my own interpretive 
theory. 
2.3.2 Towards a Hermeneutics of Radical Music and Expressive Noise 
Radical music and expressive noise require a hermeneutic that is dependent on neither 
score, nor convention. The elimination of those two features voids the immediate applicability of 
virtually every existing approach to musical hermeneutics, as is outlined above. Although some 
hermeneutic approaches may bring us closer to a thick interpretation—for instance, Susan 
McClary’s feminist approach is useful for considering certain elements of Galás’s work—none 
offer a comprehensive enough solution because radical music and expressive noise push us to the 
very boundaries of music. I propose a trivalent hermeneutic grounded in the ontological 
hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. A 
fuller exposition of this theory will follow in chapter one, but I will offer a general outline 
presently. 
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 My proposed hermeneutic involves three levels moving from general to specific: first is 
the level of general interpretive assumptions (e.g., the definition and nature of the musical work, 
the role of the author and his or her socio-historical context), which is informed by Ricoeur’s 
general theory of interpretation; the second level combines Ricoeur’s ontological hermeneutics 
with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to examine both the latent and manifest content of the 
work, as well as the experience of confronting the work; third is the metastructural level of 
conceptual approaches to music (e.g., gender theory, area studies, historiography, reception 
history, musical analysis) selected in a combination specific to the needs of a given work as well 
as an engagement with the composer on his or her own terms. The third level has two tasks: first, 
it involves the exploration the various features of the work and the clues suggested by the work 
through connotation or implication, and second, it involves an investigation of the composer and 
his or her conceptual work—his or her ideas on music, on art, on life. 
 Through this hermeneutic, we may consider the richness of a radical work in a very 
holistic sense, taking care to explore its many facets in detail. Far from constituting an 
interpretive hodgepodge of heterogeneous fragments existing in tandem but never in concert, the 
ideal thick interpretation weaves an intricate tapestry out of the multifarious strands of the work. 
A cogent interpretation must execute the best convergence of the greatest number of features of 
the work while synthesizing multiple perspectives together into a coherent totality. Naturally, 
there is no objectivity to be found in this endeavor, but this does not preclude us from evaluating 
the efficacy of a given interpretation based on the aforementioned features. Ultimately, a thick 
interpretation aims to vivify the essence of the work in the mind of the listener/reader. An 
interpretation may be philosophically elegant and filled with brilliant insight, but it becomes a 
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rather trivial mental exercise if it does not serve the music. A successful interpretation, in my 
view, must open the work up to a listener in a way never before experienced. 
3.0 Chapter Overview 
 Chapter one consists of a detailed introduction to Ricoeur’s ontological hermeneutics and 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, as well commentary on musicological hermeneutics that 
contribute productively toward a hermeneutics of radical music and expressive noise. Although 
the respective theories of Ricoeur and Lacan are thought to be antithetical, I spend some time 
comparing the two theoretical bodies and conclude, by way of Ricoeur, that they are united in 
their hermeneutic exploration of phenomena. They speak to differing realms of experience and 
knowledge, and thus they must be coextensive in every interpretation. Finally, I propose a 
trivalent hermeneutic designed especially for radical music and expressive noise, which will be 
explored more fully in the following chapters. 
 In chapter two I will provide an exposition of my concepts of radical music and 
expressive noise, taking care to situate them within both the musicological discourse and the 
other non-musical discourses that account for the bulk of the available literature. The idea of 
noise itself is fraught with varying definitions ranging from complete relativity to metaphysical 
transcendence, and these debates must be synthesized before the idea of noise can be conceived 
productively in an artistic context. 
 Chapters three through five set about testing my hermeneutic of radical music and 
expressive noise with case studies focusing on Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, as outlined above in 
sections 2.2.0 through 2.2.2. Astronome, Wild Women with Steak Knives, and the trio of 
Merzbow works—Ecobondage, Pulse Demon, and Karasu: 13 Japanese Birds Part 4—present 
an array of hermeneutic challenges that demand an approach that is not beholden to score 
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analysis or any other such conventional methodology. I hope to provide a rich network of 
meaning as I explore the many facets—cultural, situational, biographical, political, aesthetical, 
philosophical—that have not only informed the compositional process and the general aesthetic 
conceptions of the respective composers, but have also informed our hearing and experience of 
the work in the present. 
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Chapter 1 – Towards a Hermeneutics of Radical Music and Expressive Noise 
1.0 Introduction 
 In this chapter I will explore hermeneutic theories in detail. I will begin by spending 
some time introducing the ontological hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and the psychoanalytic 
theory of Jacques Lacan, and I will show how these ostensibly antithetical systems can actually 
work together to create compelling interpretations of music, generally, and radical music and 
expressive noise, specifically. Finally, I will present my own approach to musical hermeneutics, 
showing how it grows out of the theoretical bodies of Ricoeur and Lacan and how certain 
extensions of their ideas can be made to better serve the exigencies of radical music and 
expressive noise. 
2.0 Paul Ricoeur 
 Paul Ricoeur was one of the main exponents of philosophical hermeneutics in the 
twentieth century. He does not belong to the generation of influential and iconoclastic 
continental philosophers grouped together as “postmodernists” (e.g. Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard), 
but his approach to hermeneutics actually aligns with the postmodern paradigm in a number of 
ways, including issues of authorship, historiography, interpretation, and the nature of truth. An 
important difference here is the emphasis on suspicion versus restoration. Nietzsche, Marx, 
Freud, and many of the postmodernists practice what Ricoeur calls a hermeneutics of suspicion: 
“This hermeneutics,” he writes, “is not an explication of the object, but a tearing off of masks, an 
interpretation that reduces disguises.” 48  This contrasts with Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of 
restoration, which replaces suspicion with faith. “What faith?” Ricoeur asks. “No longer, to be 
sure, the first faith of the simple soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), 30.	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hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith.”49 Although the “tearing off 
of masks” practiced by Derrida and Foucault serves an important social and philosophical 
purpose, the legacy of their work has become a toolbox for disabusing rather than constructing 
new meaning. Ricoeur may tear off the mask as a first step, but he is also interested in proposing 
something to put in its place—a productive interpretation that adds meaning rather than negating 
meaning. 
In discussing psychoanalysis, the hermeneutics of suspicion par excellence, Ricoeur 
challenges the idea that consciousness is simply an illusion of control, which is unable to discern 
its motives as originating from and being obscured by the unconscious. Rather than the meaning 
uncovered in psychoanalysis negating the meaning of consciousness, it offers a complementary 
meaning that must be understood dialectically. In place of deception, there is restoration, which 
in Ricoeur’s philosophy is an additive process. 
 While philosophical factions sprang up clustered around concepts that were ostensibly at 
odds with each other such as deconstructionism, analytical philosophy, and psychoanalysis, 
Ricoeur is exemplary in his ability to find lines of continuity and agreement within diverse 
philosophical schemes. In fact, his mixture of the allegedly antithetical disciplines of 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis has greatly enhanced the power and scope of his 
philosophical inquiries. More on this will follow after I introduce Ricoeur and Lacan’s respective 
theoretical framework. Ultimately, it is Ricoeur’s conciliatory example that I hope to follow in 
the present study, especially insofar as I draw from a wide range of theoretical works to create 
the most rigorous and thorough interpretations possible. It is easy to pick a position and enter 
into the circular cycle of argumentation with its institutionally recognized opposition, but as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid, 28. Cf. Ruthellen Josselson, “The Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” 
Narrative Inquiry 14, no. 1 (2004): 1-28.	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Ricoeur demonstrates, it is usually more productive to confront this opposition and find a way to 
show that it can actually make a fruitful contribution. 
Before jumping into a more detailed analysis of Ricoeur’s thought, it is important to have 
a general overview of his hermeneutic theory. For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is not an 
epistemological investigation seeking to uncover univocal meaning,50 nor is it the Romantic 
venture where one projects his or her subjectivity onto the work; instead, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics 
is ontological, as “the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which [one 
has] of [oneself].”51 A convincing interpretation, then, does not seek to decode the information 
presented in a unidirectional flow from artist to perceiver, but rather it seeks to offer a new mode 
of self-knowledge through the novel world created through the work. Rather than establishing, 
once and for all, the definitive meaning of a work, the role of hermeneutics is to animate an 
emergent meaning in the mind of the perceiver that is made possible by figurative and non-literal 
components of the work. As Ricoeur states, “interpretation thus becomes the apprehension of the 
proposed worlds which are opened up by the non-ostensive references of the text.”52 Let us 
spend some time unpacking the philosophical arguments that have led to the above conclusion. 
2.1 Discourse: Event and Meaning 
 For Ricoeur, discourse is the event that happens when one speaks or writes.53 It is an 
intersubjective exchange wherein a message passes from the author to the reader and is received 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, 
ed. Done Ihde, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 6-7. 	  
51 ———, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 178. 	  
52 Ibid, 177.	  
 
53 Ricoeur’s idea of discourse is derived from Emile Benveniste’s work in linguistics. Ricoeur writes, “If 
the ‘sign’ (phonological and lexical) is the basic unit of language, the ‘sentence’ is the basic unit of discourse.” Paul 
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as a packet of communication that begins a process of comprehension in the moment of 
perception. For the moment, let us set aside issues of authorship as they pertain to music, which 
may have a single composer, but may also have an array of demi-authors (i.e., performers in their 
more limited capacity of semi-authorial contribution) to collaborate ex post facto in the creation 
of meaning before it even reaches the perceiver. For now, we may understand Ricoeur’s 
reference to the “author” or “speaker” as encompassing both composer and performer. 
The event of discourse is a momentary phenomenon, but, paradoxically, discourse also 
has a sameness, which Ricoeur calls its “meaning.”54 It is at once same and other. Meaning has 
an objective and a subjective dimension. 
To mean is what the speaker does. But it is also what the sentence does. The 
utterance meaning—in the sense of the propositional content—is the ‘objective’ 
side of this meaning. The utterer’s meaning—in the threefold sense of the self-
reference of the sentence, the illocutionary dimension of the speech act, and the 
intention of recognition by the hearer—is the ‘subjective’ side of the meaning.55  
 
The propositional content of a sentence can be described as “objective” insofar as it remains 
locked in its linguistic system. The utterer’s meaning, however, encompasses a) the fact that the 
speaker implicitly refers to him or herself, b) the illocutionary components of the sentence 
including the various moods (e.g., indicative, imperative, subjunctive), and c) the fact that the 
listener or reader agrees to accept the message. This last point shows that in Ricoeur’s theory, 
meaning is not the exclusive privilege of the speaker or the author because the sentence itself 
holds meaning irrespective of the author’s desire to control it (for instance, a sentence may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans 
Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007),77. 
 
54 Paul Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: 
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 167. 
 
55 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976), 19.	  
40	  	  
misunderstood or not understood at all) and because the listener or reader must take an active 
role in helping to vivify the meaning of the sentence.   
 Although Ricoeur often speaks about language, many of these concepts can be applied to 
music through a simple one-to-one transposition. Let us consider the musical work as discourse: 
the event of music is transient and we are confronted with the task of comprehension in the 
moment, but there is also an enduring meaning in the musical work that is its sameness each time 
we return to it, and this meaning is what we intend to investigate through interpretation. The idea 
of musical meaning is, of course, fraught with controversy, but here again, even the subjective 
and objective dimensions of meaning pertain. 
On a very simple level, a musical work’s objective (i.e., propositional) content could be 
the thing that it offers us in the form of its musical syntax, while the subjective content is a 
complex of the composer’s intent, his or her manner of “speaking” through the grammar of 
music, and our perception leading to understanding. This is further complicated when the 
musical work involves performers in the realization of the music. Although many radical 
composers tend to either perform their own work or tightly control the recording process (which 
leads to an ostensibly definitive, or only, version), plenty of other music involves a diverse array 
of performers who must often make choices that affect the presented meaning of the work in 
substantive ways. In the present study, I focus on three composers who are almost solely 
responsible for the realization of their works, and I will provide a more nuanced discussion of 
their roles as authors in their respective chapters; however, when considering other composers 
who may produce conventional scores that can be performed in a more straightforward manner 
by a wide range of performers, we must also consider the performers’ contribution to the 
authorial utterance, albeit to a lesser extent than the composer. Ultimately, one may wonder if 
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music can be “about” something, but the way in which Ricoeur explains the creation of meaning 
provides a novel answer to this question, which I will address presently. 
2.2 Metaphor and Mimesis 
 Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor far exceeds the rather humble literary trope where one 
word replaces another. Rather, Ricoeur argues that we need to look at the semantics of the 
sentence as a whole. “Since a metaphor only makes sense in an utterance,” he writes, “it is a 
phenomenon of predication, not denomination. […] So we should not really speak of the 
metaphorical use of a word, but rather of the metaphorical utterance.”56 The metaphorical 
utterance, then, is a unit of discourse where a word—a semantic impertinence57—replaces a 
semantically harmonious word, thereby creating a logical absurdity. The metaphorical word 
renders the sentence nonsensical until the reader intervenes and begets an emergent meaning in 
the sentence. 
 Thus, metaphor is presented as the animating principle of language. It is the locus of an 
emergent meaning that occurs in the event of discourse, but its power lies in the sense of surprise 
inherent in the act of rendering a nonsensical statement as a logically sound statement through a 
shift in meaning. The logical absurdity requires the shift in meaning to be realized by the reader 
who, faced with the impossibility of the literal use of the word, must look for clues “for finding a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976), 50. 
 
57 “Speaking of metaphor in philosophy, we must draw a line boldly between the relatively banal case of an 
‘extended’ use of the words of ordinary language in response to a deficiency in naming and the case—to my mind 
singularly more interesting—where philosophical discourse deliberately has recourse to living metaphor in order to 
draw out new meanings from some semantic impertinence and to bring to light new aspects of reality by means of 
semantic innovation.” Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John 
Costello (London: Routledge, 2004), 344. 
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new meaning capable of according with the context of the sentence and rendering the sentence 
meaningful therein.”58 This illumination constitutes the vivification of language. 
The power of metaphor is found in its ability to “redescribe” reality, which brings us to 
mimesis.59 Ricoeur refers to Aristotelian poetics in his conception of mimesis, where the mimetic 
act is more than a simple mimicry of something real; it is an elevation of something real into the 
poetic realm—a poetic redescription of reality. Ricoeur writes, 
Mimesis preserves and represents that which is human, not just in its essential 
features, but in a way that makes it greater and nobler. There is thus a double 
tension proper to mimesis: on the one hand, the imitation is at once a portrayal of 
human reality and an original creation; on the other, it is faithful to things as they 
are and it depicts them as higher and greater than they are.60 
 
Through the act of mimetic redescription, metaphor has a unique power of suggesting alternative 
ways of being in the world.61 The imitation of reality gives way to a redescription of reality, and 
this leads to a transformative experience.62 
 All of this, however, relies on what Ricoeur calls a “living metaphor” and not a mere 
word substitution. A common metaphor becomes a dead metaphor when its meaning has been 
incorporated into the natural polysemy of language. The use of a dead metaphor is thus a “sterile 
operation” because it lacks the “tension between…two interpretations, one literal and the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” 170. 
 
59 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 52-3. 	  
60 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (London: Routledge, 2004), 
45. 
 
61 “What is a world?,” Ricoeur asks. “It is something one can live in; something that can be hospitable, 
strange, hostile…in this way there are fundamental feelings that are unrelated to any specific object or thing but 
which depend on the world in which the work appears; these are, in sum, pure modalities of inhabiting.” Ricoeur, 
Critique and Conviction, 175.  
 
62 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989), 83. 
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metaphoric.”63 A dead metaphor can be read passively and does nothing to create the emergent 
meaning born of a logical absurdity. Because the solving of the logical absurdity is a part of the 
event of discourse—the moment of emergent meaning—all metaphors will become dead 
metaphors as they become common within a given language.64   
2.3 Interpretation 
Metaphor brings us to the idea of interpretation proper. Although a metaphor is living 
when it animates language, as described above, “metaphor is [also] living by virtue of the fact 
that it introduces the spark of imagination into a ‘thinking more’ at the conceptual level. This 
struggle to ‘think more,’ guided by the ‘vivifying principle,’ is the ‘soul’ of interpretation.”65 
Building on our new understanding of metaphor, we can now approach some of the larger issues 
of interpretation. Because a work can have multiple meanings (e.g., historical meaning, cultural 
meaning, spiritual meaning), our interpretation of a work must embrace an expanded view of 
signification that moves beyond the “so-called univocal signs required by the logic of 
argumentation.”66 Thus, interpretation, according to Ricoeur, “is the work of thought which 
consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of 
meaning implied in the literal meaning.”67 
Here, we can draw a useful connection between Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and Derrida’s 
more widely circulated concept of deconstruction. Through the concept of deconstruction 
Derrida claims that because language is inherently unstable, no mode of analysis may claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 51-2. 
 
64 Ibid, 63-4. 
 
65 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 358. 	  
66 Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, 
trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, ed. Don Ihde (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 4. 	  
67 Ibid, 13.	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interpretive authority, and thus interpretation is closer to a game than to an epistemological 
investigation into final truth and meaning.68 As Derrida proposes a “game,” Ricoeur borrows 
Gadamer’s idea of “play” as way to describe the interpretive process wherein we enter into a 
dynamic relationship with the work.69 Ricoeur and Derrida each embrace the intrinsic fluidity in 
language and present the interpretive process as a fluctuation between the reader and the work. In 
fact, in his comparative study, Eftichis Pirovolakis concludes that the divisional boundaries 
between each philosopher are jagged and porous—nearly coextensive, but complementary and 
unassimilable in equal measure.70 At this stage, this comparison does not yet account for the 
difference between a hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of restoration, but this will 
be addressed later in section 5.0. 
Interpretation qua play is a dynamic, multivalent process involving a complex cycle of 
hypothesis and verification—a “to and fro,” as Ricoeur says.71 Through this process, we move 
toward understanding, which is not a process of discovering facts, as such, but of discovering an 
existential potentiality. “To understand a text,” he writes, “is not to find a lifeless sense that is 
contained therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the text.”72 The play of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 This explanation is adapted from Stuart Sim’s remarkably lucid assessment of deconstructionism. Stuart 
Sim, Derrida and the End of History (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1999), 30-31. 
 
69 Paul Ricoeur, “Appropriation,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, 
and Interpretation, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-7. Rather than a 
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interpretation is not a properly intersubjective play between author and reader (or composer and 
listener) because the act of reading is not dialogical. The dynamism, however, exists between the 
reader and the work. Ricoeur writes, “whoever plays is also played: the rules of the game impose 
themselves upon the player, prescribing the ‘to and fro’ and delimiting the field where 
everything ‘is played.’”73 Because textual reference (especially with respect to the poetic text) 
refers not to reality as such, but to a proposed redescription of reality, the reader must engage 
with the text itself to bring this possible world and possible mode of being in the world to light. 
2.4 Problems of Interpretation: Authorship, Distanciation, and Appropriation 
At this stage, we have seen what one intends to do through interpretation, but there 
remain many obstacles standing between the work and our understanding of it. What exactly is 
the role of the author? How can we best account for historical and cultural difference? Do we 
historicize the work, or is the work transcendent? To whom, after all, is the text addressed? 
Borrowing from Roman Jakobson’s linguistic theory, Ricoeur describes the dialogic 
encounter of speech as fundamentally different from the alienation that marks the act of reading 
because, in the case of the former, the speaker and interlocutor share a common set of ostensive 
reference points, while in the case of the latter, there is no such connection between writer and 
reader. “Writing,” Ricoeur states, “renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of 
the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, 
textual meaning and psychological meaning have different destinies.”74 The text is autonomous 
insofar as it has transcended both the dialogic situation and the historical and cultural particulars 
of its origin, but it is not autonomous in a Romanticist sense, which would imply that the work 
achieves total transcendence from mundane existence. Our interpretative endeavors are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ricoeur, “Appropriation,” 186. 	  
74 Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” 83.	  
46	  	  
inherently colored by the horizon of our contemporary encounter with the work, but to the extent 
that we do not confront the experience of the work through the horizon of its origin, the work 
may be described as autonomous in the sense that it can be fused with infinite potential horizons 
in the future. Accordingly, Ricoeur argues against both historicism and the Romanticist primacy 
of the author. It is neither necessary nor, in some cases, possible to know the original horizon of 
the work, but this does not mean that there is not a self-sameness to the work that persists 
through time, and it is this transcendent essenence that constitutes the horizon with which the 
listener will engage. 
In the case of music, we must also note the intermediate step of performance. The work’s 
originary horizon exists with its creator, and there is a subsequent, lesser horizon that exists with 
the performers. At times, these horizons are fused, as is the case when a composer like John Zorn 
uses musicians to realize his work for a definitive, strictly supervised and controlled recording. 
Similarly, Diamanda Galás often works with trusted sound designers to help her realize her 
musical ideas, and although their authorial presence is much less significant than Galás’s because 
of the more technical nature of their role, their contributions are still worth noting. Merzbow 
belongs to a small class of composers who bypass the issue completely by being the sole realizer 
of their work. In other instances, especially where conventionally scored music is concerned, a 
particularly charismatic performer may elevate the importance of the demi-author. In extreme 
cases like Glenn Gould’s two renditions of Bach’s Goldberg Variations, the performer’s 
presence may even overshadow that of the composer. To the extent that the author is important 
in crafting an interpretation, the demi-authors are also necessary to consider; however, the 
problematics of authorship in music draws attention away from what Ricoeur is really saying, 
namely, that we are not beholden exclusively to the author(s) for the construction of meaning 
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through hermeneutics. The fusion of the author’s (and demi-author’s) horizons with our own 
allows us to construct meaningful interpretations that have validity in our present. 
The historicist position, in Ricoeur’s opinion, puts great restrictions on the possibility of 
the work to create new meaning in the present. Because we have no real access to the past, 
except through artificially constructed historiography, attempts to identify with the original 
audience must be, at best, notional, if not delusional. Even if we could escape the horizon of our 
own metaphysical existence, there is an epistemological limitation on what we may truly know 
of another being. Moreover, attempting to uncover meaning primarily through the historical 
imagination further removes us from the experience of the work and hinders our ability to speak 
to its affective dimension. If the work is to disclose a potential world to the perceiver hic et nunc, 
interpretation solely through some imaginary historical agent curbs the possibility of a profound 
personal experience. Although this may be less of an issue for certain types of discourse—
scientific treatises, for example—it is especially pertinent when confronting a work of art. It may 
be a fun exercise to imagine what it was like to experience Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen at 
the Bayreuth Festspielhaus in 1876, but does this not downplay the experience of a modern 
spectator when confronting the work for the first time? Similarly, do we not limit the potential of 
the work if we restrict its ability to propose meaning to that which the composer might have 
(explicitly or implicitly) intended? Ricoeur allows us to “unfold the revelatory power implicit in 
[the author’s] discourse, beyond the limited horizon of his own existential situation.”75 We can 
only attempt to appreciate what Wagner might have intended in the nineteenth century as an 
intellectual exercise, but we can certainly appreciate the accrual of meaning collected by the 
work as a supplement to our contemporary encounter in a fusion of our horizon with that of the 
work itself. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ricoeur, “Appropriation,” 191. 
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If the work is not beholden to its author or its original audience, the ontological question 
is raised. Ricoeur’s answer is that the work of art “exists only in its capacity for ‘monstration.’”76 
The work is a suspended potentiality with an “indefinite capacity to be reincarnated, and in a 
way each time historically different, but substantially and essentially founding.” The work of art 
transcends its originary context because of the work’s infinite capacity for successive 
monstrations—always new, and yet, always the same—and thus Ricoeur links the “sempiternal 
and the historic” as features immanent to the work.77  
Turning momentarily to musical hermeneutics, we might find Ricoeur’s position difficult 
to accept. After all, a literary work passes directly from author to reader,78 but a musical work 
presents a twofold interpretive operation: that of the performer and that of the listener. Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics are focused on the final perceiver, and so the intermediary role of the performer 
remains undeveloped by Ricoeur himself. Interestingly, he does describe the act of reading as 
resembling “the performance of a musical piece regulated by the written notations of the score” 
because the text is “no longer animated by the intention of its author.”79 However, he does not go 
on to speak to the role of an interpretive intermediary, and so I will provide a few comments of 
my own. 
In a sense, most of the above applies equally to both listener and performer; however, the 
performer faces a dialectic of interpretation and re-presentation, as he or she must first interpret 
the work and then present a version of the work augmented by his or her own wishes as a sort of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Paul Ricoeur, “Arts, Language and Hermeneutic Aesthetics: Interview with Paul Ricoeur.” Trans. R.D. 
Sweeney, Don Shula, and John Carroll. http://www.philagora.net/philo-fac/ricoeur-e.php 
 
77 Ibid. 
 
78 This process may be complicated by an editor or a translator, but for the sake of the argument, let us 
assume a simple monolingual transition from writer to reader. 
 
79 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” 175. 
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demi-author. I propose that we consider the intermediary act of performance as a deferral and 
augmentation of the meaning of the work. As we will see in the section on validity in 
interpretation, there are standards of interpretation and it is possible to differentiate amongst the 
values of a given interpretation over another. The performer thus has recourse to hermeneutics 
and, as a performer, he or she must endeavor to create the most compelling interpretation 
possible by confronting the very issue at hand: distanciation and appropriation.80 This also leads 
to the implication that the act of interpretation is more akin to musical performance than one 
might think. In this capacity, interpretation is not so much an academic exercise, but an 
expressive act. 
Returning to Ricoeur, we confront the question of how, if it is untethered from its socio-
historical origin, a work can speak through the great distance of time and space. Apropos of this 
issue, Gadamer’s concept of distanciation was an important development in Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics. Distanciation describes the distancing effect of the text, which happens as the text 
becomes unmoored from its author and original context and endures through history. Gadamer 
described distanciation as alienating, but Ricoeur proposes a “positive and productive” view of 
distanciation writing, “the text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective 
communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication. As such, it displays a 
fundamental characteristic of the very historicity of human experience, namely, that it is 
communication in and through distance.”81 Because we perceive existence as linear thanks to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 In the present study, the role of the musician is largely avoided because Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow are 
still living and, in the case of Galás and Merzbow, they also perform their own music. Zorn does hire musicians to 
perform his music, but he selects specific individuals for the unique musical contributions each will bring to the 
project as he builds their artistic voices into the composition itself. In each case, there is no true intermediary in the 
sense of a musician performing, say, the Bach cello suites. 	  
81 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” 76.	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marking of time, we can be described as historical beings. Distanciation, thus, is a natural part of 
existence. 
Distance, for Ricoeur, is a dialectical struggle between “the otherness that transforms all 
spatial and temporal distance into cultural estrangement and the ownness by which all 
understanding aims at the extension of self-understanding.”82 We sense our alienation from the 
original horizon of the work, but we simultaneously experience the immediacy of affect in 
experiencing the work in the present. Therefore, we have the dialectical counterpart to 
distanciation: appropriation, or “understanding at and through distance.” 83  Appropriation, 
however, should not imply the Romanticist notion of projecting oneself onto the work in an act 
of solipsistic interpretation. Instead, Ricoeur writes, “I should prefer to say that the reader 
understands himself in front of the text, in front of the world of the work. […] It is to let the 
work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have of myself.”84 Again, 
Ricoeur refers to Gadamer who conceives of interpretation as a fusion of horizons—past and 
present, author and reader. Ricoeur writes,  
This concept signifies that we live neither within closed horizons nor within one 
unique horizon. Insofar as the fusion of horizons excludes the idea of a total and 
unique knowledge, this concept implies a tension between what is one’s own and 
what is alien, between near and far; and hence the play of difference is included in 
the process of convergence.85 
 
There is no homogenizing metaphysics that implies a universal perspective or a fixed meaning, 
but there is a different transcendence within the work, which allows it to mean new things to 
future perceivers while retaining its essence. Appropriation implies not that we are “making the 	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83 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” 87. 	  
84 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” 178. 
 
85 Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics,” 73.	  
51	  	  
work our own,” but rather projecting ourselves into the world prompted by the non-ostensive 
references of the work. We open ourselves up to the work and we are changed. 
2.5 Validity in Interpretation 
 There are, of course, multiple ways of construing a work, but Ricoeur holds that a) not all 
interpretations are equal, and b) it is possible to judge a given interpretation with respect to other 
interpretations. Ricoeur speaks of a dialectic between guessing and validating where the reader 
engages in the aforementioned play of interpretation—the “to and fro” of trial and error. This 
holds true for the work as a totality and for the metaphor in an utterance.86  
Fortunately, we are not left to guess blindly, for the work contains clues that “serve as a 
guide for a specific construction, in that [they contain] at once a permission and a prohibition; 
[they exclude] unsuitable constructions and [allow] those which give more meaning to the same 
words.”87 This does demand that one is knowledgable enough to decipher the clues, but the 
ability to find and decode such clues is, after all, one of the primary requirements of one who 
engages in hermeneutic inquiry. Verification in interpretation does not carry the scientific 
pretention of absolute truth because the focus is on the propositional character of a given text—
the non-ostensive reference of the text to a possible world as opposed to the ostensive reference 
of a scientific experiment. The truth of an interpretation is much closer to what J.L. Austin 
describes a performative utterance because the interpretation is not a description that is truth-
evaluable from a logical perspective, but is instead a proposition that changes what it describes.88 
The work’s truth is its redescriptive power. If the interpretation succeeds in disclosing a world to 
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87 Ibid., 175. 
 
88 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, eds. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), ff. 5. 
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the perceiver, then it is subjectively true in the Kierkegaardian sense. Interpretation, after all, 
belongs to a different realm than that of objective truth derived from empirical research. 
Although we cannot speak of a more truthful interpretation in a rigorously scientific sense, we 
can speak of a more probable interpretation.89 As Ricoeur writes, “the more probable is that 
which, on the one hand, takes account of the greatest number of facts furnished by the text, 
including its potential connotations, and on the other hand, offers a qualitatively better 
convergence between the features which it takes into account.”90 
3.0 Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics and Musical Interpretation 
 Up to this point, I have drawn some connections between Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the 
text and its possible musical applications, but now I would like to focus entirely on music and its 
relationship to ontological hermeneutics. I will begin by reviewing Ricoeur’s rare but significant 
comments on music, and will then discuss the work of Roger W.H. Savage, the only major music 
scholar to offer an extended engagement with Ricoeur.91  
 On the surface, Ricoeur appears to hold a Romantic view of music, writing, “music 
creates feelings for us that have no name; it extends our emotional space, it opens in us a region 
where absolutely new feelings can be shaped.”92 Although this sounds a bit like the idea of music 
“expressing the inexpressible,” reading Ricoeur’s statement in light of his larger philosophical 
project frames this in a different manner. He initially states that music is not a mimetic art, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 78. 
 
90 Here, it is important to note that by “facts,” Ricoeur primarily means the manifest features of the work at 
hand. Ibid, 175-6. 	  
91 Lawrence Kramer’s Interpreting Music is actually very Ricoeurian, although Ricoeur is never mentioned 
in the book. Kramer appears to have reached similar, albeit less philosophically sophisticated, conclusions a few 
decades later through a reading of Derrida tempered by literary theorists. 
 
92 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998), 174. 
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then he allows, “at the limit, could not one say that to each piece of art there corresponds a 
mood?”93 Music with no linguistic content does not have denotational power and thus it cannot 
describe action as such, but because the power of his conception of mimesis lies in its 
refiguration of reality, Ricoeur can still explain the ability of a musical work to redescribe a 
“mood” or “humor” as a particularly abstract sort of mimesis. “Music,” Ricoeur writes, “opens 
up in us a region where unspoken sentiments can be represented and our being-affected can be 
expressed.”94 
 What, then, is this “mood,” this “unspoken sentiment”? Understood in a proper 
existential-ontological context, a mood differs from simple affects and feelings; rather, it is 
fundamental to our being-in-the-world—our “thrownness,” as Heidegger would say, that allows 
us to recognize the existence of, and interact with, other beings within the world.95 In Heidegger, 
a mood discloses a manner of being “before all cognition and willing and beyond [its] scope of 
disclosure.”96 When Ricoeur describes musical mimesis as corresponding to a mood, it exceeds 
any cognitive theories of the play of emotions manipulated by music. As Savage argues, “the 
idea that music is the language of emotion too quickly relegates the poetic expression of feelings 
to the recesses of the subject’s interior life.”97 Acquiescence to a total and binding subjectivity of 
criticism renders the interpretive enterprise useless because all interpretation becomes 
inconsequential in the face of whatever feelings a work may arouse in the conscious mind of the 
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individual. Instead, mood speaks to music’s ability to reach a place beyond cognition—a place of 
elemental, pre-conscious being—that has ramifications beyond the individual, even if we engage 
with the work as individuals.98 The work discloses to the individual through interpretation, but 
the work does far more than present a unified emotion to be awakened in each individual. 
The “feelings that have no name” that Ricoeur speaks about exist here in a mode of pure, 
unreflective existence, and thus, they reach us at a level of profound depth. Music, for Ricoeur, 
becomes a transfiguration of a mode of existence prior to cognition and volition. Through music, 
“we enter into a region of the soul which cannot be explored otherwise than by the hearing of 
this [individual, specific] piece. Each work is authentically a modality of the soul, a modulation 
of the soul.”99 Accordingly, an interpretation and critique of music seeks to understand not only 
structure, but also the way in which the work structures a mood, which is precisely what Savage 
sets out explore in Hermeneutics and Music Criticism.   
3.1 Savage and Musical Hermeneutics 
 As a systematic musicologist, Roger Savage presents an innovatory conception of music 
as a whole. For Savage, music’s power of affective redescription allows us to consider the 
“aporia of time and the other of time.”100 Music is a unique way in which we may engage with a 
beyond-of-time that is difficult to even conceive of—much less experience—through 
philosophical reflection alone. Although his thesis does not focus directly on the interpretation of 
radical music, the way in which he arrives at this thesis—by way of Ricoeur and Gadamer—is 
quite useful, especially insofar as he has already developed some musical applications of 
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Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. After addressing how Savage applies Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor to 
music, I will consider the musicological implications of Savage’s work for musicology and 
musical critique. 
3.1.1 Music and Metaphor 
 Although Savage recognizes the importance of questioning the metaphysical conceits of 
Romantic critics, he also contends that “exiling individual works to the recesses of cultural, 
historical, and sociopolitical analysis paradoxically dissimulates music’s efficacy and obviates 
the work’s power to speak. This power, inseparable from the aesthetic experience of a work, 
underlies the work’s expression of moods and feelings that, in turn, redescribe affective 
dimensions of our experience.”101 Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor is the solution to restoring the 
efficacy of the affective dimension of music without either capitulating to Romanticist 
metaphysics or postmodern contextualism exclusively. If music has the power to “[refigure] our 
affective relation to the world,”102 it is through the power of metaphor. 
The great debate on music’s representational power founders on the issue of reference 
because our understanding of the nature of reference precludes its applicability to music when 
we insist on the primacy of what Ricoeur calls a “first-order reference,” or a reference to the 
literal, material world. The “second-order reference,” he states, “reaches the world not only at the 
level of manipulable objects but at the level that Husserl designated by the expression 
Lebenswelt and Heidegger by the expression being-in-the-world.”103 When a scholar like Peter 
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(New York: Continuum, 2010), 212. 
 
102 Ibid., 217. 	  
103 In Husserl, Lebenswelt [lifeworld] represents the class of all things perceivable in an intersubjective, 
universal sense. It is the space of all human experience. See Edmund Husserl The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 108. For more 
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Kivy investigates the possibility of meaning in music, he is concerned exclusively with first-
order reference, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that instrumental music cannot, strictly 
speaking, be “about” anything.104 Fred Everett Maus proposes a solution to the dilemma of the 
first-order reference in music through his music as drama hermeneutic. In this theory, one 
describes musical affect in terms of an “imaginary agent” who is the figurative protagonist in the 
drama of a musical work.105 This allows Maus to reconcile score analysis with affective 
interpretation, but the usual problem arises when confronting a work that does not follow 
conventional dramatic principles, such as certain minimalist works that confound the listener’s 
expectation of a teleological mode of listening. Although Maus’s hermeneutic has much to offer 
common practice music, problems remain because of the perceived importance of first-order 
reference. 
Savage, on the other hand, argues, “By suspending ostensive, literal references, the 
metaphorical meaning of the new predicative pertinence redescribes the real in the light of its 
own heuristic fiction.” That is, when we set aside the ostensible primacy of literal, denotative 
references, the figurative meaning is enlivened and animated in a way that shows us a unique, 
refigured reality corresponding with our own individual existence. Lawrence Kramer arrives at 
apparently similar conclusions in his discussion of musical metaphor as a hermeneutic concept 
through Austin’s concept of performative utterances, although he has not systematized the 
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possibility of metaphor in the manner that Ricoeur has done.106 Ricoeur, Savage, and Kramer are 
in agreement that when we are shackled to a literalist view of reality, the poetic dimension is 
foreclosed; however, if we can overcome this tendency, the musical work opens up a new path to 
discovery, or as Ricoeur writes, “we may imaginatively actualize the potential non-ostensive 
reference of the text in a new situation.”107  
How, then, does metaphor relate to music, specifically? After all, the non-textual 
components of music do not provide metaphors themselves.108 Perhaps descriptive titles, album 
covers, and information gleaned from contextual research can suggest appropriate metaphors, but 
there is nothing inherent in the pitch content that suggests a replacement that creates the sort of 
semantic impertinence to which Ricoeur refers. Savage proposes that, 
through the analogies between a work’s syntactical features and its expressive 
content, based on coded conventions of various paradigmatic plots, the critic 
creates the metaphors suggestive of the referential value of a musical work. 
Metaphor-making, in this sense, defines the critic’s interpretive role. Expressive 
interpretation thus complements, and in a sense completes, structural 
considerations by identifying analogies between the work’s internal organization 
and the non-aesthetic experiences in which the work’s expressive features are 
grounded, and to which they ultimately refer.109 
 
In a limited sense, we already do this when we attribute any sort of linguistic descriptors to the 
instrumental component of a work of music. Describing a work as melancholic, or arch-like, or 
“suggestive of the wind in a field of tall grass,” creates a metaphorical connection by rendering 	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the materiality of the work in common language, and, in fact, this is what Marion Guck describes 
when she speaks of comparative and ascriptive metaphor.110 The former involves an ostensive 
connection between language and some material feature of the work, and the latter involves a 
non-ostensive connection between language and the suggestion of a concept or emotion in 
connection with the work. Her conception of musical metaphor is, however, less abstract than 
Savage’s. In an analysis of Chopin’s “Prelude in B minor,” Op. 28, no. 6, Guck finds the shape 
of an arch to be the operative comparative metaphor, while “urgency” is the dominant ascriptive 
metaphor.111 Guck’s interpretation is easier to perceive and defend through common intuition 
than Savage’s use of philosophical reflection, but when confronting radical music, it is difficult 
to find enough features that lend themselves to Guck’s methodology. What Savage proposes, by 
way of Ricoeur, is a sort of musical metaphor that creates a non-ostensive reference to a possible 
world disclosed by the work. Just as the logical absurdity in the metaphorical utterance involves 
the reader in the vivification of language, the application of lingual metaphors to the realm of 
music creates a similar vitality by involving the listener in the resolution of the logical absurdity 
of matching language to tones and rhythms. Although the “language” of music has its own 
internal logic, the application of verbal language to musical sounds creates a cognitive dilemma 
that the listener must resolve.  
This is a point of divergence for Savage, who follows Gadamer and Ricoeur into 
ontological hermeneutical territory, and Kramer, who adopts a more standard hermeneutical 
position. For Kramer, metaphor does not carry the same ontological weight of offering a 
possibility of being; rather, it is the simpler act of attributing dynamic meaning to music. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Marion A. Guck, “Two Types of Metaphoric Transference,” in Music and Meaning, ed. Jenefer 
Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 210. 
 
111 Ibid., 201-212.	  
59	  	  
example is Ingmar Bergman’s Autumn Sonata (1978), which features Chopin’s “Prelude No. 2 in 
A minor” (1893) throughout the film.112 Kramer tracks the accrual of meaning attributed to this 
Chopin prelude throughout the film, but his conception of metaphor from the beginning of the 
chapter transforms into what should be properly called symbolism in his actual analysis. The 
work is a symbol in the film and it takes on new shades of meaning while retaining traces of 
earlier meanings, and in this sense, it functions as what Ricoeur calls a symbol. Kramer creates a 
compelling interpretation of Autumn Sonata through his symbolic analysis, but it is one thing to 
trace the symbolism of a common practice work within a narrative film and quite another to 
attempt symbolic analysis in a work that appears to have little relation to symbols as cultural 
codes with conventionally comprehensible meaning. This is precisely why the full philosophical 
weight of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is crucial to my project. 
Savage has taken Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor and created a credible transposition to 
music, and now I intend to push further into increasingly complex metaphorical networks. It is 
here that I arrive at my first connection between Ricoeur and Lacan. My application of Lacanian 
theory is, in part, the invocation of the structure and function of the Lacanian psyche as a root 
metaphor—a gravitational center that brings smaller scale, conceptually diverse metaphors into 
concert with one another.113 Part of my intent in this study is to demonstrate the power of 
Lacanian theory as a metaphor—a living metaphor—for radical music and expressive noise. 
Through this metaphor, I hope to engender a “seeing as” in this arcane music and to help the 
musical work disclose its world to the listener. If radical music drew from the standard body of 
culturally established signifiers, then this metaphorical use of Lacanian concepts would be 
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unnecessary, but in light of the apparent incomprehensibility of these works, conventional 
symbolic analysis fails because conventional symbols are rarely evident. 
3.1.2 Ontological Hermeneutics and Musicology 
 Looking more generally to the field of musicology and music criticism, Savage touches 
on a number of issues vis-à-vis ontological hermeneutics, including the role of context in 
interpretation and the importance of the experience of the work. In the end, Savage attempts to 
move beyond a stagnant disciplinary debate regarding proper critical methodology by reminding 
us of the crucial importance of the affective dimension of music, and this may be his greatest 
contribution to musical hermeneutics. Whether one believes that all affect is socially constructed 
or not, it is useful to investigate the affective experience of the work instead of being totally 
focused on either the social function or the formal structure of the work. 
 As we saw during our discussion of Ricoeur’s anti-historicist position, the work 
occasions a fusion of horizons between itself and the perceiver. But how does this function in a 
discourse like musicology where the discipline of cultural studies has only recently gained 
traction and socio-historicist readings reign supreme? After numerous comments on the 
insufficiency of both Romantic formalism and postmodern deconstructionism to explain the 
whole work, Savage states that the “socio-historicizing questions concerning the conditions of a 
work’s production, performance, and reception illuminate the limits of a present interpretation. 
Every encounter with a work occurs within a field of changing horizons.”114 Every work has a 
context, but the power of the work is not found exclusively in the socio-historical context, but in 
the fusing of horizons of which Gadamer spoke. 
It is important and entirely obvious to discuss a work like Marvin Gaye’s What’s Going 
On (1971) in the context of American Vietnam-era crises, and we might push even further into 	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biographical issues since, upon returning from a tour of duty in Vietnam, Gaye’s brother, 
Frankie, painted such a grim picture that What’s Going On was not only culturally relevant, but 
personally relevant as well; however, it is much less obvious (and no less important to realize) 
that even such a personally and politically contingent album carries the capacity for new 
meaning in every future encounter. Long after the cultural revolution of 1960s America and the 
anti-war sentiments of the Vietnam era have withered and decayed in history textbooks as a mere 
event of the past (as opposed to a cathected experience shared by the originally intended 
audience of the album), will Gaye’s message of love and tolerance not speak to future listeners 
confronting future variations on the same human struggles? Ricoeur argues, and I agree, that the 
changing horizons of future encounters of the work will expand its potential meanings beyond 
the original, intended (and empirically lost) context. One may find it compelling to imagine the 
reunion of Gaye and his brother—the war-wary veteran—leading to such an epiphany that Gaye 
was not only inspired, but also obliged to create his masterpiece, but surely there is a limit on the 
possible empathy one can feel toward another human being. How much, after all, can one 
empathize with another individual with whom one has no personal connection, irrespective of the 
poignancy of sentiment? Is not a significant part of such a work the transplantation and/or 
extrapolation either to our own existence as individuals encountering the work or to our view of 
our social situation? Ricoeur’s limitation on the importance of the original horizon addresses 
precisely this point. Far from simply imagining the message of What’s Going On as applying to 
ourselves in the present, through appropriation, we fuse the horizons of the work with our 
contemporary situation.  
Distanciation moving to appropriation creates the illuminating power of the work. Savage 
writes, “by highlighting contemporary choices and alternatives against the historical horizons 
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that conditioned the work’s creation, critical commentaries reintroduce the sense of distance 
between present and past horizons that the contemporaneity of the experience of a work tends to 
cover over.”115 For a hermeneutics of music (or any text), it is neither a simple historicist 
reading, nor a contemporaneous, ahistorical reading that suffices. An interpretation drawing from 
history and from contemporary life increases the power of distanciation and amplifies the 
efficacy of the work as it returns to us from a greater distance. Thus, we can conduct a socio-
historicist examination of What’s Going On, but we must not privilege our attempted 
reconstruction of the original meaning over the meaning resulting from our contemporary 
encounter with the work. 
 Savage’s discussions of metaphor serve his larger theses on the importance of the 
experience that the work conveys. “Poetic feelings,” he writes, “renew our inherence in the 
world by intensifying and augmenting the sense of being affected that attests to our non-
objectifying insertion in the world.”116 Just as Ricoeur described the importance of poetic 
language in involving the reader in the act of textual animation, Savage attests to the way in 
which mimetic redescription paints a new way of being in the world. The suspension of 
conventional emotions creates a space for metaphors to “augment the affective field of our 
experiences.” 117  Furthermore, Savage speaks to the unusual potency of the “ontological 
vehemence” inherent in the work through Ricoeur’s comment that, “as the representational 
function is lessened…as the gap with reality grows wider, the biting power of the work on the 
world of our experiences in reinforced. The greater the retreat, the more intense the return back 
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upon the real.”118 Insofar as non-descriptive, non-representational music occasions what must be 
the furthest retreat from ostensive reference imaginable, Savage is able to frame music as 
uniquely suited to create a “heightened sense of being ‘out of time’ or even ‘beyond time,’ 
[opening] the world to us anew.”119 Again, Savage is creating a very broad philosophical 
proposition applicable to virtually all music around the world, but his thesis here is especially 
pertinent to radical music and expressive noise because of their intrinsic non-assimilability into 
conventional language and concepts. If music, in general, points toward a beyond of time, surely 
the “beyond” of radical music and expressive noise must be even greater. 
3.2 Summary of Ricoeur and Music 
 At this point, it is useful to take stock of the concepts at play thus far, especially with 
respect to their hermeneutic applications in music. Of the many concepts introduced above, there 
are six that seem particularly apposite to musical interpretation: the vivifying power of metaphor, 
the redescription of reality and mood via mimesis, the act of play in interpretation, the 
attenuation of historicism and the authorial voice, the fusion of horizons through appropriation, 
and the way in which we approach validating interpretations in contradistinction to one another. 
At the risk of reductionism, I offer the following schema to condense the above concepts into a 
manageable reference. 
 Above I have considered the musical work as equivalent to the main object of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics, i.e., the text. Where the text, or work, is a series of linguistic units in a syntagmatic 
relationship that form a coherent totality,120 so too is a musical work the collection of units of 	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tonal and rhythmic expression arranged to create a discrete entity, or at least an intentional 
circumscription of an aural phenomenon.121 From here, we arrive at metaphor, which presents a 
logical absurdity that the reader/listener must struggle to resolve through his or her own 
creativity, thereby animating the musical language.122 As Savage shows, the interpreter may 
invent metaphors that create illuminative connections between musical abstraction and concepts 
and objects that can be said to exist.123 The difference is that the interpreter, not the author (or 
performers), suggest metaphors, but in doing so, the listener is similarly involved in the 
vivification of the non-ostensive (non-lingual) references inherent in music. 
 Metaphor leads directly to mimesis because it is through the non-ostensive references of 
the text that reality is redescribed and a latent world is disclosed to the reader/listener. Although 
non-textual music does not possess the denotative power to refer to real objects, music can refer 
to concepts through the invention of metaphors, and it can also refer to moods. In Heidegger, 
moods refer to a generalized existential state prior to cognition and volition, and, as Savage 
claims, it is through music that we may access this realm of pure affect.124 
 Active reading/listening enlivens the text, but the reader/listener must struggle to create a 
coherent interpretation through the dance-like process of play. Possibilities are proposed, 
explored, abandoned, and accumulated to move toward an ever fuller, more convincing 
interpretation. This is no less true in music, but the potentiality of play is all the greater due to 
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the abstraction of music and the presence of second-order authors, or performers, who add to and 
modify the work at hand before it reaches the listener’s ears. 
 Ricoeur problematizes the role of the author and the importance of socio-historicizing 
contexts in the creation of meaningful interpretation. Because the text escapes the horizon of the 
author(s) and his or her original audience, the meaning offered by the text can no longer be said 
to correspond unproblematically to either the author’s intentions or the original audience’s 
horizon of understanding. Performers are intimately familiar with this issue because the 
realization of a musical score presents the same dilemma.125 The restorationist impulse is, 
however, misguided because to subscribe to the delusion of “hearing the work as its original 
audience heard it” is not only impossible, but also self-defeating. It is precisely because of the 
distance between the original horizon and the contemporary listener’s horizon that the work 
harnesses the power of distanciation following Ricoeur’s principle of the greater the distance, the 
more powerful the return.126 The attenuation of historicist and authorial issues allow the work to 
generate new meaning in its infinite capacity for subsequent realizations. Because the composer 
communicates through the symbolic notation of music, this distancing occurs almost 
immediately and to a potentially greater extent than with a text, thereby intensifying the 
distanciation effect.  
 Through the vivification of language in metaphor and the play of interpretation, we 
appropriate the work, which is to say, we understand ourselves in front of the text. Rather than a 
solipsistic projection of our own biases and prejudices onto the work, we open ourselves up to it. 
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In appropriating the text, we allow it to expand our own horizon of understanding.127 Through 
appropriation, we create a fusion of horizons that allows us to experience the work as individuals 
in direct confrontation, rather than as individuals in indirect confrontation due to the mediation 
of historicist imagination.128  
 Finally, we arrive at interpretational validation, which exists on a scale of plausibility. 
Through the interpretive process, we look for clues in the text that, in turn, suggest and 
discourage certain possibilities.129 A convincing interpretation, then, is one that is able to account 
for the greatest number of textual features, connotations, references, and offers the most 
compelling intersection of these features.130 In the case of music, this concept becomes a bit 
more difficult because of the dearth of concrete material in the way of lingual content. Savage’s 
suggestion of metaphorical creation, however, opens the musical work to new horizons and 
allows us to move beyond both formalism that is concerned primarily with the mechanical 
functioning of the work and contextualism that underrepresents the affective component of the 
work. In the case of music, the hermeneutic practitioner must look not only at the features the 
work proposes, but we must also invent metaphors to help us speak to the ontological power of 
the work. 
 To the above, I would add the following observations: In a sense, interpretation works on 
an absolutely individual level. If Ricoeur’s style of ontological hermeneutics frames the non-
ostensive references of the text as disclosing a possible world and a possible way of being in this 
world, then it seems that there are levels of interpretation in every situation. As an interpreter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 ———, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” 178. 
128 ———, Interpretation Theory,  93.	  
129 ———, “Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics,” 175. 
130 Ibid., 175-6.	  
67	  	  
radical music, I attempt to provide a first-order interpretation of a specific work that can speak to 
a wide audience and help them understand both the possible world and the possible ways of 
being in the world that the work discloses. If interpretation is a dynamic process where Ricoeur’s 
“thinking more” is the goal, my job must be to augment the vivifying inspiration of the work by 
choosing a powerful and apt metaphorical network. There is also a second-order interpretation 
that happens when a reader encounters my interpretation and, although this second-order 
interpretation is once removed from my initial interpretation, a dialectical process is initiated 
between the reader’s interpretation and understanding of my interpretation and their personal 
ideas about the work, which—ideally—leads to an imbrication of our understandings of the 
work. 
Provided that my interpretation is neither so simple as to be obvious, nor so complex as 
to be incomprehensible to anyone but myself, the phenomenological component of interpretation 
ought to be transferable with little loss of power, for the efficacy of an illuminating interpretation 
lies in the personal experience of metaphorical understanding, which happens when the 
reader/listener encounters the metaphor, not when the interpreter creates the metaphor. If this 
were not true, then the metaphors used in poetic language would have already exhausted 
themselves on the authors before even reaching the reader. 
4.0 Jacques Lacan 
Let us turn now to the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Unlike Ricoeur, Lacan’s 
discourse is hermetic and arcane; it is filled with neologisms, language games, and general 
interpretive hurdles. Because his theoretical body remains foreign to musicological discourse, I 
will spend some time introducing the concepts and their interrelations within the Lacanian 
psyche. I will create a few connections to musical hermeneutics along the way, but the bulk of 
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my discussions on Lacan and music will occur within the case studies themselves. Before diving 
into the Lacanian nebula, however, some prefatory remarks are in order. Lacan’s oeuvre extends 
over decades and not only do his many concepts change over time, but Lacan intentionally leaves 
ambiguities and resists both clear and singular definitions because he prefers his theoretical body 
to remain amorphous and polyvalent, just like language itself. For instance, the word 
“jouissance” goes through at least three major stages of development over the course of thirty 
years. When one considers the wealth of concepts that Lacan either introduces or borrows (and 
substantially modifies) from Freud, the task of the author is onerous. In reviewing much of the 
secondary literature on Lacan, one finds that a number of authors apparently shield themselves 
from critiques of terminological accuracy and meaning by hiding behind the jargon, jumping 
from term to term while assuming that the reader will interpret a given word in the “correct” 
sense. As a result, there are numerous books that remain obscure to all but the specialist. 
If an author wishes to avoid speaking only to specialists within the Lacanian discourse, 
he or she confronts the difficult choice of either burdening the reading with a lengthy exposition 
taking care to describe all senses of the concept—much of which, realistically, the non-specialist 
does not need to know—or providing the sort of clear, concise explanations that are nowhere to 
be found in Lacan’s own writing, at the risk of oversimplification and subsequent critiques by 
those who prefer a different sense of the concept. Insofar as the purpose of my writing is to 
introduce and demonstrate the hermeneutic efficacy of Lacanian theory to musicologists (and 
fellow non-specialists), I have chosen the latter strategy. In my introduction to Lacanian theory 
in the present section, I will attempt to provide clear, concise explanations of concepts using 
examples with ordinary language with the proviso that my explanations reflect the most common 
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uses and are not comprehensive.131 If my theoretical discussion appears to venture into some 
very strange and remote territory, it is only to lay the groundwork for richer interpretational 
possibilities exemplified in subsequent chapters. 
4.1 Lacan and Music 
I propose that one understands the Lacanian psyche as a metaphor for the affective and 
communicative dimensions of music. In this sense, there is a complex, multivalent exchange 
happening between the listener and the musical other (i.e., the composer, performer, producer, or 
whatever intentional agent is behind the musical utterance). There are a number of factors that 
affect this exchange. The context of the sounding experience (e.g., prerecorded, performed live 
without improvisation, performed live with improvisation) changes the degree of reciptrocity 
involved, and the context that the listener brings (his or her horizon, as Ricoeur would say), both 
impact the way that the work is perceived. Even when a given subject listens to an unchanging 
recording and the communication is essentially one-way, I propose that the way in which the 
music is perceived and interpreted shares much in common with the way one perceives and 
interprets language in the Lacanian system. It is a confluence of the subject’s personal life 
experience and the culturally established modes of artistic experience that impact one’s 
perception of music. This communication is not limited to what a subject receives both 
consciously and unconsciously from a recording, but also includes the subject’s reflexive 
projections onto the music, which in turn come back to the subject as an additional layer of 
communication. 
In truth, this use of psychoanalysis is not sanctioned by Lacan insofar as the act of 
clinical psychoanalysis relies entirely on intersubjective, verbal communication.132 This has not 	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hindered literary critics and film theorists from using Lacanian theory to either decode character 
subjectivity in narratives or to create convincing metaphorical readings of narratives in 
general.133 Slavoj Žižek, for example, inhabits both worlds: Some of his work uses cultural 
products to explain Lacanian concepts—much in the way that Lacan himself often referred to 
literature to explain himself—while his other work engages in what Richard Feldman calls post-
psychoanalysis, a transposition of psychoanalytic techniques into sociocultural theory. 134 
Moreover, some of Freud’s writings can easily be considered as sociological texts, even if he 
never refers to them as such. Lacan downplays this dimension of Freud’s oeuvre, but if we look 
at the legacy of Freud, his clinical contributions pale in comparison to his impact on 
sociocultural studies. My contention is that Lacan’s idea of “the unconscious structured like a 
language” is already a metaphor for understanding linguistic communication, so it can also serve 
as a metaphor for musical communication. It is a powerful hermeneutic tool that can lead to 
compelling, cogent readings that one could not achieve through alternate means. As I will show 
in section 5.0, his theories can also work nicely within Ricoeur’s broader hermeneutical 
framework. 
As a final introductory comment, I would caution the reader against understanding these 
Lacanian concepts as necessarily true in an absolute sense. For example, one need not believe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Essays in the following volume from Jacques-Alain Miller and Colette Soler remind us that Lacan was a 
medical doctor and not a literary theorist. That said, their emphasis is on clinical psychoanalysis and their bias is 
obvious enough. Ellie Ragland, ed., Critical Essays on Jacques Lacan (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1990). On the 
other hand, Freud frequently crossed over into sociology and cultural studies, especially in Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1929), Totem and Taboo (1913), and Moses and Monotheism (1939).  
 
133 McGowan’s psychoanalytic readings of David Lynch films are exemplary in their cogency of 
interpretation and in their rigorous adherence to Lacanian theory. Todd McGowan, The Impossible David Lynch 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
 
134 Incidentally, Korsyn advocates for this same technique in Kevin Korsyn, Decentering Music: A Critique 
of Contemporary Musical Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 54-55; Richard Feldstein, “The Mirror 
of Manufactured Cultural Relations,” in Reading Seminars I and II: Lacan’s Return to Freud, ed. Richard Feldstein, 
Bruce Fink, Maire Jaanus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 141. 
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that the Subject is formed literally by viewing oneself in a mirror. Certainly, infants have been 
discovering their difference from their mothers without the aid of mirrors for millennia. Such 
literalist readings are unproductive because they insist on applying a scientific mentality to a 
philosophical expression of experience. Numerous theorists have proposed ways of explaining 
psychosexual development, and none can technically make unassailable truth claims in the way 
that contemporary psychiatric and neurological discoveries can. This does not mean that these 
theories do not reflect some level of human experience in a conceptual manner that continues to 
resonate with at least some people. Concepts like Lacan’s mirror stage are useful insofar as they 
convey modes of experience with a sort of dramatic expression that appears to reflect the 
similarly dramatic experience of life. 
4.1.1 The Lacanian Subject 
Let us begin with some background on Lacanian theory, which we can build upon in the 
following chapters. The crux of Lacan’s theory is the tripartite psyche—three simultaneous 
orders within each subject, each order inextricable from the others. Briefly, the Symbolic is the 
order of language and the domain of the unconscious, the locus of a subject’s enunciations, the 
true meaning of which the subject is unaware;135 the Imaginary is the order of the ego 
(consciousness and self-perception) where the subject mistakenly believes his or her intent 
resides and where this intent is articulated in a straightforward (i.e., not mediated by the 
unconscious) manner; and finally, the Real is the order of the unknowable beyond of language 
and structure, that which is neither the Symbolic nor the Imaginary, the realm of pure 
phenomena that defies signification. Lacan uses a Borromean knot (See Appendix A) as a 
metaphor to describe the interrelation of these orders for a number of reasons: first, the three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Lacan writes, “The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a 
lie: it is the censored chapter.” Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits, 
trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 215. 
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strings of the knot are interdependent, so that none may exist alone; second, if one string is cut, 
the knot becomes untied; third, there is no hierarchical relationship between the orders—they all 
exist equally and always in the healthy psyche. 
The Lacanian subject differs markedly from the Cartesian cogito, a model of self-
transparency of consciousness wherein there is nothing beyond the purposeful intent of the 
subject. Freud’s discovery of the unconscious is, for Lacan, sufficient evidence that ego 
psychology at best can only ever see part of the psyche, and at worst be easily misled and 
subverted by the unconscious. Rather than Descartes’s formulation, “I think therefore I am,” 
Lacan offers, “I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking.”136 That is 
to say that, within Lacan’s model, the subject is blinded by the illusion of the Imaginary, 
considering his or her thoughts to originate at the level of the ego and in to be full control of 
them. In fact, Lacan says, the subject’s thoughts originate in the Symbolic and speak without the 
subject being able to filter or even understand them for what they really are. 
The acquisition of language leaves the Lacanian subject permanently split. Bruce Fink 
writes that the subject is nothing other than the product of this split, defined negatively in the 
space between thinking and being. He speaks about it as a two-sided surface, 
One that is exposed and one that is hidden. Though the two sides may not 
ultimately be made of radically different material—linguistic in nature—at any 
given point along the surface there is a front and a back, a visible face and an 
invisible one. Their value may only be local. […] Yet there is an at least 
locally valid split between front and back, conscious and unconscious.137 
 
Even though origin of a subject’s speech may emanate from the unconscious and remain hidden 
to them, the brief appearances of the unconscious in language—for example, in parapraxes or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: 
Norton, 2006), 430. 
 
137 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 45. 
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jokes—are discernible to the trained psychoanalyst and therefore, they can be known through an 
external agent; however, a painstaking circumlocution typifies the analytic process in practice, as 
the analyst slowly gleans enough from the analysand’s peripheral language to zero in on the 
message from the unconscious that has remained inaccessible to the conscious mind of the 
subject. The analysand’s language is a potential source of displacement and deferral in the form 
of metaphor and metonymy, and thus the analyst attempts to observe the play of signifiers and 
find connections to the signifieds from which they have become alienated through unconscious 
figuration. 
The subject is formed during the Mirror Stage, wherein the infant—still in a state of 
undifferentiated being with the mother—first recognizes itself in the mirror and realizes its 
alienation from the mother.138 The infant is delighted by the superiority it perceives in its 
appearance, which far outstrips its own sense of uncoordination, and a rivalry is created between 
the idealized image (the ideal ego) and the body. To resolve the conflict, the infant identifies 
with the mirror image, insofar as it acts as a sign of bodily mastery yet to come, and in this way, 
the infant becomes trapped in the Imaginary and learns to identify with a product of 
misrecognition.139 The realization of separation from the mother is also important because the 
subject will now comprehend the mother as mOther, thereby creating desire, as we will see 
presently. The important point is that there is a moment of self-realization wherein the infant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Although the infant can see much of itself without the aid of a mirror, the mirror image is crucial 
because it reflects the totality of the body. Here, Lacan is using the mirror literally, but later in his career he would 
acknowledge that the mirror itself was not necessary for an infant to realize his or her own alienation from the 
mOther. Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 75-81. 
 
139 This is not to say that the mature subject will retain a desirous relationship with the mirror image, for 
many adults develop issues resulting from their visual self-perception, whether it be envious desire or alienation. 
This fact only reinforces the importance of the mirror image because it shows the extent to which a subject forms 
ideas about him or herself through a visual representation that the subject imagines to be representative of the gaze 
and judgment of the Other. 
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comprehends him or herself as an independent being alienated from other beings. Lacan uses the 
metaphor of a mirror to describe this, but a literal mirror is not necessary for one to arrive at this 
realization. 
4.1.2 Desire 
 Desire is an abstract, fundamental force in Lacanian theory and is distinct from the 
related forces of need and demand. Initially, the subject is in a state of pure biological need, but 
once the subject recognizes the separation between him or herself and the mOther, the 
relationship changes. The subject becomes enmeshed in the Symbolic, in part, through a gradual 
understanding of the symbolic exchange that occurs when the subject finds that a demand of the 
mOther can result in the satisfaction of need. Joël Dor describes the theoretical first experience 
of satisfaction wherein an infant feels the vital need of hunger and experiences the satisfaction of 
being fed.140 The initial satisfaction occurs before the subject has formed a mental representation 
of the intersubjective exchange, and thus an nmemic trace is created containing a cathected ideal 
of total satisfaction—a total satisfaction from which the subject will be forever alienated. When 
the subject next experiences need, instead of linking need with a Real object (nutrition), the 
power of cathexis—in this case, the satisfaction of need experienced as love—causes the subject 
to link need with a representation of the Real object of satisfaction (the nmemic trace), which in 
turn results in a deficiency between satisfaction of hunger and the cathected nmemic trace of 
impossible, total satisfaction. 
In essence, Real objects can satiate need, but desire is an existential condition for which 
there is no satiation. Here, the subject encounters the inability of the Other’s love to meet his or 
her demand fully, for the subject demands no less than to be the sole object of the Other’s desire. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Joël Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a Language, ed. 
Judith Feher Gurewich and Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 1998), 182-3. 
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This gap between demand and total satisfaction is a permanent lack that Lacan terms desire. 
“Desire,” he writes, “is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the 
difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of 
their splitting.”141 Desire is eternally self-propagating because unlike a need, which can be 
fulfilled at least temporarily (like hunger), desire can never be satiated. Fink writes, 
Desire is a constant search for something else, and there is no specifiable object 
that is capable of satisfying it, in other words, extinguishing it. Desire is 
fundamentally caught up in the dialectical movement of one signifier to the next, 
and is diametrically opposed to fixation. It does not seek satisfaction, but rather its 
own continuation and furtherance.142 
 
Lacan names the pure, abstract cause of desire object (a)—an unattainable, unfixed, immaterial 
cause that excites one of the various drives in a given subject. The individuality of a given 
subject is accounted for in the various drives that are particular manifestations of the general 
field of desire represented by object (a),143 but this should not imply that desire is simply the act 
of, say, seeing a work of art and wanting to possess it. Rather, desire is always intersubjective, 
filtered unconsciously through the Other, as Lacan writes, “man’s desire is the desire of the 
Other.”144  
 This brings us to the dialectical nature of desire, which is multifaceted. On the first level, 
the subject desires recognition by the Other and desires to be the object of the Other’s desire. In 
other words, the subject’s desire is to be desired. Much like Hegel’s master/slave dialectic from 
which Lacan derives his conception of desire, the desirousness of an object is often inextricable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Jacques Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 
2006) 580. 
 
142 Bruce Fink, 1995, 90. 
 
143 The “(a)” stands for the French word “autre,” or “other.” 
 
144 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
Alan Sheridan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XI (New York: Norton, 1978), 235. 
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from the value that the Other places (or appears to place) on it.145 Most often, there is no rational 
justification for the object of a subject’s desire, but even though there is no intrinsic value in the 
object of desire, it takes on value when the Other desires it. Adding to the obscurity of desire, the 
object of desire is always engaged in a process of substitution. Lacan writes, “the enigmas that 
desire…poses for any sort of ‘natural philosophy’ are based on no other derangement of instinct 
than the fact that it is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward the desire for 
something else.”146 Because one cannot desire what one already has, the subject’s field of desire 
is in a constant state of deferral, engaged in a metonymic slide that eludes the subject’s conscious 
mind. 
4.1.3 The Law, Jouissance, and Radical Music 
  The second dialectical level frames desire as inherently transgressive. When the subject 
enters the Symbolic, there are certain conditions instated including what Freud called the 
pleasure principle—a law that, as Lacan writes, “superimposes the reign of culture over the reign 
of nature.”147 Here, Lacan borrows Freud’s metaphor of the Oedipus complex to explain the 
instantiation of desire in the subject. During this stage, the Father uses the threat of castration to 
bar the child from trying to possess the mother in uninhibited, incestuous enjoyment.148 Thus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Lacan writes, “Man’s very desire is constituted, [Hegel] tells us, under the sign of mediation: it is the 
desire to have one’s desire recognized. Its object is a desire, that of other people, in the sense that man has no object 
that is constituted for his desire without some mediation. This is clear from his earliest needs, in that, for example, 
his very food must be prepared; and we find this anew in the whole development of his satisfaction, beginning with 
the conflict between master and slave, through the entire dialectic of labor.” Jacques Lacan, “Presentation on 
Physical Causality,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 148. 
 
146 Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud,” in Écrits, trans. 
Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 431. 
 
147 Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits, trans. 
Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 229. 
 
148 It should go without saying that here Lacan taken Freud’s metaphor and abstracted it even further as a 
way of explaining the establishment of a sense of right and wrong both in the form of socially-determined behavior 
and in the form of subservience to the power of language to structure the world. For example, the Father is not 
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subject is said to be castrated upon entering the Symbolic because he or she is forever separated 
from primordial jouissance—a sort of enjoyment that goes well beyond pleasure to the point of 
intense pain and a breakdown of the Law. 
The establishment of the incest taboo is paradoxical because the mother was never really 
available to the subject, but as we have seen, desire is easily created out of wanting what one 
cannot have. The loss of jouissance upon entering the Symbolic—even if it is based on a 
pleasure that never was—serves to sustain desire because the subject continually strives to 
recover it. As Lacan writes, “desire is the flip side of the law,”149 which is to say that they are 
inextricable from each other. There can be no transgression without taboo, and indeed Lacan 
states, “I can only know of the Thing by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the 
idea to covet it if the Law hadn’t said ‘Thou shalt not covet it.’ But the Thing finds a way by 
producing in me all kinds of covetousness thanks to the commandment, for without the Law the 
Thing is dead.”150 
Because of the prohibition of the Law, the ensuing desire is fundamentally transgressive. 
As the drives circle incessantly around object (a), the promise of reclaiming the jouissance of the 
mythical first pleasure prods the subject along, the Law sustaining desire by keeping the subject 
at a distance from the experience of jouissance. Freud referred to this urge to go beyond the 
pleasure principle as the death drive, a concept that Lacan adopts himself, insofar as the nature of 
the drive is to assuage itself, thereby killing itself and halting desire.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessarily the biological father of the child, nor is the Father necessarily male. Often, Lacan speaks of the ‘paternal 
function’ when describing the establishment of the law, and this paternal function could just as easily be performed 
by a dominant mother or a non-familial primary caregiver. 
 
149 Jacques Lacan, “Kant with Sade,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 665. 
 
150 The “Thing” that Lacan refers is borrowed from Freud’s concept of das Ding, an unknowable object of 
desire that lies beyond the pleasure principle. Later, Lacan would replace the Thing with the concept of object (a). 
Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter, The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan Book VII (New York: Norton, 1997), 83. 
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To bring radical music and expressive noise into the discussion, we can begin to 
understand the relationship between radical music and expressive noise as one of the Law and 
desire, taboo and transgression. The codes of music are mediated by the culture from which they 
arise and they are beholden to the Law in a manner similar to language (although we will see in 
the following section how music itself has special transcendent powers that are not available to 
language). Radical music and expressive noise, on the other hand, function similarly to the 
transgressive power of jouissance—a dangerous gravitational force that points the listener to a 
space outside of music, a space where unrestrained, expressive sonic power dumbfounds the 
listener in a dazzling display of awe and terror.151 This space beyond the power of the signifier—
beyond the power of language to determine and structure—is what Lacan refers to as the Real. 
Merzbow, for example, contends that “sound work is an accumulation of pleasure, and 
the desire for pleasure is endless,”152 which is to say that expressive noise is an aesthetic 
experience that draws us toward the boundless jouissance promised by object (a). Recall, 
however, that despite the intensity of pleasure promised by jouissance, it is always excessive 
pleasure, always more than the subject can stand. Likewise, radical music and expressive noise 
promise the awesome power of erotic transgression, but it too is always excessive. Thus, it is not 
without both pleasure and pain that one experiences radical music and expressive noise. 
4.1.4 The Real 
The first thing to understand is that the Real has nothing to do with reality, the former 
existing outside of the realm of time, society, culture, religion, and intersubjective experience, 
and the latter existing as the opposite—a sociocultural construct that is not only a total product of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 A more nuanced treatment of the agent I refer to as “the listener” will follow below. 
152 Merzbow quoted in Woodward, Merzbook, 53. 
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the Symbolic, but is constituted on an intrasubjective basis for any given individual—and in this 
way, we can consider reality to be a sort of delimitation of the Real at the hands of the Symbolic, 
for it is only through language that the concept of reality, which can be discussed as such, is 
possible. Fink writes, “the real is perhaps best understood as that which has not yet been 
symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists symbolization; and it may perfectly well 
exist ‘alongside’ and in spite of a speaker’s considerable linguistic capabilities.”153 He explains 
this by way of two examples: first, there is the infant’s body prior to its induction into the 
Symbolic through toilet training, language acquisition, and general socialization; second, there is 
the Real that persists in the adult psyche as a kernel that has, as yet, remained unsymbolized, 
such as an experience from a time before the subject had the capacity to understand the 
experience, which would have allowed him or her to process it through the Symbolic.154 The 
Real becomes progressively symbolized in the psyche of an individual as he or she matures. Fink 
describes the state of pure undifferentiated being experienced by infants as an “original” Real 
“being left behind though it can never all be drained away, neutralized, or killed. There is thus 
always a remainder which persists alongside the symbolic.”155 This gives way to a second-order 
Real, which results from the eternal deficiency of the signifier—the inability of words to say it 
all. 
As for Lacan’s “reality,” Ellie Ragland-Sullivan describes it as being “built up by 
structures, effects, and the fragments of perceived fragmentations. Reality, therefore is to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 25. Original emphasis. 
 
154 Ibid, 24-29. It is also worth noting that some theorists like Julia Kristeva believe that the structuration of 
the infant’s Symbolic begins during the prenatal stage where he or she experiences the vibrations of the mother’s 
body. Cf. Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980). 
 
155 Ibid, 27. Original emphasis. 
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assessed in details, allusions, and wisps of meaning, instead of in unified thought systems.”156 
Just as the subject is fooled into believing that thoughts originate in the Imaginary, Lacan writes, 
“the world is merely the fantasy through which thought sustains itself—‘reality’ no doubt, but to 
be understood as a grimace of the Real.”157 The Real is literally impossible to describe with 
words because the moment one attempts a description, it is, ipso facto, filtered through the 
Symbolic, dissolved into language. One may object that the mere act of describing the Real is 
sufficient to inscribe it in the Symbolic, but this would imply that one could actually describe the 
inner workings of the Real. To understand the Real in the way that one understands the Symbolic 
is akin to possessing an omnipotent understanding of the infinite. Scientists can gain knowledge 
of a black hole by observing its effect on light, matter, and electromagnetic radiation, but this is 
far different from either observing the black hole itself, or even being able to find one through its 
intrinsic properties, rather than its extrinsic effects. In much the same way, the Real is only 
known a posteriori through its effects on the Symbolic and the Imaginary. 
Furthermore, even if one is able to describe an encounter with the Real, this has little 
bearing on the traumatic nature of future appearances of the Real. Because the Real is so 
radically beyond what a given subject can process through his or her Symbolic, the Real is 
experienced as a trauma capable of surpassing any intellectual understanding of a particular 
phenomenon. For example, one may understand the nature of an automobile accident very well, 
but the ability to understand it in the Symbolic does not prepare one for the experience of the 
actual event, nor does the lived experience prepare one for a repetition of the same experience. 
Although the effect may be lessened slightly, the trauma will always exceed one’s ability to 	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157 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, trans. Denis Hollier, 
Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 6. 
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process it through the Symbolic as it occurs, provided the encounter is sufficiently severe. It is 
also important to note that the trauma need not necessarily be experienced as a totally negative 
phenomenon. Some may enjoy the masochistic thrill of confronting something that powerfully 
overwhelms their psyches, but whether the encounter with the Real is experienced as a positive 
or a negative, the important point is that the Real is a phenomenon that engulfs the psyche in the 
radically unfamiliar. 
In one sense, the Real is a universal category, insofar as each subject’s psyche has a 
realm that exceeds the Symbolic. In another sense, the fact that each subject has a different body 
of experiences and a different Symbolic constitution means that each subject’s Real will vary. A 
child starts out with a great deal of phenomena that is yet unSymbolized, but as the child matures 
into an adult and gains new experiences, his or her Symbolic expands in an individualized 
manner. At its core, the Real is a concept that encompasses a transcendent experience—
something that drastically exceeds a subject’s ability to process it. The possibilities of a 
Symbolically transcendent experience may be very different between, say, a fire fighter and a 
schoolteacher, but since neither can be said to have a complete realm of experience, they will 
have plenty elements left in their respective Reals.  
In the latter portion of his career, Lacan became interested in the possibilities of topology, 
for it provided him a series of what he considered to be pure signifiers that were unencumbered 
with signifieds (whether any signifier can exist without a signified is, however, a major point of 
contention). In essence, Lacan saw the natural sciences as a field devoid of the signifier of the 
Symbolic—the symbol that stores and modifies meaning in a diachronic and synchronic 
fashion—and was therefore able to represent certain concepts, such as the Real, without 
mediation through the Symbolic. In his words, “every real signifier is, as such, a signifier that 
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signifies nothing,”158 hence the use of “real,” or non-functional, signifiers in the Borromean knot 
to explain the tripartite psyche. 
But the natural sciences were not the only field that Lacan felt could potentially 
circumvent the Symbolic. He writes, 
Of course, works of art imitate the objects they represent, but their end is 
certainly not to represent them. In offering the imitation of an object, they 
make something different out of that object. Thus they only pretend to imitate. 
The object is established in a certain relationship to the Thing and is intended 
to encircle and to render both present and absent.159 
 
The “Thing” to which Lacan refers is a translation of das Ding, Freud’s term for “the cause of 
the most fundamental human passion,”160 which would later be known as object (a). As an object 
situated in the Real, das Ding is indescribable; however, in the case of art, one may get a sense of 
the Real resulting from the manner in which art offers a transcendent experience. Even if we do 
not wish to go as far as to say that art, like the natural sciences, use signifiers without 
corresponding signifieds as Eduard Hanslick might have said if he had had a penchant for 
Saussurian linguistics, we can at least admit that the abstraction and subjectivity in art lend an 
impression of something unnamable that constitutes the appeal of art. Even in objective-
representational art, Lacan is correct in pointing out that—no matter how literal the 
representation—the work still changes its object, communicating in excess of the object itself. If 
we take music as an example, it becomes even easier to accept Lacan’s view of art: there is no art 
less tethered to the Symbolic than non-linguistic, non-pictorial music. 
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 Plato’s description of art as mimesis was cause for banishment not because art could 
merely represent its object, but because of the deception of what art communicates in excess of 
itself. The excess of a work of art was, for Plato, the form—a metaphysical element, perfect in its 
unity—of which all material objects were but poor, incomplete realizations. Art has, by its 
nature, a way of accessing a beyond-of-signification that Plato found dangerous and Lacan found 
fascinating. As an example, Lacan speaks of the value of icons: beyond being pleasing to the eye 
and representing Christian ideas, “what makes the value of the icon is that the god it represents is 
also looking at it. It is intended to please God. At this level, the artist is operating on the 
sacrificial plane—he is playing with those things, in this case images, that may arouse the desire 
of God.”161 This is only one example of how intangible qualities found in art serve to connect art 
to the Real without recourse to the Symbolic. 
Even though Lacan’s examples tend to revolve around visual art, this is no less true in 
music. To take a straightforward example, consider the opening movement of Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 7 in A minor (1811): without imposing a program on the music, one can detect a 
general impression of joy and celebration, but this says very little, for one can improvise a 
reasonably happy-sounding melody using only the white keys of the piano. What is it that makes 
Beethoven’s ascending scales so particularly exuberant? Beethoven uses a common practice 
musical language, but in that realm that we conveniently refer to as genius, we find a token of the 
Real—a message that has not been mediated by the Symbolic, an unsymbolized message that we 
cannot translate or articulate or duplicate through language.162 Moreover, if we understand 
Beethoven to be the subject behind a given enunciation—in this case, a symphony is the 	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162 One can describe certain situations in which the Real has been shown to emerge, and one can attempt to 
describe the effect of the Real after the fact, but in any case, one is simply talking around the Real without being 
able to describe it precisely. 
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enunciation—we can begin to account for his presence as subject. Just as Lacan is interested in 
what is communicated in excess of conscious speech, I am interested in what is communicated in 
excess of any tangible musical material—the unnamable thing in music that be spoken of, but 
never fully explained, talked around, but never captured by words.  
Although these ideas are potentially useful for discussing any type of music, they are 
particularly apropos when examining radical music and expressive noise. In the context of 
expressive noise, the Real is, perhaps, the most apparent because the mediation of the Symbolic 
(in this case, the cultural codes of Western music) is extremely minimal, especially when 
compared to other forms of music. The Real of expressive noise dehisces the cocoon of the 
Symbolic, appearing as pure immediacy of affect—an experience for which there is no signifier 
to create conscious understanding. We may take the composer’s subjectivity qua enunciator of 
the work into account, and we may also understand radical music and expressive noise as 
transgressing upon the Law of musical convention, but the concept of the Real is fundamental to 
the idea of expressive noise. This is, perhaps, the primary reason that it is so difficult to define, 
or even speak about, what expressive noise really is. If one could actually find the words to 
perfectly describe the Real, it would cease to exist because it would be processed through the 
Symbolic. Correspondingly, if one could invent a code to describe expressive noise in absolute 
detail, much in the way that the discourse of music theory and musicology describe music, then 
expressive noise would become music through the very process of signification. But one cannot 
describe the nature and behavior of the Real immanently. We can only know of it through the 
effect it has on the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as we can only ever understand expressive 
noise through difference and opposition. This does not, however, mean that we must stand mute 
in front of expressive noise. Lacan spent decades describing the unconscious, but this 
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illumination did not lesson the power it exerts over a given subject. In the course of this study, I 
explore expressive noise from many angles, but my goal is not to render non-music into music. 
My goal is to enhance understanding and appreciation of a sonic art on whatever terms are 
appropriate, not limited to what traditional aesthetics deem worthy. 
Notably, the way in which an encounter with the Real brings a subject into confrontation 
with something outside of the Symbolic—something unassimilable—is not incredibly different 
than Ricoeur’s use of Heideggerian mood in his conception of mimesis in music. Just as Fink 
suggests that the Real can be thought of as that which has not yet been symbolized, the mood 
suggested by the musical work discloses a certain sense of pre-conscious affect—a sense of the 
great plane of pre-conscious existence external to conscious perception. Each is equally extrinsic 
to a given subject and thus each has a uniquely powerful grasp when they are activated through 
music. Even if the particulars of Ricoeur and Lacan’s conceptions become a bit more divergent, 
the fundamental idea of a space beyond consciousness and rational explanation remains very 
similar.  
4.2 Lacan and the Social 
If one reads Lacan in a particular way, one could accuse him of presenting a monolithic 
view of humankind that negates the import of the social. This, however, is not a productive way 
to approach Lacan. What he provides is a way of articulating modes of experience and 
behavioral patterns that are actually very general. Often times, readers find terms borrowed (and 
abstracted) from Freud’s Oedipal metaphor to be too culturally loaded to understand them in the 
abstract capacity that Lacan intends; however, taking the Father as an example, can one not at 
least allow that, irrespective of one’s sociocultural situation, most humanbeings confront a 
governing entity that instills a belief in a higher power (whether divine or mundane, it makes no 
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difference) who designates the permisable from the unpermisable? For Freud, it was the literal 
father who establishes the concept of the power of authority in the psyche of the subject. For 
Lacan, the Father (capitalized to designate its Symbolic function) could be a dominant mother or 
a non-familial primary caregiver or some other influential disciplinary force, but in each case, the 
subject confronts a more powerful entity who fulfills the establishment of taboo and prohibition 
so that the subject can exist within the society within which he or she is born. As a member of 
Western European society in the twentieth century, Lacan’s metaphors will speak most 
powerfully to those with a similar sociocultural background, even if there is some degree of 
social interoperability at a deep structural level. Perhaps it is best to understand Lacan, my use of 
Lacanian theory, and my project in general as primarily speaking to a Western reader/listener. 
Because the impact of the Real on the auditor figures so prominently in my 
interpretations of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, it is prudent to revisit the Real apropos of the 
individual as listener. If the Real is experienced as a trauma, and if each subject has a different 
realm of experience, to what extent can one speak of the Real emerging from an unchanging 
work of music? It is easy to imagine a stereotypical librarian’s psyche being totally overwhelmed 
by listening to a composer like Merzbow, even at moderate volume, but what of a person who 
works in a machine shop all day and is continually bombarded with loud, inharmonic sounds? 
Certainly, each listening subject will have a different level of tolerance for loud sounds, which is 
significant insofar as one of the most obvious places where the Real emerges in experience is a 
sudden confrontation with sound that is more powerful than one is prepared to accept.  
A number of factors determine what the experience will be for any given listening 
subject. Staying with Merzbow as an example, let us consider a range of listeners from someone 
who listens to popular music casually to someone who has experience with loud music of a 
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conventional variety (e.g., heavy metal played at a high volume) to someone who has listened to 
so-called “noise music” before. The way each perceives the sonic power of Merzbow will 
partially depend upon their previous experience with music that is both unconventional and 
extremely loud. Radical music will be the most powerful in terms of sonics to an inexperienced 
listener, but radical music may be most powerful in terms of aesthetic transgression to a seasoned 
listener who possesses a stronger grasp of musical convention.  
Speaking from personal experience, I have listened to Merzbow for fifteen years, and I 
have a very solid set of expectations when I listen to a new work by Merzbow. I know what to 
expect in terms of form (typically, a lack of discernable form), timbre (lots of inharmonic sound), 
rhythm (a lack of regular pulse, typically), and volume (extreme amplitude levels) on an 
intellectual level. After the intense shock of listening to Merzbow for the first time, my own 
experience of the Real began to be mediated as I formed a Symbolic framework through which 
Merzbow became increasingly comprehensible; however, even after more than a decade, the 
sound remains jarring, louder than I expect, more intense and enveloping than I am prepared for, 
because an intellectual understanding of the Real is insufficient to counteract the sense of danger 
it provokes. To put it in plain language, Merzbow has not necessarily becomed substantially 
“easier” to listen to. 
A boxer may become accustomed to getting punched in the face, a stunt car driver may 
get used to being in automobile accidents, and a music scholar may be familiar with the 
phenomenon of having one’s ears blasted, but when the trauma is sufficiently excessive, it is 
very difficult to eradicate every trace of the Real, to understand the experience totally (i.e., 
intellectually, emotionally, physically, and psychically), to become inured to the trauma. I 
believe that every human psyche has the ability to be overwhelmed by certain base level 
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instincts, which implies that socialization is not totally responsible for the meaning created by 
these experiences. Socialization is an important factor, but it is not the only factor. A sense of 
fear or confusion resulting from a loud sound works at least two levels: on one level, the 
specifics of the auditor’s social environment will trigger varying thoughts (e.g., a city dweller 
might think of gun shots, a rural dweller might think of a propane tank explosion); on another 
level, both should theoretically feel a fear that transcends socialization insofar as they are both 
humans and should instinctually be worried about damage to their ears.  
4.3 Interpretation in Psychoanalysis 
As I now being to bring Lacan and Ricoeur together in an attempt at what Ricoeur would 
call a “secret communion,” we must first understand the nature of interpretation in Lacanian 
theory. I will draw a few connections to Ricoeur in this section before enlarging the scope of my 
comparisons in the following section. 
The common perception of interpretation in psychoanalysis centers on the idea that an 
analyst listens to the analysand describe his or her dreams and then provides a univocal 
interpretation (e.g., “your dream of chopping down a mighty oak tree means that you secretly 
want to cut your domineering father down to size”), and in fact, this is what Freud and his pupils 
did with great success during the inchoate stage of psychoanalytic practice (prior to 1910). At 
that point, bringing a hidden idea to language was sufficient to surprise the analysands with 
something that they perhaps felt, but could not consciously articulate in their own mind. Soon, 
however, the efficacy of these interpretations dropped off considerably and while analysands 
might accept the interpretation consciously, they would find no relief from their symptoms.163 
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Let us consider this change in Ricoeurian terms. Initially, Freud provides interpretations that, like 
a good metaphor, help the analysands to see themselves standing before a proposed world—a 
radical redescription of their reality. Soon after this initial period of success, Freud and his pupils 
began publishing their case studies and, as a result, the interpretations became widely know to 
the point that an analysand might offer his or her own Freudian interpretation of a dream quite 
without the aid of the analyst. The Freudian interpretations became, in a sense, dead metaphors 
as they entered the broad cultural consciousness. Rather than harnessing the redescriptive powers 
of poetic language, the interpretations seemed commonplace and unsurprising. While some 
Freudian factions decided to pursue increasingly complex interpretations in hopes of staying a 
step ahead of their analysands, Lacan proposed a different solution. 
Rather than focusing on a straightforward interpretation of symbols, as some Freudians 
had done, Lacan proposes that analysts “play on the power of symbols by evoking them in a 
calculated fashion in the semantic resonances of [their] remarks.”164 The analyst, then, should not 
present symbols in a definite, univocal capacity, but should instead exploit the natural 
polyvalence of language. This technique, he writes, “would require a profound assimilation of 
the resources of a language, especially those that are concretely realized in its poetic texts.”165 If 
this seems quite similar to Ricoeur’s conception of the power of poetic language, then it is even 
clearer when Lacan seems to be describing the very sort of ontological hermeneutics that Ricoeur 
has theorized at length. Lacan writes, “for in its symbolizing function, speech tends toward 
nothing less than a transformation of the subject to whom it is addressed by means of the link it 
establishes with the speaker—namely, by bringing about a signifying effect.”166 What is this 
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“signifying effect” if not Ricoeur’s power of metaphor brought to the dialogic encounter? In this 
case, however, the dialogic relationship is not one of a shared horizon and common ostensive 
reference points, but one where the speaker deliberately attempts to exceed the horizon shared 
with the interlocutor. The analyst offers deliberately polyvalent statements that require a 
noematic exercise from the analysand, thereby unleashing the affective power of language 
brought to life through interpretation.  
From here, Lacan envisions a new style of interpretation that is less about making sense 
and convincing the analysand of its truth than about creating a certain effect.167 In Lacan’s 
estimation, previous analysts had failed to convince their analysands of the interpretations that 
they offered because the analysts insisted on trying to fit a diverse array of particulars into a 
selection of predetermined archetypes—a sort of symbolic decoding. Instead, the analyst should 
offer disruptive challenges to the analysands that forces them to interpret the interpretation itself, 
which the analysands will do in light of the unconscious sentiments they carry, but cannot 
articulate. To put this in Ricoeurian terms, the analysand must resolve a semantic impertinence 
into a predicative pertinence; the act of metaphorical resolution vivifies the interpretation 
itself.168 Just as Ricoeur avowed the power of the surprise inherent in the logical absurdity of 
metaphor, Fink writes, “often [interpretations] must startle, perplex, or disconcert the analysand. 	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[…] Interpretations that have the most impact are rarely ones that the analysand is expecting.”169 
Lacanian interpretation was thought to be at odds with hermeneutics insofar as hermeneutics was 
thought to be equivalent to exegesis, which would imply an attempt to explain the definitive 
meaning of a text rather than propose a possible meaning. Comparative study shows that Lacan 
and Ricoeur were actually exploring similar issues with respect to interpretation, even if the 
abstruseness of Lacan and the rigorous philosophical language of Ricoeur obscure this 
connection. 
5.0 Ricoeur and Lacan 
 Ricoeur and Lacan had a vexatious relationship, each occupying a different place of 
importance in twentieth-century French intellectual culture. Ricoeur did not care for Lacan’s 
elliptical prose style or the sort of self-aggrandizing, bombastic rhetoric that he practiced in his 
seminars. Meanwhile, Lacan was angered by Ricoeur’s lack of recognition and deference toward 
his own work.170 After some brief encounters (including Ricoeur attending Lacan’s seminar for a 
period at Lacan’s invitation),171 Lacan and his followers would accuse Ricoeur of stealing his 
ideas—a point which Ricoeur refutes by pointing out that the book in question was almost 
completely written by the time he attended Lacan’s seminar.172 The point in recounting this 
background is to show that perhaps it was more an issue of personality than philosophy that 
obstructed these two famous intellectuals from engaging in fruitful dialogue.  	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5.1 Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis 
 Because Ricoeur concentrates almost exclusively on Freud, let us begin there before 
attempting a synthesis of Ricoeur and Lacan. In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur frames 
psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics because both rely on the interpretation of intrinsically 
multivalent symbols. The implication here is that, because symbols are culturally contingent, 
psychoanalysis and the natural sciences are not epistemologically equivalent. Freud’s desire to 
present psychoanalysis as a science of the mind is therefore untenable. The truth offered by 
psychoanalysis is akin to the truths of hermeneutics, which we examined earlier as part of the 
referential capacity of the work. These truths have a propositional character rather than an 
ostensive connection to reality, as such. 
From here, Ricoeur begins to find lines of continuity between phenomenology (what 
Ricoeur considers to be the larger category encompassing hermeneutics) and psychoanalysis. A 
key point is the limitation that he recognizes in phenomenological perception. 
The impossibility of total reflection, hence the impossibility of the Hegelian 
absolute knowledge, hence the finitude of reflection…[is] written into this 
primacy of the unreflected over the reflected, of the operative over the uttered, of 
the actual over the thematic. This unawareness proper to the unreflected marks a 
new step toward the Freudian unconscious; it means that the co-implicit or co-
intended cannot completely attain to the transparency of consciousness precisely 
because of the texture of the act of consciousness, i.e. because of the invincible 
unawareness of self that characterizes intentionality in act.173 
 
Without diminishing the role of intentionality to the extent that Freud does, Ricoeur allows that 
there are indeed powers of consciousness and unconsciousness that are coextensive in each 
individual. With respect to the technique of phenomenological reduction,174 for instance, Ricoeur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 378-9. 
 
174 In the practice of phenomenological reduction, or bracketing, one suspends questions of objective 
existence when reflecting upon an object. The experience of, say, listening to Carl Perkins sing “Blue Suede Shoes” 
93	  	  
writes that here “phenomenology [is turned] directly toward psychoanalysis” 175  because 
phenomenology begins by diminishing the importance of present consciousness.176 It is through 
the dissociation of what is true in reality and what is self-consciously understood as truth that 
“phenomenology reveals the self-misunderstanding inherent in immediate consciousness.”177 
 After outlining a number of striking similarities between phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis,178 Ricoeur asks, “are they not both aiming at the same thing, namely the 
constitution of the subject, qua creature of desire, within an authentic intersubjective 
discourse?”179 There are, however, important differences. First, phenomenological reduction and 
what Ricoeur calls an “archaeological excavation” of the subject are not equivalent. 
Phenomenological reduction is, according to Ricoeur, a reflexive discipline because “the 
displacement of reflection with respect to immediate consciousness” 180  occurs as a 
methodological maneuver. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is not reflexive because it relies on 
an analyst to help the subject understand what he or she would be otherwise unable to see. For 
Ricoeur, it is a matter of the slavery to the unconscious versus the freedom of intentionally 
suspending immediate consciousness.181 Inasmuch as Lacan continues this tradition of the 
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a unique combination of sound pressure waves, a series of notes in a score, a hit single from 1956). 
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176 Ibid., 377. 
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179 Ibid., ff. 389. 
 
180 Ibid., 390. 
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subjugation of consciousness, Ricoeur’s argument exposes the limitations of strict Lacanianism 
because of its sweeping claims regarding intentionality.  
 Second, phenomenology and psychoanalysis have different conceptions of the 
unconscious. In phenomenology, one may speak of non-consciousness, but this is really what 
Freud called pre-consciousness.182 What psychoanalysis refers to as the unconscious is not 
represented in phenomenology. The unconscious in phenomenology can, like the Freudian 
preconscious, be recalled relatively easily because there is no factor of repression involved, but 
when one considers the Freudian unconscious, filled with inarticulable, repressed thoughts only 
discoverable through analysis, then the difference becomes more apparent. Ricoeur writes, “it is 
indeed another text that psychoanalysis deciphers, beneath the text of consciousness. 
Phenomenology shows that it is another text, but not that this text is other.”183 The bar of 
repression separating the conscious from the unconscious is not accounted for in 
phenomenology. Through phenomenology, we may understand that “the lived meaning of 
behavior extends beyond its representation in conscious awareness,” but an additional technique 
is required to “understand the remoteness and the division at the basis of the distortion and 
substitution that make the text of consciousness unrecognizable.”184 The dissimulation that 
occurs as an operation of the unconscious is not explained in phenomenology. It is, however 
explained by Freud through the use of “energy metaphors [that] replace the inadequate language 
of intention and meaning.”185 The cathexis of representations coordinates desire and language in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Pre-consciousness in Freud refers to thoughts that are unconscious, but not repressed, and as such, are 
more easily recalled. See Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: Penguin Books, 
1991), 103. 
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185 Ibid., 393-4. 
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such a way that we may speak of drives. Thus, psychoanalysis is a hermeneutics that is unique in 
its ability to account for the energetics of the unconscious, and so we may see this as an 
important contribution of psychoanalytic technique to hermeneutics. 
 Third, the importance of linguistics is greater in psychoanalysis, especially since Lacan 
declared that the unconscious is structured like a language. Ricoeur insists that if this is true, then 
“the world ‘like’ must receive no less emphasis than the world ‘language.’”186 Rather than 
Lacan’s transposition of linguistic principles into the realm of language, Ricoeur characterizes 
the workings of the unconscious as “paralinguistic distortions” involving the infra- and 
supralinguistic. He writes, 
On the one hand, the dream mechanism borders on the supralinguistic when it 
mobilizes stereotyped symbols parallel to those ethnology finds in the great 
unities of meaning known as fables, legends, myths. […] On the other hand, 
displacement and condensation belong to the infralinguistic order, in the sense 
that what they achieve is less a distinct relating than a confusion of relations.187 
 
The unconscious, then, does not deal exclusively with natural language proper, but also jumbles 
culturally embedded symbols (the supralinguistic) and lower level linguistic operations (the 
infralinguistic) together to create a paralinguistic distortion. Although he appears to believe 
himself to be engaging critically with Lacan, I believe that Ricoeur’s reassessment of the nature 
of language vis-à-vis the unconscious is very consistent with Lacan’s own presentation. Perhaps 
Ricoeur, like many others, has interpreted Lacan’s dictum too literally, as it seems clear that 
Lacan has always intended that language serve as a metaphor for the mechanism of the 
unconscious. In fact, Lacan would later abandon this method in favor of topological models (e.g., 
the Borromean knot) that provided a more abstract, less culturally contingent metaphor. 	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Ultimately, Ricoeur seems to appreciate the benefits of the linguistic model offered by 
psychoanalysis so long as one can make a meaningful distinction between the natural language 
used in analysis and the paralinguistic distortions of the unconscious.  
 Fourth, the topic of intersubjectivity is common to both phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis albeit with an important exception: phenomenology involves the reflection of an 
individual, while psychoanalysis involves the technique of analysis—a dialogic encounter that 
“brings to light, in a special context of disengagement, isolation, and derealization, the demands 
in which desire ultimately consists.”188 The analyst must guide the analysand through the 
sequence of resistance, transference, and repetition; it is not a process that one can perform 
independently. Freud writes, “transference is itself only a piece of repetition, and…repetition is a 
transference of the forgotten past not only onto the doctor but also onto all the other aspects of 
the current situation. […] The greater the resistance, the more extensively will acting out 
(repetition) replace remembering.”189 In sum, transference involves a revival of all manner of 
psychological experiences as they become applied to the analyst in the present. The analyst must 
exploit these transferred emotions without satisfying them, and thus the economy of desire is 
central to the practice of psychoanalysis, but not phenomenology. 
 Ultimately, Ricoeur concludes, “psychoanalysis is a unique and irreducible form of 
praxis” because it is able to address something within ourselves that is not quite attainable 
through conscious phenomenological reflection.190 To summarize the above differences, we find 
that psychoanalysis offers some meaningful extensions to phenomenologically grounded 	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hermeneutics through its treatment of the unconscious as a thing that exceeds our powers of 
conscious reflection, namely in the cathexis of experience and the economy of desire. Both 
Ricoeur and Lacan agree that language provides a point of entry to the analysis of the 
unconscious, even if the wording of their concepts differ slightly. However, Ricoeur insists that 
consciousness is not merely a slave to the unconscious and is unwilling to accept the absolute 
necessity of an analyst in uncovering the workings of the unconscious. 
5.2 Two Hermeneutics 
 Ricoeur offers a re-interpretation of Oedipus Rex as a way of distinguishing between 
what he sees as two types of hermeneutics: “one is orientated toward the resurgence of archaic 
symbols and the other toward the emergence of new symbols and ascending figures.”191 Freud 
famously rejected the traditional interpretation of Oedipus Rex that dealt with the confrontation 
of fate and autonomy because where the ancient Greeks cosmology involved mythical gods who 
intervened in human affairs, contemporary audiences held no such beliefs. Ergo, he reasoned, we 
must attribute the sustained affective power of the tragedy to something else. Freud writes, 
“[King Oedipus’s] destiny moves us only because it might have been ours—because the oracle 
laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him. It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to 
direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous 
wish against our father.”192 For Freud, the tragedy is absolutely transcendent and thus it applies 
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to and speaks to everyone irrespective of culture or familial relations.193 The tragedy grips us 
because we continue to identify with it because it speaks to our own experience of maturation. 
Ricoeur affirms that Freud’s interpretation (if not the scope of his conclusion) is 
“possible, illuminating, and necessary,”194 but he also offers a second interpretation that is, in a 
sense, more complementary than contrary. Because the “first drama” of incest and patricide has 
already occurred before the beginning of Sophocles’s tragedy, Ricoeur highlights a “second 
drama” that deals with truth and self-consciousness. He writes,  
Thus, Oedipus enters into a second guilt, an adult guilt expressed in the hero’s 
arrogance and anger. At the beginning of the play Oedipus calls down curses upon 
the unknown person responsible for the plague, but he excludes the possibility 
that that person might in fact be himself. […] Oedipus must be broken in his pride 
through suffering; this presumption is no longer the culpable desire of the child, 
but the pride of the king; the tragedy is not the tragedy of Oedipus the child, but 
of Oedipus Rex.195  
 
Ricoeur concludes that the downfall of Oedipus was not due to patricide and incest—crimes he 
committed in ignorance, thereby precluding his own ethical responsibility—but due to his 
presumption as king that he is not affected by the truth. The arrogance of his lack of self-
consciousness brings about his guilt.196 
Freud’s psychoanalytic reading is concerned with the first drama—the story of Oedipus 
prior to the action of the play—while Ricoeur is concerned with the second drama—the events 
that constitute the action of the play. Freud’s reading looks to the past while Ricoeur’s reading 
looks to the present, but neither is simply correct. Ricoeur’s bivalent conception of symbols is 	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instructive in this regard because it mirrors the duality of hermeneutic methods. He writes, “on 
the one hand, [a symbol] is a repetition (in all the temporal and atemporal meanings of this term) 
of our childhood. On the other, it explores our adult life.”197 Ricoeur describes enculturation as 
an epigenetic process where symbols carry traces of originary meaning while simultaneously 
collecting new meanings that modify themselves. So too in hermeneutics do we find value in 
looking back and looking forward. 
 The dialectic of these two hermeneutics is not a simple opposition, one oriented toward 
the darkness of the unconscious and the other oriented toward the light of consciousness, but 
neither is it a simple complement. “We cannot,” Ricoeur writes, “simply add up Hegel and Freud 
and give to each a half of man. Just as we must say that everything about man is equally 
physiological and sociological, so we must also say that the two readings in question cover 
exactly the same field.”198 We must understand the conflict of interpretations dialectically rather 
than eclectically, and as proof of this, Ricoeur argues that everything that can be said about one 
hermeneutic can also be said about the other. “Do not both the Phenomenology of Spirit and 
analytical anamnesis finish with a return to the immediate? Conversely, is not psychoanalysis’ 
regression to the archaic a new march to the future? Is not the therapeutic situation in itself a 
prophecy of freedom?”199 The hermeneutical methods are coextensive and we must consider 
both of them as we move toward a dialectical synthesis of interpretation. 
6.0 Toward a Hermeneutics of Radical Music and Expressive Noise 
My final task in this chapter is to bring the above together so as to explain my own theory 
of hermeneutics that is designed to be especially useful for radical music and expressive noise. 	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There are three levels at work in my hermeneutic theory moving from general to specific: On the 
first level we have Ricoeur’s general theory of interpretation, which is the foundation that both 
allows the interplay of the other levels and serves as the conceptual basis for the nature of 
interpretation; on the second level we have a dialectical synthesis of Ricoeur’s unique style of 
ontological hermeneutics and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory; on the third level, we find the ad 
hoc use of concepts selected to address the exigencies of a specific work. This may include 
anything from formal analysis to cultural studies to historiography to arcane occult philosophies, 
all selected according to the needs of a given work. All of the above comes together under the 
umbrella of Ricoeur’s larger interpretation theory. 
The first level is the fundamental category that makes the subsequent levels possible, and 
as such, its principles rarely enter the discussion of specific works. This is the level of 
foundational hermeneutical and epistemological assumptions—the level where concepts like 
work, discourse, and author are grounded. The second level is the active conceptual foundation 
of a specific interpretation. Here we find the use of ontological hermeneutics and psychoanalysis 
as they pertain specifically to the work at hand. At this level we might consider, say, the work of 
Merzbow examining his sonically transgressive work while looking at the ramifications on the 
conscious and unconscious of the listening subject. What can we hear in Merzbow? How does it 
make us feel? Can conscious reflection provide answers for these feelings, or does the work 
reach us more in the unconscious? How can conscious reflection and unconscious analysis be 
combined to lead toward a fuller understanding and appreciation of the work?  
The third level is the metastructural category that is charged with two tasks: the 
exploration of the various features of the specific work and an investigation into the composer 
and his or her conceptual work. Ricoeur greatly diminishes the importance of the author and his 
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or her socio-historical context in the creation and designation of meaning, and although I find his 
reasoning to be cogent, one cannot ignore the continued importance of the author who continues 
to live on—in some capacity—almost five decades after the Barthes declared the author dead. 
Because Western culture continues to find Romantic idea of the author so compelling, there is 
surely something to be gained from considering the author and his or her mentalities, at least to a 
certain degree, in the construction of a holistic interpretation. When contemplating radical music 
and expressive noise, it is all the more important to consider the composer because if he or she 
has rebelled from convention enough to warrant the title of radical composer, he or she probably 
has a very idiosyncratic concept of music, which will feed an interpretation in an important 
manner.  
This is not to say that the radical composer has any more dominion over the meaning of 
the work, for the aforementioned limits on authorial control hold true. One may be fascinated 
with the quirky biographical details of a composer while finding a greatly divergent meaning due 
to any number of factors not limited to historiographical errors. Rather, the composer continues 
to be important because he or she enters the work through implication. In the case of a composer 
like Zorn, Galás, or Merzbow, their conceptions of the nature of music and the role of noise and 
transgression are so unique and powerful that the concepts themselves permeate the work, 
thereby implicating the author as enunciating subject in each sonic utterance. To a certain extent, 
every work created by Merzbow is about Merzbow’s concept of music and sound. Thus, the 
tasks of the third level involve both the use of concepts (e.g., social theory, cultural studies, area 
studies, feminism, literary theory, postmodernism) to interpret the features of the work and an 
engagement with the composer that attempts to understand his or her context while also trying to 
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understand how he or she conceives of fundamental concepts like music, sound, performance, 
and authorship. 
Diamanda Galás’s Wild Women with Steak Knives, for example, is wildly heterogeneous 
and instigates discussions of biography, post-structuralist feminism, gender studies, Greek 
lament traditions, and conceptions of death. Perhaps these categories are less heterogeneous than 
they may seem, for in the case of Galás, we find that in certain Greek traditions death is 
considered feminine. Exploring this conceptual diffraction may help us to understand what 
archaic ideas on death, femininity, and music mean for a Greek-American artist in the late 
twentieth-century postmodern era. A successful interpretation of a work, then, will involve a 
coherent synthesis of its conceptual strands against the framework of the larger hermeneutic 
theory. This is what I call a thick interpretation. 
A thick interpretation aims to satisfy the basic criteria of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic: first, a 
thick interpretation must attempt to cover the greatest number of the work’s particulars, 
including relevant connotations, connections, and derivations; and second, a thick interpretation 
must suggest the best possible synthesis of the work’s features under consideration, along with 
any possible contextual issues. The musical work and its contextual cluster of concepts provide 
clues that feed my interpretation, which attempts to provide a broad understanding of the work 
through the carefully woven convergence of musical and extra-musical features. I do not present 
a thick interpretation in hopes of offering an ironclad, unassailable interpretation, but I do hope 
to open the world of the work up to my reader so that he or she may experience this illumination, 
not only through my perspective, but through the illumination inherent in the metaphors I create 
in service of the work. 
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Although the concept of a think interpretation can be applied broadly to any work, my 
contention is that it is particularly useful when tackling a musical work that abandons musical 
convention because, in lieu of customary interpretive techniques, one must spare no effort in 
following the limited amount of interpretive clues suggested by the work. In theory, one could 
analyze the score of a Haydn symphony, or one could conduct a literary analysis of the text of a 
Schubert lied, and in each case, one could construct an idea of the meaning of the work. Perhaps 
these methodologies would not lead to a comprehensive understanding of the work, but when 
one considers the number of scholars who find the results of score or literary analysis to be an 
entirely sufficient mode of musical understanding, it is clear that there is no single-
methodological approach that contributes toward an understanding of a work of radical music in 
the same way and to the same extent. When faced with the hermeneutic challenges of radical 
music and expressive noise, it becomes crucial to examine every angle simply because 
conventional musical concepts are so insufficient in these cases. 
Radical music and expressive noise are both categories that are radically other; they 
speak to the fringes of experience and existence. In many cases a discussion of the mimetic 
power of music (i.e., its ability to redescribe reality in the form of a phenomenological mood) is 
obviated because there are other features that are either more conventional (e.g., form, harmony) 
or more directly referential (e.g., programs, lyrics) that one may cover with the satisfaction of 
having explained enough of the elements to be considered thorough; however, in the case of 
radical music and expressive noise, the lack of conventional features makes the affective power 
all the more important. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) sociopolitical grounding of radical 
music and expressive noise provides a few anchoring points for contextual analysis, but the 
power of its transgression exceeds an assessment of its mere difference. 
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As I have shown in section 3.2, Ricoeur’s ontological hermeneutics work well with 
musical works, and in section 4.1.4 I have argued that the addition of Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory is advantageous when confronting radical music and expressive noise. The role of 
psychoanalysis requires the most explanation, and although it will become clearer in the 
following chapters, I will offer a few remarks at this time. As I see it, psychoanalysis can 
contribute in two main areas: at the broad level of cultural analysis and at the specific level of the 
work. Both are potentially useful, but in the present study, I will focus primarily on the latter 
because, far from making sweeping claims about music and society at large, I am content to 
tackle the interpretation of specific musical works as a first step toward the introduction of 
Lacanian theory into the discourse of musicology. 
In the case of the cultural analysis, we may follow the model initiated by Freud and 
exemplified in his extrapolation of the Oedipus myth to Western culture, as well the more 
contemporary applications from scholars such as Slavoj Žižek. In the case of the specific level of 
the work, we have two options: the workings of the Lacanian psyche can serve as an extended 
metaphor for the work, but it can also be applied literally to the subjective experience of 
listening. Both uses speak to the affective dimension of musical experience and the meaning 
created therein. For example, let us consider the Lacanian Real. The Real is a powerful metaphor 
for that which exceeds one’s capacity for representation and understanding (as we find in radical 
music and expressive noise), and it is also a way of describing the actual experience of listening, 
especially with respect to expressive noise, a sonic phenomenon that traumatically exceeds one’s 
capacity for representation and understanding in a very literal manner. My approach to musical 
hermeneutics may involve, at times, both literal and the figurative applications of Lacanian 
concepts depending upon the nature of the work at hand. This should not, however, imply that 
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every listener’s reaction would be exactly the same. As stated above, the diverse and unique 
body of experiences that each listener brings to the work will necessarily impact the psychical 
effects of the work.  
The reason behind the comparative readings of Ricoeur and Freud in section 5.0 was to 
demonstrate not only the ability of Ricoeur and Lacan to work in concert, but to show, as 
Ricoeur argues, that psychoanalysis is a hermeneutics and that the conflict of interpretations—
the archaic and the present, the conscious and the unconscious, the psychoanalytic and the 
phenomenological—is actually a productive, dialectical collision of coextensive interpretations. 
Few would be willing to surrender the efficacy of volition that strict Lacanianism appears to 
require, but if we counterbalance the power of the unconscious with the power of conscious 
reflection, then we arrive at a far more tenable hermeneutic.  
 Ultimately, the hermeneutic theory outlined above is of little consequence if it does not 
serve the music. It is not my goal to promote the use of Ricoeur and Lacan in the musicological 
discourse beyond the level that they offer helpful concepts for the interpretation of musical 
works. Although I believe my thick interpretation hermeneutic is potentially useful for a great 
variety of musical practices, I will not argue that position here. I simply propose the thick 
interpretation hermeneutic as a means toward a fuller understanding and appreciation of a vital 
and important musical practice that is underserved through existing hermeneutic approaches. As 
I continue with cases studies focusing on John Zorn, Diamanda Galás, and Merzbow, I hope that 
the effectiveness of my method will become apparent.  
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Chapter 2 – Towards a Theory of Radical Music and Expressive Noise 
1.0 Introduction  
 Radical music tends to provoke a range of strong emotions, from shock to extreme 
consternation to utter confusion. Whatever the reaction, one can assume that neutrality or 
passivity is not one of them. Often times, the listener instinctively reaches for the volume knob 
because, irrespective of the actual amplitude level, the sonic shock is so far beyond one’s 
musical experience that the aural discomfort is incorrectly attributed to excessive loudness. The 
inevitable question follows: what is this? Previously, one had two basic options when attempting 
to answer the disquieted listener: either surrender any hope of terminological specificity and 
refer to the music as “experimental,” or launch into a lengthy explanation of whatever 
neologistic stylistic label the composer had deemed appropriate for his or her music. In this 
chapter I propose two terms around which we may build a general discourse of extreme and 
transgressive artistic sonic expressions: radical music and expressive noise.  
 The goals, then, of this chapter are fourfold: 1) to present a selection of important stylistic 
moments in the history of radical music; 2) to explain the concepts of radical music and 
expressive noise; 3) to situate them within the musicological discourse, as well as within 
discourses of art, sound, and media studies; and 4) to reflect on the relationship of music to 
sound—and sound art—on a conceptual level. In the course of my explanation of radical music, I 
will provide a brief survey of some important moments in the history of music that helped make 
radical music possible, and this will lead to a preliminary set of commonalities, including 
philosophical and aesthetic goals, as well as musical features. My explanation of expressive 
noise will focus more on the concept of noise as I survey what the idea of noise has represented 
to music and sound scholars in the twentieth century. In the final section, I will confront the 
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challenges to the concept of music issued by art, sound, and media theorists, especially as they 
pertain to the idea of sound art.  
2.0 Radical Music 
If radicalism is the quality of extreme deviance from convention, then we must first 
outline the principles of said convention.200 My assumptions cover three categories: material, 
concept, and development. The materiality of conventional music consists of the standard 
components of music including rhythm, pitch, meter, texture, melody, harmony, and form. Any 
given musical expression is likely to have many or all of these components. The concepts of 
conventional music are diverse, but have included such notions as music as fine art, 
entertainment, and linguistically transcendent expression. Conceptions of music have varied 
from era to era, and within different types of musical practices, but when we look at pre-
twentieth-century Western musical practices, it appears that the range of concepts are different 
ways of describing something that has remained relatively stable. Finally, the development of 
music involves a series of changes within ongoing streams of musical practice. The extent to 
which this change is an evolution (as opposed to simple difference) is unclear, but suffice it to 
say that within the temporal progression of a given musical language, whether vernacular or high 
art, there is at least a short-term awareness of what has come before and a desire to forge a new 
path for oneself, which typically involves building upon the work previously done in a way that 
avoids drastic paradigm shifts in favor of incremental modifications. 
Radical music, then, involves any intentional, aesthetic, aural expression that exhibits a 
particularly transgressive character with regard to both musical convention and many musical 
traditions. There are degrees of transgression, as not all radical music will eschew every single 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 For the purposes of this study, I am limiting my discussion to Western music and, to an extent, the 
greater cosmopolitan practices that are largely derived from Western musical traditions. 
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one of the constitutive material or conceptual components of music. Looking briefly to my case 
studies, we find a wide range: John Zorn’s Astronome has form, meter, rhythm, and texture, but 
few discernible pitches,201 little that we could safely call melody, and very little harmony of 
which to speak; Diamanda Galás’s Wild Women with Steak Knives has virtually no intentional 
rhythmic content, no meter, no systematic pitch relationships, and only the loosest of formal 
organization; and Merzbow’s work—especially Pulse Demon—uses almost none of the musical 
components listed above, approaching the theoretical opposite of music—pure, formless timbre.  
Radical music crosses a threshold where the assumption that a culturally aware listener 
could necessarily identify the acoustical information as music is thrown into question. It crosses 
a threshold where traditional analytic and hermeneutic methodologies cease to yield material or 
cogent interpretations of meaning immanent to the music because the music itself defies the 
terminology all the way down to the atomic level of pitch. In short, throws the concept of music 
into an ontological crisis. In this place where our vast heritage of Western analytical techniques 
cannot tell us anything substantive, where historically based assumptions are discarded, where 
cultural associations are invalidated, one finds radical music. 
I have chosen to call this music “radical” instead of experimental or avant-garde for 
semantic and historiographical reasons. Looking first to semantics, the term “experimental” 
implies that the composer was simply testing out a compositional idea with the resulting work 
amounting to a mere outcome, rather than a carefully crafted, finished artistic statement. Perhaps 
this label is appropriate in a few instances—Xenakis’s most exploratory works like Achorripsis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 The bass guitar is ostensibly playing specific pitches, but due to heavy distortion, the pitch content 
becomes generalized to the point that we can only pick out contours. 
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(1956-7) come to mind 202 —but for the vast majority of music that has been labeled 
“experimental,” the word is inappropriate. Varèse, for example, denies that what he creates is 
experimental music: “I offer a ‘finished product:’ it is for the audience…to make the experiment 
of confronting a new work.”203 
The “avant” in avant-garde implies a trajectory of musical progression wherein what is 
currently before will ostensibly become during and then after, as if music as a whole will catch 
up to these culturally deviant expressions, and then move beyond them—a view which is not 
supported by twentieth-century musical history where the avant-garde remains perpetually 
“ahead” of the mainstream, even decades later. Are Babbitt or Stockhausen’s serialist feats any 
less alienating to general listeners today than they were at the time of their conception? David 
Nicholls argues that there are varying degrees of this phenomenon, citing Steve Reich and Philip 
Glass, who both began their careers as avant-gardists before becoming establishment figures of 
musical postmodernism with a large non-specialist following.204 This use of the term “avant-
garde” makes logical sense, but it is questionable that Reich and Glass would have ever fit the 
criteria of radicalism as outlined above. Their musical expression may have arrived before the 
general listening public was ready to make sense of it, but their reintroduction of conventional 
triads alone precludes them from being considered substantively radical. One could also argue 
that some of the techniques of high modernism, for example, have found their way into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 In Achorripsis, Xenakis sets about testing his thesis of minimum constraints. In this case, he actually did 
conduct an experiment based on ideas of the “fundamental phases of a musical work.” He set out to determine the 
absolute minimum of musical features required to constitute a musical event, and Achorripsis was the result. Iannis 
Xenakis, “Free Stochastic Music,” in Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in Music (Hillsdale: Pendragon 
Press, 1992), 22. 
 
203 Edgard Varèse quoted in Arnold Whittall, Music Since the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 198. 
 
204 David Nicholls, “Avant-garde and Experimental Music,” in The Cambridge History of American Music, 
ed. David Nicholls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 517. 
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public consciousness, particularly in film music, but there is surely a sizable difference between 
the appreciation of Penderecki’s “sonority pieces” as underscoring for an ax-wielding madman in 
Stanley Kubrick’s film, The Shining (1980), and widespread acceptance of the same work qua 
concert music. 
Both terms present a historiographical problem as well, insofar as they have already been 
used in the musicological literature to refer to specific movements in twentieth-century 
Modernism. The terms typically mark a discursive divide between European avant-gardists who 
push boundaries while remaining committed to their inherited tradition of art music excellence 
and American experimentalists who reject the European style in favor of novel and individualist 
musical inventions. The extent to which this contradistinction reflects much beyond the 
historian’s framing is difficult to discern—as we will see in section 2.1.3—but the idea still 
obtains. The experimental/avant-garde divide will become clearer during the following historical 
discussion, but for now it is sufficient to understand that these are both loaded terms already at 
work in the discourse on musical modernism.  
2.1.0 Key Moments in the Development of Radical Music: A Historiographical Problem 
Let us consider the historical aspects of radical music: where did the practice originate, 
what are some lines of influence, what ideas have made it possible, and when can we speak of its 
inception, if indeed there is one? Radicalism itself is a historically transcendent concept and 
there are plenty of examples within music to which one could point. Carlo Gesualdo’s madrigals, 
for instance, contained a degree of chromaticism that would remain unmatched for at least two 
hundred years. Surely one could refer to him as experimental, avant-garde, or radical. As I define 
radical music, however, it is a decidedly twentieth- and twenty-first-century practice and is 
inextricable from the disintegration of the Enlightenment project at the hands of postmodern 
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incredulity. Perhaps there is a limited value in applying the term anachronistically to the few 
composers that worked against Enlightenment ideology; however, this is a difficult task 
considering the way in which non-canonic composers had been jettisoned by the creation of 
history until the dawn of new musicology. There may have been numerous radical composers 
working against the mainstream of music, but through historiographical filtration as well as the 
inability to record or somehow preserve the work of these hypothetical composers, it would be 
nearly impossible to find evidence of their existence, much less their music. Although there are 
numerous cases in Western musical history where a composer was “ahead” of his or her time, 
these composers are better understood as innovators who pushed music in new directions that 
would eventually influence other composers. In contradistinction, radical composers tend to 
transgress cultural norms so extensively that they do not lead to widespread cultural shifts. When 
these cultural transgressions do not fit within the narrative of stylistic development that had been 
a central component of many musical histories, they are discarded as aberrations for the sake of 
historical coherence. Ultimately, perhaps it is most useful to say that the intrinsic element of 
radicalism is historically transcendent, but because the music that is the topic of this dissertation 
is so bound to the postmodern paradigm shift, “radical music” is most clearly defined when it is 
associated with late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century composers. 
Given the inherent heterogeneity of the composer that I am calling radical, a conventional 
historical-aesthetic trajectory would appear to be impossible to construct. On the one hand, a 
significant part of the compositional mentality of a radical composer involves a rejecting of 
tradition; on the other hand, however, there are numerous precedents for radical music in the 
twentieth century, and one can actually trace some lines of influence for composers such as Zorn, 
Galás, and Merzbow. Even if their aesthetic lineage does not share the developmental coherency 
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of, say, the Germanic art music tradition stretching from Bach to Schoenberg—especially insofar 
as the composers themselves intentionally sought to align themselves with the tradition, at least 
after Beethoven—perhaps one could consider radical composers as belonging to a tradition of 
transgression—a tradition of aesthetic deviance that rejects the musical status quo in a rigorous 
and substantive manner. 
Although it is not my intention to present an exhaustive history of radical music at this 
time, it is helpful to survey a selection of important historical moments so that we may 
understand some of the various threads of the past that have contributed to the development of 
radical music. The construction of a linear narrative made more sense for a time when composers 
were not as historically conscious as they are today. Prior to the Romantic period, composers 
were most likely to know the music that directly preceeded them, which is a very different way 
to experience the musical past. Today, when one considers the immediate ease of listening to 
anything from Chopin to Nine Inch Nails to field recordings of Balinese gamelan music—all 
from the comfort of one’s personal digital music collection—questions of traceable, singular 
influence become increasingly irrelevant. Zorn is the quintessential example here, for an attempt 
to account for each of his lines of influence would result in an unintelligibly complex and 
comprehensive history of Western and non-Western music.  
2.1.1 Key Moments in the Development of Radical Music: A Brief History 
My present task is to select a few crucial moments in the development of aesthetic 
mentalities that made radical music possible. These are not so much historical epochs as they are 
situations that expanded conventional conceptions of music and art. There are three primary 
moments: First are the early twentieth-century modernist movements in Europe, especially 
including Futurism (ca. 1909-1916) and Dadaism (ca. 1916-1924); second are the two main 
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movements in musical modernism including the European avant-garde and the American 
experimental tradition (ca. 1920-1970); and third is the rise of electronic music including 
musique concrète, elektronische musik, and the sundry technological innovations that have 
ramifications beyond electronic music itself (ca. 1949-). Undoubtedly, one could select any 
number of musical, aesthetic, and philosophical streams that helped create a space for radical 
music to develop, and I offer these only as a preliminary survey. Following these three moments, 
I will also introduce some transitional figures and practices that have roots in musical 
modernism, but who also bridge the gap between modernism and postmodernism in a 
philosophical and aesthetic sense. 
2.1.2 Early Twentieth-Century Modernist Movements 
The first of our moments is found at the turn of the twentieth century with the movements 
that Andreas Huyssen describes as the historical avant-garde.205 This includes Expressionism, 
Dadaism, Futurism, and Constructivism, although for the present discussion, Dadaism and 
Futurism are the most centrally important. Although these movements were not explicitly 
concerned with music, per se, they were important for their rebellion against the aesthetic 
standard of late Romanticism. In place of transcendent works by autonomous, genius artists, 
these movements had a decidedly destructive impulse that sought to defile art through the 
introduction of the popular, the prosaic, the absurd, and generally through any means capable of 
transgressing convention.206 L’art pour l’art was rejected in favor of a politically conscious art 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986), vii. 
 
206 Robert Hughs, The Shock of the New: The Hundred-Year History of Modern Art, Its Rise, Its Dazzling 
Achievement, Its Fall (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 63. Cf. also, Ardengo Soffici, “The Subject in Futurist 
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made to attack the dominant institutions of taste and morality. Art became less concerned with 
pleasing the sensorium with beauty and more concerned with stimulating the mind through 
conceptual means. Any preoccupation with decoration, ornamentation, or beauty was promptly 
discarded as trivial, bourgeois decadence.207 
Looking first to Futurism, there are two particularly pertinent manifestos, one by founder 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, and the other by Luigi Russolo, who was the most explicitly 
musical of the group. Marinetti’s Manifesto of Futurism (1909) exhibits a straightforwardly, 
aggressively transgressive spirit. Marinetti provides eleven incendiary points, five of which 
include: 
1. We intend to sing the love of danger, the habit of energy and fearlessness. 
2. Courage, audacity, and revolt will be essential elements of our poetry. 
7. Except in struggle, there is no more beauty. No work without an aggressive 
character can be a masterpiece. Poetry must be conceived as a violent attack on 
unknown forces, to reduce and prostrate them before man. 
9. We will glorify war—the world’s only hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the 
destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and 
scorn for woman. 
10. We will destroy the museums, libraries, academies of every kind, will fight 
moralism, feminism, every opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice.208 
 
The hawkish, misogynist, chauvinist rhetoric of the Futurists has not persisted, but the vigorously 
transgressive spirit lives on in radical music. The important difference is that rather than 
“[setting] fire to the library shelves” and “[turning] aside the canals to flood to museums,”209 
radical music does seek to destroy the artistic past. Rather, it seeks to destroy the hierarchies 
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Press, 2009), 67-8. 
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Isms, ed. Mary Ann Caws (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 187. 
209 Ibid.,188. 
 
115	  	  
created by an overvaluation of the artistic past that leads to aesthetic prescription. Instead of 
negating the past, radical music negates the notion that the classic works of venerated masters are 
intrinsically superior. 
If manifestos like Marinetti’s were important to future of transgressive art in general, 
Luigi Russolo’s seminal manifesto, The Art of Noises (1913), was of particular importance for 
multiple streams of unconventional music. John Cage’s Credo: The Future of Music (1937)—
itself an important manifesto for American experimental music—is partially derived from 
Russolo’s manifesto,210 the idea of an “art of noises” would be inspiring to the pioneers of 
electronic music in the 1950s, and certain early industrial music bands would also cite Russolo as 
an influence.211 Beyond the direct influence of Russolo’s manifesto on radical musicians 
(especially Merzbow and other composers working with “noise”), The Art of Noises affected so 
many of the musical streams that would make radical music possible by the latter part of the 
twentieth-century. 
As for the manifesto itself, The Art of Noises, was a clarion call to look beyond the 
conventions of melody, harmony, and traditional instruments, and it continues to resound today, 
especially insofar as it is mentioned in virtually every book on sound art. As Cage would echo 
two decades later, Russolo writes, “every manifestation of life is accompanied by noise. Noise is 
thus familiar to our ear and has the power of immediately recalling life itself. […] By selecting, 
coordinating, and controlling all the noises, we will enrich mankind with a new and unsuspected 
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pleasure of the sense.”212 To a certain extent, Russolo’s proposal has traces of convention. He 
envisioned an “orchestra” of noise-generating machines that would realize compositions created 
according to a new language of “noises” rather than harmony. The latter point is, perhaps, the 
most important because it signals a shift towards the centrality of timbre instead of the traditional 
central concern of intervallic relationships. Russolo stops short of Cage’s great innovation—the 
use of natural, non-aestheticized sound within the framework of an aesthetic expression—but his 
call to consider a music centered on timbre rather than harmony was of the utmost importance. 
 In contrast to the violent, fascistic rhetoric of the Futurists, Dada was marked by a desire 
of childlike simplicity—a desire to know nothing. As Francis Picabia put it in his Dada 
Manifesto (1920), “Dada itself wants nothing, nothing, nothing, it’s doing something so that the 
public can say: ‘We understand nothing, nothing, nothing.’ The Dadaists are nothing, nothing, 
nothing—certainly they will come to nothing, nothing, nothing.”213 Rather than the aggressive 
proclamations of the Futurists, the Dadaists wished to surrender control and logical sense to 
chance. Robert Hughes describes these early avant-garde movements as buying into the “central 
myth…that by changing the order of language, art could reform the order of experience and so 
alter the conditions of social life”—a myth that would disintegrate with the advent of World War 
II.214 The Dada solution was to forsake all knowledge in favor of the nonsense of chance. As 
Tristan Tzara asserted, “logic is a complication. Logic is always wrong. It draws the threads of 
notions, words, in their formal exterior, toward illusory ends and centers. Its chains kill, it is an 
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enormous centipede stifling independence.”215 Having recently emerged from the trauma of 
World War I, the ideal of logic and sense had, for the Dadaists, clearly failed humanity. It was 
time for a new beginning and that beginning was Dada.216 
 The Zurich-based Dada practitioners like Hugo Ball and Jean Arp are notable for their 
rejection of tradition, but the Dada movement was not neatly contained within Switzerland and, 
in fact, two of the most interesting Dadaists—Kurt Schwitters and Marcel Duchamp—were 
actually peripheral figures with divergent aims driving their art. 217  With Schwitters and 
Duchamp, there was much less rhetoric concerning the burning of libraries and museums, and 
much more emphasis on the elevation of everyday objects to the level of art. 
Initially, Schwitters collected various scraps of waste paper—advertisements, documents, 
whatever he might find—and created collage works that he referred to as “Merz” paintings. 
Soon, however, he began work on his masterpiece, the Merzbau: The Cathedral of Erotic Misery 
(1923), which was a house in Hanover that became a massive installation in a perpetual state of 
development.218 As Schwitters would walk around the city, he would find various discarded junk 
items, return home with them, and work them into the Merzbau. Much like Duchamp’s more 
widely known “readymades,” Schwitters’ work is remarkable for “contaminating” the realms of 
high art with everyday objects. Where art had been previously governed by aesthetics, Schwitters 	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217 Curt Germundson, “Kurt Schwitters and the Alternative Art Community in Hanover,” in Dada: 
Cologne, Hanover, eds. Charlotte Stokes and Stephen C. Foster (London: Prentice Hall, 1996), 216. 
218 The most thorough documentation and analysis of Schwitters’ Merzbau can be found in Elizabeth Burns 
Garnard, Kurt Schwitters Merzbau: The Cathedral of Erotic Misery (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
2003). 
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and Duchamp pushed art into the realm of the concept. Each in their own way, they forced the 
spectators to question the very nature of art and artistic presentation.  
Cage would go on to explore these same ideas in the 1950s, this time pertaining to 
sound.219 Rather than defacing the Mona Lisa, however, he would attest to the beauty of non-
musical sound presented within a musical context both through his writings and through certain 
works like 4’33” and 0’00”.220 Although I will discuss the significance of the introduction of 
non-aestheticized sound a bit later, we may now appreciate the visual precedent of Cage’s sonic 
innovation.  
To summarize the elements of the historical avant-garde that are most important to 
radical music, we must include the willingness to adulterate fine art with everyday objects—junk 
from the streets, sounds from the city—along with a generally apostatical attitude towards artistic 
traditions amongst the most important. Russolo’s proposition of introducing non-instrumental 
sound into the concert hall, as well as his avowal of the primacy of timbre over harmony, would 
go on to influence Cage and his exponents, the pioneers of electronic music, and radical 
composers (both directly and indirectly). Schwitters’ and Duchamp’s use of found objects would 
set the precedent for the use of non-aestheticized sound within a musical context, and 
Duchamp’s turn toward the conceptual would be of particular importance for the American 
experimentalists as well as for radical composers directly.221 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Sam Richards, John Cage As… (Oxford: Amber Lane Press, 1996), 131-40. 
220 Richard Kostelanetz, John Cage (ex)plain(ed) (New York: Schirmer Books, 1996), 11. 
221 For instance, Branden Joseph describes the importance of the European avant-garde to the philosophical 
development of John Cage in Branden W. ‘Joseph, “‘A Therapeutic Value for City Dwellers’: The Development of 
John Cage’s Early Avant-Garde Aesthetic Position,” in John Cage: Music, Philosophy, and Intention, 1933-1950, 
ed. David W. Patterson (London: Routledge, 2002), 144-150. 
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The key difference between these movements and radical music is that the past no longer 
needed to be destroyed. The past, like everything else, is available to be used and abused 
according to whatever means are desired. With respect to Western music’s most cherished 
institution—the European classical tradition—it was not necessary to demolish the concert hall, 
burn the scores, and murder the conductors. Instead, the tradition was subverted and put on equal 
footing with every other class of music. 
2.1.3 Musical Modernism 
 Musical modernism, as a stylistic period and movement label, refers to one of the most 
heterogeneous movements in the conventional history of Western music. Modernism in music is 
not so much ill defined, as it is impossible to define in the same manner as other stylistic periods 
and movements because of the importance that its practitioners attribute to thoroughgoing 
originality. Much like the case of radical music, we can point toward some important figures and 
some important moments, but there is no pervasive aesthetic, and in fact, one of the tenets of 
modernism is the value of abandoning a pervasive aesthetic. From these comments alone, one 
can already see the similarities between musical modernism and the practice that I am calling 
“radical music.” The modernist situation is further exacerbated by a discursive divide between 
European modernists (often referred to as “avant-garde”) and American modernists (often 
referred to as “experimental”). In this section, I will comment on some of the general mentalities 
and stylistic trends present in modernist musical practice across both continents, and I will 
present a survey of the debate between American and European modernist practices. 
 Just as the period after World War I had provoked a thorough reconsideration of the role 
of art in life for the Dadaists and Futurists, the period following World War II provoked another 
response in musical practice. The difference here is that while World War I ravaged Europe, it 
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did not match the horror of the Holocaust or the existential dread that accompanied the atomic 
age. Conventional conceptions of art seemed altogether trivial and even delusional. Adorno’s 
familiar maxim, “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,” neatly sums up the post-1945 
sentiments.222 Some composers like Ernst Krenek would even attempt to remove all human 
agency from their music in hopes that the rigorous objectivity of serialism (objective in the sense 
that correct and incorrect notes could be determined by reference to the a priori compositional 
scheme) would allow music to be composed in a manner untainted by human fallibility.223 
Even if many composers were less pessimistic about the human element of music than 
Krenek, many were still operating in the Adornian paradigm of music as an autonomous, 
uncontaminated essence that is, by virtue of this quality, able to critique the society that it 
alienates itself from, thereby affecting progressive social change.224 These ideas, now too easily 
dismissed as “elitist,” obtained for numerous strains of modernist music—particularly those 
styles derived from Webernian serialism including the work of Pierre Boulez and the Darmstadt 
school in Europe and Milton Babbitt in the United States—until the dawn of postmodernism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 34. 
223 Krenek writes, “Actually the composer has come to distrust his inspiration because it is not really as 
innocent as it was supposed to be, but rather conditioned by a tremendous body of recollection, tradition, training, 
and experience. In order to avoid the dictations of such ghosts, he prefers to set up an impersonal mechanism which 
will furnish, according to premeditated patterns, unpredictable situations.” In this extreme case, it appears that, when 
read in the context of postwar disillusionment, Krenek is advocating a sort of agentless composition on the grounds 
that humanity is fallible and cannot be trusted with the whimsy of chance qua the traditional idea of inspiration. 
Ernst Krenet, “Extents and Limits of Serial Techniques,” in Problems of Modern Music: The Princeton Seminar in 
Advanced Musical Studies, ed. Paul Henry Lang (New York: Norton, 1960), 90. 
224 Adorno writes, “[this] type of music is that which, without consciousness of its social location or out of 
indifference toward it, presents and crystallizes its problems and the solutions thereto in a merely immanent manner. 
[…] It ‘represents,’ to be sure, not a pre-established harmony, but certainly an historically produced dissonance, 
namely, social antinomies. This…type, as ‘modern’ music is the only music which offers a serious shock to the 
listener, is represented essentially by Arnold Schoenberg and his school.” Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Social 
Situation of Music,” trans. Wes Blomster, revised by Richard Leppert in Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 396. 
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The importance of social and political change through music only seemed to intensify, as the full 
magnitude of the atrocities of World War II became known. It should be noted, however, that a 
bit of equivocation may be in order, insofar as it is difficult to speculate on the degree to which 
the innovatory attitude toward aesthetics was driven by the sociopolitical issues versus the 
natural inclination to forage one’s own artistic path amplified by the newfound twentieth-century 
freedom to offer divergent aesthetic expressions. Certainly existential anxiety played a role in 
post-1945 modernist aesthetics, but it is unlikely that it accounts for the entirety of the aesthetic 
innovations in this period. Some composers like Stockhausen thought of themselves as dutifully 
pushing their inherited musical tradition into new realms,225 while others like Iannis Xenakis 
considered a fundamental break from tradition as the best way forward. Despite the war, the 
perennial desire to move art into new realms was present. 
Discussions of modernism in music use the terms “experimental” and “avant-garde” in 
two ways: the first has to do with the straightforward dictionary definitions, but the second has to 
do with the discursive division mentioned above. In this second usage, experimentalism and 
avant-gardism present a number of dichotomies: Experimentalists are American (or figures like 
Varèse who were most active in the United States) while avant-gardist composers are European; 
experimentalists are not affiliated with institutions while avant-gardists receive plentiful 
institutional support; experimentalists reject their musical inheritance while avant-gardists accept 
its fundamental premises and attempt to further the surface level musical language;226 above all, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Stockhausen has said that, “the contemporary composer is responsible above all for the protection and 
the continuity of the great traditions.” Mya Tannenbaum, Conversations with Stockhausen, trans. David Butchart 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 8. 
226 McClary speaks about this issue, framing the avant-garde steam of ostensibly humorless music that has 
embraced increasingly rigorous uses of serialism as it attempts to establish a new aesthetic language in continuity 
with the prestigious tradition of European art music. Susan McClary, “Terminal Prestige: The Case of Avant-Garde 
Music Composition,” Cultural Critique 12 (1989): 57-81. 
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experimentalism is inextricable from American mentalities of independence, self-reliance, and 
exceptionalism while avant-gardism takes the preeminence of the European art music tradition as 
axiomatic.227 So goes the narrative.228 
One must ask, however, to what extent this discursive divide is a productive way to 
differentiate between modernist musical practices that are already so thoroughly divergent in 
their musical particulars even within the same continent. After all, we can find caricatures of the 
dour, academic serialist in Babbitt just as easily as we can in Boulez; likewise, we can find 
caricatures of the gleeful, non-academic indeterminist in Kagel just as easily as we can in Cage. 
Before I ask if there is a true essence of “American experimentalism” existing in 
contradistinction to “European avant-gardism,” let us survey some of the features common to 
both modernist streams. 
Composers on both continents made considerable musical innovations in both material 
and aesthetic terms. Schoenberg’s twelve-tone technique initiated a fascination with a priori 
compositional systems of a novel variety, and this trend continued, not just in the expansion of 
twelve-tone music to serialism to integral serialism, but also in explorations of indeterminacy. 
Without the assumption of tonality, avant-garde composers found that the realm of 
compositional systems was now open for exploration, thus leading to everything from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 The historical narrative of the American spirit of independence and exceptionalism is found both in 
literature aimed at specialists and at a general readership. Cf. Robert Morgan, Twentieth-Century Music: A History 
of Musical Style in Modern Europe and America (New York: Norton, 1991), 295-7; Alan Rich, American Pioneers: 
Ives to Cage and Beyond (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), 26-7. 
228 Recently, Amy Beal has shown that there was actually a measure of overlap and cross-pollination. Even 
though she frames American experimentalists in contradistinction to European serialists—as is standard—she shows 
how post-1945 modernist composers like Cage, Earle Brown, and David Tudor had a presence in West Germany 
during the initial years of the Darmstadt summer courses. Amy C. Beal, New Music, New Allies: American 
Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2006). 
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rigorously mathematical compositional schemes of George Perle to the loosely circumscribed 
graphic scores of Earle Brown. 
An important part of these novel compositional systems was the concept of musical time 
and its regulation (or at least circumscription) by form and rhythm. Common practice music 
typically uses a linear, goal-direct construction—each moment building upon the last—thereby 
creating a sense of listener expectation. Morgan attributes this characteristic to two factors: “a 
relatively fixed set of hierarchical tonal relationships and a rhythmic framework, also 
hierarchically ordered, based upon the recurrence of regular durational units.”229 As these 
hierarchical relationships break down in modernist music, fundamental assumptions about form 
and the passing of musical time are invalidated. Stockhausen used the concept of “moment form” 
where a musical progression gives way to a series of interrelated, but independent, moments. In a 
work like Kontake (1958-60), each musical segment is derived from an overall plan, but the 
progression from moment to moment does not convey a sense of narrative development. Cage’s 
a priori structures were not derived from elaborate mathematical algorithms, but his works are 
equally destructive of conventional notions of musical time. Works like Water Music (1960) 
remove all sense of musical time and replace it with the literal, bodily time inherent in everyday 
actions and events. Moreover, both composers, for all their differences, explored the use of 
absolute time markings to replace the relative units of rhythm found in common practice music. 
Although there are numerous examples of composers performing their own music 
throughout European art music history, modernist composers do not seem to have the same 
expectation that their music will travel far beyond the situation of their immediate involvement. 
Mozart performed his own work, but he could reasonably assume that his music would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Robert Morgan, Twentieth-Century Music: A History of Musical Style in Modern Europe and America 
(New York: Norton, 1991), 379.  
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published and performed by other musicians. Many modernist composers did not have these 
same expectations of musical dissemination, and thus they found it necessary to perform their 
own work if it was to be heard at all. In some cases, self-performance was virtually a necessity, 
as in the case of Harry Partch whose music was scored for an ensemble of Partch’s own 
instruments. In other cases, the work was so idiosyncratic that it would be very difficult to 
represent in a score, and thus the composer’s direct involvement would be crucial. In still other 
cases, the composer was the performer by default, as we find with electronic music where the 
creation of the material of the work is coterminous with its aural realization. 
The issue of timbre in modernist music is multifaceted. It is not just that there were new 
instruments to be found (e.g., extended percussion, non-instruments used instrumentally, 
electronic instruments) or an interest in exploring all manner of extended techniques; rather, it is 
a shift toward an interest in qualities of sound that was previously a secondary concern at best. 
Chou Wên-Chung, a student of Varèse and one of the first Chinese-American composers to find 
prominence in the West, notes that in many Asian musics, there is, 
great emphasis placed on the production and control of tones, which often 
involves an elaborate vocabulary of articulations, modifications in timbre, 
inflections in pitch, fluctuations in intensity, vibratos and tremolos. […] Such 
concentration on the values of a single tone is the antithesis of traditional Western 
polyphonic concepts, in which the primacy of multilinearity and the acceptance of 
equal temperament make the application of such values limited and 
subordinate.230 
 
Where Western music’s primary expressive unit tends to be the interval—the relationship 
between two pitches—in Asian music, the emphasis placed on timbre is at least equally 
important to the relationships between individual tones. While we know that American 
composers were particularly interested in Asian musics, there is not a great deal of evidence to 	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suggest that the same is true of European composers.231 My point is not to argue that modernist 
composers were deeply influenced by Asian music, but rather to demonstrate just how significant 
this newfound interest in timbre was for Western music.232 Krzysztof Penderecki’s “sonority 
pieces” are perhaps the ultimate example of modernist explorations in timbre. The wide variety 
of extended techniques in Fluorescences (1962) or De Natura Sonoris (“Of the nature of sound,” 
1966) show a new style of composing where conventional intervallic writing is almost 
completely eradicated. 
This shift toward timbre as a possibility for the central concern of a musical work leads 
us directly to the explosion of instruments permissible within an ostensible “art music” setting. 
This includes not only the extensive percussion sections that Varèse introduced in works like 
Ionisation (1929-31) and Arcana (1925-27), but also electronic instruments, non-instruments 
used in an instrumental fashion, and the exploration of extended techniques on conventional 
instruments. I will focus on electronic music in the following section, but at this time it will 
suffice to understand their importance in terms of the theoretically infinite timbral possibilities 
they offered composers. As for non-instruments used instrumentally, this could include anything 
from Cage’s turntable in Cartridge Music (1960) to George Brecht’s conceptual works like 
Comb Music (Comb Event) (1959-62) or Drip Music (Drip Event) (1959-62). 
Now that we have seen some of the avenues of exploration common to both continents, 
let us return to the discursive divide to see if there is truly a meaningful difference between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Lubet provides a sample of  composers and their various transethnic influences (e.g., Harrison and 
Javanese, Chinese, Korean, and Middle Easter musics; Reich and Ghanaian drumming, Hebrew cantillation, 
Balinese gamelon). Lubet, “Indeterminate Origins,” 98-99. 
232 In fact, it was the American experimentalists who seemed most eager to explore transethnicism. Lubet 
details this trend in Alex J. Lubet, “Indeterminate Origins: A Cultural Theory of American Experimental Music,” in 
Perspectives on American Music Since 1950, ed. James R Heintze (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 95-140. 
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European avant-gardism and American experimentalism. We have but to open a music history 
textbook to see that there is a great inequality in the style of coverage. Not that these modernist 
musical streams are in any danger of receiving too much attention when compared to the more 
popular neo-classical and neo-romantic composers, but one can tell that it is easier to write about 
a tradition like serialism with an obvious origin, a genius inventor, his students, their followers, 
and the like than it is to write about a collection of individuals without straightforward 
developmental trajectories. For decades, American experimental music was dismissed as the 
work of a few reckless individuals working isolation, and its story is only beginning to 
emerge.233 If I spend a moment now surveying the so-called American experimental tradition, it 
is for two reasons: first, because the variety of opinions and interpretations of this body of music 
have, thus far, remained obscure; and second, because their impact on radical music has been 
remarkable. 
Let us first survey the sundry definitions, explanations, and circumscriptions in use today. 
There is only the most general consensus on the “what” and “when” of experimental music. 
David Nicholls proposes the largest spectrum as he locates the origins of the American 
experimental tradition in the work of Ives, Cowell, Seeger, Ruggles, and other such composers of 
the early twentieth-century. Michael Nyman, on the other hand, uses the term to refer to the 
cohort of mid-century American modernists (e.g., John Cage, Earle Brown, Christian Wolff, 
Morton Feldman) who were exploring indeterminacy in music.234 Amy Beal adopts a similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Although this may be somewhat true in the cases of Charles Ives and Carl Ruggles, Nicholls shows that 
many of the composers were aware of each other and helped support each other through the establishment of various 
“new music” groups that offered support to composers and staged concert series. David Nicholls, American 
Experimental Music: 1890-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 218. 
234 Michael Nyman, Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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position, framing the experimental composers in contradistinction to the Schoenbergian serialists 
and the Stravinskian neo-classicists. 235 Joanna Demers presents a relativistic definition of 
experimentalism. She defines “experimental as anything that has departed significantly from the 
norms of the time, but with the understanding that something experimental in 1985 could have 
inspired what was conventional by 1990.”236 Although there are certain benefits to conceiving of 
radical music as this sort of relative category, the type of musical transgression described by the 
term “radical music” is too connected with the philosophical and aesthetic mentalities of the 
postmodern turn to benefit from a relativist definition. 
As for the question of what experimentalism is, there is a similar distribution of varying 
concepts. Nicholls provides a set of musical features common to the practice including “extreme 
chromaticism,” “tone-clusters and noise,” various rhythmic complexities, and indeterminacy.237 
Cage, at one stage in his career, provided a similar definition stating that experimentalism was 
“the introduction of novel elements into one’s music.”238 Robert Morgan and Christopher Small 
characterize experimentalism conceptually, with Morgan presenting it as an example of “rugged 
American individualism”239 and Small speaking of the “ideal of individual liberty” that led to a 
rejection of the European way.240 Henry Cowell even frames the ideology of American liberty in 
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Oxford University Press, 2010), 7. 
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explicitly political terms.241 American ingenuity and individual liberty, however, does not go far 
enough for some scholars. Catherine Cameron, for instance, attests to the importance of the 
rejection of the European tradition, which she describes as apostasy and abandonment.242 For 
her, it is not simply starting a new musical tradition, but the beginning of a struggle between 
hierarchies of value, between the venerated art music tradition of Europe and the lowly 
“experiments” of American composers who were ignorant of the more sophisticated European 
techniques. And finally, through the example of Charles Ives, Gayle Sherwood Magee shows 
that these ideas of American individualism and experimentalism are often at least as discursive 
as they are actual.243  
To the extent that we can compare two diverse continents, it appears, then, that the 
American experimentalists differ from the European avant-gardists in the way they approach 
musical tradition. The American composers tended to follow in the path of the historical avant-
garde, insofar as they rejected their European musical inheritance while the European composers 
embraced their history and if they appeared to work against it at times, it was only to move the 
art of music forward into the future. 
Clearly this view is oversimplified, especially since one can point to composers who saw 
themselves as part of the lineage like Babbitt and Elliott Carter in America just as one can point 	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persecution and reprisals of various sorts if they express their sincere ideas for the betterment of the government.” 
One should note that this statement was made in 1954 and, according to Dick Higgins, its zeal may be partially 
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to composers who did not, like Xenakis in Europe.244 Cowell was branded a true American 
radical, but his own writing disabuses this notion. Writing in the 1920s and 30s, Cowell argues 
that “modern music is distinctly not attempting to disregard the classic but rather to do exactly 
what those same classics accomplished in their day—to add new principles to what had been 
established before.” 245  At the same time, some composers were more forthright in their 
apostatical advocacy. Harry Partch—a composer generally grouped with Cowell in the same 
American experimentalist milieu—stresses the importance of forging one’s own path, of 
rejecting the evolutionary terms that deterministically bind one to his or her inherited tradition.246 
Cage also echoes these sentiments by framing avant-garde composers in Europe as maintaining 
“continuity with the past, which is expressed in each work as an interest in continuity whether in 
terms of discourse or organization.”247 Thus, it appears that for certain American composers, 
there was indeed an important discursive stance that involved a move away from (and possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Babbitt certainly considered himself to be an art music composer in the classic sense of the term, 
complete with strong ties to the European tradition; however, this did not stop him from noting a certain inequality 
in musical acceptance and prestige that accompanied European music even into the 1950s. He writes, “Only in the 
recording realm is the American composer—denied as he is official sponsorship and patronage—not at a crucial 
disadvantage in the international musical arena.” Milton Babbitt, “Musical America’s Several Generations,” in The 
Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt, ed. Stephen Peles (Princeton: Princeton University, Press, 2003), 34. 
245 Henry Cowell, “The Impasse of Modern Music,” in Essential Cowell: Selected Writings on Music, ed. 
Dick Higgins (Kingston: McPherson & Co., 2001), 298-9. Even in his presentation of dissonant counterpoint in New 
Musical Resources, he frames his innovation not in opposition to Bach, but as a difference of degree. Cowell writes, 
“The statement about the reversing of [Bach’s] rules might seem to imply that the result is a revolution in 
contrapuntal practice; but it is perhaps more just to consider the change as a gradual one of degree, rather than a 
radical one of kind.” Henry Cowell, New Musical Resources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39. 
246 Partch writes, “It would seem axiomatic that any music, whether it is that of a well-known writer of 
symphonies or that of an anonymous folk singer, reveals the philosophic attitude of its creator. It also seems self-
evident that if his attitude is vigorous and individualistic, his practical requirements are not necessarily satisfied by 
the traditions he was born to; they may even require direct antitheses. Simple repetition does not, and cannot, fulfill 
the creative urges of such a person. He is living his, a new, life, and though he is a generated bundle of physical and 
mental similarities to millions of other entities, he is still a new being. Neither physically nor mentally is he a simple 
repetition.” Harry Partch, Genesis of a Music: An Account of a Creative Work, Its Roots and Its Fulfillments (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1974), 3. 
247 Cage goes on to assert that European composers will eventually, and inevitably, “give up Europe” in 
favor of the “silences of American experimental music.” After all, “the world,” he writes, “is one world now.” Cage, 
Silence, 74-5. 
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outright rejection of) the European heritage, and based on this ideology of difference, it follows 
that American experimentalists would contribute more directly to radical music—at least in a 
philosophical sense—than the European avant-gardists, insofar as many European composers 
maintained a connection to serialist practices. 
This is not, however, to say that radical music is a simple continuation of the American 
experimental tradition. By the late twentieth century, the United States was emerging as the 
dominant cultural center of the world and certain issues of musical heirachies of value (at least 
where the Europe/America relationship was concerned) were not as central to American 
composition as they had been during the initial break. In the early part of the century, we find 
composers like Cowell and Partch writing compositional treatises that explicitly situate 
themselves in opposition to the European tradition, arguing that rejection is a necessary step in 
claiming an American identity; however, in the latter part of the century, we do not find the same 
sort of urgency in staking out a space for an American musical tradition. Where American 
composers had been considered—even domestically—as second-class imitators of Europe’s 
esteemed tradition who were only worthwhile if they had at least studied in Europe, the 
American-trained experimentalists were finally accepted as legitimate, important composers by 
the latter part of the twentieth century. When it was no longer crucial to fight for a space within 
Western art music, the struggle between musical hierarchies of prestige was ameliorated, at least 
in part. Moreover, the pluralism of postmodern aesthetics encouraged the mixing of any styles, 
no longer excluding European art music on the grounds of a discursive battle for cultural 
prestige. 
To summarize, certain issues like the existential anxiety of the post-World War II era and 
the heirerachies of musical value between the United States and Europe would fall away with the 
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end of the Cold War and the shift in artistic activity from Europe to the United States. Radical 
composers may find critical opposition, but this now has more to do with its intrinsic 
transgressiveness than with its divergence from the European style. Similarly, cultural 
mentalities like the ideology of “American individualism” have become less specific to the 
United States with the encroachment of liberal capitalism on the greater cosmopolitan world. 
Individualism may persist inasmuch as radical music tends more toward originality than 
derivation, but it is difficult to argue that this trait should still be considered inherently 
“American.” Many of the other interests of modernism continue directly in radical music such as 
the interest in novel, a priori compositional systems, the explorations of new concepts of musical 
time, the focus on timbre over intervals and harmony, and the use of both new and old 
instruments to create unfamiliar sounds. 
2.1.4 The Dawn of Electronic Music 
 The dawn of electronic music is our next event. It marks the beginning of a new style of 
music, an enormous expansion of available timbres, a brand new instrumentarium that differs 
drastically from all previous instruments, and a decrease in the expense surrounding the means of 
musical production, which lead to greater flexibility for composers to operate independently. 
Through advances made by the exploration of electronic music, a composer like Galás could 
venture into new sonic territory, building entire works out of layers of her own voice, just as 
these new tools would allow a composer like Zorn to build elaborate arrangements using the 
recording studio as an instrument itself. These advances would also allow non-institutionally 
supported composers access to the means of production and dissemination without the 
prohibitive cost of, say, hiring an orchestra of musicians, booking a concert hall, and selling 
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tickets. Most of all, fundamental conceptual issues would be explored, especially including the 
use of pre-recorded sound in general, and the use of untreated, sounds from reality, specifically. 
 Composers sporadically began exploring the use of electronic instruments in the first half 
of the twentieth-century,248 but around 1950, the Western world saw the establishment of the first 
major electronic music studios. Pierre Schaeffer’s Groupe de Recherches Musicales (GRM), 
founded in 1948, is usually presented in contradistinction to Stockhausen and Herbert Eimer’s 
Studio für Elektronische Musik at the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), founded in 1951.249 
Schaeffer was exploring the manipulation of found sounds (i.e., musique concrète), typically 
reflecting his urban environment, while Stockhausen, after a brief stint at the GRM, was 
exploring the creation of new sounds through electronic sound synthesis (i.e., elektronische 
musik). Significantly, both the GRM and the WDR were hosted by public broadcasting 
institutions, which afforded composers the chance to work with a wide array of electronic gear, 
although little of the equipment was actually designed to be used as a musical instrument. The 
Columbia-Princeton Tape Music Cente 250  was also founded in 1951, but its primary 
composers—Vladimir Ussachevsky, Otto Luening, Milton Babbitt, and Roger Sessions—were 
initially more interested in using computers to enhance composition than in creating music using 
electronically produced or manipulated sounds.251 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 For instance, Messiaen’s Fete des belles eaux (1937) for six ondes-martenot, Respighi’s use of a 
phonograph in an orchestral setting in Pini di Roma (1924), and Max Stein’s use of Theremin for the film score to 
King Kong (1933). 
249 Cf. Paul Griffiths, A Guide to Electronic Music (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1980), 12-15; Thom 
Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music: Pioneers in Technology and Composition (London: Routledge, 2002), 
73-138; Peter Manning, Electronic and Computer Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 19-67. 
250 The Columbia-Princeton Tape Music Center would be rechristened as the Columbia-Princeton 
Electronic Music Center in 1959. 
251 Manning, 2004, 76. 
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Schaeffer’s invention of musique concrète was an important moment for many reasons: 
first, it was one of the first sustained investigations of a non-instrument used to create music; 
second, it was the progenitor of our contemporary tradition of sampling; and third, it began 
chipping away at music’s anti-representational bias through the use of found sound, albeit in an 
unintentional manner. On this last point, it is important to note that Schaeffer did not intend to 
create a music based on the actual sounds of everyday life; that is just the unavoidable result.252 
He attempted to reduce his field recordings to the theoretical objet sonore (sound object)—a unit 
of pure timbre free of any external reference, especially to its source. Schaeffer’s concept of 
acousmatic listening involved the listener engaging in phenomenological bracketing, which 
involves the “bracketing out” of any external referent so that the listener may concentrate solely 
on the experience of the sound object. This proved to be impossible, as Schaeffer found that even 
when instructed in the art of phenomenological bracketing, listeners could not help but attempt to 
discover the source of the sounds. Although he found that removing the attack transient from a 
sound could fool the listener into hearing the sound as something else, the listener still had not 
abandoned the desire to discern the sound’s source. Even if Schaeffer’s goal of creating a mode 
of “reduced listening” failed,253 his experiments (in the literal sense of the term) had not only 
introduced a novel new conceptual approach to music, but had also created a vital new 
technique—sampling—that would directly contribute both to popular music and the postmodern 
music collage artists. 
During the early years of the GRM, Stockhausen was living in France and studying with 
Messiaen. He created the exploratory work, Etude (1952), using tape splices, but he quickly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Douglas Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 110. 
253 Ibid., 110. 
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abandoned the idea of this sort of composition. By 1953, he had returned to Cologne and began 
working at the WDR and experimenting with the array of electronic instruments at the studio. 
These, however, proved unsatisfactory for Stockhausen, who recalls, 
An irrevocable step became necessary: I returned to the element which is the basis 
of all sound multifariousness: to pure vibration, which can be produced 
electrically and which is called a sine wave. Every existing sound, every noise, is 
a mixture of such sine waves—a spectrum. […] Thus, for the first time, it was 
possible to compose—in the true sense of the word—the timbres in a music, i.e., 
to synthesize them from elements, and by doing so, to let the universal structural 
principle of a music also effect the sound proportions.254 
 
Thus, Stockhausen began exploring additive synthesis—an electronic music technique that 
involves adding sine waves together to create complex composite waveforms—as well as a new 
system of composition involving the total determination of all musical elements. Messiaen had 
created considerable excitement at Darmstadt in 1949 with the presentation of his piano work, 
“Mode de valeurs et d’intensités” from his Quatre etudes de rythme (1949-50; Four Rhythm 
Studies), because it was the first European example of integral serialism—a compositional 
method involving the serialization of not only pitch and rhythm, but also duration, dynamics, and 
attack.255 It was inevitable that Stockhausen would take integral serialism one step further 
including the construction and modification of synthetic timbre within the total organization of 
integral serialism.  
 By 1971, Stockhausen had codified his concept of electronic music into four criteria: 
unified time structuring, the splitting of sound, multi-layered spatial composition, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Michael Manion, “From Tape Loops to Midi: Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Forty Years of Electronic 
Music,” accessed March 6th, 2013, http://stockhausen.org/tape_loops.html. 
255 Ruth Crawford Seeger is credited with applying serialist procedures to musical elements other than pitch 
as early as the 1930s, and Milton Babbitt’s Three Compositions for Piano (1947) marks the official introduction of 
“total serialism.” It appears that both of these composers arrived at this invention independently. Judith Tick, 
“Crawford, Ruth,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online, Oxford University Press, accessed March 7, 2013, 
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equality of sound (or tones) and noise.256 Unified time structuring involves an awareness of the 
malleability of time in electronic media. Just as one could speed up a string quartet such that it 
lasts only one second and is perceived as a unique timbre, so too could one extend a one-second 
sound into a 20-minute duration, also create a unique timbre. The splitting of the sound involves 
the manipulation of the constituent elements of a synthesized sound. If one has a series of 
oscillators producing sine waves at various amplitudes to produce a particular composite wave, 
then each oscillator can be manipulated in terms of frequency and amplitude, thereby affecting 
the composite output. It is a way of composing the sound itself. Multi-layered spatial 
composition involves dispersing the sound throughout a given space and sending unique signals 
to each output channel—a technique that Varèse had used in Poème électronique (1958). Finally, 
we have the equality of noise, which is something of a misnomer inasmuch as this is not an echo 
of Russolo and Cage calling for musicalization of any and all sounds. Rather, Stockhausen 
promotes the controlled use of noise such that it balances with tones and does not overpower the 
work.257 Noise, thus defined, is more akin to sound with an aperiodic waveform than to Cage’s 
more general idea of noise as sound that one does not like. 
 Stockhausen’s four criteria present a number of innovatory techniques that radical 
composers would use to great effect. Even though his concept of noise is a bit conservative when 
compared to Cage, composers such as Merzbow would use time modification as a way to create 
new timbres. Spatialized sound would be important for certain works by Galás, and they would 
be absolutely central to the sort of site-specific works presented under the title of “sound art.”  
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Although Schaeffer and Stockhausen command the most attention in histories thus far, 
there were important advancements made to electronic music by other composers such as Cage 
and Xenakis. Unfortunately, their lack of affiliation with a major electronic music research 
center has made their contributions difficult to weave into the conventional narrative of musique 
concrète versus elektronische musik. Cage, for one, was experimenting with the use of 
phonographs as a musical instrument almost a decade before Schaeffer would begin his own 
explorations. 258  Imaginary Landscape No. 1 (1939), for instance, uses two variable-speed 
turntables playing test records that produce either a constant or a variable frequency. Although 
Cage did not explore the use of field recordings, the work is notable for the use of a non-
instrument in an instrumental context. By 1952, Cage was working on Williams Mix, which is 
remarkable both because of the way that it exposes the medium as the message and because of its 
repurposing of pre-recorded material. Where tape had been used in the recording studio as a way 
to surreptitiously assemble a composite of various takes, Williams Mix could be interpreted as a 
work about tape and tape splicing itself. Through intricate splices created according to chance 
operation, Cage creates a collage work out of extant recordings—a technique that is radical in its 
foregrounding of the medium and in its use of recorded music and sound to create a new work. 
Although I will discuss the work of Iannis Xenakis in more detail in section 2.1.5, he was 
an important figure in electronic music and thus he deserves some discussion at this moment. 
Rather than focusing on the manipulations of complex sounds as Schaeffer had done or on the 
creation of new sounds through the addition of sine waves like Stockhausen, Xenakis explored 
the concept of sound mass through his stochastic compositional method, where an acoustical 
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event would be created through a large array of small sound particles.259 For most physicists 
before the twentieth-century, sound had seemed intrinsically linear—the product of sound 
waves—but following the ideas of Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) and Dennis Gabor (1900-1979), 
Xenakis began investigating the musical possibilities of conceiving of sound as particles, which 
led him to the concept of granular synthesis—a technique where tiny samples (ca. 1-50ms), or 
grains, are layered to create a cloud of minute sounds that, when sped up, blend and create a 
novel timbre.260 He also invented two remarkably original synthesis devices—the UPIC (Unité 
Ployagogique Informatique du CEMAMu)261 system and the GENDYN (Génération Dynamique 
Stochastique) approach. The UPIC was a synthesizer with a digital tablet as an input device. This 
allowed composers to draw curves on an X/Y (pitch/time) axis, which can then be stored in 
memory and used as waveforms or amplitude envelopes. One of the important features of the 
UPIC is that it allows anyone to create music, even without prior training or experience, due to 
the intuitive nature of its input device. The GENDYN approach involves the continuous variance 
of a waveform according to a designated stochastic function.262 Rather than using notation to 
designate the manner in which an instrumentalist should create acoustical vibrations in the 
environment, the GENDYN approach involves manipulating these audible changes in air 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Iannis Xenakis, “Free Stochastic Music,” in Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in 
Composition, ed. Sharon Kanach (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1991), 8-9. 
260 Xenakis writes, “All sound, even all continuous sonic variation, is conceived as an assemblage of a large 
number of elementary grains adequately disposed in time. So every sonic complex can be analyzed as a series of 
pure sinusoidal sounds even if the variations of these sinusoidal sounds are infinitely close, short, and complex. In 
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time.” Iannis Xenakis, “Markovian Stochastic Music—Theory,” in Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in 
Composition, ed. Sharon Kanach (Hillsdale: Pendragon Press, 1992), 43. 
261 CEMAMu (Centre d’Etude de Mathématique et Automatique Musicales) was an interdisciplinary center 
established by Xenakis in 1966 dedicated to the study of art and science. Today the center exists as CCMIX (Center 
for the Composition of Music Iannix Xenakis). 
262 James Harley, Xenakis: His Life in Music (London: Routledge, 2004), 215-6. 
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pressure directly, thereby bypassing layer upon layer of compositional and performative 
methodology. Ultimately, the important point is not to understand exactly how these original 
synthesis techniques function, but to note their originality both within the field of electronic 
music and within the larger practice of musical modernism. 
 The avenues explored by composers of electronic music had an effect on radical music 
four main ways. First, the new style of electronically produced music pioneered by Stockhausen, 
Schaeffer, Xenakis, and others would prove inspiring to a large variety of radical composers such 
as Merzbow, Francisco Lopez, and Mika Vainio. It is surely difficult to envisage a novel 
approach to musical composition when one is restricted by the nature of conventional 
instruments. The mechanics of instruments and the requirements of performance practice serve 
to channel ideas within a certain space. For instance, there is a finite amount of air that a wind 
player can supply without taking a breath, and thus phrase lengths tend to fit within a certain 
durational window. Likewise, the timbre of certain instruments—violins for example—have 
strong sonic connotations and thus even if a composer like Cage writes a work like 26’1.1499” 
for a String Player (1953-55), the music is never wholly about the sounds of a culturally neutral 
chordophone; rather, there is an inescapable element of symphonic degradation that remains in 
the work. This is not to say that electronic music can ever be truly free of connotations or 
restrictions, but rather to say that it opens a new constellation of connotations and restrictions, 
many of which have yet to be explored. 
 Second, the fundamental change in the physics of sound production had an enormous 
impact not only on the types of sound that could be produced, but also on the nature of those 
sounds. One could generate a sine wave that would last for a year without wavering, or one could 
replace the attack transient of a piano with that of a trumpet thereby creating a physically 
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impossible hybrid sonic event. As Chou has noted, Western music had been focused primarily on 
intervallic relationships as opposed to timbre.263 The new sonic possibilities both offered novel 
sounds to composers, but also served to shift the focus of music to the qualities of the sound 
created. 
 Third, the exploration of electronic music provided a new array of instruments, but it also 
led to the development of a new series of tools used for recording and audio production—tools 
that composers would then use as musical instruments. In I am sitting in a room (1969), Alvin 
Lucier uses standard recording tools—a microphone, a tape recorder, and loudspeakers—as 
musical instruments to build a work that explores the material properties of the equipment and 
the room itself. He records himself reading a short amount of text and then replays his recording 
through the loudspeakers and re-records it. He then continues this process until the resonant 
frequencies of the room have completely obscured the intelligibility of the narration. More 
recently, Merzbow has used broken and malfunctioning audio equipment to generate novel 
timbres and unpredictable sounds. Broken playback equipment has been particularly interesting 
insofar as it takes the now familiar art of sampling and adds an indeterminate component related 
specifically to the equipment used. This practice of using production tools as musical instruments 
is not unique to radical music (The Beatles Sgt. Pepper’s album, for example, is one of the most 
famous examples of the recording studio used as an instrument itself), but it is a practice that is 
common in radical music. 
 Fourth, there is the pragmatic issue of accessibility of means. The lack of a viable 
patronage system and the declining interest in non-commercial (or at least that which is not 
“popular music”) would create significant problems for radical composers, were it not for the 
democratization of musical production that accompanied the lowering cost of audio equipment. 	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Initially, this was not the case. For all of the bold new directions explored, we must remember 
that early electronic music was institutionalized from the beginning. Those who controlled the 
finances of the institutions had a large influence on what was allowed to happen within the early 
studios. The institutional affiliation served to legitimize the music produced in these studios, but 
it also restricted the freedom of composers like Xenakis who did not want to work within the 
approved research areas.264 In Thom Holmes’s view, “there was nothing liberal about the social 
context of electronic music. It was only liberated by those who cast off the institutions and 
produced it themselves.”265 While this is true insofar as composers were not absolutely free to 
explore anything at all, the liberation inherent in exploring a brand new instrumentarium was still 
a major event in the formation of radical music. As technology progressed during the 1950s, new 
means became available that would allow composers to reclaim some of the artistic freedoms of 
which Holmes speaks. Tape recorders, in particular, offered an inexpensive alternative to the 
massive computers that Babbitt used or the studios full of oscillators and testing equipment 
available to Stockhausen at the WDR. Under the auspices of the San Francisco Tape Music 
Center,266 composers like Morton Subotnick and Pauline Oliveros were able to work with a 
much higher degree of autonomy. 267  By the 1990s, composers could use their personal 
computers as virtual recording and production studios thereby allowing them an unprecedented 
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amount of freedom. This is one of the primary factors that allowed Merzbow and others like him 
to operate with relative independence from any significant source of financial support. 
2.1.5 Transitional Figures 
While the majority of modernist composers and practices fit somewhere within the terms 
of my survey in section 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, a handful transcended modernism and the array of 
conceptual and aesthetic goals that are outlined above. This group of composers and practices 
might be considered pre-radical because they exhibit clear signs of radicalism while remaining 
connected to the modernist project in some substantive way. Take, for instance, Xenakis: He 
devised a number of compositional systems that were intentionally different from the Western art 
music tradition at a fundamental, philosophical level. At the same time, he was an unapologetic 
positivist who believed that the rationalism of science was the best hope of structuring a socially 
edifying artistic practice.268 Similarly, Cage began his career with modernist intentions, but he 
would later issue some of the most radical challenges to the foundations of Western music that 
have ever occurred. In this section, I will spend a bit of time examining some transitional 
figures—including Cage, Pauline Oliveros, and Xenakis—to show how they have originary 
connections to the modernist movement while also contributing works that are still quite radical. 
At this point, I have mentioned Cage as a modernist and as an electronic music pioneer. 
Now I am returning to Cage as a transitional figure leading to, and practicing, radical music. 
Even if this amount of coverage seems excessive, it is still proportional to Cage’s influence and 
importance as a transgressor of musical convention. Many are familiar with his infamous 4’33” 
(1952), but it is much more than just a “silent” work or a work about the potential beauty of 
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environmental sound.269 In describing Cagean indeterminacy, Taruskin borrows the surrealist 
concept of automatism where an artist attempts to surrender all agency while channeling some 
sort of unconscious spirit.270 The obvious inappropriateness of the terminological transposition 
notwithstanding, the idea of a composer surrendering his or her agency is profound. After all, 
what has art been, if not the intentional expression of something? This is undoubtedly an 
important facet of the work, and Cage devotes some space to the idea of giving up control in his 
article, “Experimental Music.”271 And yet not even this is the most important innovation of 
4’33”, especially insofar as there were already precedents for ostensibly agentless art works.  
The absolutely, fundamentally subversive act that Cage executed was to “let sounds be 
themselves.”272 Previously, one could offer a definition of music that involved some sense of 
music as the intentional, aesthetic production of sound filtered through some sort of cultural 
system in accordance with whatever standards pertained in this hypothetical historical/cultural 
period. The key ideas here are “production” and “filtration.” At very minimum, someone must 
produce a sound intentionally as art and he or she must also filter this sound through an aesthetic 
system. Cage rejects these fundamental premises and argues that the sound need not be 
intentional, just as the intervention of an aesthetic filter is not necessary. 
Previously, if sounds were allowed to exist unmodified, it was not even considered 
mimesis; it is simply reproduction. Roger Scruton claims that, “when music attempts the direct 
‘representation’ of sounds it has a tendency to become transparent, as it were, to its subject. 	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Representation gives way to reproduction, and the musical medium drops out of consideration 
altogether as superfluous.”273 Scruton’s comments are typical of the anti-representational bias 
that has existed at least since the nineteenth century debates on absolute versus program music. 
Where music has denoted intentionally aestheticized sound, Cage shows that the minimum 
constraints for a musical work are simply a temporal circumscription of an otherwise 
uncontrolled event. 
Granted, few composers have been compelled to take matters to the extreme of 4’33”, 
but the liberation of non-instrumental, unintentional, and un-aestheticized sound has been 
enormously important in the realm of American experimental music, “sound art,” and of course, 
radical music.274 Rather than focusing mostly on the aural, music after Cage was free to focus on 
the conceptual. Although certain sounds theorists like Brandon LaBelle see this as a “[move] 
away from an overtly musical framework…toward an increasingly contextual and ‘extra-
musical’ one,”275 I am not so ready to describe Cage as moving away from music, per se.276 
Rather, I see him as subverting musical convention while existing within the general realm of 
expressive sonic practices that we refer to as music; however, the “music” that Cage practices at 
this stage has been stripped of a necessary connection to such fundamental features as melody, 
harmony, rhythm, or even the intentional production of sound. In this way, Cage becomes a 
radical composer. 	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Pauline Oliveros is another transitional figure with strong ties to modernism. She studied 
with Robert Erickson (himself a student of Sessions and Krenek) at the San Francisco 
Conservatory of Music in the 1950s when modernist musical practices were in full swing. She 
was involved with the San Francisco Tape Music Center from its inception and then took over as 
director in 1966 when the SFTMC joined the Mills Center of Contemporary Music. There were 
relatively few female composers working in any style, and a female experimentalist was even 
more rare. Oliveros belongs to a small group including Ruth Crawford Seeger, Bebe Barron, and 
Delia Derbyshire, and even though these were all pioneering female composers who could not 
have been unaware of their role as trailblazers, Oliveros was particularly outspoken when it came 
to issues of gender and sexuality.277 Arguing from a decidedly postmodernist position, Oliveros 
advocates against the Western canon and its favoritism toward male composers. “In traditional, 
establishment music,” she argues, “people are educated to the music of the European masters, 
who are all men. As long as they’re educated to that, that’s what they’re going to elevate. […] 
You’ve got to start programming music by women, and you’ve got to fill the library with music 
by women. But it’s hard to get that to happen, because the canon is so entrenched in all the 
educational institutions.”278 It is not simply that there are no viable female composers; it is that 
the hegemonic nature of the canon promotes certain works and composers at the expense of the 
Other. Just as radical composers are inherently transgressive toward standards and convention, 
Oliveros avows that art must “be subversive, very subversive.”279  	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Bye Bye Butterfly (1965) remains Oliveros’s best-known work with good justification due 
in large part to its program. It encapsulates a simultaneous critique of both the common practice 
canon and gender politics.280 Oliveros writes, “Bye Bye Butterfly bids farewell not only to the 
music of the 19th century, but also to the system of polite morality of that age and its attendant 
institutionalized oppression of the female sex.”281 The work calls for two oscillators, two 
amplifiers, two tape recorders with delay, and a turntable from which an excerpt from Puccini’s 
Madama Butterfly (1904) plays. The first section of the work is composed of purely electronic 
sounds, but at 3:25, Butterfly’s opening aria begins to play on the turntable. This “sample” is 
mixed in such a way that the electronic sounds seem to dominate it, as Oliveros creates powerful 
juxtapositions between acoustic and electronic sound sources, between old and new, between a 
cherished masterwork and a humble, but pernicious composition for electronic equipment. 
According to Oliveros, a recording of Madama Butterfly was used because it happened to 
by lying around the studio when she was creating Bye Bye Butterfly.282 If this is indeed true, it is 
remarkably serendipitous, for there are many parallels to be found. At the level of narrative, the 
character of Butterfly is an oppressed woman—an Other both in terms of sex and in terms of 
ethnicity—whose only power is in choosing the time of her death. Taking a step back, the entire 
opera can be read as an orientalist treatment of a cultural other. Oliveros is a woman fighting 
against the sexual politics of the Western establishment, just as she is a composer fighting 
against the aesthetic politics of the Western music canon.  
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The reason behind this discussion of gender is to show the way that political and musical 
subversion fuse within her music, but this is not to say that Oliveros was primarily remarkable 
for being a woman as opposed to a gifted composer irrespective of gender. Fred Maus points out 
that Oliveros’s interest in subverting binary oppositions is not limited to gender.283 In actuality, 
Oliveros is a dialectically minded composer who seeks out oppositions—logical reasoning 
versus intuition, time versus stasis, determinacy versus indeterminacy, masculinity versus 
femininity—and endeavors to appreciate each while observing how they might contribute to each 
other. 
One way this interest in oppositions manifests is in Oliveros’s use and misuse of 
electronic equipment. She recalls, 
I used to listen to my grandfather’s crystal radio over earphones. I loved the 
crackling static. […] I used to spend a lot of time tuning my father’s radio, 
especially to the whistles and white noise between the stations. […] I also loved 
our wind-up Victrola, especially when the mechanism was running down with a 
record playing. I loved all the negative operant phenomena of systems.284 
 
The affordability of tape recorders made them an obvious choice for Oliveros’s initial 
explorations and, even though the SFTMC could not afford a great deal of equipment, her 
personal ingenuity allowed her to discover a number of sound modification techniques without 
the aid of specialized equipment. For instance, hand winding the tape while the machine was in 
record mode allowed Oliveros to make variable speed recordings.285 Even without access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Fred Maus, “Pauline Oliveros,” in Music of the Twentieth-Century Avant-Garde: A Biocritical 
Sourcebook, ed. Larry Sitsky (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 348. 
284 Oliveros quoted in Heidi von Gunden, The Music of Pauline Oliveros (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 
1983), 51-2. 
285 Oliveros describes a number of these techniques in a radio interview. For instance, she found that her 
bathtub could be used as a resonant chamber for reverb effects. She also fashioned a primitive microphone filter 
using a cardboard tube. Alan Baker, “An Interview With Pauline Oliveros,” American Public Media, January 2003, 
accessed March 12, 2013, http://musicmavericks.publicradio.org/features/interview_oliveros.html. 
147	  	  
multitrack recording equipment, she was able to build up fascinating sound worlds using 
sophisticated tape delay setups.286 Where electronic equipment was a means of ever more precise 
serialist calculations for Babbitt, and where electronic instruments offered Stockhausen complete 
serialist control over every dimension of a musical work, Oliveros took basic equipment and 
subverted its regular functionality. The radicalism of her interest in the “negative operant 
phenomena of systems” is precisely what Merzbow would spend decades exploring in the latter 
part of the twentieth-century. Although she began her career during the peak of musical 
modernism, the deconstructive impulses of her work on both sociocultural and aesthetic fronts 
situate Oliveros within the emerging field of radical music. 
In terms of pure aesthetic transgression, Xenakis can be considered as the first major 
radical composer who wrote, almost without exception, in a truly radical style for the duration of 
his career. The only significant challenge to Xenakis as a radical composer is the fact that his 
philosophy was so thoroughly tied to structuralism, and to an extent, positivism.287 In his 
theoretical writings, Xenakis attempted to discover deep structural formations in music, which 
would allow him to define the minimum criteria necessary to define a musical art. Regarding one 
such attempt, he remarked, 
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Supposing I had lost my memory, how could I extrapolate the principles of 
composition from music? What are the basic and necessary rules upon which 
music is founded, not merely compositional techniques deriving from particular 
traditions and cultures, but the underlying rules which all forms of music have in 
common?288 
 
In his article, “Symbolic Music,” Xenakis searches for the most fundamental, non-contradictory 
elements of music and builds up a general theory of music from there.289 The idea is to outline 
such general terms that any music from Mozart to Webern could be included as a particular case. 
From this point, Xenakis could then devise a system of his own particulars in radical 
contradistinction to the Western style. 
 Central to Xenakis’s philosophy was the importance of science in discovering new modes 
of artistic expression. Xenakis writes, “I shall not say, like Aristotle, that the mean path is the 
best, for in music—as in politics—the middle means compromise. Rather lucidity and harshness 
of critical thought…is the path to follow.”290 Unlike Krenek, however, Xenakis did not find the 
total determinability of serialist procedures to be a comforting sort of objectivity. Just as he saw 
Western tonality as needlessly restrictive, he also saw serialism as a deterministic hindrance on 
individual freedom.291 Rather, he writes, “when scientific and mathematical thought serve music, 
or any human creative activity, it should amalgamate dialectically with intuition.”292 The basis of 
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all artistic creation must be rigorous and scientific, but one must also allow self-expression to 
shine through.  
 Where Xenakis saw the determinacy of Western music as mirroring the Enlightenment 
project of understanding the world through reason and rationality, he sought a music that could 
confront the irrational. He writes, 
Since antiquity the concepts of change (tyche), disorder (ataxia), and 
disorganization were considered as the opposite and negation of reasons (logos), 
order (taxis), and organization (systasis). It is only recently that knowledge has 
been able to penetrate chance and has discovered how to separate its degrees—in 
other words to rationalize it progressively, without, however, succeeding in a 
definitive and total explanation of the problem of ‘pure chance.’293 
  
This search led to his use of stochastic processes to render the indeterminacy of the world in 
musical terms; however, just as Xenakis found the serialists to be too determinist, he found 
composers like Cage to be too indeterminist. After all, Xenakis argues, what has Cage done, but 
hand over his responsibility as composer to the performer? And what will this performer do, but 
inevitably fall back on the nature of his musical training?294 For Xenakis, Cage’s work was 
misguided, and it did not confront indeterminacy in a rigorous, critical manner. Stochastic laws 
allowed Xenakis take a complex, dynamic event and determine probabilities that were then 
assigned to musical features. Thus, he invented an utterly original compositional system that 
deliberately avoided conventional uses of musical components such as form, melody, harmony, 
and rhythm.  
His first stochastic work was Achorripsis (1957), which finds Xenakis exploring two 
avenues: first, he set about testing his thesis of minimum constraints—a search for the fewest 
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logical constraints necessary for the construction of a musical process295—and second, he 
attempted to “attain the greatest possible asymmetry.”296 On this last point, Xenakis’s idea is to 
negate “traditionally inherited behavioral frameworks.” 297  By starting with the minimum 
conditions necessary to create music, Xenakis is in a position to avoid any sort of structures 
based on cultural convention. Achorripsis is unique in that he did not seek to add much on top of 
these minimum constraints. With other works, however, he would take this meta-musical 
approach as a starting point to build up a new system, often derived from the musical theories of 
the ancient Greeks, especially including Aristoxenus.298 Works such as Aïs (1980) render the 
ancient Greek influence explicit not only in the use of Greek modes and text declamation style, 
but also in terms of textual borrowing. 
Xenakis’s search for a deep structure common to all music is itself a structuralist 
endeavor, but the idea of subverting the dominant cultural practice—the culturally determined 
aesthetic filter, if you will—is entirely radical in its aim. We see this sort of subversive aspiration 
in the work of many radical composers from Zorn’s dismissal of musical class structures to 
Merzbow’s dismissal of the fundamental materials of virtually all music. Xenakis was 
responsible for a great number of original compositional techniques and to describe them would 
require a dedicated chapter. Ultimately, even though Xenakis’s philosophical perspective was 
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closely tied to the structuralist milieu of France (his adopted homeland), the resulting aesthetic 
innovations fit equally well within the context of radical music aesthetics. 
2.2 Toward a Definition of Radical Music 
As I have said above, the task of attempting to explain a type of music dedicated to 
defying explanation is daunting. As soon as one begins creating criteria, numerous exceptions 
quickly become apparent and the task seems all the more impossible. My goal in presenting a 
preliminary set of features of radical music is not to develop an exclusive standard by which we 
may determine if a composer is “radical enough” or “too conventional to be included.” 
Moreover, a given composer does not need to work in an exclusively radical style to be 
considered radical in certain instances. Galás, for instance, has created some very radical works 
like Vena Cava, but she has also recorded CDs like Malediction and Prayer that are more bluesy 
than radical. Rather than creating a simple rubric, my purpose in offering the following features 
is to assist in comparative analysis and interpretation. By identifying common features, we create 
reference points that allow us to establish a discourse within which we can situate certain streams 
of music that until now have existed in the vast nebula of ill-defined “experimentalism.”  
Few radical composers will create a single work that encompasses each of the points 
below, but they will create multiple works that touch on a selection of the points below. Even if a 
flawless set of features of radical music is impossible, it is still a useful endeavor so that we may 
identify elements of musical radicalism in works that I have not discussed qua radical music, and 
so that we may begin to see broader trends within a seemingly disparate category of music. It is 
easy to label music as experimental and consider that sufficient, but it is much more difficult to 
attempt to understand such a practice and search for ways to make some sense of it, even if it 
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results in some inevitable generalities. With that said, I present nine general features of radical 
music moving from the most fundamentally philosophical to the most musically specific. 
1. Above all else, radical music is inherently transgressive. This may manifest as the sort of 
aesthetic transgressions that we see in Zorn’s refusal to accept boundaries of musical 
heirerachies of value and taste, or in Merzbow’s attitude toward the basic elements of 
conventional music. This may also be a social transgression, such as Galás’s deconstruction of 
traditional gender binaries and sexual politics. Lines of demarcation are invitations for radical 
composers, who are all too eager to overstep the boundaries of the mainstream. A bit more 
clarification is in order. First, musical radicalism often leads to innovative practices, but 
innovation is not sufficient to describe the extent of radical music’s transgressive attitude. 
Innovation is never merely a desire to explore something new for the sake of originality. Rather, 
it is symptomatic of radical composers’ deliberate attempts to explode a given category to expose 
its artificiality and constructedness. Second, the transgressions of musical convention and taste 
are not tantamount to a rejection of the works and people of the past. It is, rather, a rejection of 
how these canonized works and composers are used to define a prescriptive and exclusive 
aesthetic against which all other musical practices are judged. Radical composers may even 
employ conventional techniques at times, but in the context of a radical work, the use of a 
convention is changed and defamiliarized; through its recontextualization, tradition is subverted. 
In sum, radical music can take on many forms, but it all hovers around the gravitational center of 
transgression. 
2. Radical music is a music of extremism—extremes of intensity and extremes of 
peacefulness, extremes duration and extremes of brevity, extremes of social confrontation and 
extremes of social transcendence. Although a sort of aural violence is visited upon the listener of 
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many works by Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, radical music need not be a display of aggressive 
strength. We could just as easily apply the term to a figure like Francisco López whose music 
consists mainly of field recordings often presented with limited authorial intervention. In many 
ways, Merzbow is the sonic opposite of López, but they are comparable in the extent to which 
their aesthetic extremism takes the music—excessive noise and near silence, respectively. Along 
similar lines, we find a remarkable density of ideas in some of Zorn’s works—especially with his 
band, Naked City—while in the work of the band Sunn O))), a single guitar riff performed at a 
glacial tempo is the basis for an extended-length work. 
3. Radical music often has a prominent conceptual component that informs our perception 
and interpretation of the music. This is different from the aforementioned transgressive spirit of 
radical music because that is a general philosophical principle informing the deepest level of the 
work, while the conceptual component pertains more specifically to individual works. This 
conceptual drive exists across a broad spectrum. Aube, for instance, makes single-source 
recordings drawing from anything from an electroencephalogram to the burning pages of a Bible. 
The nature of his expressive language is transgressive when compared to musical convention, but 
on top of this, he also adds the conceptual layer of working with only one sound source. 
Similarly, Galás performs in a style that is aurally transgressive, as we find in the abject horror of 
Wild Women With Steak Knives, but beyond the transgressive sonics and aesthetics, her work 
also deals with themes of tolerance, justice, and vengeance. Although some types of radical 
music may be “about” the destruction of musical convention, a great deal of radical music also 
incorporates a prominent conceptual element in some capacity. 
4. Radical composers are rarely affiliated with commercial, academic, or philanthropic 
institutions, often for a mix of pragmatic and ideological reasons. Ideologically speaking, radical 
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composers are fiercely protective of their freedom to create anything without oversight, 
influence, or control. They tend to hold a Romantic notion of artistic autonomy, but this 
autonomous ideal is also grounded in practicality. Commercial institutions like the recording 
industry tend to exert the most influence because the importance of profitability is absolutely 
central to every decision that is made. Academic institutions may offer greater artistic freedom, 
but these positions often come with certain requirements such as the possession of academic 
credentials. Because few radical composers are academically trained, even if the academy would 
support their work, they rarely possess the academic degrees and pedagogical experience 
necessary to be eligible for a typical professorship. Radical composers may occasionally receive 
grants from philanthropic institutions, but this is rare, and in these instances, the work tends to be 
less radical that which is self-financed. Ultimately, radical composers tend to support themselves 
through CD sales through either small boutique labels or through the artists’ own private label, 
both of which exist outside of the corporate structure of the mainstream recording industry. 
This lack of institutional affiliation has ramifications beyond economics and artistic 
freedom, for it also implies a sort of break with the mainstream of music, at least in the minds of 
the composers. It is not necessarily that radical composers hold the naïve idea that it is possible 
to extricate themselves from their inherited traditions of music, but that they purposefully 
attempt to work against those traditions. Rather than conceiving of themselves as heirs to, say, 
the Germanic legacy while attempting to push it into strange new territories, as Stockhausen did, 
they question the value of the legacy itself. Again, it is important to note that radical composers 
do not seek to throw out canonic works; rather, they seek to discard the discourse of supremacy 
that has become attached to these works. Thus, the lack of institutional affiliation is both actual 
and philosophical. 
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5. In terms of musical construction, one of the most fundamental changes is the emphasis of 
timbre over intervallic relationships. Although there is a broader trend toward timbre—especially 
in popular music—over the traditionally important melodic and harmonic motion of most 
Western music, the significance of timbre is particularly pronounced in radical music. In the 
work of Autechre, for example, melody is either usually either non-existent or simple and 
repetitive, and thus one must trace the development of musical ideas through the changes in 
timbre rather than interval.  
6. The material objects of radical music are typically recordings instead of scores. This is a 
significant change from the traditional split between composer and performer, for in radical 
music, there is virtually no thought given to the idea of a performance by someone other than the 
composer, or by someone without the composer’s direct involvement. Although rebellion against 
standard Western notation practice and the production of a performance score is not a requisite 
feature of a radical composition, many composers would find it difficult or unnecessary to 
translate their idea into a spatio-visual code, especially in the manner of the conventional five-
line staff. If a radical composer produces a score at all, it tends to be a set of prose instructions 
for realizing the music. Moreover, radical composer-performers often employ an expressive 
language that is too idiosyncratic for another performer to duplicate effectively. To attempt to 
replicate the performance style of someone like Galás would be to reduce her expressive 
language—intrinsically bound to her life and background—to mere technique. Some radical 
performers also rely on a special performance technique or instrumentation that they have 
developed. This could range from the particular sampling methods used by Steve Stapleton of 
Nurse With Wound, or the unique way that Christian Fennesz approaches the guitar. The Finnish 
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duo, Pan Sonic, has even worked with an electrical engineer who invents electronic instruments 
specifically for their music.  
7. Cultural hybridity figures prominently in radical music, and although it has been an area 
of interest for the American experimentalists and the postmodernists in general, cultural 
hybridity takes a different shape in the context of radical music. After the spread of late-
capitalism, national boundaries have become decreasingly meaningful, even between the East 
and the West. Composers like Merzbow or Yasunao Tone create music that is just as Western as 
it is Japanese (or is it more accurate to say, “just as non-Western as it is non-Japanese?”). Certain 
strains of modernism can be read as an attempt to sever one’s roots, while certain strains of 
postmodernism seem to foreground the artists’ roots, especially if they are non-Western in 
origin. In radical music, we find artists who put down multiple sets of roots in a way that makes 
their work less explicitly tied to a strong sense of place. These artists exist across national 
boundaries, sometimes living and working in multiple countries, such as Ryoji Ikeda who is 
Japanese, but works primarily in Paris. Other artists practice a sort of critical cultural borrowing 
for sociopolitical reasons. Muslimgauze, for instance, was a tireless advocate for Palestinian 
liberation and many facets of Middle Eastern percussion are present in his otherwise electronic 
music. 
8. The radicalism of the aural actuality of the music is amplified through other non-acoustic 
means. The extent to which we may consider something to be truly “extra-musical” is debatable, 
but there are certain elements beyond the realm of sound that are used effectively by radical 
composers. This may include album covers, artists’ statements about specific works, or even the 
communication of an aesthetic philosophy in general. Zorn’s album, Guts of a Virgin (1991), is 
aurally assaultive, but it also features a pathology photograph of a disemboweled woman. Even 
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before the music begins, the listener’s sensibilities are already agitated. Similarly, both Galás and 
Zorn have a history of making incendiary remarks and even though they do not necessarily 
pertain to a specific work, they color the listener’s perception of the sound of the music. 
9. Radical music often uses space as an added musical dimension. Sometimes this involves 
a total sonic saturation where the intensity of the sound overwhelms the listener in a 
claustrophobically enveloping sound experience, as we find with a composer like Merzbow. 
Other times, the use of space may be quite subtle by allowing the sound to blend seamlessly into 
the listener’s sonic environment. In the case of a composer like Francisco Lopez whose work 
involves the recording of ambient sound, the space of the recording merges with the space of the 
listening environment. In other cases still, the use of space might involve multichannel sound 
setups where the listener is literally surrounded by audio transducers, as one finds with certain 
electronic works by Xenakis or Ryoji Ikeda. 
 Certain of these criteria are not unique to radical music. For instance, the move towards 
timbre over intervallic relationships is a trend that one can observe in many streams of twentieth 
and twenty-first-century music. Similarly, cultural hybridity is seen very broadly in works of the 
postmodern era, and the blurring of national boundaries is no longer intrinsically radical. My 
reason for including such trends in this list is merely to highlight the frequency with which they 
appear in radical music, irrespective of their use in other musical streams. 
Finally, it is important to note that radical music is an original term that I have created to 
account for certain trends in music, particularly in the latter part of the twentieth century and 
continuing into the twenty-first century. Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow do not refer to themselves as 
radical composers, at least in a manner that is specifically consistent with what I have outlined 
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above.299 It is unlikely that the composers would deny the radicalism of their work, but it is 
equally unlikely that they would accept a specific label that describes their work. Such is the 
relationship of the historian and the artist. In using the term, I am situating them as transgressors 
of musical convention in a very broad sense, but I am also situating them as belonging to a 
tradition of transgression that includes the figures described above in section 2.1. This is a 
different situation than that of, say, post-1945 modernism where we find a cluster of composers 
like Stockhausen, Boulez, and Maderna all exploring the same strain of post-Webernian 
composition together at the Darmstadt school, but even within the heterogeneity of their aesthetic 
goals, radical composers belong to a tradition of boundary breakers. In the present case, Zorn, 
Galás, and Merzbow each have unique ideas about what it is that they do and what their aesthetic 
goals are. I will save a detailed discussion on how they conceive of their own music for later. For 
now, it will be sufficient to understand that these three composers are united as boundary 
breakers, but the boundaries they break (and their reasons for breaking them) are quite different. 
3.0 Expressive noise 
 Expressive noise is my term for the electric current that runs through radical music. 
Expressive noise is a metaphysical essence that wreaks havoc on stability, constantly threatening 
to overturn assumptions and conventions. The radical music of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow all 
uses expressive noise in some capacity. One may draw the easy connection between Merzbow’s 
work, commonly referred to as “noise music,” and expressive noise, but this relies on only the 
most basic distinction of noise vis-à-vis music. One may contest that some of Zorn’s music is 
actually quite lyrical and beautiful by conventional standards and is not “noisy,” per se. This too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Zorn, for instance, has coined the term “radical Jewish culture,” which one can assume includes at least 
some of Zorn’s explicitly Jewish-themed works and projects. 
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assumes a straightforward definition of noise involving ugliness, and this too is far too simplistic, 
as I will show. 
Noise is not necessarily a pejorative, nor is it necessarily ugly, nor is it necessarily 
destructive. So long as we rely on conventional wisdom to provide the stable definition that we 
use in everyday language, we will continue to face difficulties in coming to terms with radical 
music. We must move beyond the common idea of noise as bad. 
3.1 What Is Noise? 
The word “noise” is colorful and evocative, but when we examine its usage in 
scholarship, we find that it is actually quite difficult to define. Because most of the prominent 
theorists of noise as an aurality are working in the field of sound studies and sound art, a survey 
of that literature is in order to gain an understanding of what noise has meant to various theorists. 
The discussion below pertains most directly to Merzbow because of the nature of his music, but 
it factors into the way I conceive of musical radicalism in Zorn and Galás as well. The following 
exploration of noise serves to introduce my concept of expressive noise, but I will revisit my 
definition apropos of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow’s conceptions of noise, especially as it pertains 
to their own music, within the case studies themselves. 
 The most fundamental issue regarding noise is unresolved and will likely remain so: does 
noise have ontological status? Is there a metaphysical essence that is isolatable, even in theory? 
The addition of the concept of music only compounds the difficulty in finding an essence of 
noise because we must now ask: is noise part of music? Is noise not part of music? If noise is not 
part of music, is it the opposite of music, is it merely outside the field of accepted cultural 
practice, or is it fundamentally other? Depending on one’s answers to these questions, there are 
various strategies of attack and defense for any of the possible positions, many of which are 
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outlined below. Because the concept of noise is so rich, a diverse array of commentators have 
created a similarly diverse way of speaking about it; however, upon reviewing the literature, the 
various conceptions of noise seemed to gravitate toward six general categories that I have named 
as such: acoustic, communicative, subjective, symbolic, transcendent, and phenomenological. 
Each of these categories offers benefits and limitations both for inclusion and exclusion of noise 
as a musical category. 
Acoustic 
In acoustic terms, noise consists of irregular waveforms, as in the common example of 
white noise. Within white noise we find a completely random combination of frequencies such 
that the resulting spectrum is flat, all frequencies being equally present on average.300 Much of 
the material of so-called noise music does use such inharmonic sounds, but limiting the idea of 
noise to a degree of randomness in a waveform merely describes the physics of the sound, which 
makes no distinction between noise and music. This assumes that noise can be reduced to a 
certain physical property, when it is common to use the term to describe sounds that are not 
inharmonic, but are nevertheless irritating for reasons that may have nothing to do with aperiodic 
waveforms. Because of the interpretive value in attaching a communicative, subjective, 
symbolic, and/or transcendental quality to the category of noise, we can consider this to be the 
most trivial definition of noise. 
Communicative 
 The fundamental communicative definition comes from information theory, where noise 
is defined as a corruption of a signal. It is an unwanted artifact that obscures the transmission of 
information, whether linguistic, sonic, or otherwise, it makes no difference. Even if one were to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Curtis Roads, The Computer Music Tutorial (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 1062. 
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temporarily consider noise to be extraneous to signal, Adam Collis points out that this extraneous 
phenomenon is not necessarily destructive, but can actually increase the information content of a 
signal.301 A musical example might be the nostalgia created by adding the hisses and pops, 
indexing an experience of listening to worn-out LPs on an old turntable, and thereby adding 
another layer of meaningful sonic information. Furthermore, what happens when a composer 
turns the sounds of signal degradation into the actual musical material? For example, Stefan 
Betke (Pole) has created multiple albums based around the unpredictable sounds generated by a 
broken Waldorf 4-Pole filter.302 For Betke, the corrupted signals routed through his filter are not 
extraneous, but rather the integral material of his work.  
Subjective 
In the twenty-first century the generalized field of art is (perhaps grudgingly) tolerant of 
virtually any form of expression, thus relegating aesthetic judgment (following Kant) to the 
position of personal preference. To define noise as unpleasant sound is to make noise a totally 
relative category. Cage said that noise is simply sound that we choose to ignore, thereby 
encompassing a huge variety of sonic phenomena from traffic and factories to pop tunes playing 
in the background at the mall.303 This says nothing about any specific timbral constitution, for 
the roar of traffic may come to resemble white noise, while the irritating background music in a 
store could be pleasant music to the same hypothetical individual in a different context. One 
might be tempted to venture that the ear fundamentally seeks out order, preferring the regularity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 Adam Collis “Sounds of the System: The Emancipation of Noise in the Music of Carsten Nicolai,” in 
Organised Sound 13(1): 32. 
302 Betke’s most enduring works under the name of Pole are a trio of albums, simply titled 1, 2, and 3, are 
collected in Pole, 123, ~scape SC 54C, 2008, compact disc. 
303 John Cage, “The Future of Music: Credo,” in Silence: Lectures and Writings by John Cage 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 3. 
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of a tone to the inharmonic waves of white noise, but this is an argument best left to 
structuralists. Furthermore, we cannot simply associate inharmonic waves with noise, for even a 
simple sine wave can serve as an irritant under the right conditions.304 If noise can only be 
defined subjectively, then it has no metaphysical essence and there is not much to say; noise is 
potentially anything and potentially nothing. 
Varèse states, “anything new in music has always been called noise,” furthering the idea 
of noise as annoying, or misunderstood, sound; “but after all,” he continues, “what is music but 
organized noises?”305 Difficulty arises in parsing Varèse’s statement because he first uses the 
word ‘noise’ in its subjective capacity and then switches to a neutral meaning of noise, which 
might be better expressed as ‘sound’—abstract units of aural phenomena without a connotation 
of consonance or dissonance. The statement is interesting because it displays the effort of avant-
gardists to take the ostensibly non-musical and reframe it as legitimately musical, a tactic that 
prefigures Jacques Attali’s views on noise. 
Symbolic 
For futurists like Luigi Russolo, noise had a metonymic (and sometimes even directly 
representational) relationship to the increasing urbanization of the western world. In The Art of 
Noises, Russolo advocates for futurist musicians to overcome the “limited variety of timbres that 
the orchestra possesses” through the expanded timbral pallet of “noise.” 306  After their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 In the case of the “Sonic Teenager Deterrent” (aka, the “Mosquito”), a sine wave around 16khz occupies 
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discouraging loitering in public spaces while leaving adults (ostensibly less likely to loiter in public) oblivious to its 
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305 Edgard Varèse, “The Liberation of Sound,” in Perspectives of New Music 5(1): 18 (1966). 
 
306 Luigi Russolo, The Art of Noises, trans. Barclay Brown (New York: Pendragon Press, 1986), 28. 
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experiences in the Italo-Turkish War,307 the futurists wanted a way to express the experience of 
modern warfare, and Russolo found that while most of the battles were fought under the cover of 
night with a limited visual component, the sounds of war—mechanical and metallic—were what 
stuck with him, and therefore music was the ideal medium to render the experience of war. 
Throughout his essay, “The Noises of War,” Russolo offers descriptions of the aural experience, 
suggesting ways that noise might aestheticize warfare.308 
Russolo’s position on noise is symbolic, but also subjective, although it is not clear which 
position he takes: is noise a beauty lost on the majority of listeners, or is noise wonderful 
because of its inherent ugliness? Perhaps this ambiguity anticipates the paradox of noise qua 
music that Attali’s theory suggests when applied to Merzbow. Time has shown that the legacy of 
Russolo’s manifesto tends to be his liberation of timbres found outside of the western orchestral 
norm, as Merzbow and other such composers cite him as a foundational figure helping to make 
their work possible; however, many artists at the turn of the 21st century have shed Russolo’s 
symbolic use of noise, as the next discursive paradigm is founded upon Pierre Schaeffer’s anti-
representational theory of acousmology and John Cage’s philosophy of letting sounds be 
themselves without deterministic structures imposed upon them.  
Taking a different approach, one might conceive of noise in a symbolic form where its 
variance from the culturally standardized codes of music represents a rebellion against normative 
sociocultural values. Jacques Attali sees music as a symbolic system expressing social meaning. 
In this capacity, noise is a transitory, rebellious symbol that society has not yet assimilated—an 
abstract signifier prior to its enmeshment in a knot of culturally assigned signifieds—but it has 
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no special status as a sonic practice that is permanently outside the sphere of music in a given 
society; eventually, all noise will become an accepted cultural practice and will, ipso facto, lose 
its status as noise. Just as Varèse observed the art of the early twentieth-century avant-garde 
slowly move from rejection to (again, grudging) acceptance, Attali writes “despite the death it 
contains, noise carries order within itself; it carries new information.”309 
I believe that Attali’s idea of music requires a metaphysical transcendence that is not 
found in historical experience, for a great deal of music remains at the periphery of canonized 
musical discourse long after it should have been assimilated. A composer like Iannis Xenakis 
may receive coverage in our histories of Western music, but he is framed as a perennial outsider, 
notable more for his intrinsic unassimilability than anything else. If Xenakis must be considered 
“noise” under Attali’s definition, how are we to understand an artist like Merzbow or Galás? 
Transcendent 
 Rather than conceive of noise as extraneous, Christoph Cox proposes that sound is “a 
continuous, anonymous flux to which human expressions contribute but which precedes and 
exceeds these expressions. […] [He proposes] that this sonic flux is composed of two 
dimensions: a virtual dimension that [he terms] ‘noise’ and an actual dimension that consists of 
contractions of this virtual continuum: for example, music and speech.”310 This definition derives 
from Leibniz’s idea of the perceptual unconscious, where complex phenomena are absorbed at 
an unconscious level only to emerge as clear ideas once a structuring and limiting system has 
been instituted.311 This idea has an obvious precedent in the technique of subtractive synthesis 	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311 The anti-Cartesian arguments of Leibniz foreshadow Freud’s own theory of the unconscious mind. For 
both philosophers, the mind is a powerful perceiving device that pulls out details that slip beneath conscious 
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where a complex sound (e.g., white noise) is filtered to produce a more harmonically focused 
sound. It also evokes the Fourier transform, which takes a complex timbre and breaks it into its 
constituent sine waves. The idea of transcendent noise avoids the issue of subjectivity, as well as 
composer intent versus the corruption of intent, but it also downplays the possibility of noise 
carrying intrinsic meaning as a totality. It does, however, fit nicely within the Lacanian 
framework as outlined in chapter 1. 
 Along similar lines to Cox, Paul Valéry writes, “a sound makes into a semi-presence the 
whole system of sounds—and that is what primitively distinguishes sound from noise. Noise 
gives ideas of the causes that produce it, dispositions of actions, reflexes—but not a state of 
imminence of an intrinsic family of sensations.”312 Here, again, we find noise as a transcendent 
sonic category from which sound is extracted and may begin to take on specific meaning, but as 
with Cox’s conception, the delineation breaks down when faced with two acoustically equal 
sonic events, one intentional (and imbued with meaning) and the other unintentional (with no 
intended meaning). Nevertheless, Valéry’s idea of noise as a transcendent category is, like 
Cox’s, a useful idea to retain when Lacanian theory is in play.  
Phenomenological 
 The discourse of the practices known as “noise music” and “sound art” are riddled with 
phenomenological accounts of noise advocating the Schaefferian concept of acousmology—a 
method of reduced listening that seeks to focus all attention on timbre, free of any context.313 	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This tends to lead to shortsighted, reductionist readings of works because once one has 
surrendered to the ostensible impossibility of talking about music, all that remains is silent 
enjoyment of context-free sound. In this manner of thinking, there is no difference between noise 
and non-noise; they are both equally valid sonic occurrences. The phenomenological approach is 
likely attractive to so many within the noise music scene because value judgments are a non-
issue—sound simply is—but Seth Kim-Cohen goes to great lengths to show how 
phenomenological under-readings—a sort of lingua franca for sound artists—repeatedly miss 
out on fascinating conceptual readings that add a further level of depth to the work.314 
From a purely philosophical position, reducing sound to pure, neutral timbre is useless if 
we are trying to arrive at an understanding of noise in contradistinction to whatever noise is not; 
however, Salomé Voegelin approaches her phenomenology of music through Merleau-Ponty 
whose philosophy involves an emphasis on the corporeality of phenomena, especially as they 
relate to the perceiving body. Her definitions of noise as sound that “deafens [her] ears to 
anything else,”315 makes noise relative in the Cagean sense, but as she develops the idea, she 
adds a physical component that, while not universally applicable, captures the crucial assaultive 
nature of the particular type of noise we find in Zorn’s Astronome, Galás’s Wild Women, and 
Merzbow’s work in general. The category of noise is not contingent upon deafening volumes, 
but in the case of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, volume is an essential experiential component. 
Naturally, a phenomenological conception of noise will be subjective, but unlike Cage’s 
subjective idea of noise (i.e., sound that one finds unpleasant), Voegelin’s noise does not imply a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear: Toward A Non-Cochlear Sonic Art (New York: Continuum, 
2009), 121-148. 
315 Salomé Voegelin, Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 44. 
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value judgment because it simply demands, for better or worse, the listener’s undivided attention. 
Although aural annoyance may not interest her, Voegelin incorporates a unique element that 
rarely pertains to expressive culture: actual physical danger. Russolo may have aestheticized war, 
but his idea of music was close enough to concert music of the early twentieth-century that one 
might find it distasteful, but not threatening. In the 21st century, for example, we find sound used 
to create extreme states of psychical discomfort for inmates in secret military prisons,316 and 
even within the realm of aesthetic practice, there is now the potential danger of hearing loss 
during many types of concerts. Every time one listens to Merzbow or many works by Galás and 
Zorn, there is a choice: does one experience the music as intended and play it as loud as possible, 
even to the point of pain; or, does one save oneself from certain hearing damage and weaken the 
composer’s work by attenuating the volume to a safe level? In the 21st century, sound may be 
not only ugly, but also physically dangerous. 
3.2 The Paradox of Noise/Music 
It is very unlikely that Attali was imagining these turn of the century radical composers 
when he wrote Noise: The Political Economy of Music, but his theory nevertheless exposes a 
paradox within the idea of noise qua music: If the practice of noise carries within itself an 
anarchist sentiment—a desire to transgress boundaries—what happens when one begins to 
accept this noise as a legitimate expressive act within a cultural system? If the point of noise 
music is to be reviled, there is no need for Merzbow to release hundreds of CDs, to say nothing 
of the hundreds of less visible figures in the noise music milieu. One CD of transgressive, 
perpetually unlistenable noise should be sufficient as a conceptual artistic statement, much in the 
way that Duchamp did not need to create an endless series of urinals to fill galleries across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 For an extended discussion of sound as a weapon, see Steve Goodman, Sonic Warefare: Sound, Affect, 
and the Ecology of Fear (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). 
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world in order for his message of rebellion, context, and conceptualism to propagate throughout 
the art world.  
If a composer spends multiple decades working in a style, producing hundreds of 
works—many of which are perceptually similar, at least on a surface level—then we must 
assume that the artist is either wholly unoriginal, or that he or she is creating this work because it 
is at least partially constructive of some deeper form of expression than simplistic destruction for 
its own sake. This problematizes the idea of noise as a corruption of signal as well as Attali’s 
idea of noise as a harbinger of the future of society. In this sense, noise becomes signal, and that 
which is signal can exist within a cultural system.  
This raises an ontological question: can radical music be music and noise 
simultaneously? Provided we do not insist on the binary opposition of information theory, we 
might conceive of noise in a nomadic sense, where it has the potential to exist within the same 
plane as music while slipping across the structural and delimiting borders of conventional music 
in a given culture. This allows noise to retain a significant portion of its oppositional quality 
while existing within a general field of music. At the lowest level of distinction, noise exists 
within the plane of general expressive culture, provided there is authorial intent behind it. From 
that point, the extent to which a specific cultural construct allows noise to pass within the 
boundaries of music is decided on a case-by-case basis. Noise will continue to transgress the 
boundaries of music, but for most definitions of music, noise will remain an outsider. 
One may contend that this creates an asymmetrical power relationship between noise and 
music and reinforces ideas of beauty and ugliness, which surely must be subjective; but, I do not 
wish to retain value judgments that would define noise as the poor, wretched “other” of purified 
music, for there is great power in the disruptive force of noise. Bataille wrote that to accept the 
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writings of the Marquis de Sade as literature, as opposed to obscene works of horror, is to rob 
them of their disruptive power, thereby negating their threat to morality.317 Likewise, so long as 
noise retains its minority position, it retains the right to nomadicism, to freedom, to unrestricted 
disruption. The only way to conquer noise is to put it on equal footing with conventional music 
because only then will it be subject to the bondage of cultural codes. 
Ultimately, noise qua music must retain its paradoxical essence if it is to have meaning 
apart from music. It may exhibit an oppositional relationship or it may exhibit a relationship of 
pure difference, but either way, noise cannot be subsumed by music. The listener must hear the 
noise as both noise and music (i.e., not-noise) simultaneously. In this way, noise shares much 
with Lacan’s dialectic of desire, where prohibition and transgression are absolutely dependent 
upon each other to sustain themselves and to give each other meaning. As I described in the 
previous chapter (section 4.1.4), the phenomenon of jouissance is the paradoxical motivator that 
maintains the desire to experience noise as both music and noise, impossibly and simultaneously.  
When we take all of the above into consideration in the context of a composer like 
Merzbow, two elements are paramount: the paradoxical relationship to music and the expressive 
intent behind the sound. Referring to Merzbow’s work as “noise music” tames the word noise 
into a mere qualifier of music, which does not do justice to the otherness and subversive power 
of noise. Moreover, it broadens the meaning of music to the point of effective meaninglessness. 
After the above survey of conceptions of noise, I believe that simply referring to Merzbow’s 
work as “noise” is too vague because one does not necessarily need to understand the word 
“noise” as carrying authorial intent, nor does one necessarily understand noise as anything other 
than a matter of taste. Paul Hegarty’s history of noise in music uses “noise/music” as its title, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Georges Bataille, “The Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade (An Open Letter to My Current Comrades),” in 
Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, ed. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl, Carl R. Lovitt, and Donald 
M. Leslie, Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 92-3. 
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which is a nice way of highlighting both the connectedness and the difference of noise and 
music, but there again one may reduce this distinction to music/non-music, non-music potentially 
meaning many things not limited to noise, such as silence.318 
For these reasons, I propose the term “expressive noise.” Expressive noise implies 
authorial intent—the most fundamental element of art—as well as a separation from music that 
allows noise to be its own expressive category, thereby highlighting its oppositional relationship 
to music. The creator may seek to minimize his or her determination of the final outcome, but the 
most elemental artistic enunciation or circumscription remains in effect, for even the most 
indeterminate works by John Cage, for instance, retain a trace of his presence as the instigator of 
the work. Authorial intent is an important component of expressive noise because from the 
position of the auditor, one could equate the experience of perceiving expressive noise with the 
experience of being in an uncomfortable sonic environment within which one has no control over 
the sound. The experience may be similar in some cases depending upon the sort of knowledge 
the auditor has about the work in question (i.e., can he or she understand the expressive noise as 
an artistic statement?), but the distinction between intentional and non-intentional sound is 
crucial when looking for meaning within a sonic expression. While the auditor may choose to 
find meaning within non-intensional sound (as in the case of Cage’s 4’33”), the sort of meaning 
that I propose to find, as outlined in chapter one, requires an enunciating subject who puts forth a 
specifically aesthetic statement. 
It is also important to understand that my reasons for eliminating the word “music” have 
nothing to do with the reasons that so-called sound artists have for eschewing the term music. 
Although no two sound artists share the same definition of sound art, common themes include a 
rejection of the Western art music canon, a belief in the possibility of acousmatic listening, a 	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171	  	  
greater importance attached to site-specific works, a struggle to define their practices 
independent of traditional ideas of music, and an attempt to divest themselves of an aesthetic 
history that they would sooner not come to terms with (even if this aesthetic history is 
inescapable). Rather than trying to negate a connection to music for the above reasons, my 
intention for choosing “expressive noise” instead of “expressive noise music” has to do with a 
mutually dependent relationship between music and noise, or as we have seen in chapter one, 
taboo and transgression. 
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Chapter 3 – The Arcanum of Creativity: John Zorn’s Astronome 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Within John Zorn’s exceedingly diverse oeuvre, Astronome stands out as one of his most 
challenging works both conceptually and sonically. Over its forty-five-minute duration, one must 
confront a cacophonous barrage of sound presented with a minimum of conventional features, all 
surrounded by occult themes are that never explicitly articulated. From the lack of discernible 
pitches and form to the wordless libretto, Astronome provides little to steady one’s self, and the 
experience is aggressively alienating. However, through a hermeneutic investigation, I will show 
how the work not only communicates a coherent theme throughout, but also how the musical 
materials actually support the meaning of the work through sound. 
I will begin with some background on Zorn, his many compositional styles, and his 
philosophy of music. Along the way I will make a case for reading Zorn as a radical composer 
and demonstrate the value of my thick interpretation hermeneutic. My analysis of Astronome will 
begin by examining the influence of Zorn’s dedicatees— Edgard Varèse, Aleister Crowley, and 
Antonin Artaud—on the music materials and themes of the work. I will then show how the 
contributions of the three dedicatees can work together to form a coherent thematic reading of 
Astronome. From there, I will introduce a few additional Lacanian concepts that will aid in 
understanding how the sonic material of Astronome is able to achieve the thematic goals of the 
work. Above all, I will show how Zorn uses loudness, the voice, and expressive noise to create 
an extreme expressive language that forces the auditor to undergo a similarly extreme 
experience. 
 
 
173	  	  
2.0 John Zorn 
 Attempting to summarize John Zorn’s creative output is a bit like attempting to 
summarize the multifarious streams of Western music in the twentieth century. In both cases, 
unprecedented stylistic diversity appears to be unified only by virtue of the timespan in which it 
occurs. As Zorn approaches the fortieth year of his career, he has written in virtually every 
conceivable style from virtuosic solos works like Carny (1991) and concertos like Aporias: 
Requia for Piano and Orchestra (1994) to the lounge music of the “Dreamers” ensemble (active: 
2008—) and the hardcore, thrash-jazz miniatures of Naked City (active: 1988-1993). The 
disparate musical threads in Zorn’s oeuvre are held together by little more than the personal logic 
of his aesthetics. Ornette Coleman can exist alongside Mozart because Zorn insists on the 
equality of their musical import and the interoperability of their respective expressive languages.  
 Since the mid-1990s, Zorn has had a peripheral presence in musicological scholarship, 
although this typically amounts to the appearance of his name on lists of so-called “postmodern” 
composers. Save for a few articles and essays, Zorn would not be the central focus of an 
extended scholarly engagement until John Brackett’s monograph in 2008, which had the 
unenviable task of introducing and summarizing such a chameleonic composer.319 
 By the time that Zorn began to receive substantive musicological attention, mainstream 
music journalists had already cemented his reputation as a “bad boy,” a “Downtown hero,” and a 
“postmodern prankster.”320 For his part, Zorn has done little to counter this mythology, and in 
fact, he seems to encourage it with antagonistic, profanity-laced interviews. If we are to confront 
a work like Astronome with the utmost accuracy, we must address this mythology, for if one can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 John Brackett, John Zorn: Tradition and Transgression (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
320 For instance, see Francis Davis, “‘Zorn’ for ‘Anger’: The composers John Zorn likes being the bad boy 
of new music,” The Atlantic Monthly 267 (1991), 97-100. 
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determine that Zorn is just a “bad boy” irreverently poking fun at cherished musical traditions, it 
is easy to dismiss his work as a single joke that has overstayed its welcome. I believe that what 
has been widely interpreted as irreverence is actually iconoclasm—a genuine attack on a value 
structure instead of a mere lack of respect. Moreover, one could make the mistake of thinking 
that Zorn has an attitude of irreverence toward, say, the Viennese masters, when this is 
completely backward. It is not the composers and their music that Zorn attacks; it is the 
superiority implicit in their canonization as masters of “serious” and “artistic” music. In one 
instance, Zorn actually compares himself to Mozart, arguing that if Mozart were alive today, he 
too would be exploring new instruments like the electric guitar and turntable as serious 
instruments with artistic potential.321 In some respects, Zorn does not see a fundamental 
difference between himself and Western art music composers of the past, although any 
willingness on the part of Mozart to experiment with new instruments is hardly tantamount to the 
much more aesthetically transgressive work that Zorn sometimes creates, such as Astronome. 
2.1 Zorn and Postmodernism 
 Postmodernism, as a term, remains both ambiguous and controversial. There is a 
tendency to collapse its multiple meanings and uses into a single definition, and this leads to 
inevitable misunderstanding and condemnation. When discussing art, there are two important 
senses of the word: the first concerns philosophical postmodernism, which involves skepticism 
toward hegemonic structures;322 the second concerns aesthetic postmodernism, which involves 
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to all this different music that is around. It’s not an unusual thing for a creative person to be interested in creativity.” 
Bill Milkowski, “John Zorn: The Working Man,” Jazz Times, May, 2009, accessed May 6, 2013, 
http://jazztimes.com/articles/24597-john-zorn-the-working-man. 
322 Cf. Jean-Jrançois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, Of 
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an array of stylistic techniques such as intertextuality, quotation and borrowing, collage, and 
ironic juxtaposition.323 Many of these aesthetic features are made possible by the philosophical 
tenets of postmodernism, but even when a composer does not employ aesthetic postmodernism, 
philosophical postmodernism may still affect his or her work. 
 Zorn is frequently referred to as a postmodern composer, and in some ways, this label is 
apropos. In his music we find elements of aesthetic postmodernism such as a fusion of disparate 
styles, a blurring of the distinction between so-called “high art” and “low art,” the use of 
heterogeneous collage techniques, less emphasis on continuity and cohesion, and plentiful 
intertextuality. These are stylistic features common to aesthetic postmodernism; however, Zorn 
also exhibits traits of philosophical postmodernism in his skepticism toward hegemonic 
formations such as the Western art music canon. The postmodern straw man composer is said to 
enjoy smashing art and popular music together for the sake of irony while constructing a 
patchwork of depthless surfaces—and indeed the critics of postmodern aesthetics have gleefully 
trounced this straw man—but few of these critiques hold up under scrutiny, for a composer like 
Zorn is not simply piecing together surface features for a cheap laugh.324 Rather, there is a deeper 
philosophical message behind his use of aesthetic postmodern techniques. In Forbidden Fruit 
(first recorded, 1987)—a chamber work for string quartet, voice, and turntables—Zorn presents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Michel 
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direct quotations of canonic works such as Mozart’s B-flat Major Piano Sonata and Beethoven’s 
Große Fuge. The use of these quotations reveal a number of things: first, their existence 
alongside newly composed material suggests a sort of equivalence of musical heirerachies of 
value; second, their context within Zorn’s own string quartet explicitly demonstrates Zorn’s 
indebtedness to the past; and third, their presence is liberating insofar as it signals a changing 
mentality toward European music, for the European hegemony that Cowell and Partch protested 
has ceased to pose an overwhelming threat and can now be reintroduced without necessarily 
implying artistic superiority. The very fact that an American composer can situate his or her 
artistic voice in communion with (rather than in opposition to) the European tradition signals the 
end of the Americanist experimental music project and indicates the arrival of the postmodern 
mentalities, even if postmodern aesthetics are not always used. 
 Reading certain works as aesthetically postmodern will undoubtedly lead to interesting 
interpretations. David Brackett, for instance, frames Zorn as a postmodern composer, but this is 
convincing because Brackett’s framing is based primarily on Zorn’s collage works (e.g., 
Spillane, Godard) and the music of Naked City—in essence, the music that Zorn was famous for 
at the time.325 Other works do not fit within the purview of postmodern aesthetics as easily. 
Redbird (1995), for instance, could be described as aesthetically postmodern only insofar as Zorn 
seems to be channeling Morton Feldman’s compositional techniques (e.g., limited pitch material, 
ample repetition, long duration, delicate timbres). Otherwise, the work fits within the sort of late 
modernist practice that Feldman continued to explore into the 1980s. 
 Even within a collage work like Spillane, however, Zorn exhibits some modernist 
tendencies as well. Despite the use of pulp novels in an art music context, Zorn is an admitted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 David Brackett, “‘Where’s It At?’: Postmodern Theory and the Contemporary Musical Field,” in 
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“control freak”—a supreme author creating a situation where he alone sees the full picture.326 
Some improvisation and collaboration are built into the work, but this is a much more calculated, 
controlled endeavor than Cagean indeterminacy.327 His chamber works from the twenty-first-
century such as LeMômo (1999), 777 (2007), and A Rebours (2010) are even closer to musical 
modernism insofar as they are completely notated, are filled with the sort of extended techniques 
popular with avant-garde and experimental composers, have few discernible connections to the 
musical past, and employ a novel musical syntax. 
 Looking to Astronome specifically, we find little evidence to suggest a postmodern 
reading. There is no real borrowing from music history, there is no discernible irony, this is not a 
collage work, and there are no recognizable quotations; rather, Zorn is using a language much 
closer to post-1945 modernism where the absolute purity of the concept is placed before (and 
often against) the idea of historical beauty, where radical means convey a radical message. 
Rather than the sort of cultural and historical borrowing found in Zorn’s more postmodern 
works, Astronome exhibits a level of cultural transgression and comparative lack of referentiality 
to existing music that is more in line with musical modernism. The use of a rock trio 
instrumentation invites comparisons to popular music, but I am strongly against the tendency to 
examine Zorn’s music as popular music, even if popular music now approaches the same sort of 
cultural legitimacy that art music enjoys. In the case of Astronome, to read the music as popular 
music is to fail to see beyond the rock trio instrumentation while ignoring the fact that the other 
features are virtually antithetical to anything found in popular music. A popular music reading 	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also contradicts Zorn’s compositional mentality, for even if he engages with the stylistic 
languages of various popular music traditions, he nevertheless presents himself as an artistic 
genius in the Romanticist sense. This, therefore, solidly implies a Western art music mentality, 
even though Zorn rails against the hiererachy of value with which it is concomitant. 
This is not to say that popular music scholarship has nothing to offer my project. David 
Brackett’s analysis of Elvis Costello’s “Pills and Soap” in Interpreting Popular Music combines 
the best of musicology (analysis of the pitch content, without the common pitfall of focusing 
mostly on the song lyrics) and ethnomusicology (analysis of the sociocultural context of 
Costello’s writing and of the music’s audience).328 Brackett even takes the laudable step of 
looking beyond traditional analytic techniques for answers, as evidenced by his use of spectral 
graphs to examine texture, as well as a graphic gestural notation to show vocal inflections that 
fall between the cracks of traditional notation. Although harmonic and formal analysis may serve 
certain types of music rather well, with so much emphasis placed on idiosyncratic performance 
and timbre in popular music, accounting for the intervallic relationships offers only a simplistic 
reading of harmonically basic, but richly nuanced works. Brackett realizes that not all of the 
tools of classical musicology are going to serve emerging musical forms and styles, and thus he 
calls upon new techniques to serve his purpose. In this way, I too recognize the need for new 
tools to face the sort of hermeneutic challenges posed by a work such as Astronome, which is 
precisely why I propose that we view the work as radical music and subject it to my thick 
interpretation hermeneutic, as discussed in chapter one. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 David Brackett, Interpreting Popular Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 157-98. 
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2.2 Zorn as a Radical Composer 
 In many ways, Zorn is a paragon of radical composition. Looking back to the features of 
radical music as outlined in the previous chapter, we find a number of similarities. First, much of 
Zorn’s music is inherently transgressive sonically, pictorially, and philosophically. For instance, 
consider Zorn’s band, Naked City.329 The instrumentation is straightforward—guitar, bass, 
drums, keyboards, saxophone, and vocals—and the music is anything but. In the course of one 
forty-second song, we hear a kaleidoscopic array of styles all smashed together, as if a 
hyperactive child was flipping through channels on the television. The song “Speedfreaks” is an 
often-cited example because it perfectly encapsulates the Naked City style: over the course of 
thirty-two bars at 200 beats per minute, the band changes styles—drastically and yet 
seamlessly—in each bar. One could interpret this in a postmodern sense and speak about the 
phenomenon of zapping or the elevation of stylistic surfaces over structural, developmental 
depth, but as John Brackett notes in his harmonic analysis, there is structural coherence 
underneath the admittedly zany stylistic strata.330 I would add that the way Zorn uses the familiar 
thirty-two-bar song form is a statement regarding his dismissal of hierarchical stylistic 
relationships. In “Speedfreaks,” each style receives its due in almost equal measure, for jazz 
exists alongside reggae, which collides with country, which leads to hard rock, which leads to 
funk and thrash and lounge and so on. Here, Zorn transgresses boundaries of taste, style, and 
musical hierarchies of value. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Naked City consisted of John Zorn, saxophone; Bill Frisell, guitar; Fred Frith, bass; Wayne Horvitz, 
keyboards; Joey Baron, drums; and, unofficially, Yamatsuka Eye. 
330 John Brackett, John Zorn: Tradition and Transgression (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 
24-26.	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  Astronome is transgressive in numerous ways. The thoroughgoing dissonance and sonic 
power aside, the work is also transgressive in the way it radically refigures the genre of opera. 
What is traditionally considered an elite genre—the height of refined beauty—is now gloriously 
debased with sonic cacophony of a decidedly noisy nature. Not only are the beautiful arias 
missing, but also the poetic libretti are replaced with grunts and screams, and in fact, there is a 
lack of many of the fundamental components of Western music such as melody, harmony, and 
discernible form. Most fundamentally, Zorn completely dismisses conventional aesthetics with 
this work that is deliberately ugly by conventional aesthetic standards. Although he is hardly the 
first composer to flout the necessity of aesthetic pleasure in music, his voice counts amongst the 
most consistently vigorous. In the context of expressive noise, two aspects are notable: the use of 
acoustic noise in the distorted electric bass guitar and the use of subjective noise in Zorn’s 
deviant approach to opera. 
 Second, much of Zorn’s music uses an extreme expressive language, but this is never 
merely for shock value. For instance, the brutal thrash-jazz of Spy Vs. Spy (1988) is a re-
imagining of Ornette Coleman tunes through the language of hardcore punk using extreme sound 
levels to recreate the sense of aural and aesthetic shock felt by the audiences who first 
encountered Coleman’s initial explorations of free jazz. Again, Astronome is an excellent 
example, insofar as the intensity and volume are particularly excessive, even within Zorn’s 
oeuvre. Although one might draw comparisons to certain Naked City and Painkiller albums, 
instead of a blast of sonic aggression lasting for a matter of minutes (or seconds), Zorn now asks 
the listener to endure this style over the course of a forty-five-minute work. Electric guitar with 
heavy distortion is idiomatic to the sort of heavy metal style that Zorn references in Astronome, 
but now the distortion has become so heavy that the individual pitches are obscured. The fact 
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that Zorn uses a distorted bass guitar only exacerbates the difficulty of discerning pitches, for 
low frequencies are all the more difficult to pick out, even without intentional distortion. This 
brings the phenomenological aspect of expressive noise into play, because the sound overtakes 
the spectator both in terms of psychical disturbance and physical discomfort. 
 Third, Zorn has deliberately avoided any sort of support from commercial and academic 
institutions, with the brief exception of four albums released on Nonesuch Records and a single 
record released by CBS/Sony.331 Although Zorn has supported himself, in part, through CD 
sales, he chose to start his own record label to ensure that he reaches his audience unfiltered by 
pragmatic considerations such as marketability or political correctness. Despite the fact that Zorn 
uses recordings as a mode of financial support, Tzadik functions much differently than a normal 
commercial record label because where a conventional record label has certain financial 
concerns that supplant the primacy of autonomous artistic expression, Tzadik operates on an 
egalitarian profit-sharing basis. This notion of the romanticized, autonomous artist was instilled 
in Zorn during his early twenties, and the influence of Jack Smith is particularly notable. Zorn 
states that, “Jack was a symbol of purity, plain and simple. He never compromised in his life. It 
was not even in his vocabulary. He never even put himself into the situation where he could 
compromise—it was not even a question, it never even came up.”332 Near the beginning of his 
career, Zorn rather famously quarreled with Nonesuch because he wanted to use some very 
controversial images for the cover of his second Naked City album. This experience, along with 
the pride of indigent independence and his deep-seated antiestablishment mentality led Zorn to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 The Nonesuch albums include The Big Gundown (1986), Spillane (1987), Spy Vs. Spy: The Music of 
Ornette Coleman (1988), and Naked City (1989). The CBS/Sony album is Cynical Hysterie Hour (1989). This 
album was only released in Japan and has been subsequently rereleased on Zorn’s Tzadik label. 
332 Cole Gagne, “John Zorn,” in Soundpieces 2: Interviews With American Composers (Metuchen: The 
Scarecrow Press, 1993), 513. 
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eschew any sort of support structure in the future.333 As Zorn puts it, “Jack [Smith] and Richard 
[Foreman] and Ken Jacobs really instilled in me the love for the underappreciated and the love 
for doing things under adverse conditions, on small budgets—how money can be like handcuffs 
rather than something that frees you up.”334 One could argue that it is easier to hold these 
uncompromising values when one has achieved the sort of success that Zorn has, but one could 
just as easily argue that these uncompromising values led to the success that Zorn now enjoys.  
 Fourth, in many cases, Zorn’s music places emphasis on timbre instead intervallic 
relationships. Granted, certain works like kol nidre (1996) and Contes de Fées (1999) are 
carefully notated and use some sort of pitch organization scheme, but outside of his “concert 
music,”335 intricate pitch relationships are secondary to timbre and mood. Because there are so 
few moments in Astronome where one can discern specific pitches, most of the listener’s 
attention is focused on the quality of sound created in the extended techniques employed by 
Patton, Dunn, and Baron. In the rare moments where discernible pitches do emerge, these seem 
to function as moments of auditory rest, but their appearances are too fragmented to form much 
in the way of melodic expectation. 
 Fifth, the material objects of Zorn’s compositional work tend to be recordings instead of 
scores. In some cases this is due to the fact that he has not created a traditional score that could 
be realized without the composer’s involvement. This is the case with Zorn’s file card works 
such as Spillane, Elegy, and Astronome. The creation of these works involves a mix of notated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 One might argue that the profit-sharing structure of his Tzadik record label acts as a support structure, 
but insofar as Zorn’s own recordings routinely outsell those of any other artist, Zorn still carries most of the risk for 
the label. 
334 Gagne, 513. 
335 Zorn refers to this music as “concert music” on his publishing website, Hips Road Edition: The Concert 
Music of John Zorn. Accessed May 7, 2013, http://www.hipsroadedition.com.  
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fragments, oral instructions, and incrementally recorded sections that Zorn builds into the 
completed work. When creating music with this method, Zorn alone sees the bigger picture and 
knows where the piece is headed. The compositional work is only finished once the recording is 
completed, and thus, the recording stands as the central object of the work. 
In other cases, Zorn does create a fully notated score that allows performers to realize the 
music independently; however, even in these instances, it seems that Zorn’s emphasis remains 
with the recording as the primary object of the work. The works are all eventually released on a 
CD on his Tzadik label complete with artwork and text that Zorn has selected as an extension of 
the aural actuality of the music. Furthermore, Zorn closely supervises the recording process to 
ensure that the release comes as close as possible to his exacting specifications.336 Although he 
may appreciate and encourage subsequent interpretations from different performers, there is 
always the sense that the recording as released by Tzadik is the urtext.  
 Sixth, Zorn’s aesthetic extremism extends beyond the sonic, often in a controversial 
manner. This tends to happen in two ways: in the artwork on Zorn’s album covers and in the 
persona that Zorn cultivates in interviews. It is not at all clear that these are “extra-musical” 
facets of the work because they are such an integral part of shaping the listener’s perception. 
Looking first to the artwork, Zorn states, “with me, the packaging is essential—that is my 
artwork…and I want to give people as many clues as I can. […] I’m trying to be as clear as I can, 
and when I put the pictures on the covers that I do, it’s really to tune you in to what’s going 
on.”337 While conceiving of a given work, Zorn will compile inspiring images, some of which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 “I don’t really believe in the idea that you just write it and then you put it on the shelf, the way Charles 
Ives did. I write it for people I know, I get the best people to do it, I find the best possible venue, we rehearse it the 
best possible way and then we present it to people in as pure a way as possible.” Milkowski, 2009. 
337 Gagne, 531. 
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will often appear somewhere in the finished album’s artwork. Sometimes they are quite 
provocative, such as the stills from sadomasochistic Japanese films featured on Naked City’s 
Torture Garden. Other times they are completely benign, such as the use of Agnes Martin’s 
abstract expressionist paintings for the cover of Zorn’s tribute to her, Redbird (1995). Either 
way, the effect of the artwork is remarkable. In Ellie Hisama’s assessment of Zorn in 
“Postcolonialism on the Make,” she scarcely mentions the sound of his music, focusing almost 
exclusively on condemning his album artwork and track titles.338 Similarly, in his monograph on 
Zorn, John Brackett dedicates one of his four chapters to the artwork of Zorn’s albums, albeit in 
a less subjective and more analytical sense.339 
 The brash, antagonistic persona that Zorn displays publically also plays an important role 
in shaping listener expectations and perception. There are plenty of anecdotes that speak to his 
concert antics, such as the Knitting Factory performance when Zorn told a loud group of people 
(including Madeline Albright) to “shut the fuck up.” Interviews are also an important outlet for 
Zorn to construct his “bad boy” personality. When asked about the way he blends high art and 
low art, Zorn replied, 
This is something I really react strongly against, the idea of high art and low art. I 
mean, that distinction’s a bunch of fucking bullshit. That’s the kind of thing 
created to make it look like you listen to classical music while you’re sipping 
champagne and with rock music you’re boogeying with a bottle of beer and jazz 
you’re in some dirty club with a shot of whiskey or some shit like that. That’s a 
fucking bunch of bullshit! There’s good music and great music and phoney music 
in every genre and all the genres are the fucking same.340 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Ellie M. Hisama, “Postcolonialism on the Make: The Music of John Mellencamp, David Bowie, and 
John Zorn,” Popular Music 12, no. 2 (1993): 91-104. 
339 John Brackett, 2008, 1-39. 
340 Edward Strickland, “John Zorn,” in American Composers: Dialogues on Contemporary Music 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 128.	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In this colorful rant, Zorn is espousing a very postmodernist statement on aesthetics in a 
deliberately profane manner. Here we find the core of Zorn’s dismissal of the elevation of the 
Romantic canon in Western culture—the essential core of his argument for the abolishment of 
musical hiererachies of value. 
 Because Zorn’s work is fundamentally transgressive, aesthetically extreme, avoids 
commercial institutional support, favors timbre over intervallic relationships, is more focused on 
recordings than scores, and uses extra-sonic means to support the aesthetic extremism, I argue 
that Zorn is a thoroughly radical composer. However, as with many radical composers, Zorn 
does not always compose in a radical style. Comparing Astronome to the sort of music he writes 
for the Dreamers ensemble is a bit like comparing Robert Mapplethorp to Thomas Kinkade. The 
music he writes in these instances is neither transgressive nor extreme; it is simple, pleasant 
music that appears to emphasize sensuous pleasure over confrontational aggression. The 
presence of these compositions does not make Zorn any less radical. It merely shows that he is 
multidimensional and is also able to engage in music in a way that has more to do with sensuous 
pleasure than the philosophically charged work that typifies his style.  
As for Zorn’s own concept of himself, we find that he despises any sort of label, 
especially if it relates to postmodernism. In 1998, Zorn stated that, “composers don’t think in 
terms of boxes and genres. They just do what they do, and they love good music, whatever hits 
them. […] Maybe once I’m dead people will look back and figure out what the hell I was doing. 
I personally would rather not know!”341 Two years later in the inaugural preface to his Arcana 
book series, Zorn is even more forceful: “Rock. Jazz. Punk. Dada. Beat. These words and their 
longer cousins, the ism-family…are used to commodify and commercialize an artist’s complex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Ann McCutchan, “John Zorn,” in The Muse that Sings: Composers Speak About the Creative Process 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 163. 
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personal vision. This terminology is not about understanding. It never has been. It’s about 
money.”342 In the former quote, Zorn is expressing a sentiment very common to artists, 
especially insofar as artists tend to embrace the Romantic notion of a genius individual 
expressing something profoundly personal and removed from any practical consideration. There 
is no reason to expect that Zorn would be more pragmatic about definitions and labels than 
anyone else. The latter quote, however, seems to be a stronger reaction against not only the 
music industry, but against art criticism in general. I believe that part of this may be explained by 
the aforementioned mainstream music journalists who all too easily labeled Zorn a postmodernist 
and found themselves with a handy rubric for evaluating Zorn’s work without needing to 
confront each new work in a rigorous manner. Although Zorn would undoubtedly disapprove of 
my labeling of him as a radical composer, my purpose is to situate him within (and against) the 
larger field of Western musical practice precisely to lead to understanding in a rigorous, 
substantive manner. Undoubtedly, Zorn would prefer to be considered as a completely singular 
entity beyond label or categorization. This may be an important discursive tactic for an artist in a 
Romanticist mindset who wishes to present him or herself as utterly unique, but it is 
disingenuous to act as though one is beyond categorization. Without creating musical-historical 
concepts to understand the work of composers, the creation of reference points is impossible. Far 
from trying to avoid a nuanced engagement through the use of an existing set of opinions, the act 
of situating Zorn within the context of late twentieth-century musical practice actually allows us 
to understand his work better because we can form connections to practices with which we are 
already familiar. Approaching each composer only according to his or her specific criteria is not 
productive because it denies the obvious cultural situation from which the music arises.  	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In another interview in 2000, Zorn appears less defensive and when asked what musical 
tradition he most closely identified with, he responded: “the avant-garde.”343 This is significant 
when we consider a similar description that Zorn would offer almost a decade later. Amidst a 
discussion of the various backgrounds of the musicians with whom he frequently collaborates, 
Zorn states that, “ultimately, I thought of myself as more of a classical musician who then got 
involved with different kinds of players [i.e., players from non-classical backgrounds].”344 This 
is significant not only because it shows Zorn’s composer-centric mentality, but also because it 
exposes a connection that he sees between himself and his Western art music heritage. For a 
composer so often casually framed as a bad boy wrecker of tradition, this statement is 
tantamount to a paradigm shift in mainstream conceptions of Zorn and his music. As I have said 
in chapter two, radical composers transgress boundaries and attack power structures like the 
Western art music canon, but they do not reject the music of the past. This is surely the case with 
Zorn. 
3.0 Astronome 
 Astronome grew out of an informal request for an opera by playwright and avant-garde 
theater impresario, Richard Foreman. Zorn expressed ambivalence about writing an opera for a 
few reasons. In the liner notes to Astronome, Zorn states that, “writing an opera seems an awful 
waste of time. Just what role does opera play in our society today? It certainly does not have the 
kind of impact it had one or two hundred years ago when it was fresh, vibrant, and as much a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Here, I believe that Zorn’s use of the term “avant-garde” should be taken in the general sense, as 
opposed to the more specific meanings that I explored in chapter two. By “avant-garde,” Zorn appears to reference 
both European and American composers without an explicit distinction. Bill Milkowski, “John Zorn: One Future, 
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part of daily life as eating.”345 Although many would disagree with Zorn’s assessment of the 
cultural irrelevancy of opera in the twenty-first century, its status as mass entertainment has 
certainly changed. As a composer, Zorn always prefers making an impact to creating a work as 
an intellectual challenge. Rather than the intellectual challenge of staging a traditional opera, 
Zorn endeavors to create a radical revisionist opera that “recapture[s] the intensity, immediacy 
and intimacy it once had.”346 Significantly, this remark echoes the theoretical writings of Artaud, 
as we will see in section 4.3. 
Moreover, Zorn states that he finds it “impossible to set words to music.”347 Indeed, from 
Arto Lindsay’s nonsense phonemes in the improvised rock of his Locus Solus project (1983), to 
the manic screaming of Yamatsuka Eye and Zorn in Naked City, to his bel canto vocal writing in 
Rituals (2005), Zorn has deliberately avoided texts. When Zorn does use a text, it is almost 
always presented as spoken word, as in the narration of Spillane or the poetic recitations on the 
pieces on his New Traditions in East Asian Bar Bands (1997) CD.348 The only linguistic content 
of Astronome is the vaguely suggestive scene descriptions, such as “A secluded clearing in the 
woods; a full moon illuminates a coven dancing around a large bonfire; an orgy.”349 The work 
does include a libretto, but it is pictorial and there is no explicit narrative created. The libretto 
features black and white photographs by Scott Irvine that are stylistically suggestive of Joel Peter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Liner notes to John Zorn, Astronome, with Joey Baron, Trevor Dunn, and Mike Patton, 2006 by Tzadik, 
7359, Compact Disc. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Liner notes to Zorn, Astronome, 2006. 
348 There are a few exceptions. Naked City’s rendition of Ives’ “The Cage” maintains the sung vocal part, 
the Dreamers’ cover of “The Christmas Song” involves lyrics sung by Mike Patton in a conventional manner, and 
the sixth Moonchild CD, Templars: In Sacred Blood, involves some sung text. Considering the size and scope of 
Zorn’s oeuvre, these are rare exceptions indeed.  
349 Liner notes to Zorn, Astronome, 2006. 	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Witkin, but even within the pictorial libretto, the images serve more to suggest a mood than to 
establish concrete meaning. 
 Thus we arrive at the inevitable question: in what sense is Astronome an opera? On the 
one hand, it is an extended, dramatic work for voice with instrumental accompaniment, it 
includes a libretto, and it is divided into acts and scenes. On the other hand, the connections to 
anything that one could easily identify as operatic are tenuous. There is no bel canto singing (or 
anything that resembles conventional vocal delivery), there is no dramatic narrative, and at the 
time of the work’s creation, there were no concrete plans to ever actually stage it.350 Moreover, 
the division of the acts into scenes is ambiguous, for the CD contains only three long tracks—
one for each act. Even if one listens with the pictorial libretto in hand, there is nothing explicit in 
the music that cues the beginning of a new scene. Ultimately, there is little to tie Astronome to 
the operatic tradition. The three acts are through-composed and, on the whole, the music is quite 
sectional, often alternating between structured and freely improvised sections. At times, one of 
the three musicians is featured in a solo section, although to draw any facile connections between 
this and the idea of an aria would be an abuse of the term. 
3.1 Form in Astronome 
Although the music is through-composed, there are a few things to say about form. If 
there is anything resembling a consistent stylistic trait in Zorn’s variegated oeuvre, it is the use of 
sound blocks arranged to create a sort of “moment form,” which is a technique he grew to 
appreciate in some of his favorite composers—Ives, Stravinsky, Xenakis, and Varese—during 
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http://blogs.villagevoice.com/music/2009/02/interview_direc.php. 
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his formative years.351 Jonathan Kramer’s tidy definition of moment form seems most apt for this 
analysis, as the music does in fact “consist of a succession of self-contained sections that do not 
relate to each other in any functionally implicative manner.”352 There is exactly one thematic unit 
that is repeated across two movements, which means that all of the other sections are somewhat 
discrete. I do not, however, wish to suggest the full rigor of Stockhausen’s original formulation 
of moment form,353 in which the elements are far more disparate, insofar as Astronome does not 
actively eschew unity—it is simply through-composed with little direct repetition and no 
harmonic telos. Where Stockhausen’s concept seems to be a theoretical maximum of disunity, 
Zorn speaks of the painstaking process of arranging his musical moments into something that 
makes musical sense diachronically, even if one section is not, strictly speaking, the result of the 
previous section.354 
 This leads to the question of creating unity from disparate elements. Stockhausen’s idea 
of moment form seeks the antithesis of unity, but Zorn does not share this outright rejection. 
Because he was initially known for his collage works, Zorn has a reputation as a “radical 
postmodernist” who employs principles of disunity as a modus operandi.355 Although there are 
degrees of disunity within some of Zorn’s work, he strives for some sort of large-scale 
coherence, even in very sectional works like Spillane. He states, “Spillane has a unity in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 “I would say block structures developed over the course of years, through the study of Ives, Xenakis, 
Stravinsky, film and cartoon soundtracks, and Stockhausen’s ‘moment-form.’” Gagne, 512. 
352 Jonathan D. Kramer, “Moment Form in Twentieth Century Music,” in Musical Quarterly 64, no. 2 
(1978), 179. 
353 Stockhausen quoted in Kramer 1978, p. 179. 
354 Liner notes to Zorn, Spillane, 1987. 
355 Jonathan D. Kramer, “Beyond Unity: Toward an Understanding of Musical Postmodernism,” in Concert 
Music, Rock, and Jazz since 1945, ed. Elizabeth West Marvin and Richard Hermann (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 1995), 11-34. 
191	  	  
sense that each element deals with some aspect of Mickey Spillane’s world […] You try to give 
a composition a coherent sound, the way Varèse used three pitches for Octandre.”356 Even if the 
music is not unified by a large-scale harmonic structure, Zorn uses other means. Spillane uses the 
narrative element to create unity, while Astronome creates unity by virtue of the consistency in 
instrumentation, timbre, theme, and character.  
 How, then, might one approach Zorn’s moment form? Gordon Fitzell conducts a 
phenomenological reading of Zorn’s Road Runner (1986) in order to account for the extremely 
discontinuous nature of the music (based, of course, on the music of Warner Brothers cartoons), 
but this approach of considering each moment in itself as a discrete entity is more appropriate for 
a totally non-teleological work.357 Astronome has a sort of forward momentum not present in 
Road Runner, which does not carry a great deal of coherency between its blocks. All too often, 
works in moment form lead to lengthy play-by-play descriptions that tell the reader nothing he or 
she could not learn from simply listening to the work. In the process of finding a method to 
understand Astronome from a formal perspective, I transcribed the entire work looking for 
patterns, only to find nothing significant that was discernible on a large scale. If I were to 
provide an account for all of the sections, it would surely fall prey to the problem of endless 
phenomenological description. The best one could say is that there is a general alternation 
between periods of intensity and rest. This does not mean that loud sections always give way to 
soft sections, not does this mean that the alternation occurs with enough periodicity for a listener 
to perceive any large-scale outline unless he or she has listened to the work many, many times. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
356 Gagne, 530. 
 
357 Gordon Dale Fitzell, “Time-Consciousness and Form in Nonlinear Music” (PhD diss., University of 
British Columbia, 2004), 65-74. 
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Zorn states that his “music is put together…in a very…‘filmic’ way, montage. It’s made 
of separate moments that I compose completely regardless of the next, and then I pull them, cull 
them together.”358 The operative word here is “montage.” Looking to the theoretical writings of 
Sergei Eisenstein, the master and chief theorist of Soviet montage, we find surprising 
connections: In “Methods of Montage,”359 Eisenstein uses music as an extended metaphor to 
speak about the creation of ideas through editing. In Eisensteinian montage, the editing technique 
is not used merely to provide wider coverage of a single event or to focus the spectator’s 
attention on a specific element of the mise-en-scène by switching between medium shots and 
close-ups. Rather, it is used to create meaning that transcends the individual shots through the 
technique of rhythmic editing and juxtaposition, and in this way, the collection of shots 
communicate something greater than what is found in the individual shots. 
Many of Eisenstein’s ideas are directly applicable to music, such as the case of metric 
montage, which is explained using musical meter. He writes, “pieces are joined together 
according to their lengths, in a formula-scheme corresponding to a measure of music…Tension 
is obtained by the effect of mechanical acceleration by shortening the pieces while preserving the 
original proportions of the formula.”360 Zorn inverts this principle in what I will call the 
“Astronome theme”—the only material to recur in multiple movements. The Astronome theme 
first occurs at 01:27 in the first act and lasts six bars in the following metrical pattern: 7/16 - 
10/16 - 13/16 - 9/16 - 12/16 - 15/16. The entire pattern is typically present two or three times in 
succession and each repetition lasts around 16 seconds, knocking the listener off balance by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Edward Strickland, American Composers: Dialogues on Contemporary Music (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 128. 
359 Sergei Eisenstein, “Methods of Montage,” in Film Form: Essays in Film Theory, edited and translated 
by Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1977), 72-83. 
360 Ibid., 72. 
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rapid onslaught of irregular, mixed meter, like a crazed reference to Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring. 
Where film tends to build tension by an acceleration of edits, Zorn creates tension by slightly 
expanding the meter and thereby deferring the downbeat the listener expects. 
Elsewhere, we can find the principles of “rhythmic montage,” which Eisenstein describes 
as being equally concerned with both the length of the segments and the content within the 
frame. He writes, “formal tension by acceleration is obtained here by shortening the pieces not 
only in accordance with the fundamental plan, but also by violating this plan. The most affective 
violation is by the introduction of material more intense in an easily distinguished tempo.”361 An 
example of this occurs in act one, scene two between 09:14 and 09:59. Zorn repeats a four-bar 
phrase in 7/8 three times, each intercut with seven seconds of freely improvised, non-metered 
noise blasts. This section is very typical of Astronome’s construction. It is a semi-autonomous 
block of music containing local repetition of small sections within its purview, but does not 
contain any material that extends beyond the block itself. The sole exception to this principle is 
the Astronome theme.  
Looking ahead to Varèse’s influence, Varèse writes, “each of my works discovers its own 
form. I could never have fitted them into any of the historical containers.”362 This is exactly the 
same process we have seen Zorn describe when speaking of his file card works and his studio 
works. His process is especially evident in the second act in two ways: upon simply listening to 
the music, one detects the segmented nature of the music, but does not discern any sort of 
pattern; and upon examining the contours of the waveform, looking at the act in its entirety, one 
can see clearly the various segments. As Varèse and Zorn state, the music has determined the 
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362 Edgard Varèse, “The Liberation of Sound,” Perspectives of New Music 5, no. 1 (1966): 16. 
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form such that there is a logical progression from one moment to the next with tasteful 
alternations of intensities and relaxations. There is even a well-constructed arch of intensity in 
the second act, peaking in the middle of the 17-minute act with a quasi-inversion of the 
Astronome theme (07:30-08:20). 
3.2 Zorn’s Collaborators 
Zorn typically writes with specific musicians in mind, and Astronome is no exception. At 
the time of this paper, the three musicians have coalesced into a band informally known as the 
Moonchild Trio. 363  Looking first at drummer Joey Baron, we find a long history of 
collaborations with Zorn, including his participation in two of Zorn’s most visible bands, Naked 
City and Masada. As his playing with these groups demonstrates, he is not only a master of many 
different musical styles, but he is able to quickly change styles, as is required by Zorn’s complex 
arrangements. Beyond his technical prowess, his playing is marked by an emphasis on timbre 
and timing—finding the perfect sound for the perfect moment. Oftentimes, rather than presenting 
a whirlwind of rhythms, Baron’s playing has an elegant simplicity that allows his sound choices 
to shine through. Although most of Astronome calls for drumming in the conventional sense of 
hitting the drumheads and cymbals, there are plenty of sections where Baron creates an 
interesting array of sounds by playing his drum set in an unconventional manner. Amongst other 
things, these techniques include striking the side of the drums and hardware, dragging various 
items like chains across the rims and drum heads, and dragging the tip of the drumstick along the 
grooves of the cymbal to create an eerie, piercing screech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 This is in reference to the first Zorn album that featured these musicians in this hardcore, metal, free jazz 
configuration. John Zorn, Moonchild – Songs Without Words, with Joey Baron, Trevor Dunn, and Mike Patton, 
2006 by Tzadik, 7357, Compact Disc. 
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Baron’s range also includes the ability to shift easily from thunderous metal grooves to 
delicately nuanced improvisatory sections. In Painkiller, Zorn used Mick Harris, the drummer for 
the death metal band Napalm Death, whose drumming is uniformly loud and aggressive—a style 
that is entirely appropriate for the Painkiller music; however, because Astronome calls for not 
only thrash metal drumming, but also for the creation of subtle percussive textures, we can 
surmise that Baron’s ability to play in both a metal idiom and a jazz/free improvisation style 
made him the obvious choice. 
Trevor Dunn is known primarily for his work with various rock bands that specialize in 
musical complexity, detailed arrangements, and stylistic variance within a more popular music 
idiom. He, along with Mike Patton, was a founding member of Mr. Bungle, and he has gone on 
to work in other instrumentally virtuosic groups such as Secret Chiefs 3, Fantômas (again with 
Patton), and Trevor Dunn’s Trio-Convulsant. 
Dunn is responsible for virtually all of the pitched material, and he is also responsible for 
providing the “electric guitar” impression so critical in a metal idiom, but this is not to say that 
one can necessarily discern pitches in his playing with ease. Rather, the tones are clouded by 
extremely heavy distortion to the point that one perceives contours above all else—low versus 
high, static lines versus multi-pitched lines. Like Baron, Dunn uses a number of extended 
techniques to create unusual timbres. These extended techniques coupled with an array of effects 
(e.g., chorus, various types of distortion, backward looping) lend a great deal of variety to the 
sound of Dunn’s electric bass. 
Finally, we have the centerpiece of Astronome—the vocal performance of Mike Patton. 
One can detect traces of Patton’s style, even on his early work with Mr. Bungle. Although he 
does not use the same sort of wordless vocal techniques that Zorn would request in his work with 
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the Moonchild Trio, Patton’s ability to assume multiple personas within a single song (or even 
within a single phrase) is notable. The schizophrenic style that one hears on a track like “Slowly 
Growing Deaf” is taken to the extreme in Astronome, and it is all the more disconcerting because 
there are no lyrics to help the listener interpret the tone of the utterance. Over the course of 
Astronome, Patton portrays a number of different personalities. His voice is uniquely suited to 
this work, as he is able to produce an unusual array of extended vocal techniques, many of which 
are potentially damaging to one’s voice. Patton’s part also requires a sense of theatrical presence, 
which I will return to later in connection with Antonin Artaud’s theory of the Theater of Cruelty.  
3.3 Authorship 
 The role of authorship with radical composers is often straightforward because the 
composers are usually also the performers and producers. Although a composer like Merzbow 
might receive assistance from a mastering engineer, he is responsible for virtually every part of 
the conception, creation, and aural actuality of the music. With Zorn, the situation is a bit 
different because he uses musicians to realize his work. Moreover, his music often includes 
elements of improvisation with varying degrees of structure. The music of Naked City, for 
instance, calls for frequent improvisation, but within the rigid structure of the music, the 
improvisatory space may be anywhere from a few bars to one phrase to one single beat. 
 Astronome uses three musicians with distinct personalities, and because the score is not 
always explicitly notated, we must investigate the issue of authorship for this work. Much in the 
way that Duke Ellington would tailor his compositions to the unique voices of his big band, Zorn 
chooses his musicians carefully according to the unique contributions that he predicts they will 
make. In this sense, the realm of composition extends beyond what can be notated and includes 
the selection of musicians, almost as one would select instruments in the process of 
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orchestration. A familiarity with, say, Mike Patton’s vocal technique must have influenced 
Zorn’s composition of Astronome inasmuch as he knows that he can get a particular sound and 
performance from this particular musician. Once in the recording studio, the musicians have 
freedom to contribute to the particulars of their own parts, but this is a limited freedom, as we 
will see. 
 Much like Spillane and Zorn’s other file card compositions, Astronome was constructed 
bit-by-bit in the recording studio not from a fully-notated score, but from Zorn’s notes that might 
include anything from chord changes to melodic fragments to prose descriptions of moods or 
performance instructions. In a radio interview, Zorn describes his approach: 
Rock music is very much the oral tradition of working in the studio, so I had 
detailed notes of where I wanted the music to go and different intensities and 
different emotions I wanted out of the voice and exact rhythms and pitches, but 
instead of giving them written music, I would sing down to them what the next 
section would be, describe the melody or rhythm to them, we’d rehearse it, 
rehearse it, and then record it and then we’d learn the next section.364 
 
Thus, although Baron, Dunn, and Patton had certain freedoms within the compositional structure, 
they never had an overview of where the music was going, so it would be difficult for them to 
intentionally affect the outcome of the performance. In this way, Zorn is similar to a film director 
like John Cassavetes where the actors are handed new script pages each day as they contribute to 
the construction of characters without seeing the final resolution. On the realization of 
Astronome, Zorn states: 
When you get a musician like Joey Baron, you don’t want to write out a drum 
part. You want him to do it his own way, so you write out the beats and the 
time signatures, what instruments you want them to use, and you also let them 
be creative. Mike Patton’s voice is capable of so much, and you can’t really 
write that kind of vocalization down, so what I had down was different 
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intensities and different modes of expression, different emotions and different 
dramatic scenes that I wanted him to imagine he was in.365 
 
With respect to Baron’s and Dunn’s contributions, it would be difficult to capture the heavy 
metal idiom without allowing them to create parts that feel natural. Patton seems to have had the 
most artistic freedom, but again, without knowing where the work as a whole was headed, it 
would have been difficult for him to affect the outcome in an intentional (i.e., co-authorial) 
manner. 
 In speaking about authorship, we must consider Zorn’s role as composer and director of 
musical realization, but we must also consider the fact that Zorn selects and supervises his 
recording engineers as carefully as his musicians. Bob Musso (recording), Bill Laswell (“mix 
translation”), and Scott Hull (mastering) are all frequent Zorn collaborators, each contributing to 
dozens of his releases. Although their contributions are more technical than creative, they each 
contribute to the overall sound of the work, and their techniques create consistency across the 
Moonchild Trio’s recordings. 
 Beyond the compositional and technical components discussed above, we must finally 
consider the conceptual. I have described the musicians of the Moonchild Trio above, but the trio 
is more than a collection of musicians; it is also a compositional approach. Zorn describes the 
musical conception as “a project…combining the hypnotic intensity of ritual (composition) with 
the spontaneity of magick (improvisation) in a modern musical format (rock).”366 This idea of a 
rock band using ritual magic is undoubtedly inspired by Varèse, Crowley, and Artaud—the 
dedicatees of each of the Moonchild albums—and from this inspiration, Zorn has created a new 
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compositional approach that has led to a variety of works, including a song cycle (the original 
Moonchild album), an opera (Astronome), and a profane litany (Six Litanies for Heliogabalus).367  
 Baron, Dunn, and Patton have each made important contributions to the musical material 
of Astronome, just as Musso, Laswell, and Hull have help to craft the sonics of the recording; 
however, when one considers the extent to which Zorn was responsible for the conception, 
realization, and production of the work, one can easily view Zorn as the main author of 
Astronome with the other contributors playing the role of demi-authors, as outlined in chapter 
one. Zorn’s comparison of his role to that of a film director is apt, at least in the auteurist sense 
that I believe he intends. Just as a filmmaker like Jean-Luc Godard would develop a script, create 
a storyboard to outline the cinematographic design, direct actors through the various scenes, 
oversee the myriad details that go into the sound and image, and maintain the overall vision of 
the film, so too does Zorn develop a series of musical moments, create a coherent order for them, 
direct the musicians through the various moments, oversee the other elements of production and 
recording, and maintain the overall vision for where the work is headed. For these reasons, I 
argue that it is appropriate to consider Astronome as a largely single-author work provided that 
we recognize the important contributions from Zorn’s collaborators. 
4.0 Zorn’s Dedicatees 
Let us turn now to Zorn’s dedicatees—Varèse, Crowley, and Artaud. We can unite all 
three through their mutual fascination with arcana—a secret knowledge hidden from our 
consciousness that is only accessible through radical transcendence, a work of alchemy, a 
transmutation of elements. For each of the three explorers of the unknown, this general goal 
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manifests itself in different ways: Varèse was a man of modern science, but he was also 
fascinated with the alchemist Paracelsus; Crowley’s connection to arcana is obvious, insofar as 
he was an occultist seeking spiritual transcendence; and Artaud was dedicated not so much to 
gaining a secret knowledge, but to transmitting this knowledge beyond words to an audience 
through theatrical means. By examining each of these figures in greater detail, layers of meaning 
in Astronome will begin to unfold, which will allow for a richer, more nuanced interpretation. 
4.1 Edgard Varèse 
 Varèse’s contributions to Astronome are threefold: first is Varèse’s longstanding 
fascination with the Renaissance physician, astrologer, alchemist, and occultist, Paracelsus 
(1493-1541), which is evident both generally across Varèse’s oeuvre and specifically in his 
orchestral work, Arcana (1927); second is Astronome’s namesake, Varèse’s massive, unfinished 
theatrical work referred to alternately as L’Astronome and The One-All-Alone;368 and third are 
Varèse’s compositional style and innovations, some of which are similar to Zorn’s. 
 It may be surprising to imagine a composer like Varèse, fascinated as he was by science 
and technology, finding inspiration in an occult figure like Paracelsus, but Paracelsus was more 
than an alchemist. He proposed a new approach to medicine wherein empirical methods 
superseded the use of cures based on ancient texts that had long been accepted as timeless truth. 
Naturally, this was considered heretical and left Paracelsus branded as a dangerous radical. Thus, 
we can speculate that beyond his importance to the advancement of modern science, Varèse 
probably also saw Paracelsus as a kindred spirit—a fellow radical pushing the boundaries of his 
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discipline, all while drawing the ire of his peers.369 In fact, the protagonist of Varèse’s 
L’Astronome is a sort of amalgamation of Paracelsus, da Vinci, and Varèse himself.370 However, 
the strongest example of Varèse’s interest in the hermetic philosophy of Paracelsus is found in 
the epigram to Arcana, wherein Varèse creates a number of analogies between music and 
alchemical mysticism. 
 Arcana is something of an anomaly in Varèse’s oeuvre insofar as it is scored for a full 
orchestra and features an orchestral language slightly more conventional than his previous 
chamber works such as Hyperprism and Octandre. He even refers to Arcana as a symphonic 
poem, which makes the work seem less revolutionary than the others. Nonetheless, Varèse 
comments, “it is perhaps in Arcana that you will truly discover my thought,”371 lending to the 
gravity of his homage to Paracelsus on the title page of the work, which follows: 
One star exists, higher than all the rest. This is the apocalyptic star. The 
second star is that of the ascendant. The third is that of the elements—of 
these there are four, so that six stars are established. Besides these there is 
still another star, imagination, which begets a new star and a new heaven.372 
 
In Arcana, Varèse is exploring this seventh star, this unknown star of pure creativity that begets 
new words of expression. Zorn, like Varèse, finds this to be a compelling metaphor for artistic 
creation and actually reproduces the title page of Arcana in the liner notes of Astronome.  	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371 Varèse quoted in “Artistes de l’avant-garde en Amerique,” Le Figaro Hebdomadaire (Paris), 25 July, 
1928 in Malcolm MacDonald, Varèse: Astronomer in Sound (London: Kahn and Averill, 2003), 187. 
372 Arthur Edward Waite and Paracelsus, The Hermetic and Alchemical Writings of Aureolus Philippus 
Theophrastus Bombast, of Hohenheim, called Paracelsus the Great. Now for the first time faithfully translated into 
English. Edited with a Biographical Preface, Elucidatory Notes, a Copious Hermetic Vocabulary, and Index 
(Mansfield Centre: Martino Publishing, 2009), 310. 
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 According to Varèse, the links between the epigraph and the music of Arcana are 
overstated, and it appears that he did not have the quote in mind during the composition of the 
work; however, sometime before the work was published, he revisited Paracelsus’s writings and 
upon discovering the above quotation, Varèse felt compelled to include it on his title page not 
only in French, but also in the original Latin and in English. Varèse may downplay the 
importance of the Paracelsus quote as “an amusing analogy,” but clearly there is something more 
here. He continues, stating that there is an analogy “between the transmutation of base metals 
into gold and the transmutation of sounds into music, and also…the process of musical 
composition is the discovery of the arcana—the hidden secrets in sounds and in noises.”373 Thus, 
whether Varèse had Paracelsus in mind when composing Arcana or found it later, we can note 
that he found an important affinity between his conception of music and Paracelsus’s hermetic 
philosophy. As we will see below, Zorn has a similar fascination with Aleister Crowley, for even 
though Zorn does not profess to be a practicing Thelemite, he does find Crowleyan mysticism to 
be a powerful metaphor for artistic creation. 
 L’Astronome (aka The One-All-Alone, aka The Astronomer) occupied Varèse’s attention 
for decades and he worked on it sporadically from the late 1920s until at least 1947. It was to be 
a monumental theatrical work involving three choruses, a large ensemble of brass and 
percussion, vocal soloists, actors performing pantomime, and spatialized electronic sound 
emanating from loudspeakers scattered throughout the performance space. Virtually every 
concrete part of the work has been lost (only a few bars of music and a few handwritten notes 
remain), and thus, most everything one can learn about L’Astronome is based upon the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Varèse quoted in MacDonald, 191. 
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descriptions of the artists who worked on the project.374 There are a number of libretti that were 
attempted and abandoned, but they all typically relate to the same core narrative: an astronomer 
notices a star and as he begins to communicate with it, the star begins to move toward the earth, 
thereby causing global catastrophes.375 An angry mob threatens the astronomer and implores him 
to cease his communication with star in the belief that the astronomer is bringing the destruction 
upon the earth, but he persists in spite of everything. During the climax, the astronomer is 
enveloped by the light, ascends into the heavens, and the angry mob begins to worship him as a 
Nietzschean Übermensch. 376  The general idea of a fearless explorer boldly dragging the 
quivering masses into a brighter future resonates with both Paracelsus and Varèse. 
There were three main problems that contributed to L’Astronome’s failure to reach 
completion. First, after working with a number of writers, Varèse was still unable to transition 
from the basic scenario that he developed to a libretto that communicated these ideas in manner 
that matched the radical nature of Varèse’s musical language. At one point, Alejo Carpentier, 
Robert Desnos, and Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes were all working together on a draft of a 
libretto for Varèse, but despite the power of their own surrealist poetry, the collaboration did not 
lead to anything sufficiently radical. Varèse then began to work with Antonin Artaud, but this 
collaboration was similarly unsuccessful, as I will discuss below. Second, Varèse’s imagination 
outstripped the technology of the day, and his sonic ideas could not be realized, at least through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 The most complete account of the scattered fragments concerning The One-All-Alone can be found in 
Anne Jostkleigrewe, “Reaching for the Stars: From The One-All-Alone to Espace,” in Edgard Varèse: Composer, 
Sound Sculptor, Visionary, ed. Felix Meyer and Heidy Zimmermann (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2006), 242.  
375 Sirius and Sirius B, the latter of which Varèse refers to as the “Companion.” Scientists had only recent 
discovered Sirius B when Varèse was developing the scenario, and he was enthralled by the incredible mass and 
gravitational power of the white dwarf, Sirius B, remarking “It’s the size of a fingernail, but its weight is beyond 
imagining. What Universe would achieve its disruption?” Varèse quoted in MacDonald, 222. 
376 According to his wife, Varèse was in fact thinking of Nietzsche’s Übermensch when he devised this 
scenario. Louise Varèse, Varèse: A Looking-Glass Diary, Volume I: 1883-1928 (New York: Norton, 1972), 260.	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any practically available equipment. In fact, Varèse would have to wait until 1958 to conduct the 
first experiments in spatialized electronic sound, which resulted in his Poème électronique. 
Third, the enormous expense involved in staging the work prohibited Varèse from staging even a 
compromised version without any of the electronic effects that had not yet been invented. Due to 
the lack of venues that could accommodate the particulars of Varèse’s vision, he considered 
staging the work in an enormous circus tent, but the cost of procuring and setting up all the 
theatrical elements (e.g., lights, a stage, audio equipment) made this impossible. For his part, 
Varèse unsuccessfully sought both technological and financial assistance so as to either develop 
original instruments or explore musical applications of existing sound technology, such as the 
equipment used by Hollywood movie studios. 
 Nevertheless, the general idea of L’Astronome, and more specifically, the idea of Varèse 
and Artaud collaborating seems to have inspired Zorn during the composition of Astronome.377 
Varèse’s interest in the way language was to be used is particularly notable, not only because he 
involved four major literary figures during the development of the libretto, but also because of 
the way that Zorn seems to have taken some inspiration from Varèse’s ideas. After disbanding 
his first team of writers—Carpentier, Desnos, and Ribemont-Dessaignes—Varèse was 
introduced to Antonin Artaud and was impressed with his conceptual work on language and 
theater, especially as it was outlined in the essays that would eventually be collected in Artaud’s 
manifesto, The Theater and Its Double. Of Artaud’s work, the use of nonsense words, empty 
phonemes, guttural sounds, and even screaming, seemed to inspire Varèse so much that when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Zorn writes, “The nexus of these two radical giants [Varèse and Artaud] seemed fascinating, and in the 
flights of my imagination I began to envision directions their work could have taken.” Liner notes to Zorn, 
Astronome, 2006. 
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Artaud delivered a draft of the libretto, Varèse was disappointed with its relative conventionality, 
which led, amongst other things, to the termination of their partnership. 
Varèse then set out to rework an earlier draft, which struck closer to the tone he had 
envisaged, but this time he began to add nonsense words and extra phonemes himself in an 
attempt to subvert the deterministic function of language. Varèse understood the importance of 
the voice in perception, as the sound of a fellow human reaches our ears (and psyche) in a much 
different manner than the sound of, say, a trumpet, and he wanted to play with our perception 
through a number of means: first of all, Varèse wanted to separate the voice from the body, 
which he planned to accomplish by using a singer working in tandem with an actor performing 
pantomime—a mute body and a disembodied voice; second, Varèse wanted to create such a 
cacophony of simultaneous words that intelligibility was severely compromised; and third, 
Varèse wanted to use phonemes devoid of linguistic function to transcend the referential power 
of language—to give an impression of verbal communication, but to exceed the limitations of 
textual signification. Zorn seems to have borrowed this idea and taken it to the extreme in 
Astronome, which contains no actual words, save for obscure and poetic descriptions of 
atmosphere in the pictorial libretto. Over the course of the work, Mike Patton takes on numerous 
personalities. Some give the impression of speech, and some are far more atavistic and abstract. 
It is difficult to determine how much Zorn knew about Varèse’s unfinished work when he 
composed Astronome. Malcolm MacDonald’s 2003 book, Varèse: Astronomer in Sound, 
provided the most thorough overview of all the available sources until Varèse’s estate changed 
hands and new documents relating to L’Astronome were finally made available in 2006. Zorn 
might have read MacDonald’s book during the research phase of his compositional process, but 
MacDonald also paints a fairly unflattering picture of Artaud. Indeed, Artaud had never actually 
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heard Varèse’s music, Artaud worked alone in his creation of part of the libretto, and when 
Artaud finally delivered some pages to Varèse, the libretto did not reflect the techniques of 
Artaud’s “Theater of Cruelty” and had little to do with Varèse’s original scenario. Rather than 
the cosmic scope of Varèse’s scenario, Artaud created something that MacDonald refers to as a 
“subjective manifesto with elements of political polemic.”378 Artaud even changed the title to Il 
n’a a plus de firmament (There is no more firmament). It is understandable why Varèse found 
Artaud’s contribution to be completely unacceptable. 
The actual failure of the collaboration between Varèse and Artaud notwithstanding, it 
appears that Zorn is revising history and restoring the full conceptual weight of Artaud’s 
theatrical vision to Varèse’s L’Astronome. Within Zorn’s Astronome, Varèse’s pioneering music 
meshes perfectly with Artaud’s radical theatrical style to create the sort of overwhelming 
sensorial experience that Varèse had intended all along. As we will see, Varèse’s idea for the 
climax of L’Astronome has much in common with Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty and Zorn’s 
musical approach in Astronome. Carpentier recounts Varèse’s intentions for the climax: 
In the final scene when the astronomer is volatized into interstellar space, factory 
sirens and airplane propellers were supposed to come into action. The ‘music’ 
was to be as strident and unbearable as possible, so as to terrify the audience and 
render it groggy, as he put it. At that moment, he told me, the powerful spotlights 
supposedly raking the sky up on stage would be turned abruptly down into the 
auditorium, blinding the audience and filling them with such panic that they 
wouldn’t even be able to run away.379 
 
Here, Varèse is using extreme aesthetics to push the spectator beyond what he or she can 
comfortably process, to create an experience that forces one to react in a visceral instead of 
intellectual manner, to break down the barriers that allow spectators to observe passively from a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 MacDonald, 237. 
379 Alejo Carpentier, Varèse Vivant (Paris: Le Nouveau Commerce, 1980), 11-12. Quoted in MacDonald, 
231-2. 
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distance. This description would be just as apt for Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty or Zorn’s 
Astronome. Imagine, then, if Varèse had staged his spectacle where his modernist music 
combined with Artaud’s confrontational theatrics to build into this perfect climax that pushes the 
spectator right over the edge. I believe this gets us closest to what Zorn imagined when creating 
Astronome. 
 In terms of general musical features, one can hear similarities between the compositional 
approaches of Varèse and Zorn in Astronome. Chou Wen-Chung notes that Varèse was one of 
the lone Western composers whose style was directed more towards timbre than towards 
intervallic relationships.380 In works like Arcana and Hyperprism, one can hear sound masses 
slowly shifting and colliding with one another in a way that decisively breaks from the Western 
tradition of harmonic and melodic motion. Charles Wuorinen notes that Varèse’s approach to 
musical time is marked by “the juxtaposition of differentiated elements, rather than the inter-
connection of evolutionarily related elements.”381 Rather than using intervallic motion to create 
temporal relationships that establish musical unity, Varèse uses timbre to create unity within 
works comprised of seemingly unrelated sections. In a similar way, Zorn does not structure 
Astronome according to any discernible harmonic or melodic scheme. Instead, motives are 
constructed out of rhythmic figures, timbre, and moods. 
Varèse is also notable for the way that he uses blocks of sound that remain in a constant 
state of flux. Sound masses contract and expand with lively, polyrhythmic irregularity and 
maintain timbral consistency, which lends a sense of linearity to the music, even though the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Chou Wên-Chung, “Asian Concepts and Twentieth-Century Western Composers,” Musical Quarterly 
57, no. 2 (1971): 214-17. 
381 Incidentally, this description is remarkably similar to Jonathan Kramer’s definition of moment form. 
Charles Wuorinen quoted in Ruth Julius, “Edgard Varèse: An Oral History Project, Some Preliminary Conclusion,” 
Current Musicology 25 (1978): 45. Cf. Kramer, 1978. 
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moment-to-moment movement seems to be highly discontinuous. In Astronome, Zorn’s sound 
blocks can be anything from guitar riffs and beats to sporadic blasts of free improvisation. 
Although Zorn’s sound blocks do not undergo the same sort of rigorously notated continual 
fluctuation that Varèse’s do, the use of apparently discrete blocks unified by timbre is similar.  
4.2 Aleister Crowley 
Aleister Crowley presents the most difficult challenge when attempting to understand the 
impact of the dedicatees to Astronome. First, hermetic philosophy is intrinsically obscure, 
jargon-laden, and difficult; and second, there is a dearth of scholarly material on Crowley. There 
are plenty of biographies bordering on hagiography that do not problematize the rather unusual 
nature of Crowley’s personal mythology. Most biographers either take Crowley at his 
(outlandish) word, or they call him a charlatan before replacing his theosophical claims with 
their own preferred theosophy.382 Considering the murky situation of Crowleyan discourse and 
the utter impenetrability of his own writing, if there is anything directly applicable to an 
interpretation of Astronome, it is beyond the abilities of this author to discern.383  
In some instances, there are more-or-less concrete connections to be found. John 
Brackett’s analyses of Necronomicon and IAO: Music in Sacred Light reveal the ways that 
Thelemic Kabbalah provides a way of determining micro- and macro-structural features of 
certain works.384 Because these two works are scored in a traditional manner, Brackett is able to 
find numerological significance in the pitches (represented by numbers) and rhythms, and even if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 The following sources are as rich in detail as they are impoverished of critical distance.  Lawrence Sutin, 
Do What Thou Wilt: A Life of Aleister Crowley (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2002); Richard Kaczynski, 
Perdurabo: The Life of Aleister Crowley (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2010). 
383 The most lucid collection of Crowley’s own writings can be found in Aleister Crowley, Portable 
Darkness: An Aleister Crowley Reader, ed. Scott Michaelsen (Chicago: Solar Books, 2007). 
384 John Brackett, “Magick and Mysticism in Zorn’s Recent Works,” in John Zorn: Tradition and 
Transgression (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 40-78. 
209	  	  
the results are difficult (or impossible) to discern by audition alone, it is fascinating to see the 
way that symbolic numbers contribute to the structural aspects of certain works. 
With Astronome, the absence of a traditional score compounds the difficulty of searching 
for numerical significance. Because Baron and Dunn aided in the construction of their own parts, 
looking at the specifics of the rhythms or pitches played will not expose the same sort of formal 
design that Brackett found in his analyses. There are a few places where numbers come into play, 
and these could potentially yield some sort of symbolic significance. One example is the six-bar, 
mixed meter motive (the Astronome theme) that appears four times throughout the three 
movements in the following pattern: 7/16 – 10/16 – 13/16 – 9/16 – 12/16 – 15/16. Crowley’s 
“table of correspondences” in his Liber 777 may yield some significance, but to the uninitiated, it 
is nearly impossible to understand what the symbols communicate. For instance, the number 7 
represents, amongst other things, victory, the sphere of Venus, A’arab Zaraq, Hathoor, Aphrodité 
and Niké, and “the vision of beauty triumphant.”385 Each number corresponds to more than 
twenty objects, concepts, or deities, but without a comprehensible way to use the information in 
the table of correspondences, the symbols communicate very little. In Brackett’s analyses, he 
found the use of certain numbers with Thelemic significance such as the number 666, which 
represents both the Beast in the Book of Revelation and Crowley himself. In the case of 7-10-13-
9-12-15 (or 66 in sum), there are so many possible meanings for each number that no probable 
meaning emerges that reflects the importance of these particular numbers in this particular 
combination.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Aleister Crowley, Liber 777 vel Prolegomena Symbolica ad Systemam Sceptico-Mysticae Viae 
Explicandae Fundamentum Hieroglyphicum Sanctissimorum Scientae Summae, ed. Israel Regardie (Newburyport: 
Red Wheel, 1986), 2-14. 
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Perhaps, however, the point is not to discover a singular truth hidden in the numerical 
content of Zorn’s work. After all, Brackett allows that his interpretation is exceptionally 
subjective by normal academic standards and that the ambiguous way that Zorn slips between 
Jewish Kabbalah and Crowley’s Thelemic variant means that one can interpret the number such 
that they can mean almost anything.386 In lieu of a conventional score, I propose that we 
understand Crowley’s influence in a more general thematic way. Zorn’s tacit suggestion to the 
listener that there may be numerological significance hidden within his music is sufficient to put 
the listener in the correct state of mind. There is an air of mystery, a riddle just out of reach, 
arcana hidden within the music. Perhaps this is the ultimate aim of Zorn’s invocation of 
Crowley. I propose that we read Crowley’s texts not as manuals for ritual magic, but as literary 
expressions of occultist aesthetics, because this reveals a number of themes directly applicable to 
the interpretation of Astronome.  
Within Crowley’s theosophy, two elements seem particularly germane to music: ritual 
and the invocation of deities. Ritual is defined as “the uniting of the Microcosm with the 
Macrocosm. The Supreme and Complete Ritual is therefore the Invocation of the Holy Guardian 
Angel; or, in the language of Mysticism, Union with God.”387 There are three main methods of 
invoking a given deity: first, devotion involves both the establishment of a shrine according to 
certain principles (e.g., it must be a place dedicated to the deity, there must be an image of the 
deity, there must be appropriate objects associated with the deity) and a lifelong commitment to 
living in a manner that pleases the deity;388 second, ceremonial invocation involves constructing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 John Brackett, 2008, 75. 
387 Aleister Crowley, “The Principles of Ritual,” in Portable Darkness: An Aleister Crowley Reader, Scott 
Michaelsen ed. (Chicago: Solar Books, 2006) 70. 
388 Aleister Crowley, “Astarte vel Liber Berylli sub Figura CLXXV,” Equinox 1, no. 7 (1912). 
211	  	  
a ritual specific to the deity by assembling all the necessary elements according to Book 777, and 
repeating a prayer until the deity’s presence floods the participant’s consciousness;389 and third, 
and most apposite to Astronome, dramatic invocation involves the addition of an aesthetic 
component to the ritual. Crowley writes that a dramatic invocation is the most powerful, and he 
refers generally to historical usages of drama to religious ends. His idea is similar to Plato’s 
conception of art qua mimesis, which has been a powerful concept throughout history, especially 
in the Doctrine of Affections of the Baroque era. It also creates interesting parallels with 
Artuad’s Theater of Cruelty, which holds the ideal of a transcendent experience through the 
dramatic act wherein the spectator is shocked out of complacency, his or her spectatorial gaze 
interrupted by a violent outburst of unmediated truth. 
The ability of art to transcend the linguistically communicable has been an attractive 
concept for artists for centuries, and it is unsurprising that Zorn finds Crowley’s writing to be 
enchanting in this respect. Zorn even goes as far as to create a metaphor out of the idea of 
ritualized, dramatic invocation. He writes, 
I take “magical weapons” (pen, ink and paper), I write “incantations” 
(compositions) in the “magical language” (music)…I initiate “rituals” 
(recordings, performances)…I call forth “spirits” (musicians, engineers, 
printers, CD sellers and so forth…) The composition and distribution of this 
CD is thus an act of Magick.390 
 
For Zorn, there is an analogical relationship between artistic inspiration and magick, and in fact, 
he has dedicated an entire volume in his Arcana series to essays exploring the connection 
between art and magick.391 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Aleister Crowley, “The Principles of Ritual,” in Magick: Liber ABA, book 4, parts I-IV, with Mary Desti 
and Leila Waddell, edited, annotated, and introduced by Hymanaeus Beta (Boston: Weister Books, 1997), 144-147. 
See also, Crowley, 1998. 
390 Liner Notes to John Zorn, I.A.O.: Music in a Sacred Light, 2002, Tzadik, TZ 7338, Compact Disc. 
391 John Zorn, “Preface,” in Arcana V: Music, Magic and Mysticism (New York: Hips Road/Tzadik, 2010). 
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 As Zorn explores the nature of artistic inspiration in Arcana V, we find another affinity to 
Crowley relating to the idea of ostensibly autochthonus creation.392 Both Crowley and Zorn 
express some concept of inspiration that appears to emanate from an external agent. In 
Crowley’s case, this accounts for the creation of The Book of the Law, the holy book of Thelema. 
The myth of its divine origin recounts how during a trip to Cairo, Crowley’s wife, Rose, 
prophesied that on three consecutive days between 12 and 1pm, he was to enter a room and 
transcribe the words of a deity who would identify himself to Crowley as Aiwass, “the minister 
of Hoor-paar-kraat.”393 Crowley describes how he was then compelled to write things that he 
could not have possibly invented in his own conscious mind.394 Zorn describes something similar 
in his preface to Arcana V, albeit in a more general manner and without reference to Thelemic 
variants of Egyptian deities. He writes, 
One exists inside the hot crucible of creativity itself, connected with a spirit, 
energy or historical lineage that is overpowering, exhilarating, frightening. One 
is one’s goal, and the creative act is existence—rewarding in and of itself. At 
these times freedom (so normally equated with artists) becomes obeisance. 
One does what one is compelled to do, inevitably resulting in something 
beyond your known capabilities.395 
 
Here, Zorn appears to be attempting to describe in prose the creative act itself. For both Crowley 
and Zorn, the ego is set aside and an unknown agent is channeled through the artist, a perfect 
autochthonous utterance. In a sense, they are both describing the formation of an inchoate work 
by means of notional ekphrasis, whether divine inspiration or personal creativity, it makes no 	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seems to originate independently within a subject, as if from a foreign agent. 
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A.— (Las Vegas: New Falcon Publications, 1991). 
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difference—the origin of the idea cannot be traced back to the subject in his or her own mind. As 
we have seen, Varèse shares these sentiments as well when he creates analogies between his 
composition and the alchemy of Paracelsus.  
4.3 Antonin Artaud 
 In some ways, Antonin Artaud is the most important of the dedicatees, for he is a point of 
convergence between Varèse and Zorn. Through his extension and transfiguration of the voice in 
theater, we can approach the most peculiar and interpretation-resistant component of Astronome, 
namely the vocal performance of Mike Patton. Although a simple transposition of Artaud’s 
theory of the Theater of Cruelty would serve to illuminate Zorn’s work in interesting ways, an 
application of Lacanian theory will take us even deeper, enriching our capacity for hermeneutic 
discovery. In this section, I will provide some background on Artaud’s theory so that I may give 
a Lacanian reading of his goals apropos of the theater in section 5.1. If, unlike the previous to 
sections, I do not bring Zorn into the discussion just yet, it is because I wish to save elements of 
Artaud’s theory for the central analysis of Astronome. 
Artaud held a negative opinion on the state of theater, centered as it was on “the lives of a 
few puppets” and serving merely to “[transform] the public into Peeping Toms,”396 that is, 
presenting a literalistic portrayal of scenarios involving well-worn theatrical archetypes, all the 
while distancing the spectator who could, for cultural reasons, no longer relate. Just as Adorno 
once theorized that Classical opera could no longer be performed live in its original form due to 
the fact that its clichés and conventions rendered it impotent and self-parodic to contemporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Antonin Artaud, “The Theater and Cruelty,” in The Theater and Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline 
Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 84. 
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audience,397 Artaud felt that contemporary theater had become staid to the point that the public 
was abandoning it for the visceral thrill of the movie theater. Artaud found the solution to his 
impasse in the Balinese theater, as he writes, 
The spectacle of the Balinese theater, which draws upon dance, song, 
pantomime—and a little of the theater as we understand it in the Occident—
restores the theater, by means of ceremonies of indubitable age and well-tried 
efficacity [sic], to its original destiny which it presents as a combination of all 
these elements fused together in a perspective of hallucination and fear.398 
 
This is where Artaud begins to formulate the Theater of Cruelty—a theater capable of smashing 
through the comfortable spectatorial wall, an immediacy of experience, a transcendent level of 
communication from which there was no hiding in the dim light of the darkened hall. He then 
goes on to explain the appeal of the Balinese theater in more detail, taking time to note the level 
of abstraction present. There may be a somewhat conventional story at the heart of the 
production, but the details are vague and suggestive, and little is communicated at the level of 
speech and language, which clears a space for communication by means of gesture—a beyond of 
signification. Western theater is to photography as Balinese theater is to painting. In this case, 
Artaud is striving to create something beyond literalist representation, beyond language. In fact, 
the way Artaud sought to use the vague and suggestive nature of Balinese theater, at least as he 
understood it, is quite similar to the way that Zorn’s libretto for Astronome is remarkably 
abstract, suggesting only the most general of ideas through its brief scene descriptions. 
The Theater of Cruelty, then, is Artaud’s concept of a theatrical experience that will 
shock spectators out of their thoroughgoing passivity, “hence this appeal to cruelty and terror, 
though on a vast scale, whose range probes our entire vitality, confronts us with all our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Theodor Adorno, “Opera and the Long-Playing Record,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard D. Leppert, 
trans. Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 284. 
398 Artaud 1958, 53. 
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possibilities.”399 Artaud writes, “from the point of view of the mind, cruelty signifies rigor, 
implacable intention and decision, irreversible and absolute determination.”400 If this is already 
reminiscent of Zorn’s declaration, “Powerful secrets are revealed through intensity and extremes 
of experience,”401 a statement I will have frequent cause to return to, it is because Zorn was 
indeed reading Artaud during the inception of Astronome.402 Artaud speaks of “a spectacle 
unafraid of going as far as necessary in the exploration of our nervous sensibility, of which the 
rhythms, sounds, words, resonances, and twitterings, and their united quality and surprising 
mixtures belong to a technique which must not be divulged,”403 a description that would be 
perfectly apt for Astronome itself. Elsewhere he writes, 
The public will believe in the theater’s dreams on condition that it take them 
for true dreams and not for a servile copy of reality; on condition that they 
allow the public to liberate within itself the magical liberties of dreams which 
it can only recognize when they are imprinted with terror and cruelty.404 
 
Artaud is radically re-imagining the possibilities of the theater in a way that will be impossible to 
consider from a dispassionate distance. Significantly, Zorn mirrors these sentiments exactly 
when he speaks of envisioning a new opera that “[captures] the intensity, immediacy and 
intimacy it once had.”405 Both Artaud and Varèse sought to use a radical expressive language to 
create a powerful, transcendent experience, and Zorn is no different. 
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401 Liner notes to Zorn, Astronome, 2006. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Artaud 1958, 87. 
404 Ibid, 86. 
405 Liner notes to Zorn, Astronome, 2006. 
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 Before relating Artaud’s theory to Astronome, we must take a brief detour through 
Lacan’s theory of speech and enunciation. This will allow us to better understand how Artaud’s 
Theater of Cruelty (and by extension, the techniques that Zorn borrows for Astronome) creates a 
unique psychical state in the listener. Following that, we may begin to unlock the centerpiece of 
Astronome—Mike Patton’s vocal performance. 
5.0 Speech and Enunciation 
Inasmuch as the constitution of the subject in the Symbolic makes the individual, the I, 
coextensive with speech and language, Lacan spends considerable time developing the concept 
of enunciation. Bakhtin’s concept of the utterance will aid in our understanding of the 
polyvocality of language both in the conscious and the unconscious writing: “every utterance 
participates in the “unitary language” (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same 
time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).”406 In the 
“unitary language,” we have what Lacan calls the “statement”—assemblages of abstract 
grammatical units, language according to socially normative rules—and in heteroglossia, we 
have the enunciation—an individual performance by a specific subject that is both situational 
and occurs at a particular time and place. Enunciations further represent a double inscription of 
the conscious and the unconscious, which the psychoanalyst endeavors to decode. This bivalent 
enunciation is further complicated by the Other because all communication is intersubjective: as 
Emile Benveniste writes, “what characterizes enunciation in general is the emphasis on the 
discursive relationship with a partner, whether it be real or imagined, individual or collective.”407 
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The statement and enunciation occur simultaneously, with the former deceiving the 
subject in the Imaginary—Lacan’s “I am thinking where I am not”—and the latter 
communicating a hidden message from the Symbolic. Lacan demonstrates this phenomenon by 
analyzing the statement, “I am lying,” showing that at the level of the statement, it produces a 
logical paradox, while at the level of the enunciation, we can consider the intersubjective nature 
of the utterance changing it to “I am deceiving you,” which the psychoanalyst can interpret as a 
true statement.408 
This goes to show that there are a number of instances where the statement is banal, 
inapposite, illogical, paradoxical, or even nonsensical, but may also contain meaning if one 
examines it at the level of enunciation. Additionally, there are utterances that fail to register even 
as statements, including all manner of non-verbal sounds (which are of obvious interest to the 
present study), but nevertheless constitute enunciations that are potentially filled with meaning. 
Lacan writes, “Even if it communicates nothing, discourse represents the existence of 
communication; even if it denies the obvious, it affirms that speech constitutes truth; even if it is 
destined to deceive, it relies on faith in testimony.”409 In a sense, this is analogical to the 
communicative aspect of expressive noise because where one might view these utterances as 
communication failures (i.e., the failure to convey an intelligible message), Lacan argues that 
they actually carry meaning within, even if the utterances appear to be mere “noise.” 
Freud theorized the parapraxis so widely that it was renamed in his honor, and Lacan 
adds even more rhetorical devices, especially metaphor and metonymy. Anything that evinces a 
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break in the flow of speech is of interest: the unconscious may force an aposiopesis, drawing 
attention to what was left unsaid; an autochthonus utterance may point to something the subject 
is unwilling or unable to consciously articulate; and the verbal content of a prosopopoeia is only 
part of the interest. After all, tone and inflection sometimes communicate just as much as the 
statement itself.410 This is similar to the way distortion functions on an electric guitar or bass. 
One might consider the distortion to be a degradation of the pure signal of the guitar, but really, 
the degradation actually adds a layer of meaning and what appears to be communicative noise 
turns into expressive noise. 
Finally, there is the somewhat counterintuitive idea that as little value as the statement 
itself carries, the actual words or sounds, not the conscious intent behind them, are the only 
matter of interest.411 One can only discern the enunciation through the particular manifestation of 
the statement, for the intent of the analysand, like the ego-driven surface level of the statement, is 
wholly a product of the Imaginary, and is thus of illegitimate origin. 
5.1 The Theater of Cruelty Revisited 
At this time, we may return to Artaud’s innovations in theatrical performance to 
understand them in the context of the Lacanian psyche. Although, as we will see, the two 
theorists are exploring strikingly similar terrain, they remained at odds with each other in both 
life and scholarship. For a brief period, Artaud was under Lacan’s psychiatric care, and this 
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resulted in the incorrect diagnosis, “Artaud is obsessed, he will live for eighty years without 
writing a single sentence,”412 while Artaud railed against Lacan’s ostensible “erotomania.”413 
 Artaud writes that “theater will not be given its specific powers of action until it is given 
its language,”414 which goes to show that language is just as important for Artaud’s theory of the 
theater as it is for Lacan’s theory of the psyche. When Artaud speaks of ending the “subjugation 
of the theater to the text,”415 he is, in Lacanian terms, saying that the theater must stop thinking at 
the level of the statement and strive to think and communicate at the level of the enunciation—
the order of the Symbolic where the unconscious holds court with its coded messages, always 
arriving in an alienated formulation. Similarly, Artaud’s call for the theater to “create a 
metaphysics of speech, gesture, and expression, in order to rescue it from its servitude to 
psychology and ‘human interest’,”416 is none other than a call for an enunciative performance 
that transcends the statement. 
 Artaud goes even further than this, however, as he looks not only to what can be 
communicated verbally from the unconscious, but what may also emanate from the Real as a 
message that remains unsymbolized, never being mediated by the Symbolic. 
Abandoning Occidental usage of speech, [the theater] turns words into 
incantations. It extends the voice. It utilizes the vibrations and qualities of the 
voice. It wildly tramples rhythms underfoot. It pile-drives sounds. It seeks to 	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exalt, to benumb, to charm, to arrest the sensibility. It liberates a new lyricism 
of gesture which, by its precipitations or its amplitude in the air, ends by 
surpassing the lyricism of words. It ultimately breaks away from the 
intellectual subjugation of the language, by conveying the sense of a new and 
deeper intellectuality which hides itself beneath the gestures and signs, raised 
to the dignity of particular exorcisms.417 
 
The manner in which Artaud goes about this is rather astonishing, even if he was never able to 
stage a production in this style. There are two examples that will serve to explicate the move 
from theory to praxis: the first is a solo performance by Artaud, and the second is a radio 
broadcast tilted, Pour finir avec le jugement de dieu (or To have done with the judgment of God; 
hereafter “Judgment”).418 At this point, the connection between Lacan, Artaud, and Zorn should 
begin to emerge, as Zorn too endeavors to create a new mode of expression that will liberate 
music from conventional meaning and opera, specifically, from the determinism of the text. 
5.2 A Poetry Reading at the Vieux Colombier 
The first example was a reading of three of Artaud’s poems, an account of which is 
provided by Helga Finter: 
As witnesses reported, the evening took place according to plan until Artaud, 
having read the poems, which had duly impressed everyone, began to read his 
life story from a manuscript, from which he soon deviated into free speech. 
Finally, after he could no longer find his place among the manuscript pages 
and began gathering the pages that were scattered across the stage, he broke 
off, and, confused, was gently escorted away by André Gide after the three-
hour performance.419 
 
This was not, as some believed, the exploitation of a schizophrenic, but a perfect realization of 
the Theater of Cruelty, albeit on a small scale with no mise-en-scène, no scenario, and no 	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supporting players. Nevertheless, Artaud had accomplished a theatrical performance so utterly 
transcendent that it moved the spectators in such a way as to disguise the act of theater 
completely. They were able to observe a purity of performance that ceased to be mediated by the 
conventions of theater; a surprising appearance of the Real suddenly broke through the Symbolic 
creating all manner of emotions in an audience unprepared for such an experience. The shock, 
dismay, anger, sympathy, whatever was felt, was precisely the desired result of the 
performance—a performance with an efficaciousness rarely equaled. 
 Two things are evident: the boundary between spectator and actor was demolished in a 
manner that allowed a sort of unconscious communication between the two, bypassing any 
pretense of the Imaginary; and the utopian nature of the Theater of Cruelty became manifest, 
insofar as a repeat performance with the same audience would almost certainly fail to produce 
the same result. Regarding the former point, a significant amount of the power of performance 
surely resides in the actor transcending his or her role as character in a manner that opens a line 
of communication between the spectator-as-subject and the actor-as-subject. Artaud’s portrait of 
a tortured psyche was an intentional act,420 but it was not perceived as such, and therefore the 
audience identified with Artaud-as-subject in place of Artaud-as-performer. Of course, Artaud is 
placing himself in the line of the scopophilic gaze, but the spectator is deprived of the privilege 
and pleasure of the gaze once his or her psyche is penetrated by the Real, thereby fundamentally 
changing the operation of the spectator-performer relationship. Simply put, it is quite 
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uncomfortable to watch such phenomena because the artificially constructed intersubjective 
barriers are broken down. 
Finter writes, “in the context of the symbolic contract implicit in a lecture on a theatre 
stage, the irruption of the Real in the form of sickness, suffering, and insanity was perceived as a 
sensational exhibitionism and histrionics,” implying that the performance had been a failure, or a 
realization of the impossibility of speaking through the Real and being understood as something 
other than insanity. She follows with a quote where Artaud appears defeated, claiming his 
audience had not heard his true message and that only bombs could achieve his intentions. I 
believe that Artaud misses the mark in his assessment of the performance. Artaud was suffering 
from the always-present delusion of intent originating in the Imaginary, while his message 
originated in the Symbolic and was manifest in the Real. If he was seeking a transcendent 
discourse, he succeeded the moment the Real appeared in the form of schizophasia, to the 
astonishment and bewilderment of the audience. As Lacan writes, “the actor lends his [limbs], 
his presence, not simply as a puppet, but with his unconscious which is well and truly real, 
namely the relationship of his [limbs] to a certain history which is his own.”421 This is precisely 
the sort of radical theatrical experience Artaud sought from the Theater of Cruelty, but that he 
had not been able to understand that he had already accomplished the goal when his unconscious 
began to speak through him in an autochthonous manner. He incorrectly identified the locus of 
his meaning in the statement instead of the enunciation. 
Regarding the latter point, Artaud’s performance here exposes the utopian construct of 
his theater. Firstly, and most obviously, the unconscious cannot be controlled; the Real emerges 
as a fracture in the Symbolic creating chaos in its wake. If the actor creates a psychical state 	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wherein the Real is apt to emerge, it will dominate any intent on the part of the performer, 
director, or any conscious agent of governance. As a loose analog, consider Gena Rowlands in 
Cassavetes’s A Woman Under the Influence (1974) or Opening Night (1977), where her 
performance creates a psychical state that blurs the lines between what one might casually refer 
to as “acting” and “reality,” a state that actually allows the afflictions of her characters to 
penetrate through her own Imaginary.422 Although to convey a traditional narrative entirely from 
the Real stands as the great impossibility of the Theater of Cruelty, this does not preclude non-
traditional artistic communication from allowing the Real to speak through performance in a 
manner that is both powerful and meaningful; it merely states that the messages will not be 
intelligible in the Symbolic to either the performer or the spectator. This necessitates an 
epistemology that values non-linguistic enunciations to which the spectator must agree, at least 
in part. The other issue is that the example of the poetry reading by Artaud can only happen 
once, because a repeat performance would see the psychical effect diminished to the extent that 
the performance would be mannered and predictable. A theater built out of this sort of psychical 
shock to the spectator is not sustainable because it quickly loses its power once it is understood; 
in Lacanian terms, the Symbolic begins to tame the Real in the form of creating a new language 
complete with expectations, rules, and standard interpretations. To continue in this path would 
necessitate a series of increasingly catastrophic spectacles until the performer has nothing left to 
present but his or her own death, hence Finter’s description of Artaud as a “theater of 
impossibility.”423 However, as I will show in my discussion of Zorn, there are possibilities for 
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introducing elements of the Real into artistic work that may not be as holistically spellbinding as 
Artuad’s performance, but are no less powerful. 
5.3 Pour finir avec le jugement de dieu 
Artaud’s radio work will also aid in interpreting Zorn’s use of the voice in Astronome, as 
it demonstrates a radical approach to language and performance. The project was created for 
broadcast through the Office de radiodiffusion télévision française (ORTF)—France’s official 
public radio and television agency from 1964 until 1974. Although it superseded the previous 
instantiation of French public broadcasting, the Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (RTF), with 
the idea of less governmental control, the French government would continue to intervene in 
special cases, as it did with the censorship of Judgment. Artaud was not necessarily convinced 
that radio was an ideal medium, but it would have given him an unprecedentedly large audience 
comprising a large cross-section of a public who still tuned in regularly as a source of 
entertainment and education.424  
 The specifics of the content are quite secondary to the large-scale themes and the 
performance, almost to the point that one can listen to the recording without a translation and 
take away the same feeling of pain, anger, defiance, and disease that are found in the text itself. 
Through the utterances of the Real of Artaud’s psyche, he communicates, as Lacan would say, 
avant la lettre. Of particular interest to the topic of Astronome are the techniques Artaud uses 
and their similarity to Patton’s vocal technique. I doubt that anyone can provide a cogent 
explanation of just how these performers create the actual acoustic phenomena of their 
performances—least of all the performers themselves acting on pure creative instinct—but we 
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can analyze the resulting phenomena to notice similarities and speculate that a component of the 
enunciations involves a surrendering of the conscious mind to an enunciation from within that 
will always remain unknown because to know the enunciation would be to process it through the 
Symbolic and thus lose its power of symbolic resistance. 
 In Judgment, Artaud smashes his words through glossalaliac exclamations, he shrieks and 
howls, he intones nonsense words, he speaks in made-up languages, and he screams. Moreover, 
he creates a polyphony of enunciations, the ego diffracted, the dividing lines blurred. Unless one 
subjects these outbursts to rigorous analysis and forces them to be understood as Symbolic—as 
the analyst does to the psychotic’s speech, and as we are doing presently—the effect is unsettling 
in a manner that cannot be clearly articulated. There is the sense of intersubjective 
communication, but one would have a difficult time comprehending what exactly was 
communicated. The messages from the Real confront the auditor like a sucker punch—sudden, 
violent, unexpected, and disappearing before the action is even comprehended.  
 In a technique that Zorn borrows directly, Artaud uses sound in an aggressive manner, 
attacking the auditor’s ears with piercing, painful sounds. Through these means, Artaud creates 
conditions through which the Real may emerge, creating some of the symptoms of pain and 
anxiety within the auditor in the process. Granted, one is at liberty to simply attenuate the 
volume on the stereo, but what is this if not a willful resignation to the excess of the power of the 
performance, of the expressive noise? Diamanda Galás uses this same technique, as does 
Merzbow, as does Zorn. The intensity of volume is a technique for creating an actual 
phenomenological situation wherein one’s psyche comes under attack by the acute sense of 
danger triggered by pure instinct. As Salomé Voegelin describes noise as that which “deafens 
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[one’s] ears to anything else,”425 we find that the power of Zorn’s use of expressive noise 
overwhelms the senses, making it nearly impossible to reflect on the work and the sonic 
experience from a distance during the act of perception. 
Naturally, the effect will vary depending upon one’s own experiences with loud sounds. 
In certain extreme cases, an individual may have become so inured to loud, perceptibly formless 
sound that he or she has less of a reaction, and in these cases, the power of the work may be 
greatly diminished; however, the work will still be aesthetically transgressive, even if the aural 
intensity is enervated. The extent to which becoming accustomed to loud sound weakens the 
power of the work to affect the psyche of the listener is unclear. Perhaps the nature of the sound 
also plays a role in determining one’s perception of it. Perhaps a construction worker who uses a 
jackhammer all day becomes acclimated to the sound of the tool, but does this necessarily mean 
that he or she will be equally desensitized to the sounds of distorted bass and screaming? After 
all, numerous scholars have theorized the voice as having a special kind of power. 
Carolyn Abbate writes, “[the voice] exists in present time, as physical and sensual force, 
something beating upon us,”426 and considering that she is speaking of nineteenth-century 
opera—a traditional art music aspiring to an ideal of aesthetic beauty, as opposed to a music 
deliberately trying to wreck ideals of classical beauty—one can imagine how the effect is 
amplified when the physicality of the sound is ratcheted up to the extent of Artaud and Zorn. 
Artaud’s voice is high-pitched and grating; he makes his voice shrill and coarse so that even if 
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one ignores the words, the message remains potent at the level of the unconscious; he defies us to 
cover our ears to his theater of raw experience.  
 Finally we have the aural component that expresses in excess of language, or what 
Barthes calls the grain of the voice.427 In his essay, Barthes borrows Kristeva’s bivalent speech 
concept, the pheno-text and the geno-text, which correspond closely to what we have been 
denoting as statement and enunciation, respectively. For Barthes, the pheno-text encompasses the 
techné of music—the structure, the performance practice, the conscious and practiced 
expression—while the geno-text encompasses the ineffability of music, the beyond of ideation, 
the Real. A point of confusion that may arise in using the concept of the grain is that Barthes 
feels that certain vocalists have more of a grain than others, in his case, the comparison is 
between Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, the technician, and Charles Panzéra, the artist who has the 
grain of the voice. For Lacan, every speech act contains both the statement and the enunciation, 
just as there is always a pheno- and geno-text for Kristeva. I do not think Barthes means to imply 
that one can ever have a voice sans grain, but that it may be more present in a given performer. I 
do, however, believe that an artist such as Artaud or Zorn can place more emphasis on the 
enunciative function of speech than on the statement, for if Judgment was merely the sum of its 
text with out the grain of its creator’s voice—the aural embodiment of his psyche—it would be 
fairly banal and tiresome antiestablishment rant indeed. 
6.0 General Themes 
By now, a constellation of themes emerge in Astronome: mysticism, alchemy, the occult, 
rituals, transcendence, all in search of the great arcana—the treasure of transcendence through a 
secret knowledge. But what is this arcanum that is the subject of Astronome? I propose that it is 	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none other than the secret of artistic creation—Paracelsus’s seventh star. Astronome is Zorn 
expressing that which an artist can never truly express in language—the origin of the creative 
act. This is the unifying device that ties together Varèse, Crowley, and Artaud; that ties together 
their various theories of radical transcendence; that creates coherence and clarity out of an almost 
inscrutable work of art. 
Let us begin by returning to Paracelsus, who urges us to follow him and discover “the 
tincture, the Arcanum, the quintessence, wherein lie hid the foundations of all mysteries and of 
all works.”428 We are, then, to understand that the Arcanum of alchemy is purified essence and 
potency, unadulterated, a pure phenomenological artifact that remains after all impurities have 
been burned away. Paracelsus continues, “through the agency of fire, the true is separated from 
the false. The light of Nature indeed is created in this way, that by means thereof the proof or 
trial of everything may appear, but only to those who walk in this light.”429 We return to Zorn’s 
maxim, “powerful secrets are revealed through intensity and extremes of experience,” in this 
context to see that it is through the blistering intensity of Astronome that he will share his 
knowledge of the Arcanum of creativity. Although the metaphor is broad and suggestive, one 
might take one facet and simplify that the requisite “agency of fire” may be the sheer act of 
enduring forty-five minutes of blindingly intense music, at high volume, almost without anything 
conventional to steady oneself.  
 Zorn already considers performance a ritual, as we have seen above, but perhaps the act 
of listening is as much a ritual as the performance itself. Perhaps there is a double ritual 	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happening wherein the musicians invoke the arcanum through performance (and remember that 
Crowley finds a dramatic invocation to be the most effective) while the auditor undergoes a 
purification ritual in order to receive the secret knowledge. On ritual purification, Crowley 
writes, “the point is to seize every occasion of bringing every available force to bear upon the 
objective of the assault. It does not matter what the force is (by any standard of judgment) so 
long as it plays its proper part in securing the success of the general purpose.”430 Just as Varèse 
wanted to bring “every available force to bear” upon his audience during the climax of 
L’Astronome, so too did Artaud in the Theater of Cruelty and Zorn in Astronome. Crowley goes 
as far as to characterize the purification as an assault, and in the case of Astronome, the assault is 
clearly aural.  
This is not, of course, the extent of Crowley’s contribution to Astronome, nor is it 
Paracelsus’s. The scene descriptions outline a general narrative in which “the initiate” is 
possessed by demonic spirits, undergoes a satanic baptism, conducts alchemical experiments, 
engages in a supernatural battle, and reaches a level of transvection and transcendence. The 
scene descriptions follow, and I am including time markers for scene breaks, as I interpreted 
them: 
ACT ONE 
• Scene 1 – A secluded clearing in the woods (00:00) 
o A full moon illuminates a coven dancing around a large bonfire – an orgy 
• Scene 2 – A single bed in a small room (04:44) 
o Midnight – the initiate, asleep, is haunted and possessed by demonic spirits 
• Scene 3 – The innermost chapel of a secret temple (10:35) 
o The summoning of demons by the coven – a satanic baptism – visitation of the lord of light 
ACT TWO 
• Scene 1 – A mediaeval laboratory (00:00) 
o Divination by the tarot – alchemical experiments – elixirs of transformation 
• Scene 2 – In the magick circle (07:30) 
o Spells and obeahs of possession – raising the dead – a sacred ceremony 
ACT THREE 
• Scene 1 – A barren plain at midnight (00:00) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Aleister Crowley, Magick: Book 4, Liber Aba (Newburyport: Weiser Books, 1998), 212. 
230	  	  
o The battle of the wizards – a ritual of sacrifice 
• Scene 2 – An unnamed location (05:21) 
o Transvection – readings from a sacred book – magick symbols and sigils – transcendence 
 
As one can see, Zorn’s descriptions are vaguely suggestive, but not specific in a manner that 
allows one to necessarily detect these events in the music. The point is not to convey a narrative 
through programmatic elements in the music, but to suggest certain themes for the listener to 
stow in his or her mind, and to create an aura of mystery and discovery. The signifiers are not 
even exclusively Crowleyan (e.g., there is no Satan in Thelema, nor are there alchemical 
experiments), which furthers the idea that Zorn does not wish us to form specific conceptions of 
the music. 
Moreover, no track breaks or time markers are present to divide the acts into their 
constituent scenes. The three acts are separated into three long tracks (each over ten minutes) and 
because of the timbral consistency of the music, the listener is easily disoriented and efforts to 
locate scenes are confounded. The time markers that correspond to the scene divisions presented 
above are based on a combination of an analysis of the waveform of each track and my own 
musical intuition. Examining each track visually as a waveform helped me to get a better sense 
of the acts as a whole because the amplitude contour corresponded to musical intensity. From 
there, it was possible to observe that dramatic breaks in intensity could correspond to sections of 
relative temporal equivalence, which would make sense musically. Figure 1 shows the scene 
distribution for Act 1. 
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Figure 1 – Astronome, Act 1 
Where one might normally create a makeshift score to examine structural issues like this, 
Astronome contains many sections that break out of time, and thus it becomes difficult to be sure 
of even simple issues like the number of measures in a section. Due to the sectional nature of the 
music, it is likely that various sections may use either a musical metrical scale or a time scale. 
6.1 Meaning in Astronome 
Finally, we arrive at the difficult question of how Astronome has the power to mean 
anything through musical sound alone. In the above section I have sorted through the textual 
clues that Zorn provides, which inform my interpretation on a literary level; but this is where 
many analyses are content to end, having explained the thematic content without addressing a 
number of questions relating specifically to the sound of the music. The most pressing of these 
questions is how the musical materials have the ability to create meaning apart from the textual 
clues that superimpose concepts on abstract sounds. 
 At the literary level, music acts as a metaphor. In this particular case, I could argue that 
Astronome is a metaphor for artistic creativity and leave it at that. If we look to Lacan’s 
definition, it fits: 
Metaphor’s creative spark does not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two 
images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers. It flashes between two 
signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by taking the other’s place in the 
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signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue of its 
(metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain.431 
 
The music acts as a signifier that can stand for an actual concept while the friction between the 
concept and its transposition into musical signification create the musical interest of the work. 
One could even say that Zorn’s use of “noise” is symbolic insofar as the loudness and dissonance 
of Astronome could symbolically represent the mysterious, threatening supernatural forces 
suggested by the scene descriptions. A great deal of music uses sound as a signifier for an actual 
concept, especially when the music uses a culturally established corpus of signifiers. In the case 
of Astronome, it is uncertain that one could make the claim that it uses a sufficient amount of 
existing musical signifiers to constitute an effective and meaningful metaphor. Again, I return to 
the voice and, specifically, the screaming. Screaming in music almost always connotes terror, 
fear, or anger, as we find in Wagner or Berg’s Lulu—at minimum, it represents a state of intense 
emotion—but in Astronome, this is much too limiting. Surely Zorn has not devoted all this time 
to a work about an angry or terrified subject, too moved by a simplistic base emotion to create a 
linguistically coherent utterance. What originates in the Real is typically filtered through the 
Symbolic and reaches us as metaphor or metonymy, which is to say that it becomes encoded in 
language (whether verbal or artistic); however, certain instances of the Real remain 
unsymbolized and create disruptions in the expectations created by a lifetime in the Symbolic. 
 Astronome is a particularly potent example of the Real in music, and this is the point at 
which music of extreme and unusual character has the power to reach us as artistic 
communication. We often speak in metaphors to attribute a concept to a musical sound, but in 
Astronome, it’s not that the music is a metaphor for the ritual of the secret of artistic creativity. 
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The work is the ritual itself. The music is Zorn attempting to baptize the listener (the initiate) in 
the purifying fires of raw, unrestrained expression to show us the mysteries of creativity. In A.E. 
Waite’s lexicon of alchemy, he describes Paracelsus’s Arcanum as “an incorporeal, immortal 
substance which in its nature is far above the understanding and experience of man.”432 If we 
replace the word “substance” with “psychical order,” we have a wonderfully succinct definition 
of the Real. Astronome is both in the Real and of the Real. If this secret were such that Zorn 
could divulge it through conventional language, he probably would; but words can only take us 
so far, and accordingly, Zorn has written a work of music about musical creativity. He creates 
conditions conducive to an emergence of the Real and allows them to remain unSymbolized 
because to subject it to the Symbolic would render it impotent and ineffectual. In the case of 
Astronome, Zorn uses multiple dimensions of expressive noise—the acoustic, the 
communicative, and the phenomenological—to transcend the potentially symbolic function of 
noise. By engulfing the spectator’s psyche through the expressive noise of Astronome, Zorn 
enacts the purification ritual of the arcanum of creativity. 
 I believe the secret to the communication of this idea rests in Patton’s vocalise 
extravaganza. One has but to listen to the portions of Artaud’s Judgment designated “sound 
effects” to see the connection to the vocals in Astronome. Just as Artaud wails and screams and 
speaks in nonsense languages and creates pained, tortured utterances, so too does Patton. The 
difficulty arises when we compare Artaud and Patton in their respective capacities as enunciating 
subjects. Artaud is clearly the enunciating subject of Judgment, but Patton’s position is more 
elusive. In both cases, the vocal utterances create an altogether different effect than one would 	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have listening to a language that one does not understand. Although the sounds may not 
correspond to linguistic units in the mind of the auditor, the majority of language involves a 
certain amount of regularity of tone, cadence, inflection, and rhythm. The sort of non-sense 
vocalizations that Artaud and Patton practice involve no such features.  
 The answer lies in Zorn’s compositional methodology. Although Zorn does not 
specifically refer to anything but the second act as a file card piece, his working method as 
described in section 3.2 is identical to his approach for previous file card compositions. Zorn 
states that, “bit by bit we’d build it up. An additive process, with the musicians concentrating on 
the details of one section at a time, but relatively blind, as far as where the piece is going. Like a 
director in film, only I would have the overall perspective.”433 In a sense, Patton is surrendering 
part of his agency as a performer. He is creating the phenomenological instantiations of the 
utterance—the enunciations from the Real that remain unsymbolized in the music—but he is 
doing so at the direction of Zorn, the actual subject of enunciation, and he is doing so also in a 
relatively blind fashion. While Zorn is not directly in control of the psyche of his performers, he 
is acting almost as an analyst directing an analysand, creating conditions conducive to the 
unconscious, gently directly the psychical state of his performers to a state of revelation. That 
said, the voice is an important part of the music’s ability to convey the Real and thus I will 
explore it in this section. 
 Like Artaud, Zorn seems to acknowledge the inefficaciousness of communication at the 
level of the statement. This is, perhaps, why most music communicates through metaphor, while 
certain strains of experimental music (Astronome included) may not have recourse to the 	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Symbolic. For Lacan, the tropes of metaphor and metonymy are the primary vehicles of the 
unconscious when it appears in language, and to use literal words in a musical work is to 
subjugate it to the Symbolic; but when the Real appears, it is unknown, unexpected, and 
unexplained. In Žižek’s thought, “the Real is an entity which must be constructed afterwards so 
that we can account for the distortions of the symbolic structure.”434 In a sense, this is exactly 
what I am doing here: I am accounting for disruptions and distortions in the Symbolic of music 
by attributing them to the Real. Of course, Lacan writes that one cannot attain, strictly speaking, 
the Real, but at the same time, one cannot avoid it. Zorn simply creates a space for it to emerge 
in performance and allows it to travel to the auditor. 
 This claim may be difficult to entertain in a poststructuralist context, which claims, as 
Žižek writes, “that a text is always ‘framed’ by its own commentary: the interpretation of a 
literary text resides on the same plane as the ‘object.’”435 To suggest that a text communicates 
above the level of metonymy is to run aground on Derrida’s argument against the metaphysics of 
presence—the idea that a concept can be transmitted unproblematically between the speaker and 
the auditor. However, Žižek argues, “the position from which the deconstructivist can always 
make sure of the fact that ‘there is no metalanguage,’ that no utterance can say precisely what it 
intended to say, that the process of enunciation always subverts the utterance, is the position of 
metalanguage in its purest, most radical form.”436 
I do not argue the metaphysics of presence in Astronome—the distorted bass, for 
instance, has a much different function for a heavy metal listener than for a baroque music 
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aficionado, to say nothing of non-Western nations that do not have electronically amplified 
instruments—but I do wish to highlight certain extraordinary characteristics in the work. An 
example would be the terrific sound pressure resulting in a correct (i.e., high volume) listening. 
When Richard Foreman staged Zorn’s work, he issued a warning in the program indicating 
potential sonic discomfort and provided earplugs to any spectators who were not up to the 
challenge. The psychical destabilization created by loud noises is something that Zorn 
understands and uses to create a receptive state of being, such that one can experience the Real in 
a meaningful way. In this way, the physical damage of the body is a mark of the Real—we 
cannot understand its presence, but we can understand where it has been after the fact. We might 
draw a parallel between this experience and Crowley’s definition of a spiritual invocation where 
“the macrocosm floods the consciousness,”437 but of course, in our case, it is the unconscious 
that gets flooded. The ototoxic anxiety of aural pain and potential hearing loss smashes through 
our spectatorial walls, and the expected display of concepts mediated through musical 
performance becomes a sense of actual danger—the ritual purification by fire. Beyond this, 
however, is another level wherein the amplitude of the sound creates an atavistic terror that 
reaches the auditor at a level beyond the Symbolic—a level of pure instinct. I would argue that 
phenomena concerning the Real has a metaphysical existence that is at least partially immune 
from Derridian presence, inasmuch as certain instinctual drives (the fear of loud sounds, for 
example) are not socially specific constructs. If the pain of audition has anything whatsoever to 
do with sociocultural conditioning, it must be in a highly limited capacity. 
6.2 Lacan, the Voice-Object, and Astronome 
 Finally, we must discuss the power of the voice—the dramatic centerpiece of Astronome. 
One might say that Zorn has eradicated the pheno-text entirely, leaving only the geno-text—the 	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grain of the voice. Where the grain of the voice is typically what a vocalist communicates in 
excess of the text, Patton’s vocal performance is all excess—actualized jouissance. 
 Let us take a step back and see what Lacan has to say about the power of the voice. 
Recall the discussion of object (a) in chapter one (section 4.1.3). Object (a) is the pure, abstract 
cause of desire, but it can manifest as a number of part-objects that in various combinations 
excite the drives of a given subject. Object (a) and its constituent part-objects are forever lost to 
the subject, and thus the subject will continue to seek them out again and again in the metonymic 
slide of desire. Freud proposed a number of part-objects (e.g., the breast, feces, the penis) with 
which a subject might take as the object of a drive in lieu of a whole person. A common example 
is the infant who, in a state of undifferentiated being with the mother, experiences the breast as 
an entity unto itself—an isolated source of total fulfillment. To Freud’s list of part-objects, Lacan 
adds the voice and the gaze—two part-objects with libidinal investments equal in strength to the 
more commonly sexualized part-objects of Freud. 
Just as the mythic “first satisfaction” of the infant receiving the mother’s breast creates a 
cathected nmemic trace of the primordial jouissance that must be surrendered upon entering the 
Symbolic, a nmemic trace is also created in response to the power of the infant’s mythic “first 
cry” to summon a source of satisfaction. Michel Poizat writes that “this cry is a pure 
manifestation of vocal resonance linked to a state of internal displeasure, and that this cry is 
answered by the Other.”438 However, when the infant repeats this cry, he or she is making a more 
specific demand for satisfaction and thus, the infant enters into a Symbolic exchange. The 
primordial jouissance experienced during the total satiation resulting from the first cry is forever 
lost because after the initial experience of pure need and pure fulfillment, the infant’s expression 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Michel Poizat, The Angel’s Cry: Beyond the Pleasure Principle in Opera, trans. Arthur Denner (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 100. 
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of need now encompasses both demand (which can be sated) and desire (which cannot be fully 
sated). Thus, as part of object (a), the voice-object is subjected to a constant metonymic slide 
between various potential pleasure sources that the subject believes will satisfy his or her desire. 
The voice-object is from the Real; it is impossible to render through image or symbol, and 
because no metonymic substitution can ever take its place, the subject must seek it out again and 
again.439 
 Poizat interprets the loss of the voice-object (and the resultant loss of jouissance) in a 
way that involves a search for the return of the first satisfaction, and thus, he explains our 
fascination with the beauty of the operatic voice as an attempt to regain this first satisfaction.440 
In this way, the voice-object is aligned with jouissance qua pleasure—something to bring about 
ecstasy if only one could regain it; however, as we saw in chapter one, a more orthodox 
understanding of jouissance involves a unique sort of pleasure, or enjoyment, that is so excessive 
that it is terrifying and painful. To experience this sort of jouissance is to go beyond the Law, to 
excise oneself from the Symbolic, to become psychotic. 
Žižek explains the voice-object as an “empty a priori”—a condition from which all 
speech is possible.441 The voice-object is a void—all-consuming silence—that we must mask by 
speech and music in order to avoid the madness of confronting the infinite. He asks the rhetorical 
question, “‘why do we listen to music?’: in order to avoid the horror of the encounter of the 
voice qua object. […] When the intricate musical tapestry disintegrates or collapses into a pure 
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440 Poizat, 1992. 
441 Slavoj Žižek, “‘I Hear You with My Eyes’; or, The Invisible Master,” in Gaze and Voice as Love 
Objects, eds. Renata Salecl and Slavoj Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 90. 
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unarticulated scream, we approach voice qua object.”442 The creation of intelligible sounds of a 
musical or linguistic nature uses the Symbolic to shield us from a traumatic encounter with the 
voice-object. By excluding the voice-object, we submit to the Law and are able to participate in 
normal reality. If one were to transgress the Law, the result would be unrestrained jouissance—a 
traumatic encounter with the voice-object in the Real. The vocals in Astronome demonstrate this 
sort of jouissance beyond the Law; they encompass the painful ecstasy of a subject unchecked by 
the Law.  
Abbate writes that “the sound of the singing voice becomes, as it were, a ‘voice-object’ 
and the sole center for the listener’s attention. That attention is thus drawn away from words, 
plot, character, and even from music.”443 So powerful is the voice-object that, when it appears, it 
pulls the spectator out of complacent, distanced observation and demands attention. As Poizat 
notes, this voice-object often emerges in a most unwelcome fashion, often in the form of 
mistakes on the part of the performer—errors that force the audience to regard a character in an 
opera as a performer, as a fellow human being.444 This is not to say that performance errors are 
the only way to bring forth the voice-object, but simply to say that when the voice-object 
appears, it jars the spectator out of passive reception. 
In Astronome, this is all part of the plan. Patton’s “pre-linguistic” vocal utterances exist 
before the instantiation of the Law and before the threat of Symbolic castration. They inhabit the 
Real in a state of primordial jouissance, and in their capacity as voice-object, we find them 
terribly fascinating and horrifying. They affect us psychically in a way that is uncomfortable (we 
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might interpret it as frightening, or grating, or even frustrating) because they threaten to engulf 
us in our lost jouissance—they threaten to give us all, thereby killing our ability to desire. Of 
course we cannot actually experience the homeostasis at the heart of the desire of the voice-
object because to reclaim the lost maternal voice, to re-experience the primordial cry, is to die—
the only escape route from the Symbolic. 
In an evocative, if somewhat unbelievable formulation, Mladen Dolar writes that “music, 
in particular the voice, shouldn’t stray away from words, which endow it with sense; as soon as it 
departs from its textual anchorage, the voice becomes senseless and threatening, all the more so 
because of its seductive and intoxicating powers.”445 Granted, there are plenty of occasions 
where the untexted voice is not threatening at all, but in the context of the style of vocalise that 
Patton performs on Astronome, Dolar’s assessment seems plausible. What Zorn does is give us a 
taste of the Real, of jouissance, in a manner only slightly mediated by an aesthetic filter, to create 
a transcendent experience; and he does this using the techniques of Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty. 
It is precisely through this abjuration of the Law in Astronome that I can make the claim that the 
music transcends the level of metaphor and affects the auditor directly at the level of the 
unconscious. Poizat and Žižek present the voice-object in different ways, but they both avow its 
importance for creating desire. Although the extreme sonics of Astronome are plenty powerful, 
the way that Zorn uses the voice compounds the traumatic psychical impact on the listening 
subject. 
7.0 Conclusion 
Upon one’s initial encounter with Astronome, the expressive language is so far removed 
from any sort of musical convention that meaning immanent to the sound seems impossible. 	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Even if one agrees that, at times, un-texted music may possess some sort of referential power, 
Astronome does not use enough of the common musical signifiers to constitute a comprehensible 
communication of anything. Therefore, what is the thematic content other than a strictly extra-
musical notion placed on top of the musical sound without any legitimate cohesion between the 
sonics and the concepts? Through cultural convention, a descending melodic line in the minor 
mode can connote sadness, but what part of Astronome could be said to represent an alchemical 
ritual of transcendence in this same way? 
 Through a thick interpretation, we can make sense of Zorn’s radical expressive language 
in Astronome by reading it through the thought of his dedicatees, and through some Lacanian 
concepts, we can understand how the musical material actually accomplishes this goal sonically 
through expressive noise. Varèse, Crowley, and Artaud each approached their work as an attempt 
to break through conventional expression so as to offer the respective listener, initiate, or 
spectator an experience that transcended the linguistically communicable. In each of their 
respective projects, they sought to deliberately transgress convention in such an extreme fashion 
that the perceiver’s Symbolic would be overwhelmed with an appearance of the Real. 
With these same ends in mind, Zorn blends Varèse’s music with Artaud’s theatrics and 
Crowley’s ritual magick to create a powerful and traumatic experience—Paracelsus’s “agency of 
fire” that separates the true from the false. By “[bringing] every available force to bear” on the 
perceiver through the use of expressive noise in the way that Astronome does, Zorn creates the 
conditions for an encounter with the Real. Just as the Initiate of the libretto conducts rituals, 
undergoes an alchemical transformation, and experiences transcendence, so too does the listener 
endure the ritual of listening leading to a transformative and transcendent experience. Through 
the daring act of listening, Zorn invites us to discover the arcanum of creativity. 
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Chapter 4: Diamanda Galás: Écriture Féminine, Abjection, and Feminine Jouissance 
Now I-woman am going to blow up the Law; let it be done, right now, in language. 
 
Hélène Cixous 
1.0 Introduction 
Diamanda Galás cannot fail to make an impression. Whether it is due to her enormous 
vocal range and array of extended techniques, or her dramatic, threatening persona, or her 
elaborate theatrical stagings, or her confrontational topics, or the sheer ferocity of her music, it is 
impossible to confront her work with passive detachment. Her music is thematically radical in a 
straightforward sociopolitical sense, but it is equally radical in a musical/aural sense; she offers a 
radical message in a radical expressive language. 
In this chapter, I will construct a thick interpretation of Galás’s Wild Women with Steak 
Knives (1982), showing how her radical expressive language creates an intersection between 
gender construction, Greek lamentation practice, abjection, and feminine empowerment. In this 
work for solo voice, Galás stages a psychodrama of femininity becoming empowered as a source 
of extra-Symbolic creativity. By reading Wild Women through a network of Lacanian theory 
along with the poststructuralist French feminine philosophies of Hélène Cixous and Julia 
Kristeva, an exhortation of feminine creativity and feminine jouissance becomes apparent in an 
otherwise inscrutable work of art. What appears to be an alienating exploration of extreme vocal 
techniques against a grisly (if vague) thematic backdrop becomes an uplifting (if terrifying) 
vision of the birth of a feminine expressive language that reaches beyond the strictures of 
dominant phallologocentric discourse. 
After providing some background on Galás, her distinctive compositional and 
performance style, and the unique biographical factors that are inextricable from her thematic 
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interests and activism, I will situate Wild Women within the discourse of feminine expression as 
proposed by Cixous and Kristeva. I will further explain how elements of her Greek, Maniat 
heritage and the Maniat lamentation style factor into Galás’s composition and performance style, 
and how through the use of pain and suffering, she is able to create powerful works of art that 
affect an aural collision with the Real. Finally, I will provide a close reading of Wild Women to 
show how all of these elements come into play within her work of radical music. 
2.0 Diamanda Galás 
Diamanda Galás was, at first, discouraged from using her voice for music. Greek men 
tended to think of singing as something that prostitutes do to advertise themselves and attract 
customers, and thus her father forbid her to sing in her home and especially in public.446 For 
Galás, the very act of using her voice in public was, in essence, an act of rebellion against a 
dominant masculine discourse. Her first experiences with vocal music were very private, 
ritualistic affairs involving LSD and an anechoic chamber as the University of California San 
Diego Medical School—a time of intimate discovery where she was finding her voice in both a 
literal and figurative sense.447 
Of all the elements that make Diamanda Galás a unique artist—her radical activism, her 
dedication to the dispossessed, her ferocious piano style—it is her voice that is the sine qua non 
of her expressive power. The topics of her works vary, she writes in a range of styles from 
modern to postmodern, and she performs anything from blues standards with a piano to theatrical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 He did, however, encourage her piano studies from an early age, providing Galás’s initial musical 
training and giving her invaluable experience through steady gigging in a range of styles. By the age of 14, she had 
performed Beethoven’s “Piano Concerto No. 1 in C major, op. 15” with the San Diego Symphony Orchestra. Will 
Oldham, “Diamanda Galas,” 1999, Index Magazine, accessed October 15, 2013, 
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447 Edward Batchelder, “The Politics of Disquiet: Diamanda Galás in conversation with Edward 
Batchelder,” New Music Box, Monday, August 4, 2003, accessed October 15, 2013, 
http://www.newmusicbox.org/assets/55/interview_diamanda.pdf.	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works with electronic music accompaniment, but the defining element across all of her work is 
her voice and the way in which she uses it as a force of power, or as she says, “an instrument of 
inspiration for my friends, and a tool of torture and destruction to my enemies.”448 
Virtually every article and interview mentions her legendary three and a half octave vocal 
range, but Galás dismisses these statements as hyperbole.449 “I think I would be considered a 
lyric spinto soprano,” she states, “but the projection of my voice has a very hard edge to it that 
cuts like a knife. I like thinking of it as a mezzo with a higher and lower extension.”450 She was 
trained in the bel canto style, which she describes as being crucially important in achieving 
powerful projection, in helping her realize what was in her head, and in helping her perform her 
range of extended vocal techniques in a safe and sustainable manner.451 Beyond her natural, 
extended range, she also uses multiple microphones and digital signal processing equipment to 
modify her voice and to create spatial effects within the concert hall. 
2.1 Compositional Style 
 Galás’s compositional style is difficult to pin down because some works, like Wild 
Women, could be read as modernist, while other likes, like Defixiones: Will and Testament 
(2004), use more postmodern techniques. Moreover, a number of her works rely on her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Khatchig Mouradian, “An Interview with Diamanda Galás,” Aztag Daily, June 3, 2004. 
 
449 “The Woman Who Knows Too Much: A conversation with Diamanda Galás, avenging queen of the 
damned,” Bluefat, March 2008, accessed October 15, 2013, http://www.bluefat.com/1002/Diamanda_Galas08.htm 
 
450 This quote appears in an interview in Goblin Magazine. Unfortunately, Goblin Magazine’s Internet 
presence seems to have dwindled and it is no longer possible to provide a citation for the original source. A reprint 
of the interview text is available at the follow location: Jon Randall and Wesley Joost, “Diamanda Galás,” Musivine, 
accessed October 15, 2013, http://www.musivine.com/blogs/26?mv=true. 
 
451 I was trained in bel canto, which ultimately was the technique that Wagner wanted his singers to use 
because it was the only technique that would cut through that huge orchestral sound. He wanted singers to project 
the sound through the skull with all the facial bone resonances you need to sustain a line in bel canto. I studied that 
in my twenties because I had to continue to be equal to what I heard as an improviser; otherwise I'd either be a liar 
on stage or I'd stop performing. In order to make a career, just like an opera singer, I can't just perform once a month 
and lose my voice. I had to build up a lot of stamina, a lot of power, a lot of physical wisdom about where the sound 
is placed. So I never hurt my voice singing. Ibid.	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collaboration with a sound designer, which problematizes the idea of Galás qua sole author of the 
work. I propose we read her work collectively as that of a radical composer. At times she may be 
closer to the language of modernism with its inherent abstraction, its concentration on extremes 
of performance practice, and novel compositional systems. At other times, she may be closer to 
the language of postmodernism with complex, intertextual webs of meaning along with a mixture 
of so-called high art and low art styles and genres working in tandem. 
This is not to say that she exists exclusively within the realm of radical music, as Galás 
inhabits two roles interchangeably: radical composer/performer and idiosyncratic performer of 
popular songs from a number of styles including blues, soul, spirituals, and jazz. Her renditions 
of popular songs are at once raucous and haunting, violent and emotional.452 Even when she is 
singing music by other composers while accompanying herself on piano, all of the work is both 
thematically related to her overall interest in avenging victims of dominant power structures and 
filtered through her unique aesthetic. When she sings “My World Is Empty Without You,” a 
song popularized by The Supremes, the song becomes dissonant, lugubrious, and bitterly 
sarcastic—nearly unrecognizable from the popular, upbeat Motown version. It is as if Galás 
plays a vengeful woman standing over the body of an unfaithful lover that she has just killed, 
sarcastically lamenting his demise. Ultimately, these borrowed songs end up contributing to her 
larger project of lamentation and vengeance for victims who can no longer speak for themselves. 
 Where one might wish to present a survey of a composer’s compositional training, for 
Galás, it seems more appropriate to examine the way that she developed her distinctive vocal 
technique. After all, she appears to have had little formal training and is, rather, an intuitive 
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composer whose voice is the way that she can express musical ideas.453 The way in which she 
conceives the music is inextricable from the power of her voice, and while she could 
theoretically devise a notational system to fit her style, she is not concerned with others 
performing her music.454 It is a personal expression that cannot exist apart from its creator. One 
might be able to mimic Galás’s vocal style with enough practice (and the requisite vocal range), 
but without the intense personal connection to the subject matter, this would result in mere 
parody. 
Galás made her vocal debut in 1979 at the Festival d’Avignon in France playing the lead 
in Vinko Globokar’s opera, Un Jour Comme un Autre (1979), which details the torture of a 
Turkish woman accused of treason. Galás’s unique vocal abilities made her a perfect fit for a role 
that required a singer who could “begin every evening singing like a lyric soprano and finish 
screaming like an animal.”455 Although this is technically part of her performance history, I 
mention it in this discussion compositional style because the vocal training regimen that she 
designed to prepare for this role was a crucial stage in the development of her own performance 
style, which therefore opened up new compositional possibilities to her.456  
Following that, she toured throughout Europe performing the works of Globokar and 
Xenakis, a fellow composer of Greek heritage who shared a similar outsider position with 
respect to the cosmopolitan avant-garde. Undoubtedly, Xenakis influenced her early 
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454 “[Lukas Foss] expressed a real worry that when I die the music is going to die because I didn’t notate it. 
All I can say is yes, probably, because I don’t know how to notate it. I never studied composition. I just performed 
many piano works up from five years old into graduate school. I know what kind of devices I’m using structurally 
just as any artist is aware of them—but I don’t know how to write the work so that another singer could do it.” 
Randall and Joost. 
 
455 Charles Neal, Tape Delay (Wembley: SAF Publishing, 1992), 199. 
 
456 John Payne, “Vengeance is Hers: A Conversation with Diamanda Galás,” Arthur 28 (2008). 
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compositional style; if one compares her treatment of the voice—the distinctive glossolalia, the 
extreme range of pitch, the sheer virtuosity—in early works such as Wild Women, Litanies of 
Satan, or Panoptikon (1984) to Xenakis works such as Nuits (1967-68), which feature similar 
treatments of the voice, one can see the marked influence of the composer she calls a “personal 
hero.”457 Ultimately, she decided to stop performing the work of other composers because she 
found it unrewarding to put so much creative energy into the interpretation and realization of 
these very difficult avant-garde works only to see the composer get most of the credit.458  
As mentioned above, Galás tends to compose alternately in a modernist and 
postmodernist style. Her modernist tendencies are heard most clearly on albums like The Litanies 
of Satan (1982), Diamanda Galás (1984), Vena Cava (1993), and Schrei X (1996). In these 
predominantly electronic works (which include “Wild Women with Steak Knives”), Galás 
creates abstract, unconventional music that does not conform to any standards of form, harmony, 
melody, or rhythm. While one can make the case that the majority of her work fits under the 
banner of radical music, these works are the most radical insofar as they eschew convention most 
rigorously. Even with a work like “The Litanies of Satan,” which is a sort of setting of a poem by 
Baudelaire, her expressive language is so far removed from any conventional practice that not 
even the use of a borrowed text can ground the music (i.e., the non-lingual portion of the sound) 
with any sort of familiarity. 
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458 I stopped singing for other composers because what I realized is that— 1) the performer had to spend an 
immense amount of time in what often turns out to be a very anal activity—this indulging of the "composer's" every 
"musical" whim, and 2) the performer most often has to do a lot of musical improvisation in order to make any sense 
of the work. Having done that enough times and not being credited for it, I decided if I'm going to be experimenting 
with my voice I might as well write my own music. The career of Cathy Berberian bears testament to this. She was 
never credited as the co-composer of works such as "Sequenza" and "Visage," for example, which were 
collaborations between Berberian and Luciano Berio. She was a great improviser....” Randall and Joost.	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Her postmodernist tendencies are most evident on the Masque of the Red Death trilogy 
(1986-88), Plague Mass (1991), and Defixiones, Will and Testament (2003). All of her work 
could be described as dealing with the afflictions of a certain people, but in these more 
postmodern works, her topics are quite specific: the victims of AIDS (and the subsequent hatred 
inflicted upon them by mainstream society) and the victims of genocides, including the 
Assyrians, the Greeks, and the Armenians. The specificity of her topic lends itself to textual 
borrowing, and indeed Galás compiles heterogeneous texts for each of these works including 
Biblical passages, poetry by Armenian, Assyrian, and Turkish poets, news articles, propaganda, 
popular songs, folk tunes, and potentially any other relevant media. Amongst these various texts 
borrowed from, and sung in, Armenian, Greek, Assyrian, Turkish, and English, she constructs a 
dense, intertextual web in which the plurality of her vision, along with radical juxtaposition and 
recontextualization, lead to fascinating and unexpected connections. For example, during 
“Holokaftoma” in Defixiones, Galás throws Pasolini’s “A Desperate Vitality” into stark relief by 
layering it over the top of a taped recitation of another poem, Hatred, published by a Turkish 
newspaper, Hurriyet, two days prior to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. On the one hand, 
we have Pasolini’s ambiguously melancholic poem, and on the other, we have a sickeningly 
intolerant call for the deaths of Greek giavouri, or infidels.459 Other than the intertextuality of 
these works, they could also be described as postmodern in the way that Galás fuses disparate 
genres together. In Defixiones, Galás combines elements of her studio compositions with songs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 On the one hand, we have Pasolini’s beautiful, philosophical reflections on his so-called “desperate 
vitality” (i.e., his inner artistic drive), and his desire to affect social change through art; and on the other, we have an 
anonymous, simplistic call to war stated in the most pedestrian language: “As long as the vulgar Greek exists in this 
world / By Allah, my hatred won’t leave me / As long as I see him there like a dog / By Allah, this hatred won’t 
leave me / A thousand heads of infidel Giaours cannot wash away this hatred.” See 
http://www.diamandagalas.com/defixiones/hatred_e.htm. 
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lullabies, and folk tunes thereby leading to a mixture of so-called “high art” and “low art” 
sources within the same work. 
In terms of the actual creation of her work, Galás appears to spend a great deal of time 
researching her topics, compiling documents, finding extant artwork that has a relevant 
connection, and carefully considering what she would like to say through the music. Following 
that, she creates an overall plan in prose notes including how she wants to treat elements like 
timbre and texts. She then enters the recording studio with a sound designer who helps her 
realize her ideas from a technical standpoint.460 Her major work is thus conceived and created in 
a recording studio, and although it is created in such a way that she can perform it live (with 
recorded accompaniment and live effects), her main compositional tools end up being her voice 
and the recording studio itself.461 In terms of authorship, it is impossible to know the exact extent 
of the contributions from her producer and engineer. Galás describes herself as an auteur in the 
vein of Hitchcock—an auteur who conceives of the entire work before various others step in and 
assist with technical matters.462 Whatever the scope of their contributions, it seems clear that 
Galás is solely responsible for the themes and tone of the work, and for any particulars relating to 
her voice and other instruments. Any technical matters attended to by a producer are likely to be 
less creatively involved even than, say, a musician realizing a musical work from a composer’s 
notation. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Randall and Joost; Mark Ambrose Harris, “Diamanda Galas – Love is a Ballad that Eviscerates,” Empty 
Mirror, accessed October 15, 2013, http://www.emptymirrorbooks.com/features/diamanda-galas.html. 
 
461 Oldham, 1999. 
 
462 Gracie and Zarkov, “The Killing Floor: The Harrowing Spirituals of Diamanda Galás,” Mondo 2000 8 
(1990): 76-79. 
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2.2 Performance Style 
 Galás’s performance style is legendary and has, at times, seemed to overshadow the 
music for certain reviewers who consider her to be more of a performance artist than a musician 
and composer—a position Galás vigorously protests. Her work as a performer involves dramatic 
staging, which uses traditional mise-en-scène elements (e.g., lighting, costumes, set design), 
carefully selected performance spaces (such as her infamous performance of Plague Mass in The 
Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City),463 and an enactment of her art upon the 
body, such as the aforementioned Plague Mass performance where she appears bare-breasted, 
covered in stage blood. Even when she is performing at the piano in a more humble singer-
songwriter context, she presents herself very precisely as a striking, somewhat threatening figure 
dressed all in black with dramatic stage makeup, all shrouded in darkness. 
 Unfortunately, casual, musically unsophisticated critics have had a difficult time 
distinguishing between performance art with a musical component and a musical performance 
with a dramatic component. This difference in emphasis is actually a crucial distinction, for 
Galás expects her music to stand on its own apart from its live performance. Because 
performance art so frequently involves a prominent conceptual component, this designation also 
serves to downplay the importance of the sonic experience of the music. For example, In Carolee 
Schneemann’s Interior Scroll (1975), the artist stands naked on a table and reads from a scroll 
that she slowly extracts from her vagina. A mere description of the act accompanied by the text 
of the scroll is sufficient to appreciate (at least partially, if not fully) the transgressive power of 
the work along with its attempt to reclaim the power of the female body for women. To describe 
a work like Plague Mass in conceptual terms reduces the musical work to the point that one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 This performance is documented on the following: Diamanda Galás, Plague Mass (1984—End of the 
Epidemic), 1991 by Mute Records Ltd. 9 61043-2, Compact Disc.	  
251	  	  
might read a description—“a hysterical woman covered in fake blood screams about AIDS for an 
hour”—and mistakenly believe that he or she understands the work in any substantive capacity. 
One can understand the theme and fundamental message through a conceptual description, but 
the way that the aural actuality conveys this message in a regulation of sonic intensity over time 
cannot be reduced to a prose description. Undoubtedly, it is always more powerful to experience 
a work realized before one’s eyes, but when the emphasis of the work is more musical than 
conceptual, the label of performance art is inappropriate.  
Performance art is hardly a women’s genre, but due to the abundance of powerful feminist 
works in the 1960s and 70s by artists like Carolee Schneemann, Maria Abramović, and Yoko 
Ono, it appears that there is already a handy critical rubric in place for any female artist whose 
work includes an important performance element. Galás vigorously refuses this label, stating,  
I would never use that word [performance artist] for myself. I use the word 
auteur, as Hitchcock would. Yes, I compose the music and I perform the music 
and I compose the libretto and I design the lights until I turn it over to a 
professional lighting designer. But Wagner did that, too! People who call this 
performance art do it out of sexism—any woman who organizes a 
Gesamtkunstwerk is condemned to this territory.464 
 
The application of the label “performance art” is shortsighted at best; it completely discounts the 
musical components—the essence—of the work, for there is no necessary implication of music 
within the field of performance art. I believe the frequent usage of the label “performance art” 
has more to do with her special presence on stage, which makes a performance of her work by 
another artist unthinkable; one may be able to copy her style and delivery to a greater or lesser 
extent, but we lose the essence of her voice—the voice that lost her brother to AIDS, that is 
descended from a persecuted band of exiles, that was told never to prostitute her voice in public. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Interestingly, Galás invokes two decidedly misogynist figures in this statement. Perhaps she is drawing a 
distinction between what is acceptable for dictatorial male archetypes and what is acceptable for women. Gracie and 
Zarkow, 1990. 
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2.3 Experiencing Tragedy 
For Galás, her biography is intricately tied to her work; she creates what she knows, what 
she has experienced; she spills her blood on her work. Of Plague Mass, she remarks, “half my 
friends are HIV-positive; this is my life.”465 This leads to two important insights: first, she seeks 
not to merely describe the subjects of her art, but to reproduce them aesthetically through an 
artistic medium; and second, she seeks more than a passive reception of the work, for she 
intentionally transgresses upon the listener with the extremity of both her work and her 
presentation. 
For her audience, there is no escape, no comfortable distance between themselves and the 
substance of her work, no excessive aestheticization to mask the raw brutality of her message 
and her style. Galás’s music seeks to bring the audience into direct confrontation with difficult 
ideas (e.g., AIDS, genocide) communicated in a transgressive style. She expresses scorn for 
artists who choose to present difficult topics within an accessible aesthetic model because while 
they claim to use conventional expressive practices to reach a wider audience, she feels that it 
trivializes the topic and ends up lacking the substance of a proper critique.466 Galás’s texts are 
explicit and aggressive in the way that they deny the listener any comfort in ambiguity or 
distance. She does not allude to the horror of AIDS; she describes it in vivid detail. Similarly, 
Galás’s music is sonically aggressive, especially when listened to at the painful volume levels 
that she recommends, and it invades and overwhelms the psyche of the listener.  
Her textually and sonically confrontational style is notable for many reasons, not least of 
which concerns the substantial amount of music in which composers portray death either 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Andrea Juno and V. Vale, “Diamanda Galás,” in Angry Women, RE/SEARCH #13 (San Francisco: 
RE/SEARCH Publications, 1991), 14. 
 
466 Diamanda Galás, “CBC Interview + Live Toronto 1992,” accessed October 24, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0gc13WpR-w. 
253	  	  
abstractly (thereby allowing audiences a false representation of death to shield them from the 
immediacy and horror of a violent death) or simplistically using musical signifiers that are so 
common that they have lost much of their metaphorical power. In the case of John Adams’s On 
the Transmigration of Souls (2001), the music is not only highly abstract in nature, but does not 
even engage the events of the September 11th terrorist attacks directly, instead concentrating on 
the aftermath and those who were left behind in a cloud of uncertainty. Granted, this is a 
perfectly legitimate approach—certainly not every 9/11 tribute needs to shock us with a terrible 
reminder of the horror experienced—but it is not an approach Galás would take. Similarly, John 
Williams, in his score for Schindler’s List (1993), represents the Holocaust in a very 
straightforward manner by playing on common musical signifiers of sadness and Judaism. This 
approach is easy to decode, but the music uses what Ricoeur would call a dead metaphor; the 
semantic impertinence of musical tones standing in for a concrete concept fails to surprise the 
listener by opening up a new horizon of experience because the metaphor has been used so 
frequently that it has entered the canon of common meaning. Although Williams’s score could 
potentially be moving, it could also easily sound like a musical cliché—a straightforward 
message stated in a straightforward manner, to the surprise of no one.  
Rather than using abstraction or musical signifiers of sadness common to the Western ear, 
Galás forces the listener into a traumatic encounter with the Real. Her music goes well beyond 
mere representation and puts the listener in a vulnerable position of ototoxic anxiety where actual 
fear is induced. Her works can be read as a transgression on the audience, as she remarks, “I 
have speakers in four different locations, the audience is in my cage…the high frequencies really 
fuck people up!”467  Nicholas Chares notes, “Galás’s singing does not secure the body’s 
boundaries but instead impinges upon them. Her performances frequently act not to comfort but 	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to discomfort.”468 Although I will spend considerable time examining how she creates this sonic 
and psychical confrontation through her music in due time, we cannot underestimate the power 
of the urgency of her work, which is undoubtedly related to the fact that Galás has lived these 
tragedies. As her brother developed full-blown AIDS and wasted away before her eyes, she 
witnessed how his pain was met with scorn and hate, especially from the leaders of the Catholic 
Church insofar as they were the most outspoken on the issue at the time. When howls of despair 
punctuate her music in Plague Mass, it is a literal outpouring of personally experienced grief. As 
she puts it, “most pop music is descriptive, it’s about the thing, not the thing itself. Whereas my 
work is the thing itself, it is the sound of the plague, the sound of the emotions involved.”469 
2.4 Galás as Radical Composer 
Having examined Galás’s work in the common terms of modernism, postmodernism, and 
performance art, I would like to propose that we view Galás’s work collectively as radical music. 
First, her music is inherently transgressive on numerous fronts: works such as Wild Women 
eschew so many musical conventions that it is difficult to relate it to any existing musical 
practice other than some of the most extreme works by twentieth-century avant-gardists like 
Xenakis or Globokar. Her entire oeuvre is also transgressive along sociopolitical lines as it 
aggressively attacks hegemonies of politics, race, ethics, and sexuality. 
Second, Galás’s music is extreme: extremely loud, extremely intense, and extreme in 
terms of her aesthetic deviation from conventional modes of artistic expression. Just as Galás 
describes her voice as a weapon against her enemies, her music is often a violent display of 
defiance and aggression toward the perpetrators of the injustices she confronts. Works like Wild 
Women and Panoptikon are loud, abrasive assaults on the senses and they force the listener into a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 Nicholas Chare, “The Grain of the Interview: Introducing Diamanda Galás,” in Parallax 13 (2007): 62. 	  
469 Ibid., 61. 
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traumatic encounter with the Real—a mode of expression so foreign that one can scarcely 
understand it in any sort of comparative terms.  
Third, Galás’s music involves an important conceptual component, as all of her works 
require the listener to consider social, cultural, and political issues. Although I have already 
given examples of her work in support of humane treatment of AIDS victims and Assyrian, 
Greek, and Armenian victims of genocide, she has also composed works like Insekta, which is 
dedicated to the horror of medical testing conducted on mental health patients in institutions like 
Willowbrook State School in New York. As interesting as the sonics of her music are, they are 
never abstract experiments in sound for the sake of sound; they are heavily cathected expressions 
of definite topics. 
Fourth, Galás largely avoids institutional support. With respect to commercial 
institutions, she does release albums through a record label—Mute—but far from being a major 
label offering large recording budgets, Mute functions more as a niche label akin to Nonesuch. In 
lieu of financial support, Mute offers very minimal artistic intervention, which is critical for a 
sociopolitical dissident like Galás. Concerning academic institutions, Galás sometimes takes an 
anti-intellectualism stance, finding it to be a lot of posturing with too much emphasis on issues 
that do not matter. She finds the academic preoccupation with the analysis of musical scores to 
be much less important than the actual creation and dissemination of the work through 
recordings and performances.470 At the same time, Galás takes on a more intellectual role when 
given the opportunity to answer substantive interview questions.471 Perhaps the issue is that 
Galás is quite satisfied with her working method and feels no need to explain how it functions on 
a technical level, and thus, she sees nothing to be gained from getting involved personally with 	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471 Galás even mentions Adorno in one of her most formal interviews. Chare, 2007, 65.	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any sort of academic investigation into her music. Ultimately, she avoids conventional 
commercial institutions and she avoids academic institutional support, choosing instead to 
support her work through performances and the sale of art objects and recordings through her 
website. 
 Fifth, timbre is an important element of Galás’s music, especially where the voice is 
concerned. The extended vocal techniques that she employs are crucial for her mode of 
expression. On the one hand, works like The Litanies of Satan and Vena Cava offer so few 
conventional musical elements that timbre is one of the few remaining features that one can 
discuss easily. On the other hand, however important timbre is to her expressive style, it is less 
central to her work than that of, say, Merzbow, for Galás does use some conventional song 
structures at times and she often uses a text. In those cases, her unusual use of timbre enhances 
the meaning of the texts, but does not necessarily steal the focus from them. 
 Sixth, the material objects of Galás’s music are recordings instead of scores. This is not 
to say that the recording is necessarily the ultimate version of the work, but it is the most 
permanent representation of the work. When asked if she considered her albums to be “pieces, or 
documentations of pieces,” Galás replied “both, really.”472 When we take the improvisatory 
component of her work into consideration, we find that despite the fact that she offers elaborately 
constructed studio recordings as albums, she still maintains the importance of a dynamic 
conception of the “work.” A composer like John Zorn seems to place more emphasis on the 
recorded document that is perfect with subsequent performances being, in essence, live 
representations of works created in the studio. Galás is a composer who emphasizes the opposite; 
the recordings are specific instances of works that are most vital and flexible when experienced 
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live. Ultimately, however, even if the recordings are more like frozen versions of her works, they 
are the lasting documents that will allow the music to persist beyond Galás’s lifetime.  
 Seventh, Galás’s work is often culturally hybridized musically, textually, and 
occasionally thematically. In the case of Wild Women, there are considerable affinities between 
her vocal style and the Maniat lamentation practices of her mother’s homeland. Other works 
from Plague Mass to Defixiones combine literary and poetic sources from diverse cultures. 
Defixiones concentrates on the genocides of Asia Minor circa 1914-23, and accordingly, she 
borrows texts and songs from Armenian, Assyrian, and Anatolian and Pontic Greek sources. 
 Eighth, Galás uses non-acoustic means to amplify the expressive content of her work. 
This encompasses her dramatic staging of her performances as discussed above, but it also 
involves the cultivation of her persona. Visually speaking, virtually every article on Galás is 
accompanied by theatrical portraits of the composer in costume with dramatic makeup that 
makes her appear threatening and evil. In fact, it is so difficult to find photographs of Galás 
without heavy stage makeup that she has virtually become the image found in magazines and in 
her performances. Her own visual self-presentation is an important part of her expressive 
practice. Much like Zorn, she fosters a bad-girl attitude with a penchant for profanity-laced rants 
in interviews about anything from the unrecognized vocal brilliance of Doris Day to the dumbing 
down of jazz classics by “shit-ass alternative bands.”473 
3.0 Feminism 
Anytime one approaches the work of a female artist who makes any attempt to occupy a 
position of discursive power, it is tempting to read the work as feminist. Indeed, the way that 
Galás aggressively performs femininity points toward themes of female empowerment, and to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 Incidentally, both topics come up in Diamanda Galás, “The Woman Who Knows Too Much: A 
Conversation with Diamanda Galás, Avenging Queen of the Damned,” Bluefat, March 2008. Accessed September 
24, 2013. http://www.bluefat.com/1002/Diamanda_Galas08.htm 
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extent, this is apt; however, I believe that it is a mistake to view all of her works from a feminist 
perspective insofar as many of her topics are not strictly feminist, but humanist. AIDS, genocide, 
medical experimentation on mental patients—these are all afflictions on humanity. That said, in 
the case of Wild Women with Steak Knives, I believe a feminist reading is warranted, especially 
because her topic deals directly with feminine empowerment. 
As I will show, I believe a Lacanian approach can lead to a compelling interpretation, 
especially when paired with the feminine theories (if not feminist theories) of Hélène Cixous and 
Julia Kristeva; however, before examining Wild Women as a feminist expression, three things are 
necessary: first, I will present Lacan’s concept of gender and femininity to show how it can be 
used productively with postmodern theories of gender; second, I will pick up a few useful 
concepts from Cixous and Kristeva that will factor into my thick interpretation; and third, I will 
explain Galás’s own relationship to feminism. Along the way, I will survey the discursive maze 
of psychoanalysis, feminism (generally), French poststructuralist feminism (specifically), and 
Butlerian postmodern gender studies.  
3.1 Lacan, Feminism, and Femininity 
 Lacan, Cixous, and Kristeva have all faced criticism from Anglophone feminists, but the 
entire discourse is marked by a great deafness to Lacan’s late teaching, which involved a 
significant reconceptualization of gender and femininity. Even when the basic Lacanian 
framework contributes productively to feminist studies, as is the case with Cixous and Kristeva, 
the work is largely based on an earlier Lacanian paradigm. The pervasive feminist conception of 
Lacan from Cixous to Butler to any number of secondary commentaries can be traced back to a 
single article—“The Signification of the Phallus”—that dates from the early part of Lacan’s 
career and is thus unrepresentative of where he would end up during the latter part of his 
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teaching.474 This makes a great deal of the commentary largely irrelevant, for Lacan and many 
feminist scholars are actually more in agreement than disagreement when we consider Lacan’s 
late work. 
Feminist discourse that confronts Lacan tends to fall into two camps: those that borrow 
and extend his conception of subjectivity and those that are predicated on a gross 
misrepresentation of Lacan due to a lack of understanding of certain ideas and statements that, 
when removed from an original context that the author may not have understood to begin with, 
appear to be misogynistic. At times, it has been sufficient to quote some of Lacan’s most striking 
statements—“woman does not exist,” or “there is no sexual relationship”—without the burden of 
understanding what they mean beyond a simplistic, literal interpretation. Thus, amongst the 
feminists who use Lacan productively, he contributes a useful way of understanding the psyche 
and its regulation of drives and desires, despite what they claim to be an essentialist, 
phallocentric concept of sexuality and gender. Amongst the feminists who know Lacan only 
through his aphoristic formulations, he appears to be a masculinist misogynist who is the very 
antithesis of feminism. This situation is exacerbated by three things: first, “The Signification of 
the Phallus” has been widely anthologized, despite the fact that Lacan would completely 
reconceive his concept of gender within fourteen years of its creation; second, the article was one 
of the few translated into English until nearer the end of the twentieth century and was the only 
one to deal extensively with gender; and third, even though Lacan’s reformulation of gender was 
first presented in 1972 with an authoritative English translation following in 1999, twenty-first-
century accounts of Lacan and his role in the history of feminism continue to reference the early 
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Lacan only. In feminist and gender scholarship today, Lacan has become inextricable from his 
early thought. 
Initially, in “The Signification of the Phallus,” Lacan is still using a largely Freudian 
model based around the Oedipus complex and the phallocentric unconscious. The subject cannot 
form a sexual identity except through language, and thus the subject undergoes Symbolic 
castration prior to developing a sexual identity. Symbolic castration implies a loss of jouissance 
that is required when a subject submits to the Law and becomes a speaking being, and 
accordingly, the Name-of-the-Father replaces the infantile desire of the mother with a new 
signifier of desire—the phallus.475 Even though Lacan begins to see the phallus as a signifier (not 
an organ) and begins to disassociate gender from biological sex, both sexes still have recourse to 
the phallus as signifier. The man sees the woman as the phallus he lacks, and the woman believes 
the man possesses the phallus she desires. Both sexes are marked by a lack created upon entering 
the Symbolic, and both are beholden to the phallus in different ways. 
Lacan’s views on gender in the late 1950s would end up provoking a great deal of 
counter-theorizing within poststructuralist French feminist scholars who looked for ways to 
oppose or transcend the power and primacy of the phallus, and by extension, the Symbolic. The 
general Lacanian system is still evident in their work, and they use his terminology, but there is a 
marked emphasis on subverting the functioning on the Symbolic. For Kristeva, she proposes an 
extra-Symbolic psychical register called the “semiotic,” which allows the subject to connect to a 
pre-Oedipal state of maternal intimacy 476 —a point prior to the institution of repressive 
sociopolitical structures that channel the sexes into a hierarchical gender binary—as a way 	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the paternal function can be fulfilled by any dominant influence (male or female) during a child’s development. 
 
476 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984), 25-30. 
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around the repressive nature of the Symbolic. For Cixous, the answer lies in transcending the 
Symbolic through a similarly extra-Symbolic, radical mode of writing that she calls écriture 
féminine—a writing that does not serve the Symbolic, which is governed by the phallic 
function.477 If we are confronting early Lacan, Kristeva and Cixous are justified in their critiques, 
writing as they did in the 1970s and 80s, and one cannot blame them for continuing to reference 
what was an undeniably important article on gender and sexuality. It is, however, disappointing 
that feminist discourse continues to enjoy beating up on the phallocentric straw man of early 
Lacan instead of confronting his later work. 
Let us turn now to Lacan’s later ideas about the gender process, or as he calls it, 
“sexuation.” Recall from chapter one the importance of lack as a means for spurring desire in 
every subject. A subject can make a demand of the Other, but the subject’s demand will always 
outstrip the Other’s ability to fulfill it, thereby leaving a remainder of that which has not been 
satisfied—i.e., desire. The lack in the subject—the need for the Other—compels the subject to 
enter the Symbolic. If the infantile subject were to remain in a state of non-differentiation with 
the mOther and have every need satisfied fully, there would be no need to speak at all.478 
This fundamental lack in all subjects brings us to the phallic function. The phallus in the 
latter stages of Lacan’s teaching is the signifier of desire created by lack. It is an abstraction that 
has nothing to do with the bodily organ, and the lack that is established by the phallic function 
affects all subjects irrespective of actual biology. Its use here, then, is somewhat different from 
its use in “The Signification of the Phallus,” and there is no sense of “having” or “being” the 
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phallus to the opposite sex, and in fact, the idea of an “opposite” sex is no longer even 
applicable. 
According to Lacan, “There’s no such thing as a sexual relationship.”479 That is to say, 
there is no comparative relationship between the genders; they do not complement each other as 
parallels or opposites; a male and a female do not combine to form a complete biological unit. As 
Bruce Fink notes, “the sexes are defined separately and differently, and…their ‘partners’ are 
neither symmetrical nor overlapping.”480 Moreover, masculinity and femininity are considered to 
be structures placed on top of a subject’s biological reality. It is only after a subject becomes 
enmeshed in the Symbolic that he or she can become a gendered being, and the gender of a 
subject need not match the subject’s biology. The concept is remarkably similar to Judith 
Butler’s theory of gender performance, although she implies that gender is a more conscious 
choice, whereas Lacan sees gender operating at two levels: the Imaginary level where the subject 
consciously identifies as a man or woman, and the Symbolic level where masculine and feminine 
structure come into play.481 These two levels need not be in alignment, for a woman may self-
identify as a woman, and yet she may exhibit a masculine psychical structure, or vice versa. 
We will look first to men, mostly because they are easier to understand at this stage. Men 
are simple because they are defined entirely by the phallic function. They have undergone 
Symbolic castration and are thus wholly subject to the Law. Men’s access to pleasure is 
contained within what is allowed by the phallic function; they experience only phallic jouissance, 	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which is a jouissance limited by the Symbolic that is intrinsically insufficient. Phallic jouissance 
cannot ever offer the man full satisfaction. Man’s desire circles continually around object (a), 
and although he finds a promise of it in his partner (who can be biologically male or female), his 
relationship is with his object (a). This implies that men’s desire transcends the specific 
individuality of their partners and that men, in essence, have a relationship with themselves, 
thereby making their jouissance masturbatory.482 
In contrast, women are not wholly subject to the Symbolic, and while the phallic function 
remains in effect, it does not affect women in the same absolute sense as men. Again, this does 
not mean that women are defined by, or have a necessary relation to, the penis. The phallic 
function only describes the fact that women too experience alienation and loss upon entering the 
Symbolic. Because women, like men, are subjects within the Symbolic, they too can experience 
phallic jouissance, but crucially, Lacan proposes that there is another kind of jouissance available 
to women known alternately as “Other jouissance” or “feminine jouissance.” This feminine 
jouissance is remarkable insofar as it exists beyond the Symbolic. Where man’s jouissance is 
wholly Symbolic in nature and completely delimited by the Law, woman’s jouissance can exist 
within the Symbolic or beyond the Symbolic. Lacan’s theory of feminine sexuation is, therefore, 
compatible with Cixous’s concept of écriture féminine for what Cixous proposes as a radical 
mode of feminine writing beyond the Symbolic, Lacan had already proposed a few years earlier 
under the name “feminine jouissance.” 
Finally, let us consider what Lacan means when he states, “woman does not exist.”483 
This means that there is no definable class of all women; there is no single signifier that can 
stand for the fundamental substance of woman, as a whole. Man can be defined by one 	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signifier—the phallus—because he can be defined by his limitations imposed by the phallic 
function. Because woman is not limited under the power of the phallic function necessarily, one 
signifier cannot define her. Something that cannot be defined by a signifier cannot “exist,” which 
is to say it cannot be spoken. Instead, woman ex-sists. That is, woman comes from a place 
beyond the Symbolic. Woman can participate in the Symbolic order, but because she transcends 
it, she cannot be captured within a single, defining signifier, and thus she remains ineffable, at 
least to the extent that Lacan was able to theorize her.   
3.2 Cixous With Lacan 
 A conventional reading of Cixous and Kristeva with Lacan sets up an opposition between 
Cixous’s and Kristeva’s subversive feminist powers and Lacan’s ostensible phallocentric 
hegemony. Their feminine philosophies work in opposition to the tacit assumptions of Freud and 
early Lacan, even if they adopt some of Freud and Lacan’s fundamental concepts about the 
psyche and the unconscious. But what happens if we consider Cixous and Kristeva in the context 
of Lacan’s late teaching? Here, the woman has access to a beyond-the-Symbolic, a special mode 
of feminine jouissance that cannot be represented by the Symbolic. Lacan situates woman as 
unknowable and unsignifiable, but what if we read the Symbolic subversions that Cixous and 
Kristeva propose not as subversions, but as answers to Lacan’s feminine aporia? Perhaps woman 
cannot be written in the Symbolic—by Lacan—but perhaps Cixous and Kristeva have found 
ways to speak about the unspeakable—to describe the way that woman can transcend the 
signifier through feminine jouissance. 
Turning first to Cixous, we find her encouraging women to find their voices—to speak not 
from a position of Otherness within a masculinist discourse, but to speak from a position of 
fundamental difference outside of the discourse. After all, any discursive battles won are of 
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limited value when they occur within the system of binary oppositions imposed by a structuralist, 
phallocentric hegemony. Cixous asks us to “image that difference or inequality—if one 
understands by that noncoincidence, asymmetry—lead to desire without negativity, without one 
of the partner’s succumbing: we would recognize each other in a type of exchange in which each 
one would keep the other alive and different.”484 Here, Cixous forestalls objections that écriture 
féminine is merely a tactic to address an imbalanced binary opposition. If it is to have any real 
power, écriture féminine cannot be defined in oppositional terms; it cannot be the other of 
phallocentric discourse. Although its relationship to the Symbolic is subversive, does this 
necessarily mean that écriture féminine must be defined exclusively by this subversion? Could it 
not be subversive with respect to the Symbolic, while having another simultaneous mode of 
existence that is more non-coincidental than confrontational? 
 From this position of difference, Cixous proposes écriture féminine—a mode of 
femininity in writing. Before explaining exactly how écriture féminine can possibly function 
beyond the Symbolic, it is important to note a few things. Écriture féminine, as a concept, has 
almost always been translated and understood as “feminine writing,” but Cixous cautions that her 
ideas should be properly understood as “femininity in writing” because it is a practice that is not 
limited by biology.485 Men, she claims, can also access this mode of writing.486 In this way, 
Cixous conceptualizes gender along the same lines as Lacanian sexuation where a biological 
male may nevertheless have a feminine psychical structure. Cixous has faced criticism for gender 
essentialism probably due to the way in which the female body and the mother enter into her 	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discourse. In one of her most famous passages, she writes, “there is always at least a little good 
mother milk left in her. She writes with white ink.”487 When considering passages like this in the 
context of the gender theory that she lays out in the same article, I believe these statements are 
best understood in a poetic, metaphorical sense. The maternal body can represent a great deal of 
things beyond the biological reality of childbirth. The mother can represent a wellspring, an 
entity of creation, a nurturing figure, and it seems that Cixous is playing on these ideas when she 
references the mother. Moreover, even her theoretical texts move freely between poetic and 
discursive registers, and to read Cixous in an exclusively literalist manner is to read her as 
“écriture masculin.” 
 Écriture féminine is an alternative discourse—a radical alterity. From this space, it is 
possible to construct a new discourse that is defined not in opposition to the dominant discourse, 
but in radical difference to the dominant discourse. Just as Lacan states that “there is no sexual 
relationship,” Cixous seeks to break the male/female binary and to consider both genders not as 
competitive, hierarchically organized halves of the same whole, but as unique constructs defined 
on their own terms. To bring this to fruition, Cixous argues: 
It is by writing, from and toward women, and by taking up the challenge of 
speech which has been governed by the phallus, that women will confirm women 
in a place other than that which is reserved in and by the symbolic, that is, in a 
place other than silence. Women should break out of the snare of silence. They 
shouldn't be conned into accepting a domain which is the margin or the harem.488 
 
As the Symbolic castrates its subjects by forcing them to surrender the full potential of their 
jouissance in exchange for participation in language, Cixous wants to break free of its strictures. 
She wants to violate the prohibitions of the Law to reclaim something of the lost jouissance. 
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How, then, might écriture féminine be possible? Like Lacan’s feminine jouissance, we 
cannot speak it because it exceeds the signifier. Lacan argues that we can deduce the presence of 
phenomena in the Real by their effects in the Symbolic, even if they cannot be contained within a 
signifier. Cixous writes, “this practice [of feminine writing] will never be able to be theorized, 
enclosed, coded, which does not mean it does not exist.”489 Lacan would agree, but he would 
claim that Cixous practice ex-sists, which is to say it does not exist entirely in the Symbolic, and 
thus cannot be reduced to the sum of its signification.  
 As described above, men are wholly subject to the phallic function, but because women 
have access to feminine jouissance, they are only partially beholden to the phallic function. Thus, 
it is possible, as Cixous argues, that there remains a trace of the archaic, a trace of the 
unassimilable. Obviously an écriture féminine must exist partially within the Symbolic, for 
without the use of any basic language, any feminine utterance would be incomprehensible to 
anyone without this access to an extra-Symbolic register. Écriture féminine, thus seems to be a 
way of using and exceeding language that accesses something transcendent to create novel 
meaning, much in the way that Ricoeur’s concept of metaphor involves the creation of a 
semantic impertinence so strong that it requires an illuminative mental operation to translate into 
a meaningful utterance. 
3.3 Kristeva With Lacan 
Where Cixous’s approach involves transcending the Symbolic through some subversive 
act—i.e., blowing up the law, as she colorfully puts it—Kristeva’s approach involves focusing 
on the pre-Oedipal phase prior to Lacan’s mirror stage where the infantile subject experiences a 
special closeness with the mother. According to Lacan, this relationship between mother and 
child must be surrendered so that the child can form an independent subjectivity. The mother 	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must become the mOther once the child enters the Symbolic. Kristeva argues that these pre-
Symbolic experiences continue to have a presence within our subjectivity, and even if we are 
given mostly to the Symbolic, there is still a remainder that cannot be discarded. 
Kristeva refers to the pre-Symbolic psychical state as the chora—a realm of disorder and 
non-differentiation prior to the acquisition of language and the formation of the subject in the 
Symbolic. During this developmental phase, Kristeva speaks of drive-energies directed toward 
the mother in her capacity as caregiver. Because the infantile subject has not yet been castrated 
by the Symbolic, he or she is not subject to the Law, and thus he or she may experience the 
primordial jouissance that must be surrendered upon entering the Symbolic. This is essentially 
the same concept that Lacan proposes for the creation of desire within the subject. Recall from 
chapter one that the experience of the mythical first (and total) satisfaction given by the mother 
creates a cathected nmemic trace that drives desire in the subject who will continually try to 
reclaim this lost jouissance, always without succeeding.  
While in the chora, the subject begins to develop a semblance of a symbolic system (in 
general, not the Lacanian Symbolic) based on the rhythms, sensations, and pulsations of the 
maternal body. Kristeva’s semiotic is not the same as Lacan’s Symbolic, but it helps prepare the 
infant for his or her eventual entry into the Symbolic. When the subject does enter the Symbolic, 
the semiotic, like primordial jouissance, must be repressed, but never entirely abandoned or 
forgotten. The Symbolic instills a linguistic structure ensuring that intersubjective 
communication is possible, but Kristeva argues that a trace of the semiotic remains and comes 
into play in the form of new and creative uses of language. Without the Symbolic maintaining a 
sense of order, semiotic statements would appear incomprehensible and psychotic, insofar as 
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they would exist outside of the Symbolic;490 however, when it enters a dialectical relationship 
with the Symbolic, the semiotic can emerge in the form of particularly surprising metaphors 
(understood in the full Ricoeurian sense). Like écriture féminine, the semiotic is not limited by 
biological sex and could apply just as easily to a poet like Stéphane Mallarmé whose work 
Kristeva analyzes in detail in Revolution in Poetic Language. Thus, the semiotic is a token of the 
archaic that occasionally disrupts the functioning of the Symbolic in an unusual, but meaningful 
manner. 
The semiotic can appear because, according to Kristeva, the power of the Symbolic is 
only ever partial.491 The body may be structured and ordered by the Symbolic, but an array of 
bodily phenomena either exceeds or defies the structuring power of the Symbolic. Here, Kristeva 
proposes the concept of abjection—an irreconcilable reminder that one cannot ever be 
completely within the Symbolic. At some level, the body is not subject to the Symbolic—death 
and decay are inexorable—and to face the materiality of our humanity (e.g. bodily fluids, waste, 
rotting flesh), is to confront this fact head-on.492 As Kristeva writes, “the abject has only one 
quality of the object—that of being opposed I,”493 or to put it in more straightforwardly Lacanian 
terms, the abject is what is rejected as Other in order to form a discrete subjectivity. Through this 
process of rejection, the subject circumscribes his or her Ego, or individual subjectivity. Kristeva 
continues, “what is abject…is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning 
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collapses.” 494  It is that anti-object that resists signification and reminds us of the 
incommensurate. In an aesthetic capacity, the abject encompasses sensations that are at once 
horrifying and fascinating: curdling milk, vomit, excrement—all a latent threat to one’s “clean 
and proper self.” The abject knows no prohibitions, “but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; 
uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them…it lives at the behest of death.”495  
The corpse is the ne plus ultra of abjection. Kristeva writes, “if dung signifies the other 
side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the most 
sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, 
‘I’ is expelled.” 496  The corpse has a special property in that it doesn’t represent death 
symbolically, but rather is death—an “infection” of living—and in this sense, it has the power of 
attraction, of human curiosity and interest, but it also has the power to engulf life itself. It is for 
this reason that abjection, especially when related to death, can create ruptures in the fabric of the 
Symbolic—a yonic opening through which we confront the Real. 
Ultimately, Cixous and Kristeva propose useful extra-Symbolic possibilities. The ecstatic 
energy of Cixous’s écriture féminine aligns most closely with feminine jouissance, and the 
horrific nature of Kristeva’s abjection aligns with a traumatic encounter with the Real. Both 
involve different ways of exceeding and dehiscing the Symbolic, and thus both exceed the 
phallic function in meaningful ways. Once we arrive at Galás’s Wild Women in section 5.0, we 
can begin to understand their interpretive relevance more fully. 
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3.4 Critiques of French Feminism 
Before continuing on with the relationship of Cixous and Kristeva’s feminine theories to 
Galás’s work, it is important to address a few critiques of the discourse.497 One of the chief 
criticisms leveled at French feminists is that of essentialism. When Cixous proposes a certain 
feminine essence that is accessible through writing, this can be read as an attempt to tie biology 
to traits that may be psychological or social in nature. Similarly, because some of Kristeva’s 
concepts (e.g., the chora, the semiotic) deal with the maternal body, her work has been read as 
biologically determinist and essentialist. Some of these critiques can be interpreted as a 
misunderstanding of the metaphysical nature of the claims that French feminists are making 
through a Lacanian framework. Nancy Fraser takes a more sociological stance and vigorously 
attacks Lacan and the French feminists for presenting a monolithic, ahistorical, asocial concept 
of gender identity; instead, she argues, feminists should concentrate on historicized, culturally 
contingent concepts of gender, inasmuch as there are important sociocultural difference that are 
relative to one’s position in history and in the world.498 Naturally, historical and cultural 
relativism are both legitimate concerns, but this presents a false binary between the metaphysical 
and the material. Lacanian theory is intrinsically metaphysical, but why can we not consider 
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sociocultural contingency as a secondary layer of inquiry? This is, after all, precisely what I 
propose to do with a thick interpretation.  
Fraser frames Lacan and Kristeva as structuralists and argues instead for a pragmatic 
approach to feminism that “studies language as social practice in social context.”499 She 
continues, “This model takes discourses, not structures, as its object. Discourses are historically 
specific, socially situated, signifying practices. They are communicative frames in which 
speakers interact by exchanging speech acts. Yet discourses are themselves set within social 
institutions and action contexts.”500 I wonder what these social institutions are, if not structures. 
Moreover, to view discourses (in the Foucauldian sense) as anything other than structural 
formations themselves is to see structuralism as a necessarily universalist venture. 
Fraser seems to view Kristeva as operating within a phallocentric structure, thereby 
reinforcing a hierarchical binary that places man ahead of woman, but Fraser’s recommendation 
is to abandon this level entirely and focus on higher-level discursive change. Kristeva, on the 
other hand, finds these to be superficial investigations when fundamental issues of the formation 
of subjectivity are left unexplored. Evidently for Fraser, one cannot have both metaphysical and 
material concerns. On Kristeva, she writes, “having fallen under Lacan’s sway along the way, 
she has not managed to maintain a consistently pragmatic orientation. Instead, she has ended up 
producing a strange, hybrid theory, one that oscillates between structuralism and pragmatics.”501 
By critiquing the structure itself (in this case, the Symbolic), Kristeva is attempting to open up a 
new pathway that does not rely on a hierarchical masculine/feminine binary, and it is from that 
point that Fraser’s culturally contingent pragmatics can truly make a difference. 	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3.5 Galás and Feminism 
 Galás has an odd relationship with feminism and indicates that she is acutely aware of 
feminism and the significance of the battles early feminists won for her and other female artists, 
but she also adds that it’s not something she feels compelled to address through her music.502 
Rather than not addressing feminism specifically, it seems more appropriate to say that feminist 
struggles are one of many that she addresses. Within her general interest in speaking for the 
outcasts, the wretched, and the Other, victims of gender prejudice constitute one of many groups 
that include victims of AIDS, intolerance, medical experimentation, madness, and genocide. 
Moreover, Galás’s antiauthoritarian sentiments make it unlikely that she would align herself with 
an explicit social movement. 
 Susan McClary notes that while Galás “can be read as simply reaffirming the worst 
stereotypes available,”—the hysterical madwoman full of rage and barely contained violence—
“she can also be read as extremely courageous as she confronts these stereotypes head-on, 
appropriates them, and rechannels their violent energies in other directions.”503 The hysterical 
woman has been a familiar trope, but she has traditionally been a construction of men, and thus, 
she does not control her own rage. It is mere madness without meaning. When Galás 
appropriates this trope, she embodies all of the intrinsic violence and rage, but with the addition 
of intent and control. Galás’s madwoman is not mad at all; rather, she is so radically Other that 
her utterances cannot be contained by the Symbolic. So long as her actions are judged according 
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to their resistance to the phallic function, they will be seen as exclusively subversive and 
psychotic, but if her actions are considered as pure difference defined independently of 
masculine discourse, they can create meaning independent of any subversive, oppositional 
effects they might have or be perceived as having. 
 Despite Galás’s hesitancy to get involved with gender discourse, Cixous and Kristeva 
offer ideas that lead to a compelling reading of her work. The way that Cixous emphasizes the 
empowering act of a uniquely feminine expression through écriture féminine fits nicely with 
Galás’s own expressive style, and Kristeva’s avowal of the power of the abject works well with 
Galás’s predilection for the macabre and the transgressive. 
4.0 Lament 
Considering both Galás’s cultural heritage and the themes of unjust death that run 
throughout her oeuvre, it is unsurprising that lament practice figures prominently in her work. It 
is difficult to determine the extent to which this is intentional borrowing or an unintentional 
consequence of her Greek heritage, as Galás has at times claimed that she became aware of the 
connection only after some of her early compositions were recorded.504 It is likely that the 
similarities between her vocal performance and Maniat lament in Wild Women are more 
coincidental than intentional, insofar as she appears not to have experienced an actual 
lamentation at that point in her life; however, it is unclear if she has since experienced one 
firsthand and has used this experience in subsequent works. Intentional or not, an understanding 
of the lamentation practices of her Greek, Maniat heritage will help us create a richer 
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understanding of the work at hand.505  
Generally speaking, laments are an important part of the traditional death rituals of rural 
Greece and are, significantly, the domain of women. Loring Danforth describes the Greek idea of 
death as a tripartite process: separation, which encompasses all the events between the actual 
physical death—the cleaning of the body, the period of mourning in the presence of the corpse, 
the funeral procession—and the burial; liminality, where the body—considered not completely 
dead, nor completely alive—is buried for five years, during which time the women in the family 
will visit the grave often to lament the deceased in hopes of bringing peace to the deceased and 
aiding in the transition between life and death; and incorporation, which involves the 
disinterment of the corpse, an inspection of the cleanliness of the bones to determine the success 
of the liminal stage based on the completion of decomposition, and the replacement of the bones 
in the village ossuary.506 Women lament the deceased during each of these stages and are thought 
to wield considerable power over life and death, inasmuch as a properly lamented individual will 
pass on to the afterlife in peace, while an improperly lamented individual may return to haunt the 
living. This lamentation is actually thought to commune with the spirit world in a way that is 
both threatening and unnerving to the men of the community. 
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The laments themselves are musico-poetic forms that fulfill the aforementioned private and 
communal functions of not only helping the deceased to make the transition between this life and 
the afterlife smoothly, but also to help members of the family and the community to grieve and 
feel a particular type of pain called ponos. Ponos is a Greek word that implies a feeling of 
profound sorrow and loss, and the experience of ponos is often described as a burning sensation 
within the body.507 When the women are able to channel ponos in their laments, the laments 
become naked outpourings of raw, abject emotion that combine song with deep sighs and 
weeping, with punctuated breaks of wailing and screaming. Ponos, in this sense, can be 
understood as a rupture in the fabric of the Symbolic—a tear through which one has a traumatic 
encounter with the Real. 
One can find many examples of this style of vocal expression in Galás’s work, but there is 
a particularly clear example in “There Are No More Tickets to the Funeral” from Plague Mass, 
where a series of wails and shrieks explode through the texture. Although they are part of the 
composition, they give the listener the feeling of a spontaneous overflow of emotion, as if to 
suggest that when the subject matter becomes too terrible, Galás must abandon not only vocal 
technique, but also language itself—there are literally no words that can describe the pain. This 
is not to suggest that her wails are unintentional musical expressions, nor is it to suggest that her 
wails do not come from a place of authenticity, of personally-experienced tragedy; they are both 
intentionally executed bouts of sophisticated vocal gymnastics and genuine expressions of grief. 
Galás herself claims, “one almost has to have had a firsthand experience with death in order to 
start taking it very seriously.”508 Ponos is a crucial part of lament, and therefore a lamentation 
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without the experience of death has little of the emotional power, little of the unmediated truth 
that emanates from a source beyond the self. 
4.1 Maniat Lament 
Looking specifically at Galás’s Maniat heritage, we find important differences between 
Greek lament practices in general. David Schwarz notes that Maniat laments are unique amongst 
Greek laments in a number of respects: rather than focusing mainly on mourning the dead, 
Maniat laments often involve a strong juridical drive towards avenging an unjust death; they also 
feature a great deal of detail concerning the specifics of the particular death within long narrative 
laments.509 The jural component of Maniat lament is important because, as Nadia Seremetakis 
has shown, it is one of the only opportunities for Mani women to participate in sociopolitical 
critique. Witnessing is an important element of Galás’s music and, just as Maniat laments are 
most powerful when they are the truthful outpourings of grief of the deceased’s closest female 
family members, Galás’s work is inextricable from her life experiences. As she attests, “this is 
the real truth. When I go onstage, I have to speak honestly about what I know about the world, 
what I’ve seen in this epidemic, how I’ve felt about it all these years.”510 Like the Mani women 
who use these rare occasions to critique the social establishment, so too does Galás use her own 
work to critique Western society from a place of intensity and personal experience, and one of 
the key components to the communicational efficacy of her work is her use of pain through 
music. 
The use of pain in a public discourse like Maniat lament is an important technique, 
especially for those out of line with the social establishment, to create culturally constructed 	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truths.511 Seremetakis writes, “the personal signification of pain, synthesizing emotional force 
and body symbolism, can vividly dramatize the dissonance between self and society.”512 She 
states further that this signification of pain can be extended to an entire social group, in this case, 
women, offering them a rare chance to be heard in a masculinist society. In Maniat lament, “the 
antiphonal vocalization and physical display of ‘pains’ construct an affective enclave where 
alternative codifications of women’s relation to the social order achieve a formal status as 
biographical testimony and oral history.”513 Thus, pain is an important force in vitalizing the 
construction of cultural truths.  
Within Western society, Galás occupies a minority position both in terms of being female, 
and in terms of speaking for outsiders on the wrong side of dominant social constructs. Her use 
of pain empowers her and animates her cultural truth claims, and she does this using the same 
technique as the women of her ethnic heritage. With respect to the jural and socially critical 
components of her work, we find plenty of examples. Take, for instance, Galás’s vivid, detailed 
descriptions of the atrocities visited upon the Armenian people in “Orders from the Dead” from 
Defixiones: Will and Testament: 
Our dead watched their daughters 
Butchered 
Raped and beaten 
in the still-burning of those flames 
 
Our dead watched an ax remove their  
mother’s skull 
and crown a wooden spit 
in the continuous burning of those flames 
 
Our dead watched while Chrysostomos 	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eyes and tongue were pulled out, 
teeth and fingers broken, one by one, 
in the laughing and the cheering 
of those flames514 
 
During the course of the nearly twelve-minute movement, Galás describes in historically 
informed detail a great number of unspeakable acts of violation derived from the numerous first-
hand accounts of the genocide. She holds nothing back in her descriptions; she wants to record 
and lament the specifics to bear witness to the tragedy, to judge the perpetrators, and to critique 
the political entities that continue to allow this genocide to go unrecognized; and she bolsters the 
urgency and import of these claims by creating ponos within the listener. 
Interestingly, Galás seems to embody epanastasi—a “revolution” of strong emotions 
described by Maniat women—in her performances, even when she isn’t engaging in the more 
specific act of lamenting. Seremetakis provides accounts of Maniat mourners who “‘melt,’ 
‘burn,’ and ‘liquefy’ because of their pain.”515 Similarly, Galás describes the conditions of her 
performances: “My sound monitors would deafen anybody else…I have to feel it—I fry under 
that sound,”516 thus showing that she too needs to experience the “transgression of bodily 
integrity” that Seremetakis refers to. 
Beyond this, Galás also mirrors the Maniat expressions of pain through a revolution of 
the social norm by ripping her costume (as in Plague Mass),517 physical violence (Insekta), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Diamanda Galás, Defixiones – Will and Testament, 2003 by Mute Records Ltd. CD STUMM 205. 
Compact Disc. 
 
515 Seremetakis, 1990, 491. 
 
516 Juno and Vale, 1991, 10. 
 
517 C. Nadia Seremetakis, The Last Word: Women, Death, and Divination in Inner Mani (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 73. 
 
280	  	  
generally with what Seremetakis calls a “heightening of feminine presence.”518 In Galás’s 
performance of Plague Mass, she appears in a dress pulled down to her waist, thereby exposing 
her breasts; however, far from being a simplistic display of confrontational feminism, this 
display of nudity has its precedent in her Maniat heritage. Seremetakis describes the significance 
of the black scarf of women in mourning: “the woman who pulls her scarf off her head and down 
to her shoulders displays one level of intensity, while the woman who pulls it completely off her 
head signifies a deeper level of mourning. A woman who rids herself of the scarf, pulling her 
hair out, scratching her face and beating her chest, exhibits the deepest signs of pónos.” While a 
black scarf doesn’t necessarily hold the same symbolic significance to a cosmopolitan audience, 
Galás’s costuming in Plague Mass certainly does. 
Finally, there is a strong connection between Maniat lament and abjection, both of them 
representing a quiescent threat lurking on the periphery, always with the explosive potential to 
burst into the center, to create disruptions in the Maniat patriarchy and Symbolic, respectively. 
Let us first take up lament: Seremetakis describes the array of Mani women’s cultural practices 
as an “empowering poetics of the periphery,”519 a phrase capturing the creative expression of 
Mani women, the idea of poesis (both making and imagining), and the spatial social practices of 
the Mani women who keep away from the most central public spaces, walking on back roads, 
close to the walls. Indeed, women are largely invisible to Mani society save for an important 
exception: in death rituals, the women come to the center, empowered, charged with the task of 
helping the recently deceased pass safely into the afterlife. During this small cluster of days, 
women not only have a voice and a public presence, but they are the central voice of society, the 
priests’ brief Christian rituals notwithstanding. The meta-commentaries and juridicism that 	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Seremetakis speaks of are terrifying to the men, as they are threatening to masculine dominance. 
Through abject displays of intense emotion, the fabric of the patriarchy begins to fray, as the 
women appear not only to rip apart cultural establishments, but also to commune with the utterly 
transcendent forces of God and death. 
 Analogously, the abject is what one excludes from oneself in order to become a discrete 
subject, but the exclusion is never completely successful and the abject lies in wait on the 
periphery of the subject’s existence. Much like the women of Mani, the abject can, at times, 
come to the fore with a grisly reminder of the pre-Symbolic, striking a dagger in the fragile 
envelope of the subject. Whereas abjection is instrumental in the constitutive process of inchoate 
subjectivity, we find that Maniat men also issue a form of rejection—a rejection of the feminine 
in public discourse—so as to allow their masculine hegemony to exist; the lamentation and death 
rituals of Maniat women are, thus, an abject force that encroaches on the reigning patriarchy. 
Each are forces on the periphery that threaten the dominance of the Symbolic/patriarchal order, 
and this is precisely why we can consider Maniat lament practices to be a particularly pure form 
of social abjection. 
There is, however, a crucial difference between Maniat lament in its original social 
context and Galás’s adoption of it for a Western audience: when Maniat women lament, they are 
engaging in a social custom, and as threatening as it is for the men, there is a precedent for this 
activity; when Galás borrows from the lament tradition in a performance for a Western, 
cosmopolitan audience, the effect is amplified, and the social norms that are uprooted in Mani 
become a wrecking ball of aesthetic expectations as the music approaches the limits of what 
certain audiences can comprehend as art. But this wrecking ball is absolutely necessary, as 
Cixous writes, “a feminine text cannot fail to be more than subversive. It is volcanic…it’s in 
282	  	  
order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law, to break 
up the ‘truth.’”520 Whether we are considering Cixous’s écriture féminine, Kristeva’s semiotic, or 
Galás’s use of Maniat lamentation customs, the fundamental principle is the same: To speak as 
an outsider, one must transcend the dominant discourse, and this involves moving to the 
beyond—to the emotional, the mystical, the primordial. 
Finally, Wild Women is not, strictly speaking, a lament in the same way that Plague Mass 
or Defixiones can be read as laments. There is no real mourning component to the work; 
however, the concepts are very relevant in three respects: first, Galás’s vocal style uses similar 
techniques that go beyond conventional expression such as the way her occasional verbal 
outbursts are smashed into non-sense sounds, thereby pointing to a linguistically transcendent 
level of meaning; second, Galás’s juridical and vengeful drives carry a similar sentiment to 
Maniat laments, although in this case her vengeance is carried out in the space of the psyche 
rather than in physical reality; and third, she uses extreme displays of emotion to create ponos 
within the listener so as to overwhelm his or her psyche in a powerful manner.  
5.0 Wild Women with Steak Knives (A Homicidal Love Song for Solo Scream) 
Let us now turn to Galás’s Wild Women with Steak Knives to see how feminine 
expression, the semiotic, abjection, Maniat lament practices, ponos, and death all come together 
in her work of radical music. Although the work was created in 1982, there are still strong 
connections to the 1970s avant-garde movement with which Galás was involved, and one can 
hear traces of the influence of Globokar, Penderecki, and Xenakis in the extreme and unusual 
treatment of the voice.521 As a sort of program note, Galás writes, “Wild Women with Steakknives 
[sic] is a kind of bloodless and unmerciful brain surgery, a kinesthetic representation of the mind 	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diffracted into an infinity of crystals…the subtractive synthesis of mental entropy into various 
bands of absolute and mere schizophrenia.”522 Ostensibly, Wild Women is the brutal, homicidal, 
and schizophrenic love song of a madwoman,523 but we can also read it as an act of defiance—an 
angry rebuke of the masculine oppressors of femininity: oppression of language, oppression of 
the social order, oppression through violence, both actual and mythological. These oppressive 
forces, the Wild Woman is a force of abjection rendered musically. 
Galás includes an alternate program note in the original vinyl release: “Wild Women with 
Steak-Knives (from the tragedy-grotesque by D. Galas—Eyes Without Blood) is a cold 
examination of unrepentant monomania, the devoration instinct, for which the naïve notion of 
filial mercy will only cock a vestigial grin.”524 Between the two program notes, there is a 
common theme of cold-blooded, draconian brutality of a decidedly obsessive nature. We 
understand that the work will use a violent expressive language, but we do not yet understand the 
significance of this brutality.   
Before looking at the non-lingual sonic elements, a close reading of the text is needed. 
The text occupies only about three minutes of the twelve-minute work: it is barely intelligible, 
there are additional performed verbal fragments not included in the written text, and Galás does 
not even utter all the words that she includes in the “libretto.”525 Although the extent to which 
one can separate the text from the musical work as a whole is debatable, the fact that a dedicated 
text was included, and the fact that the text appears to differ substantially from what one can 
perceive aurally in the work, justifies examining it first in isolation. Irrespective of how the text 	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aligns with the aural actuality of the work, the text at least serves to put a distinctive picture in 
the listener’s mind and helps one understand the work in a richer capacity. 
5.1 The Text 
The first stanza begins: 
I commend myself to a death of no importance, 
to the amputation of all seeking hands, 
pulling, grasping, with the might of nations, 
of Sirens, in a never ending bloody bliss 
to the death of mere savagery 
and the birth of pearly, white terror. 
 
From the outset, the speaker pledges herself to death—the ultimate act of retribution, the ultimate 
exertion of power. “The might of nations” suggests that this pledge is of universal import, 
speaking for the oppression of women from all walks of life. The mention of Sirens indicates a 
link to Greek mythology, which is rich with the tales of vengeful women who were able to use a 
distinctly feminine facet of their being to achieve victories over men. The Sirens had little 
physical power, but their song of seduction was invested with a particular type of libidinal 
energy that was irresistible to men and could lure them to their death. Significantly, the song of 
the Sirens is spoken around, but never spoken directly. Renata Salecl describes their song as a 
kernel of the Real that must be omitted in order for the Odyssey’s narrative to maintain 
comprehensibility. Their song is “not simply something prior to symbolization; it is also what 
remains: the leftover, or better, the failure of symbolization.”526 This remainder must be abjected 
in order to maintain Symbolic clarity. In this capacity, we could see the Siren song as a sort of 
écriture fémninine—a semiotic expression that is so profound in its otherness that the Symbolic 
of those who encounter it is traumatically affected. Here, Galás’s description of a “never ending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 Renata Salecl, “The Sirens and Feminine Jouissance,” Differences 9, no. 1 (1997): 16-17. 
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bloody bliss” points toward a similar mode of radical expression that confronts the listener with 
the Real. 
The final two lines speak of the “death of mere savagery” and the “birth of pearly, white 
terror.” Here, Galás invokes a sort of binary between birth and death, but the second half of the 
binary is skewed, as savagery and terror are not in opposition to each other. It would appear that 
“mere savagery,” in this instance, is the product of men and their brutal, indiscriminate violence, 
while “pearly, white terror,” is a violence of greater purity—a violence with intellectual intent 
behind it in contradistinction to a violence born of animal instinct. Recalling the madwoman 
trope that Galás ostensibly appropriates, we find that indeed her violence, her madness is not the 
indiscriminate hysteria of the male-constructed madwoman, but is in fact an empowered, 
intentional figure who merely appears mad. The idea of “white terror” is also reminiscent of 
Cixous’s proclamation that women write in white ink.527  
 The second stanza continues: 
Wild women with veins slashed and wombs spread, 
singing songs of the death instinct 
in voices yet unheard, 
praising nothing but the promise of Death on earth, 
laughing seas of grinning red, red eyes, 
all washed ashore and devoured 
by hard and unseeing spiders. 
 
The second stanza has strong psychoanalytic tones with abjection, the Freudian death drive, and 
generally, a concern with the Real. The slashed veins and spread wombs of the first line certainly 
evoke the horror of abjection; the breakdown of the body reflects the breakdown of meaning in 
the Symbolic. The “wild women with veins slashed and wombs spread” destroy themselves to 
destroy meaning, to cut a hole in the fabric of the Symbolic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 Cixous, 1976, 881. 
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 The second line refers to the “death instinct,” thus furthering the idea of destruction of the 
Symbolic order. Freud’s concept of the death drive528 describes an unconscious desire to return 
to the pre-natal, the pre-Symbolic, the Real. Bataille goes so far as to describe this drive towards 
death as erotic, insofar as he posits that we live in a state of discontinuity, constantly striving to 
return to the pre-birth continuity that we share with the whole of the universe, achievable in 
small measure through the “little death” of the sex act, and in sum through bodily death.529 
Again, Galás is invoking that which transcends the Symbolic, that which is untouched by the 
patriarchal discourse, that which is available to begin a new discourse of femininity defined 
independently from—not in opposition to—masculinity. 
 The third line brings this mode of thinking to its conclusion: the “voices yet unheard” are 
the voices of écriture féminine. The previous two lines were instrumental in getting us to a point 
where écriture féminine is even possible: first, Galás invokes the abject to pose an oppositional 
threat to the Law, thereby doing violence to the protective cocoon of the Symbolic. Second, she 
invokes the Real. Just as the song of the Sirens was powerful enough to attract men even under 
the threat of death, the breakdown of the Symbolic horrifies us, but the promise of reclaiming our 
lost jouissance is too powerful to resist. Once these tasks are completed, women can have a voice 
independent of any phallocentric discourse because it is not built from within a system where a 
dominant force is always already in effect.  
 In the fourth line, she is already celebrating the “promise of death,” which will bring 
about the new continuity—the fulfillment of the death drive, Bataille’s erotic conclusion. While 
anthropology tends to consider death as a disruption of the social fabric that requires mending 
through the myriad funeral rites of various societies to bring us back into integrated homeostasis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 This is actually sometimes translated as “death instinct.” 	  
529 Georges Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality (New York: City Lights, 1986). 
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death, as Galás frames it, isn’t really a disruption of anything but an oppressive discourse; rather, 
it brings about continuity, insofar as the feminine subject gains access to a pre-Symbolic state, a 
state where she can access her semiotic power, where she can enter into a state of 
undifferentiated being with her semiotic creativity and originary life force. Where Bataille 
contends that we can only achieve true continuity through death, Cixous argues that we can 
achieve it by denying the power of signifier. This wave of feminine destruction brings the 
speaker to a crazed laughter—the “laugh of the Medusa.” 
The final stanza concludes: 
I commend myself to a death beyond all hope of 
Redemption, 
beyond the desire for forgetfulness, 
beyond the desire to feel all things at every moment, 
But to never forget, 
to kill for the sake of killing, 
and with a pure and most happy heart, 
extol and redeem Disease. 
 
The first three lines of the final stanza return to themes of the first stanza, thereby exposing a 
basic ABA structure. “But to never forget / to kill for the sake of killing,” returns to the idea of 
killing as an act of purity, an act of intentional disruption, an act with a higher purpose than the 
typically mundane motives of murder (e.g., jealousy, greed, lust). Finally, to “extol and redeem 
disease” is to face the abject head-on, to face this terrifying place where signification begins to 
fray and embrace it for its disruptive efficacy. 
5.2 The Music 
Having examined the textual manifestation of the work, let us now turn our attention to 
what is actually sonically present in the recording. There is a measure of overlap between the 
libretto and the text that one can discern on the recording, but a fair amount of the text in the 
recording is not represented in the libretto. Wild Women with Steak Knives begins with an 
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explosion of glossolaliac utterances with wild panning around the stereo soundstage; the voice 
isn’t immediately identifiable as human, and when we do begin to recognize the timbre of the 
voice, we struggle to determine if the utterances are a foreign tongue, or if they’re nonsense; we 
are taken aback at the shrill, piercing timbre and we attempt to discern the temperament of the 
sounds—are they angry, are they sad, are they simply manic? All this within the first few 
seconds of listening, and yet we are no closer to any answers, for very little can prepare us for 
the barrage of vocal calisthenics that Galás has in store for us. This disorienting, disconcerting 
effect will last long into the work—our ears simply do not allow us to adjust to the aural 
peculiarities of Wild Women easily—and that is a major part of the efficacy of the music. It 
seems to be the sound of death itself. 
As much attention as I have given to the composed text, the non-verbal portions of the 
work outweigh it considerably; and even though the text gives us a number of interpretive clues 
and suggests a number of thematic elements, ultimately, it is Galás’s glossolalia that is the key to 
interpreting the work fully, for that is where she most fully embodies the Wild Woman, a modern 
day maenad, wielding her thyrsus (or in this case, a steak knife), radically shredding musical and 
Symbolic convention. 
At many points in the work, Galás uses extended vocal techniques to achieve a wide 
array of non-traditional vocal sounds—e.g., hisses, wails, sighs, unvoiced breath, screams—and 
thus we face a hermeneutic problem: how to deal these vocal sounds that are non-lingual and 
musically unconventional (i.e., singing not grounded in a stable sense of pitch). One might argue 
that the proximity of Galás’s non-lingual sounds to the texted portions actually brings the non-
lingual sounds into the Symbolic, and one might further argue that by describing the functions of 
these sounds I am turning them into Symbolic expressions. If we believe that the proximity of 
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the sensible to the non-sensible tends to turn everything into a sensible (i.e., Symbolic) 
expression, then it follows that my interpretation tames the expressions and makes them into 
Symbolic (if strange) utterances, and essentially ruins the transgressive power of the work. I 
believe the opposite is a much more interesting and rewarding way to approach the problem. 
Through the proximity of lingual to non-lingual utterances, the words are transformed from 
linguistic units into cathected units pulverized by their encounter with a Symbolically 
transcendent utterance. Rather than being tamed, the non-lingual sounds that make up the 
majority of the work fragment and problematize the meaning of the words leading more toward 
the obfuscation of their linguistic meaning than to the elevation of their influence. Finally, I hold 
that speaking about the functioning of an extra-Symbolic utterance is not the same as changing it 
into a Symbolically comprehensible utterance. If we were dealing simply with words and sounds, 
perhaps this argument would be convincing. We are, however, dealing with words and musical 
sounds, and when the music is sufficiently transgressive (as is the case with radical music), its 
thoroughgoing difference tends to make it resistant to verbal substitution. Simply put, when the 
sonic expression is alien enough, words can describe it, but they can never replace the 
phenomenological impact created. When I offer interpretations based on the meaning of the 
words presented, I attempt to account for the effect of the non-lingual sounds surrounding them. 
In a sense, I am treating them like appearances of the Symbolic within a sea of semiotic mystery. 
Finally, a word about structure: When confronting radical music, discernible, logical 
structure is rarely a central focus, if it is present at all. In the case of Wild Women, there is an 
actual score, although its validity and usefulness are questionable. According to Galás, the score 
postdates the actual creation and recording of the work and had more to do with the fulfillment 
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of a grant requirement than any desire to produce a performable, accurate score. In an interview, 
she has the following to say: 
[Groans] They [the granting institution] wanted me to notate all my music—
notate ‘Wild Women with Steak Knives.’ The only way for me to do that was to 
take a massive amount of drugs and listen back to it and come up with these 
ridiculous art drawings—all these squiggles and all this crap. And I was like, ‘you 
know? I would never sing this score. I would never be bothered. But if that’s what 
you want, you got it.’530 
 
The score was accompanied by a short article in Perspectives of New Music, and even though 
Galás routinely dismisses the importance or meaningfulness of both the article and the score, she 
nevertheless includes both in her collection of librettos, The Shit of God. The score uses graphic 
notation, but even from the first few seconds, it is impossible to see enough of a connection 
between what is heard and what is notated to hold any hope of creating a subsequent 
performance based on the score alone. It is particularly useless in determining where the text of 
the libretto should be placed, inasmuch as there is no mention of the text at all. It is, however, 
useful in two respects: first, there are some technical directions for setting up the microphones 
and effects (including the proper reverb and delay settings), and second, she indicates that there 
should be “multiple declamations” of approximately three minutes.531 Based on this evidence, I 
consider the work to be through-composed with four three-minute sections along with a brief 
coda which functions more as a closing malediction than a musical resolution. 
5.3 Section One 
The first section breaks down into three episodes, the first of which is an introductory 
outburst of glossolalia that runs from 00:00 to 00:45. Many of the extended vocal techniques that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 Unfortunately, this interview is no longer available on the Choler Magazine website. Sean Flinn, “The 
Serpent Speaks,” Choler Magazine, accessed November 25, 2009, 
http://cholermagazine.com/articles/diamandagalas2.shtml.  
 
531 Galás, 1996, 6-7. 	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Galás employs make an appearance here in rapid succession. This immediately grabs the listener 
due to its utterly alien character. This flurry of ideas gives way to eight seconds of silence, just 
enough for the echo of her voice to die away. From 00:53 to 02:14 Galás sings multiphonics of a 
particularly screeching variety—a ghastly sound—intermixed with some high-register bel canto 
singing, reminiscent of the distinctive keening of lamentation, albeit in a more aestheticized 
manner. From 02:14 until 02:46 there are preverbal vocalizations that seem to move increasingly 
towards intelligible speech—Kristeva’s semiotic moving toward Lacan’s Symbolic. Galás’s 
delivery suggests one who has thoughts, but is unable to form words, struggling against her own 
tongue to communicate an idea. Much like the way Freud describes infants as fantasizing their 
desires (e.g., food, attention) in an attempt to communicate with their parents before they 
develop the power of speech, the Wild Woman has similar fantasies of communication (in this 
case, much more complex than the aforementioned infantile desires), but she has not yet acquired 
language. 
 The fragmented sounds of the introductory outburst set up the dissociative state of the 
Wild Woman, her subjectivity diffracted into the “infinity of crystals” mentioned in the program 
note. During this opening section, Galás introduces at least four distinctive sounds, which will be 
developed in more detail in subsequent parts of the work. This polyvocality becomes synchronic 
as Galás refracts her voice into multiple simultaneous bands of sound through multiphonics. 
Here, the sound is somewhere between a wretch and a scream, which becomes the first instance 
of abjection; how is one to reconcile the ugliness of expression with the humanity of the voice? It 
points to that raw, instinctive, animalistic drive that is latent within the subject lurking under the 
surface—that unassimilable kernel that threatens to dehisce the Symbolic. Indeed, Salecl writes, 
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“it is in the tonality of the voice…where we encounter jouissance […] This excessive jouissance 
that pertains to the voice is what makes the voice both fascinating and deadly.”532 
 The third part of the first section is most interesting, as there are multiple possible 
readings, all of which are potentially present. First of all, the preverbal utterances could be 
considered parapraxical sounds indicating the unconscious speaking independently of the 
conscious mind. We could also hear this as a sort of Kristevian semiotic communication. It 
resembles the patterns and sounds of speech, but has no meaning, at least within the Symbolic. 
As the music continues, the garbled speech-sounds become increasingly intelligible—we are on 
the threshold of language. As stated above, desire—the unsatisfied excess of need—plays a 
crucial role in bringing the subject into the Symbolic, and this moment is no exception; Galás’s 
first words are “what I want,” repeated with struggles and gasps in between, the tension building 
and building, both due to the emergence of intelligible speech and vocal register, until finally she 
breaks through, thus leading us into section two. We can read this first section as a sort of 
formation of the subjectivity of the Wild Woman whose psyche is still reverberating from the 
semiotic rhythms of the chora. She is discovering her desire, but she is struggling against the 
phallic function because she refuses to surrender her jouissance. 
5.3.1 Section Two 
 At 02:46, the Wild Woman’s inchoate subjectivity is becoming split between language 
and jouissance. As she begins to acquire language, the semiotic impulses are increasingly forced 
out by the rigidity of the Symbolic. She is being alienated from her pre-Symbolic experiences 
and her jouissance. The music reflects her resistance through antiphony: “I want you to get down 
on your knees and I want you to ask me, what is my name,” spoken in a breathy, intense whisper, 
but with markedly masculine undertones; it is not a request, but a demand. This masculine voice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 Salecl, 1997, 20. 
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is demanding that she submit to castration, that she become a speaking being, and that she ask 
the question, “what is my name?” The Wild Woman is compelled to discover her name and thus 
be defined according to the Symbolic. Again we hear, “what is my name,” repeated with 
increasing intensity, but we begin to hear an antiphonal response of wretches and gasps as the 
Wild Woman fights Symbolic assimilation. She fights using the unintelligible language of the 
semiotic to resist the phallic function of the Symbolic.  
Finally, in a declamation, we hear “Your – Name – Is,” and at this point, something very 
interesting happens: the name, twice repeated, is unintelligible; it sounds something like “all 
man” or “oh man,” but it could also be the Turkish word “aman,” which is an exclamation akin 
to “oh my” or “mercy!” In Greece, the word aman is itself rich with meaning: it sounds like the 
reverse of the Greek word for mother, mana—thus anchoring it with the concept of the chora, or 
a mystical feminine energy—and is used as an exclamation, especially when one is in pain; it 
also functions as a song word, often used in the Greek genre, amanes, as a sort of nonsense word 
used at the end of verses in an improvisatory, melismatic fashion. It is possible that this utterance 
is triple-coded, suggesting to the listener all of the following, each potentially present in the 
Derridean sense: “all man” could be a reference to the phallocratic, the primordial oppressor of 
the feminine; “aman” could be an exclamation of grief, shock, disbelief—a word she may have 
inherited from her parent’s vernacular; or it may be nothing at all—empty syllables by intent—to 
totally obscure all linguistic meaning (however, in this case, one could still argue that Galás’s 
unconscious deliberately, parapraxically choses syllables resembling the previous two 
possibilities.) Whatever the intent, the key idea is that the word is intentionally obfuscated to rob 
it of its power in the Symbolic. 
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What is this name that the Wild Woman refuses to speak? I believe it is none other than 
the Name-of-the-Father—the master signifier that traps the subject in the Symbolic. The Wild 
Woman begins to enter the Symbolic, but she refuses to submit fully to the Law. In Lacanian 
terms, this foreclosure leads directly to psychosis. Lacan describes this “imaginary cataclysm” as 
follows: 
No longer can anything in the mortal relation…be held on lease. Then there is the 
separate deployment and bringing into play of the entire signifying apparatus—
dissociation, fragmentation, mobilization of the signifier as speech, ejaculatory 
speech that is insignificant or too significant, laden with non-meaningfulness, the 
decomposition of internal discourse, which marks the entire structure of 
psychosis.533 
 
The importance of this denial is almost impossible to overstate, for the Wild Woman qua 
psychotic is missing a fundamental element of psychical prohibition. Where Symbolic castration 
requires a relinquishment of jouissance, the psychotic subject refuses to let go. Without the 
Name-of-the-Father to anchor the subject’s Symbolic, his or her language cannot become tied to 
meaning and thus the structure of language is not acquired.534 Lacan describes this phenomenon 
as a “fault concerning the permanent discourse that supports the everyday, the miscellany, of 
human experience. Something detaches itself from the permanent monologue and appears as 
some kind of music for several voices.”535 Thus, Lacan describes the psychotic’s inability to 
create normal relationships between language and meaning as a sort of linguistic polyphony—a 
simile that has an obvious affinity with the monomaniac polyphony of Galás’s Wild Woman. 
It is important to note that, under normal circumstances, psychosis is a great affliction, 
and it is neither something to aspire to, nor something that one can choose. In the present 	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W.W. Norton, 1997), 321. 
 
534 Fink, 1995, 94. 
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context, the concept of psychosis functions as a metaphor for a radical mode of expression that 
exists by transgressing the boundaries of the Symbolic. In this sense, I am taking some 
expressive license to create a novel interpretation. However, when Cixous speaks about the 
phallocratic transcendence of écriture féminine or Kristeva describes the function of the semiotic 
in artistic expression, they are essentially describing a mode of expression that is not completely 
beholden to the Symbolic. Cixous writes, “you only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see 
her. And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful and she’s laughing.”536 Just as the Medusa is 
considered a dangerous and deadly force within patriarchal society, perhaps we could 
figuratively describe the psychotic’s discourse with all of its inherent language “disturbances” 
and irregularities as being similarly misunderstood expressions of otherness. From a place in the 
Symbolic where the phallic function limits language and jouissance, a psychotic hole in the 
Symbolic and its inherent aberrations may seem terrifying and awful, but perhaps it is merely an 
opportunity to construct a new discourse infused with extra-Symbolic feminine jouissance. 
Fink describes the psychotic as “prone to immediate action, and plagued by little if any 
guilt after putting someone in the hospital [or] killing someone…”537 and indeed, at 03:10, Galás 
begins a new declamation, “I have been looking for a killer, and I’m not talkin’ about 
meatballs—I am talkin’ about steak.” Now we begin to see something of the “bloodless and 
unmerciful brain surgery” mentioned in the program note. This line is delivered in a forceful, 
masculine manner—the Wild Woman is becoming dominant as she becomes renegade, 
unencumbered by the phallic function. She can use the codes of masculinity in her speech 
because she has transcended them; the masculine oppressors have become like steak—hunks of 
flesh, powerless—ready to be cut with her steak knife in a Bacchic frenzy. The word “steak” is 	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immediately repeated and morphs back into the style of glossolalia that we heard in the opening 
seconds of the work—a sort of maniacal, pathological jouissance, gleeful and crazed. 
03:44 marks the beginning of a bel canto section, where Galás’s soaring, wailing lines are 
punctuated by outbursts of guttural sounds. The coherence of the bel canto line is continually 
broken by a barking sound, as if the semiotic impulses cannot be silenced by a more tamed, 
conventional use of the voice. At 04:47, this gives way to a rapid-fire array of voiceless sibilants 
that become punctuated with voiced sibilants. Finally, at 05:25, Galás unleashes a series of 
lengthy blood-curdling, multiphonic screams to transition us into the most complete statement by 
the Wild Woman, thus marking the beginning of section three. 
By this point, the Wild Woman has entered in a psychotic, Dionysian state where her 
expression has been overtaken by feminine jouissance. She has entered language, but not the 
language of the Symbolic; she speaks in the language that Lacanian theory can only call 
psychotic, dissociative, fragmentary, ejaculatory; she has begun to construct her own her 
discourse—her écriture féminine. Figuratively speaking, she has used her steak knife to castrate 
the Lacanian phallus, insofar as it tries and fails to shape her into an obedient subject. 
5.3.2 Section Three 
This section contains the entirety of the written text discussed in section 5.1 and at this 
time, we will revisit it to examine how the music enhances the text. Leading into the text is a 
section between 05:45 and 06:10 where Galás once again returns to language, but in a sort of 
antiphony between a dominant voice and a subordinate voice. We can understand this antiphony 
as an exchange between the empowered Wild Woman (the dominant voice) and the submissive 
woman (the subordinate voice). The exchange follows: 
Erection to terror 
[is it, was it] 
erection to nightmares 
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[is it, was it, (unintelligible)..., was it, is it] 
to 
[is it, was it...] 
really 
[is it, ever...] 
I has 
[ever, ever, ever...] 
that can never 
[is it, was it...] 
understand but lead (scream)... 
to the death of mere (mere, mere, mere...) savagery 
and the birth (and the) [unintelligible] ... terror 
 
This leads directly into the penultimate line of the first stanza (the first five lines are never 
articulated outside of the written text): “to the death of mere savagery….” The word “lead” is 
implied, but Galás only pronounces the first portion of the word before rocketing into her highest 
register. In these last two lines, the text is rendered in at least two different voices—two distinct 
personalities. 
 During the vocalization of the text, Galás uses an array of voices, moving between them 
effortlessly in a dazzling display of vocal virtuosity and subjective schizophrenia. There are at 
least four different voices: a forceful, declamatory voice; a high, shrill, quavering voice; a 
smooth, feminine voice; and a low, demonic, and masculine voice. Mapping the occurrences of 
these voices onto their respective words does not yield a pattern or formula and since they are 
not notated in the score, it seems that Galás uses them in an improvisatory style during each 
performance. What we can take away from this section is the psychosis evident in the Wild 
Woman’s expression. The “music for several voices” that Lacan mentions in his description of 
the psychotic’s discourse appears now as the Wild Woman’s discourse becomes complex and 
polyvocal—she speaks in multiple registers of meaning and signification. The final line is 
particularly evocative: “extol and redeem disease.” The words “extol and redeem” are rendered 
seductively, while the word “disease” is whispered as a sorceress intoning the final word of a 
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curse. The end of the word “disease” morphs into a maniacal, non-voiced laugh, and thus marks 
the beginning of section four.  
5.3.3 Section Four and Coda 
By section four, the maenadic Wild Woman has pledged her allegiance to death (or to the 
resistance of the phallic function) and issued a malediction against the oppressors of femininity. 
Now she can explore her voice and begin to develop her écriture féminine, or as Cixous might 
say, she can “come to writing.” I believe this section is best read as the process by which the 
Wild Woman explores the edge of her expressive abilities: we have a non-voiced exploration of 
different formants (07:39), high-pitched multiphonics of varying pitch combinations (07:57), bel 
canto singing with microtonal pitch variations (09:17), as well as middle-register glossolalia 
(10:09). Seremetakis shows that heavy, rapid breathing sounds, much like we hear at 07:39, are 
used in Maniat lament as corporeal signifiers of death—of bodily disruption—as they bear an 
indexical acoustic resemblance to death throes;538 thus, it is quite possible that Galás is playing 
on this signification in her non-voiced passages. 
 Finally, we arrive at the coda—a malediction that demonstrates that the Wild Woman has 
come into her own. The glossolaliac utterances now blend seamlessly with her regular speech, 
suggesting that a reconciliation of the split subject has indeed occurred; she moves in and out of 
recognizable language not with the antiphonal effects of section two, but now in one voice—a 
unification of her subjectivity: 
...(unintelligible)... 
She was hanging on the... 
(unintelligible) 
with the rats at her feet 
and I asked you, ‘Well? Well? Well? Well?’ 
and I asked you, ‘Well? Well?’ 
and I asked you, (unintelligible)... 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 Seremetakis, 1991, 117. 
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What would you do? 
 Would you...(unintelligible)... 
 Would you...(unintelligible)... 
 
Galás’s voice grows more distorted and more horrific throughout this last portion before she 
arrives, gasping, screaming, clawing at the words, “ARE. THERE. ANY. ANGELS. IN – THE – 
HOUSE. TONIGHT?!” 
5.4 Concluding Remarks on Wild Women 
To summarize my reading of Wild Women with Steak Knives, I would like to return to the 
progression of events as I see them: We begin with the subject, the Wild Woman, who is in a 
pre-Symbolic, chora state. She begins to discover and experiment with language, and she reaches 
a point where she must speak the Name-of-the-Father, surrender her jouissance, and undergo 
Symbolic castration if she wishes to become a fully fledged speaking subject structured by 
language; however, she refuses to speak the Name-of-the-Father and experiences foreclosure, 
thereby creating a tear in the Symbolic and becoming psychotic. From this opening, she is 
flooded with feminine jouissance and semiotic impulses that constitute the subversive power of 
her écriture féminine. She is now able to explore her feminine voice—that voice that has been 
alien to her, that voice that is powerfully transgressive, that voice denied by the phallic function. 
Finally, she reconciles her conscious with her unconscious and ventures off into a new territory 
of écriture féminine. 
As mentioned above, Galás does not consider herself to be a “feminist” artist (in general), 
but the title and text do situate Wild Women within a feminist context. Even the central thesis of 
her oeuvre is not exclusively concerned with feminist topics, Wild Women explicitly seems to be 
an exhortation of feminine creativity and power. Considering the violence and aggression of the 
work, one might ask whether this display of apparent psychosis qua feminine jouissance is the 
only available option to a woman in a subordinate power position. I do not think this is the case. 
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The occasional violent metaphor notwithstanding, Cixous’s work can be read broadly as 
attempting to do something similar—to create a space for feminine expression that exceeds the 
Symbolic. I believe it is more accurate, in this case, to attribute the brutal, ferocity of Wild 
Women to Galás herself. There is a confrontational, transgressive spirit that runs throughout her 
oeuvre, as well as a strong juridical drive irrespective of the topic of a given work. Whether she 
is calling justice for the Armenian genocide or critiquing the Catholic Church’s handling of the 
AIDS epidemic, Galás is a fighter who pulls no punches. 
It seems to be a question of emphasis. For example, there are plenty of damning critiques 
one could level at the sex industry, and yet feminists like Annie Sprinkle and Camille Paglia 
choose to approach feminine sexuality and even pornography with gleeful irreverence.539 
Similarly, Galás could chose to celebrate the work of female artists, or the indomitable spirit of 
the Armenian people, or the perseverance and humanity of AIDS victims, but she chooses 
instead to document, lament, and avenge the victims of the atrocities that she represents, and she 
is empowered by ponos. Just as the Maniat lamentation practice involves the use of semi-
aestheticized pain to create a transcendent discourse, Galás too taps into this wellspring of 
emotional power to create cultural truth claims. Even though the gravity of her subject matter 
virtually demands solemn treatment, her Greek roots are perhaps more important than anything 
in her drive toward witnessing, judgment, and vengeance. Thus, it is misguided to place too 
much emphasis on the ostensible battle between the sexes in the particular case of Wild Women. 
Galás’s natural state is one of confrontation, but this is not something necessarily intrinsic to the 
feminist plight in general, especially in the latter part of the twentieth century. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 Annie Sprinkle, Post-Porn Modernist: My 25 Years as a Multimedia Whore, (Berkeley: Cleis Press, 
1998); Camille Paglia, Sex, Art and American Culture: Essays (New York: Vintage, 1992). 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In Wild Women with Steak Knives, Diamanda Galás engages in a radical discourse of 
femininity that is also about a radical discourse of femininity. Like many works of radical music, 
her mode of expression is extremely unconventional, but unlike certain other radical works, there 
are also linguistic utterances. The rarity of vocal sounds within Wild Women that constitute 
comprehensible lingual expressions is belied by the importance one might place upon them, 
especially insofar as they are the only concrete elements to grasp in this otherwise abstract and 
alien work. I believe that in the interest of constructing the fullest, most rigorous thick 
interpretation possible, it is necessary to reflect not only on the words, but also on their 
relationship to the non-texted vocal sounds that constitute the bulk of the work. To this end, I 
have called upon Lacanian theory, as well as the traditions of Maniat lamentation to aid my 
interpretation because both help to explain the import of vocal expressions that exceed language. 
I have also called upon Lacan thematically because his concept of sexuation provides a way of 
understanding how Cixous and Kristeva can argue for a Symbolically transcendent mode of 
feminine discourse. Through these means, I conclude that Wild Women is a statement of 
feminine creative power and a musical realization of feminine jouissance. In Wild Women, Galás 
exemplifies the very Symbolic transcendence that she advocates in the work itself. 
Ultimately, Galás has constructed and uses an écriture féminine to speak the unspeakable, 
to say what men cannot say; to paraphrase Cixous, “her body knows unheard-of songs.” She 
answers Cixous’s call for women to write themselves, to write their bodies, to write their souls; 
and in doing so she creates a radical, subversive message to the dominant masculine discourse: 
she intends to blow up the law, right now, with music. 
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Chapter 5 – Merzbow: The Jouissance of Expressive Noise 
1.0 Introduction 
 In many ways, Merzbow (b. Masami Akita) is the ne plus ultra of radical music. His 
work eschews melody, harmony, rhythm, discernible form, and virtually other definable musical 
trait with the exception of timbre (or the presence of a sound at all) and musical intent. For 
decades, his work has been easily defined as “noise music” without much thought as to what 
those two terms mean either in isolation or in conjunction. Furthermore, his work has been 
viewed as an exercise in the experience of pure sound—depthless presence of changing timbres 
with no meaning beyond the sounds themselves. Simply put, Merzbow’s music has been difficult 
to speak about and interpret because so many of our analytical tools require some semblance of 
musical convention in order to function.  
 This is where my thick interpretation hermeneutic is crucially important in breaking 
through existing hermeneutic blockages. Merzbow’s web of influences are very diverse, from the 
philosophy of George Bataille to Viennese Actionism to sadomasochistic pornography, and by 
reading his work through these influences, we can gain a better understanding not only of the 
thematic content of his work, but also of the way that the aural actuality of the work supports 
these extra-sonic concepts. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss Masami Akita and his work as Merzbow, taking care to 
examine his musical and artistic background and the role of his Japanese ethnicity in his work. 
After discussing Akita’s place within the broader discourse of so-called “noise music” and 
exploring what this over-used and under-defined genre label might mean, I will explore Akita’s 
compositional and sonic style, as well as his concepts of noise and music. Here, I will situate 
Akita as a radical composer using an especially potent form of expressive noise. Through an 
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analysis of his interest in certain strains of transgressive art and philosophy, I will show how 
these influences can serve our hermeneutic ends and reveal meaning hidden within the 
cacophony that is Merzbow. Finally, I will examine three works from various points in his 
career, showung how the use of a thick description hermeneutic can unveil layers of meaning 
within a sonic practice that appears impenetrable. 
Discourse on Merzbow tends to occupy three positions: first, there are those who spend 
most of the time discussing the fact that it is impossible to discuss Merzbow’s work; second, 
there are studies that are content to talk around Merzbow, describing aspects of the cultural 
formation of noise music without actually saying much about the aural actuality of his work; and 
third, there are phenomenological descriptions of the work that set aside any possibility of 
meaning within the music or greater cultural issues. In this study, I hope to present a new way 
forward that will allow scholars to speak substantively about Merzbow and his philosophy of 
noise and music without talking around the music and without denying the possibility of greater 
meaning within the work. 
2.0 Masami Akita 
Masami Akita (b. 1953) has been performing under the name Merzbow since 1979, and 
in that time, he has created a massive oeuvre exploring an expressive sonic art at the absolute 
fringes of general musical practice. With more than 320 solo releases and another couple 
hundred collaborative, split, and compilation releases, he is the most visible figure in the noise 
music genre, and he has influenced countless other composers and bands. As the de facto father 
of “noise music,” Merzbow’s reputation is remarkably expansive, especially considering the 
intentional obscurity of the noise milieu. Thanks to his lengthy list of collaborations, he has 
found a diverse audience, which is even rarer for a composer working on such a radical project.  
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Akita’s formative teen years began in the late sixties, and he points to classic British and 
American rock as his earliest sources of inspiration; however, he gravitated toward the stranger 
albums such as the Rolling Stones’s Their Satanic Majesties’ Request, George Harrison’s 
Wonderwall, and John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s Unfinished Music No. 1—Two Virgins. From 
there, Akita recalls switching to progressive rock while playing drums in bands covering tunes 
by Frank Zappa, King Crimson, and Captain Beefheart. Subsequent high school bands became 
freer and freer, eventually moving to totally improvised rock music. After high school Akita 
studied painting and graduated from Tamagawa University with a degree in fine arts. It was there 
that he discovered many of the interests that would directly inform his work as Merzbow 
including Dadaism, Surrealism, Viennese Actionism, aesthetic theory, and postmodern 
philosophy.540 
 Akita first recorded as Merzbow in 1979, releasing improvised music on cassette tape 
along with collage art made with a Xerox machine. By the early 1980s, punk rock from the West 
arrived in Japan and influenced an entire generation of Japanese musicians. Akita recalls,  
When punk rock happened, we moved away from the usual rock improvisation 
and became more pure and conceptual under the influence of free music like 
Derek Bailey and Han Bennink. In the early 80s, cassette media seemed very new 
and revolutionary. I thought I should have my own independent media so I could 
make everything with no censorship, interference or the interpretation of others.541 
 
From here, Merzbow’s first label, Lowest Music & Arts, was born, adopting certain elements of 
punk ideology along the way, albeit without the guitars. Significantly, the vast majority of 
Akita’s cited influences are Western. In various interviews, the names he returns to again and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 Brett Woodward, Merzbook: The Pleasuredome of Noise (Melbourne: Extreme Records, 1999), 10-11. 
 
541 Ibid, 10. 
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again—Zappa, King Crimson, Albert Ayler, Pierre Henry, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Iannis 
Xenakis—are American and European.542 
This brings us to the role of Merzbow’s Japanese heritage in his music. He has said, “I 
don’t think my music is related to any tradition of music in Japan…It is much more related to 
Western influences.”543 Merzbow is not alone here. Monia De Lauretis conducted a series of 
interviews with members of the Japanese independent music scene in the 1990s, beginning with 
the question of American and European influences. Of the 15 individuals who responded, each 
attested to the formative importance of Western music, referring most frequently to popular and 
progressive rock from the 1970s and avant-garde jazz from the 1960s and 1970s.544 Experimental 
multi-instrumentalist Haco545 states, 
When it comes to music, Japan is full of information about American and 
European music, so of course, it is a big influence. Bigger cities like Tokyo and 
Osaka are the most sensitive and quick to catch on to anything that is new and 
fashionable in the rest of the world. You could even say it is a kind of sickness we 
suffer from.546 
 
Later in the same collection of interviews, De Lauretis asks musicians to locate any sense of 
absolute diversity from the Western tradition that they see in Japanese music. Dan Oshima 
responds: “I think that Japanese indie music is based on an absolutely absurd spirit. I mean it’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542 Akita quoted in Chad Hensley, “The Beauty of Noise: An Interview with Masami Akita of Merzbow,” 
Esoterra.org, accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.esoterra.org/merzbow.htm. 
 
543 Hans Ulrich Obrist and Ute Meta Bauer, “Interview with Akita Masami (Merzbow),” trans. Akiko 
Miyake, accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9908/msg00083.html. 
 
544 Monia De Lauretis, “About Myths, Common Places and Other (Japanese) Oddities,” in Japanese 
Independent Music, ed. Franck Stofer (Talence Cedex: Sonore, 2001) 46-9. 
 
545 Biographical information on Haco in English is scarce save for Japanese Independent Music, ed. Franck 
Stofer (Talence Cedex: Sonore, 2001) 135-6. 
 
546 Ibid, 46. 
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built on nothing, it contains no culture. In Europe, music is based on history, a very long one.”547 
If the musicians interviewed saw any distinction at all between their music and Western music, it 
tended to be a variation on this “absolutely absurd spirit.” Most of the musicians convey the idea 
that their culture is a melting pot where Western culture is mixed together and loses its 
referentiality, thereby making the Japanese result devoid of meaning. David Novak’s recent 
ethnography of Japanese noise music affirms this same musical lineage, as noise practitioners 
continue to cite Western progressive rock and punk rock as important influences.548 Akita 
himself states that the important distinction between Western noise music from bands like 
Throbbing Gristle or Whitehouse and Japanese noise music is that the Western bands have a 
thoroughgoing sociopolitical message while Japanese noise is intrinsically meaningless.549 
Naturally, I find this position to be somewhat disingenuous and completely unacceptable for 
reasons that will become apparent. After all, it is aparant that Merzbow does in fact attribute 
different types of meaning to his expressive noise, even if the meaning is extremely abstract and 
conceptual. This idea of non-referential sound does, however, align these Japanese composers 
with the majority of experimental composers/sound artists in the West who subscribe to the 
fantasy of acousmology.  
Beyond this, we find that Merzbow’s Western influences were not limited to music and if 
we look to his many books, we find an emphasis on Western culture. Noizu wō: Noizu myūjikku 
to sono tenkai (Noise War: Noise Music and Its Development) examines industrial, noise, and 
power electronics bands from the late 1970s to mid 1980s, including Throbbing Gristle, SPK, 
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548 David Novak, Japanoise: Music at the Edge of Circulation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 2-3. 
 
549 Masami Akita, Noizu wō: Noizu myūjikku to sono tenkai [translated title: Noise War: Noise Music and 
Its Development; English title: Noise War Noise 10 Years], trans. Aki Otake (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 1992), 221-224. 
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and Whitehouse; Sukkusu shinboru no tanjō (Birth of the Sex Symbol) traces the development of 
the sex symbol from Jane Russell and Jane Mansfield to burlesque shows, beach movies of the 
1950s, and fetishistic and sadomasochistic magazines of the 1960s, all centered in the United 
States;550 Sutorenji nūdo karuto: Fushigi no ratai tengoku (Nūdo wārudo vol. 2) (Strange Nude 
Cult: Mystery of Nude Paradise (Nude World Vol. 2)) examines the profusion of nudist 
magazines from 1950-70 that were popular in the United States because their ostensibly edifying 
study of lifestyle and culture allowed publishers to skirt anti-obscenity laws;551 and Tōsaku no 
anaguramu: Shūenteki porunogurafi no gekijō (Anagram of Perversion: Theatre of Fringe 
Pornography) is a collection of articles on Western pornography and “[catalogues] fetish items as 
signifiers of capitalistic production-reproduction.”552 As one can see, Merzbow displays a 
documentarian fascination with aberrant threads of Western culture. 
 How then might we come to terms with an artist such as Merzbow who exhibits such 
cultural hybridity? Nicolas Bourriaud argues that the postmodern obsession with 
multiculturalism has led to a dead end for aesthetic criticism. In an effort to avoid imposing the 
cultural values of a dominant nation onto the work of an Other, we end up defining and 
delimiting the space from which this Other can speak.553 For example, in place of a nuanced 
understanding of Merzbow, the line of critical questioning is shackled to a sense of ethnic place: 
how does Merzbow perform Japaneseness through his music? Perfunctory multiculturalism ends 	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up exposing its facile attempts at political correctness once we realize that it only reinforces 
otherness; it accepts the Other—true—but it only accepts the Other qua Other. Looking to the 
post-postmodern future, Bourriaud proposes a new approach suitable for the twenty-first-century 
artist who is a product of inevitable cosmopolitanism. He proposes the term altermodernity 
which he describes as “a construction plan that would allow new intercultural connections, the 
construction of a space of negotiation going beyond postmodern multiculturalism, which is 
attached to the origin of discourses and forms rather than to their dynamics. It is a matter of 
replacing the question of origin with that of destination.”554 He describes the altermodern work 
as an “emulsion: the social and cultural liquid is stirred up by movement, producing an alloy that 
combines, without dissolving them, the separate ingredients that enter into its composition.”555 
To read Merzbow as an essentially Japanese composer is a mistake and a survey of his artistic 
interests and obsessions will make this clear. Despite the fact that Bourriaud theorizes the 
altermodern in the twenty-first-century, I find it to be a useful concept for cultural polyglots such 
as Merzbow, and in section 3.5, I will make a case for applying the concept retroactively. 
2.1 Noise Music and Sound Art as Genre 
 Before continuing on with Merzbow’s music, let us take a moment to understand the 
fraught concepts of “noise music” and “sound art” as genre labels and attempt to understand to 
understand how the practitioners define their work in relation to the concept of noise, music, and 
art. Although I have developed the concept that I call expressive noise in chapter two to account 
for the paradoxical relationship of various conceptions of noise to music, Merzbow’s recordings 
also exist within this discursive formation known as “noise music.” I describe it as a discursive 
formation because if noise music is in fact a genre, it is quite amorphous (although perhaps not 	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as amorphous as some would claim). When speaking about, say, rock music, there are many 
variations (e.g. rock and roll, hard rock, psychedelic rock, progressive rock, indie rock), but there 
are also a collection of fundamental traits such as instrumentation, song structures, themes of 
youthful rebellion, and a lineage that many of rock music’s practitioners acknowledge. Novak’s 
ethnography shows how virtually everyone involved in the noise scene tends to either feel deeply 
ambivalent about the term “noise,” or reject it completely.556 Throughout the book, Novak shares 
the wide range of explanations on just what noise, or noise music, might be with answers ranging 
from very personal definitions of the term to total rejections of the term, and anything in 
between.  
 In an interview that Novak conducted with Jojo Hiroshige of the legendary band 
Hijokaidan, Hiroshige had this to say on the topic of noise: 
Noise is not just serious, not just a joke, not just shocking—it includes many 
things…but almost no one can know and understand Noise. That’s a very good 
and important thing. Because—there’s hardly anything we don’t know any more, 
is there? But there are still mysterious things, right? Noise is like a ghost, like a 
ghost story. We know this, too, that there are still some mysterious, but 
unmistakable, things; Noise must be this kind of mysterious thing.557 
 
This nicely encapsulates the paradoxical nature of noise; it is a powerful phenomenon, and we 
may experience and even create it, but it exists at the fringe of concepts of music and structure, 
intent and order, the knowable and the unknowable. For every comment like this, however, there 
are plenty more that dismiss the idea of the existence of a noise music entirely, or at least allege 
that if a scene had existed, then it is surely dead now. Of this latter position, Masonna’s 
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comments are typical: “Noise isn’t a kind of music. Masonna is just me doing my thing. I don’t 
even listen to other stuff called noise.”558 
 And yet, the term persists. When music journalists casually use the term, we know what 
they mean, just as when we flip through the records in the “noise” bin, we have an idea of what 
we will find. Noise music is a very poorly defined category, but it has also solidified into a genre 
that allows listeners to form expectations about instrumentation (often guitar effects pedals and a 
mixer), sonics (feedback and distortion), and performance practice (short, incredibly loud 
concerts, often with manic performances). In some ways, noise music is amorphous by virtue of 
its thoroughgoing anti-structural sentiments, but in other ways, this also serves to unify the 
composers and listeners. In creating the concept of expressive noise, my intent is not to generate 
a new term to describe what it is that Merzbow, or Masonna, or Emil Beaulieau does as a 
musical practice. My hope is that it explains the relation of their aural expression to the category 
of music and that it also explains the transgressive power inherent in this type of aural expression 
and relation to conventional conceptions of art. The present discussion of noise as a genre is 
simply to frame the musical category of which Merzbow is the ostensible king. 
In my hermeneutic study of Merzbow, I consider him as a radical composer, which 
carries an implicit connection to so-called “art music,” whereas writers such as Novak and Paul 
Hegarty explicitly examine composers like Merzbow in line with popular music. I am not 
convinced that the genealogy that the music historian creates is critically important in this case, 
as each approach highlights different facets of the composer and work. In the specific case of 
Merzbow, I find his intellectualism and his connection to modernist movements in art and music 
to be more compelling than the influence of the progressive rock records that he enjoyed as a 
teenager. If I was examining a wide range of composers, as Novak does, I could understand the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Ibid., 118. 
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merit of approaching the work as popular music since other noise artists like Hijokaidan have a 
stronger connection to extreme forms of popular music. 
The term “sound art” is sometimes thrown around when discussing creative individuals 
who work in the medium of sound, but do not create expressive sonic work that shares much 
with the conventions of music. Often, these individuals refer to themselves as “artists” rather 
than “composers” and trace their artistic lineage through modernist movements of the twentieth-
century rather than through the European art music tradition. The term sound art is a point of 
contention itself, and without commenting on the issue of whether “music” is a term for any 
expressive sonic act, or if it should remain tied to the conventions as established by the European 
art music tradition, I will offer the following: Merzbow’s music does flout the conventions of 
Western art music in general, and he does borrow a number of aesthetic principles from non-
musical modernist movements; however, he also cites numerous musical influences and even 
refers to his work using the word “music.” Most of all, his work is robbed of its transgressive 
power if we define it in terms of essential difference. Following Merzbow’s metaphor, noise can 
only be nomadic if it exists within the structural field of music. His work exists at the fringe of 
music and points toward a place where the conceptual core of music collapses; it behaves 
radically cutting across structural lines as it refuses conventional understanding and definition. If 
Merzbow’s work is simply sound art, then it becomes simplified and nullified.  
 Even if I consider Merzbow as a radical composer and describe his work as expressive 
noise, the journalistic label of “noise music” remains important inasmuch as Merzbow is 
considered to be its leading practitioner, at least by his Western audience. Despite the 
problematics of the label, it has served composers like Merzbow in creating the perception of a 
movement (even if the movement does not exist, as such) and the perception of an aesthetic 
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(even if the aesthetic goals of the practitioners is very different), all of which has helped to create 
the niche market for extreme forms of aberrant music that allowed composers like Merzbow to 
release loads of recordings and perform live concerts around the world. The label is both a 
journalistic convenience and a marketing tool, but it remains in use and must be reevaluated in 
the context of this study if it is to have productive use. I am not convinced that the term sound art 
has the same practical benefits, insofar as its function appears mainly to benefit either scholars 
who want to claim Merzbow for their discursive construction or critics who casually see the term 
as being a more dignified label than “noise music.” It is not clear what is gained by describing 
Merzbow’s sonic practice in terms that contradict his own descriptions of his work. In section 
2.3, I will examine Merzbow’s very idiosyncratic conception of noise, which will lead us on an 
exploration of his chief influences. Before that, however, it is important to get a sense of 
Merzbow’s sound and compositional style. 
2.2 Merzbow’s Sound and Style 
The typical Merzbow album begins with a blast of sonic energy that continues, usually 
unabated, through the duration of the track, if not the entire CD. The first thing that one notices 
is the loudness. Digital CD mastering techniques have allowed the average loudness of a 
recording to rise by at least 10 decibels between the 1990 and the 2000s through a combination 
of advanced compression and peak limiting, but in the early 1990s, Akita was already mastering 
his CDs to use as much of the Permitted Maximum Level (PML) as possible.559 Thus, even 
before the systematic expansion of audio mastering levels, Merzbow CDs were objectively 
louder as recordings; however, even after mainstream mastering levels have risen to match, his 
albums still sound subjectively louder (i.e., a Merzbow recording may not exceed a given decibel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559 The Permitted Maximum Level refers to the highest possible volume permitted in a given system before 
distortion is present. 
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range as compared to a conventional album, but one will nevertheless perceive it as sounding 
louder). A typical rock album might be mastered within a razor thin margin of the PML, but the 
sound is marked by many individual attacks—drum hits, guitar strums, vocal sibilants—and thus 
the sound is not a constant stream of maximum loudness. Merzbow’s work is different because 
he uses many sounds that, although not necessarily continuous in frequency, are continuous in 
amplitude. The result is a steady stream of acoustical energy similar to the effect of finding the 
loudest instant on a contemporary rock album and stretching it to the length of an entire track. 
The result is also one of subjective shock, for even the seasoned Merzbow listener continues to 
underestimate just how loud the music is compared to conventional recordings. Where one might 
become accustomed to the sound of feedback instead of guitars after a given period, the effect of 
the loudness continues to surprise much longer. In my own experience, having listened to 
Merzbow for more than ten years, I almost always instinctively reach for the volume control 
within the first second of a track because even though I know that my ears and speakers are not 
really at risk, the abundance of sonic energy exceeds my expectations again and again. 
After the opening loudness shock as been absorbed, one is lost amid a seemingly 
formless swarm of acoustical noise, distorted tones, and piercing feedback. All sense of musical 
time is absent, and the listener must struggle to move beyond ingrained musical expectations, for 
they will never be met. Even if one has prior experience with drone music or minimalist music 
and has come to terms with a non-teleological mode of listening, the aggressive sonic character 
of Merzbow’s work presents a whole new challenge. Where one might find Steve Reich’s 
Drumming or Alvin Lucier’s Music on a Long Thin Wire to be peaceful or meditative, Merzbow 
eschews the pulsing regularity of Reich’s work and the serenity of Lucier’s drone; the work is 
both disconcerting and aggressively alienating. A varying array of sounds assume the focus of a 
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given track, but insofar as a typical listener is not used to hearing music constructed mostly out 
of inharmonic sounds, any analogies one could create between these centrally focused sounds 
and the prominence of melody in conventional Western music is more intellectual than 
experiential. 
The quintessential Merzbow sound is a monolithic mass composed of a handful of sound 
sources. Most of the timbres are inharmonic and bristle with harsh distortion. The exception is 
the relatively pure tone of feedback that cuts through the cacophony, although its purity is no less 
grating. All of the sounds are strident, raucous, shrill; they are irritating and intentionally ugly by 
most culturally subjective standards. Where Western instruments are thought to be pleasing if 
they can mimic the human voice, Merzbow’s timbral pallet occupies the opposite pole. The 
overall effect is one of timbral unity, but from moment to moment, the sound is in a state of 
constant flux. The continuously shifting sounds hook the listener’s attention as Merzbow dazzles 
him or her with an incomprehensible sonic stream. 
A great deal of electronic music might be described as inhuman and mechanical both due 
to the particular timbres used—few of which bear a mimetic relationship to the voice or the 
acoustic instruments—and due to the structural precision of music. When a computer is 
involved, all musical events can be calculated and controlled with exceptional precision. 
Interestingly, Merzbow’s music contains traces of humanity thanks to the performance 
component of his work. Rather than constructing songs methodically using a MIDI controller 
and a digital audio workstation like Pro Tools, Merzbow performs long takes by hand without 
any sort of keyboard controller locking him into any artificial octaval division. This is noticeable 
in the way that pitches, filters, and amplitude levels shift in imperfect, non-linear motions. 
Conventional recording procedure involves a great deal of control over parameters like 
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amplitude changes, often using some sort of parametric curve so that the amplitude shift is steady 
and even without sudden motions or pauses. Merzbow manipulates these parameters by hand 
using equipment controlled by knobs.560 When a new sound emerges from silence, the shift in 
amplitude is only as steady as is possible when twisting a knob. The same goes for the central 
frequency of a bandpass filter or a sine wave generator. When changes occur, we can often 
discern Merzbow’s physical motions in creating the sound, which adds an interesting sort of 
humanity to his work that is ostensibly devoid of any humanity.  
On a few rare occasions there is a quiet moment where one might detect the faint sound 
of a short sample looping continuously. From here, Merzbow will gradually increase the 
amplitude of the sample past the point of distortion until it because unrecognizable as anything 
but acoustical noise. The track “Takemitsu” on Merzbow’s Amlux (2002) is a rare extended 
example of this technique where the amplitude of a looping sample is gradually increased until it 
becomes obliterated with distortion to the point of unrecognizability. Ostensibly, a large amount 
of Merzbow’s work involves the manipulation of samples, but it is rare that they function as 
anything other than noise sources, as they are distorted until they have no resemblance to their 
original sonic content. If anything, Merzbow uses these looping samples to add a sense of 
movement to sounds that would otherwise remain immobile.  
Merzbow’s music flows seamlessly from section to section, moment to moment, rarely 
landing to rest long enough for one to reflect on the trajectory of the work. The listener loses any 
sense of musical past or anticipation as everything collapses into a perpetual present; however, 
there is a sense of continuity, as if the current timbral configuration has grown out of the last. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 This performance style has changed somewhat since the 2000s when Akita adopted a laptop for 
Merzbow performances. This move to a computer-based setup has lessened part of the physical traces that I 
describe, but the way he uses the computer does not involve the same sort of rigid programming that one finds in 
lots of electronic dance music. 
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Even if one would be hard pressed to explain how the music has arrived at any given point, there 
is never a sense of discontinuity or segmentation. The combination of foreign sounds, loudness, 
and an apparent lack of any conventional musical grounding overwhelm the senses, making in-
the-moment reflection virtually impossible. 
In terms of the compositional logic that Merzbow employs, we typically find some sort of 
baseline sound against which other more active sounds occur. This may take the form of a 
looping sample, a synthesized ostinato figure, a drone, or simply a bed of crackling distortion. 
This baseline sound may occupy any register, but it tends to be either in the bass or in the 
midrange. Much like gamelan music, the lower sounds tend to move slower, while the higher 
sounds more increasingly quickly. Merzbow typically spends between one and five minutes on 
any given baseline sound before gradually phasing it out as the new baseline begins. 
Occasionally he will suddenly abandon a sonic configuration and move to something different, 
but it is far more common for Merzbow to slip imperceptibly between drones or ostinatos. 
This is often extremely difficult to hear because even though most of his music breaks 
down into low, middle, and high sounds, he tends to use multiple sound sources with a similar 
timbral makeup. Because we tend to perceive sounds made of filtered acoustical noise as similar, 
it is difficult to distinguish between them, and thus it is easy to become disoriented in the midst 
of a track. It is even more difficult to determine if any of the baseline sounds recur in a motivic 
fashion because Merzbow overwhelms the listener with so many varieties of inharmonic sounds 
that one loses track easily. In the course of my research, I diagrammed a number of tracks, 
putting time markers anywhere that the sonic makeup changed significantly. Other than noticing 
that Merzbow tends to move between sections within a span of five minutes or less, I did not find 
any patterns or discernible method as to how long a given section will play out. 
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Merzbow blurs the lines between composition and improvisation, which undoubtedly 
contributes to the fluidity of his work. As he puts it, “my pieces are not composed as ordinary 
music, but are rather like an abstract rendezvous of various sounds happening and/or 
prepared.”561 Merzbow typically experiments with the creation of various sounds from an array 
of sources (e.g., synthesizers, samplers, mixers, other electronic devices) until he finds the 
perfect mixture of timbres. Incidentally, when Merzbow plays live, there is actually a more 
structured plan in place than when he creates the music for his albums. When preparing for a live 
performance, Merzbow states, “I…prepare the structure, what to do with rhythms, etc. 
Improvisation plays a very, very small part in my solo shows.” 562  It appears that the 
compositional process is more somewhat intuitive, but with enough planning and structure to be 
repeatable in a live setting. 
2.3 Merzbow as Radical Composer 
 Returning to the question of Merzbow’s work as “noise music,” we find that the label has 
served him in a practical manner insofar as it created a label that could commodify what he did. 
The use of this label was artistically limiting, possibly inaccurate, and very beneficial in the way 
that it helped him disseminate his work and find a wide audience around the world. My framing 
of Merzbow as a radical composer does not supplant this label, and so long as we acknowledge 
the artificiality and unsanctioned use of the term “noise music,” as well as its conceptual 
limitations, it can continue to function as a convenience and a marketing tool. For our present 
purposes, the more clearly defined term “radical music,” will allow us to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of Merzbow as composer. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 “Fifteen Questions with Merzbow: Lost and Found,” accessed July 24, 2013, 
http://www.15questions.net/interview/fifteen-questions-merzbow/page-1/ 
 
562 Akita quoted in Joseph Burnett, “Razor Blades in the Dark: An Interview with Merzbow,” The Quietus, 
April 3rd, 2013, accessed July 10, 2013, http://thequietus.com/articles/11806-merzbow-interview	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 First, Merzbow’s music is inherently transgressive. It defies the basic criteria of virtually 
all Western music with its absence of melody, harmony, rhythm, and discernible form. At least 
on the surface, timbre is all that remains. Pierre Schaeffer constructed music out of sound that 
was not initially created with musical intent, and John Cage encouraged us to hear naturally 
occurring acoustical phenomena as music. Both transgressed musical boundaries at the time, but 
Merzbow’s musical transgressions are somewhat different. His sounds are not always naturally 
occurring, nor are they unintentionally musical. Rather, he very carefully creates the sound with 
explicit musical intent. Part of his work does involve the use of found sounds, but their sonic 
character is almost always obliterated after they are driven to extreme distortion. Unlike 
Schaeffer, who attempted to merely disguise the origin of the sounds and Cage who let the 
sounds be themselves, Merzbow intentionally crafts the sounds that will contribute to his music. 
Merzbow’s music is fundamentally transgressive because it categorically refuses any of the 
conventional features that constitute musical expression in both Japanese and Western music, 
except for artistic intent. 
 Second, Merzbow’s music is extreme in its many facets from its aesthetic deviance to its 
thematic content to its sheer loudness and intensity. As described above, the music is both 
objectively and subjectively louder than most conventional music due both to the recording 
techniques used and to the nature of acoustic phenomena like feedback and white noise. If 
listened to a proper volume level (i.e., painfully loud), the experience is one of extreme 
endurance and borderline masochism, but also excitement and vitality. The lack of conventional 
sounds and form only exacerbates this extreme experience of listening to Merzbow. 
 Third, there are important conceptual components to certain streams of Merzbow’s 
music. He has a longstanding interest in eroticism that influences the music on an abstract, 
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metaphorical level, as will be discussed in section 3.0. In 2002, Merzbow began a new phase of 
his career dedicating his work to animal rights and veganism. This has affected his work in a 
number of ways, the most obvious being explicitly textual with album titles such as 24 Hours – A 
Day of Seals, Merzbear, and Bloody Sea. The treatment of these animal themes varies, as 
Merzbear does not appear to have any political agenda, while Bloody Sea has the message, “Stop 
Whaling” in Japanese and English on its cover. The animal rights concept has also contributed to 
Merzbow’s work in a material fashion, as he creates works out of sampled animal sounds 
(although, again, the samples are unrecognizably distorted). 
 Fourth, Akita does not have conventional institutional affiliations. He has avoided 
standard commercial institutions and has instead taken on a punk-inspired do-it-yourself attitude 
that dates back to the establishment of his Lowest Music & Arts label.563 During that period, he 
was handling every component of his releases from the recording and duplication to the collage 
cover art made from old pornographic mailing advertisements and the distribution of his tapes. 
Since that time, Merzbow has released music on dozens of tiny, ephemeral, boutique labels 
catering to the so-called noise scene with very limited edition releases. He has even released two 
albums on John Zorn’s Tzadik label. The use of boutique record labels allows Merzbow a great 
deal of artistic freedom, both sonically and visually. These labels cannot offer any significant 
financial compensation, but they can offer uninhibited creative freedom. 
 Almost since the dawn of electronic music in the 1950s there have been academic 
institutions devoted to electronic music research and composition, and Japan is no exception.564 
The Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) studio was an active hub for electronic music exploration with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Woodward, 1999, 10-11. 
 
564 See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion of early electronic music studios. 
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an active roster of Western composer residencies including Karlheinz Stockhausen, Iannis 
Xenakis, and John Cage.565 Merzbow could have conceivably worked within this environment, 
but he chose to avoid the milieu of Japanese academically affiliated electronic music, possibly 
due to the fact that he seems to have come to music primarily through his rock, jazz, and punk 
influences.566 If his role models were musician/composers like Frank Zappa, it is plausible that 
an academic career path in music was never even a real consideration for Merzbow. 
 Fifth, Merzbow does not just emphasize the importance of timbre over intervallic 
relationships; he does away with intervals (and even specific pitches) entirely. Timbre is the 
defining feature of Merzbow’s work, but attributing the influences that led him to this style of 
music is difficult. One could point to the general prominence of timbre in traditional Japanese 
music prior to the adoption of Western instruments. The shakuhachi repertoire, for example, 
typically consists of simple melodies played with very finely nuanced timbral subtleties. In place 
of the complex pitch relationships of a Bach partita, the emphasis is on the skilled coloration of 
tones. There are two main problems with this view: first, traditional Japanese music and 
instruments were considered inferior in the wake of post-World War II Westernization where 
nationally recognized Japanese composers like Akio Yashiro studied in Europe and aligned 
themselves exclusively with the European canon; second, when Akita speaks of his formative 
years, he tends to emphasize American and British rock music. Moreover, he mentions 
composers such as Schaeffer, Stockhausen, and Xenakis as important influences, and insofar as 
the actual timbral makeup of their music is more similar to Merzbow’s sound than any traditional 
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Japanese instrument, it seems that, at very least, Merzbow’s valuation of timbre over interval is 
due both to Japanese and Western influences. 
 In a sense, the timbres that Merzbow uses constitute his musical voice. Just as one can 
instantly identify Tom Waits by his gravely voice or Bill Frisell by his plaintive guitar tone and 
phrasing, the way that Merzbow creates his distortion is one of his most important techniques—
his sonic signature. A jazz pianist might play “Straight, No Chaser”—a standard on a 
conventional instrument—but if the musician is a true artist, he or she contributes something in 
excess of the standardized particulars. In the case of Merzbow, I believe that this artistic essence 
is found in the way that he constructs acoustic phenomena and, to a lesser extent, how he 
combines these sounds in an expressive fashion. In fact, Novak shares an anecdote about a 
novice noise musician who copied Merzbow’s equipment setup and began performing with a 
counterfeit version of Merzbow’s sound. Astute observers, however, recognized both the 
physical architecture of Merzbow’s setup and the sonic architecture of his sound, and the novice 
was judged to be an inferior imitator.567 
 Sixth, the material objects of Merzbow’s work are always recordings instead of scores. 
As mentioned above, Merzbow’s compositional method involves collecting an array of sound 
sources and then performing a semi-structured improvisation with them that is recorded directly. 
Suffice it to say the original recording is the essence of the work. Even if Merzbow worked out a 
notational scheme for his music, the sound is crucially dependent upon signal processing 
methods and electronic instruments used on the recording, which, unlike a piano or guitar, is 
more of a proprietary configuration. One would need both the equipment (e.g., the synthesizer, 
the samples, the signal processing effects) and the schematic for how the equipment was used to 
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recreate even the correct sounds, to say nothing of how the sounds function in relation to one 
another. 
 Seventh, Merzbow’s music is intrinsically culturally hybridized. As we will see, his 
conception of music and art blends certain Japanese elements with a great deal of Western 
aesthetic theory, and one of his central themes—erotic transgression—is both Japanese and 
Western. Even the prominent role of timbre—a feature typically associated with Asian musics—
is at least as Western as it is Japanese. A fuller discussion will continue in below, especially in 
relation to cultural concepts of eroticism. 
 Eighth and finally, Merzbow sometimes uses extra-sonic means to amplify the content of 
his music. His album covers are one such example, and their focus changes over time. In the 
early phases of his career, the musical assemblages were reflected in the collage art that 
accompanied his limited release cassette tapes. A number of albums such as the “Pornoise” 
series and both volumes of Music for Bondage Performance use sexual and/or pornographic 
imagery to intensify the transgressive aspect of the music. Once his focus shifted toward animal 
rights, Merzbow began to use mostly animal imagery to convey his ethically grounded message, 
often featuring photography and paintings by his wife, Jenny Akita. In certain instances, 
Merzbow may not have been closely involved in the creation of his album covers, but in most 
cases, they are crucial components of the works. With respect to the animal rights albums, 
Merzbow occasionally includes slogans (e.g., “Don't send animals to war”)568 or short reports on 
the culturally accepted crimes against animals. For instance, in the liner notes to Minazo Vol. 1, 
Merzbow describes, in Japanese and English, the famous elephant seal of Japan’s Enoshima 
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Aquarium who lived to be only 11 years old instead of the average 20.569 He speculates that 
Minazo’s daily performances may have exhausted the seal and led to his early death. Akita also 
promotes the idea of a cruelty free life frequently in interviews and articles. Because of the 
abstract, un-texted nature of his music, these extra-sonic means become crucial pieces to the 
interpretive puzzle of his work. 
2.4 What is Noise to Merzbow? 
Akita’s explanations of noise vary from interview to interview, but it is not evident that 
there are any large-scale conceptual shifts over time with regard to the essence and purpose of 
noise; he merely creates different metaphors and explanations, different ways of conceptualizing 
something that resists conceptualization.  
My opinion of the term ‘noise’ has different aspects and meanings when I explain 
it in regards to the strategy of Merzbow—it’s a positive meaning. If I use it for 
society, it’s against the stupid music scene. Otherwise, of course, noise is just 
used in the context of information theory. […] People misunderstand that noise is 
something other than music.570 
 
In the above, we see Akita accepting the sundry concepts of noise explored in chapter two (e.g., 
acoustic, communicative, subjective), and he thereby agrees to a context-specific usage of the 
overburdened word. The important points are that a) “noise” is not a pejorative so long as the 
noise is subjectively accepted, b) it has a practical meaning in fields such as information theory 
and science, and c) that noise fits within the purview of music. The last point is notable because 
where many similar artists prefer to avoid the term “music” in favor of the less overdetermined 
“sound art,” Akita does not need to hide from the concept of music.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 Liner notes to Merzbow, Minazo Volume One, Important Records imprec097, 2006. 
570 Akita quoted in Woodward, 15. 
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 Elsewhere Akita has said, “the most crucial thing is to regard noise as the nomadic 
producer of difference.”571 Akita’s use of Deleuze’s concept of nomadicism requires a bit of 
explanation before we can understand how this idea of noise starts to bring the polyphonous 
conceptual strands together. In Deleuze, the politics of nomadicism deal with the difference 
between transcendent and immanent principles, which organize being in space. He creates a 
distinction between what he calls logos—space structured externally, divided and predetermined 
by an external, transcendent law—and nomos—space structured from within, constituting itself 
immanently in time, always in flux. In nomadic space, there are no transcendent governing 
principles, but “only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebulas or 
constellations.” 572  Hierarchies are present within nomadicism, but they are determined 
extrinsically unlike the predetermined principles of logos. Deleuze and Guattari compare the 
nomos/logos distinction with the “smooth” space of the Go board versus the “striated” space of 
the chess board;573 where the chess pieces carry an intrinsic hierarchy and move only according 
to prescribed patterns, the Go pieces have no prescribed pattern of movement or intrinsic 
hierarchy and thus exhibit a freedom of movement, a smoothing of space that does not recognize 
externally instituted boundaries. Thus, we have one of Akita’s two powerful metaphors for the 
function of noise in the field of musical expression. As a nomadic producer of differences, noise 
transgresses traditional structural boundaries of music such as genre or form. The nomadic 
behavior of noise creates a smooth space within the field of music, crossing boundaries and 
deterritorializing them justified by the internal logic of its gravitational center. This transgressive 
spirit is a fundamental trait in radical music, and indeed, any composers that we could arguably 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 Ibid., 39. 
572 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brain 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 353. 
 
573 Ibid, 352-3. 
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describe as “radical” share this drive to not only dismiss boundaries, but to actively work against 
them.  
3.0 Noise, Eroticism, and Transgression 
 Akita’s second major noise metaphor creates a connection between noise and eroticism, 
derived in large part from Georges Bataille’s philosophy. Eroticism is the connecting thread for 
many of the various obsessions that inform Merzbow’s music, including Kinbaku (Japanese rope 
bondage), pornography (both Japanese and American), Wilhlem Reich, Georges Bataille, Otto 
Mühl and the Vienna Actionists, Kurt Schwitters, Dadaism, and Surrealist art. Some background 
is necessary before we can fully appreciate the symbolic web created by these influences, and 
beginning with the philosophy of Bataille will help us to understand the importance of eroticism 
and transgression in the subsequent areas. 
There are two common themes in philosophy and social theory that seem particularly 
advantageous when discussing radical music: first is the idea of a beyond-of-structure—a space 
outside of common perception and structuration, the beyond, the unknown—because it speaks to 
the legendary ineffability of music, especially as encapsulated in the hackneyed (and cherished) 
saying, “music expresses the inexpressible;” and second is the related idea of transcendence from 
structure to freedom—the act of musical liberation from the mundane.  
Regarding the former, we find examples in the sublime of Kant and Schopenhauer, where 
we are confronted with the awe, terror, and enormous unknowability of the universe.574 Lyotard 
re-envisioned the sublime in a postmodern context, defining the sublime as a non-representable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 128; Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation, Vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), 205. 
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phenomenon that exceeds our ability to incorporate and understand it.575 In Bataille, we find a 
concept that he refers to first as the general economy—a way of explaining the ebb and flow of 
phenomena prior to a more rigid structuring system—and later as continuity—a connectedness 
with the whole of the universe from which we are alienated by life.576 For Lacan, the concept of 
the Real represents a beyond of signification—a place beyond the structure imposed on subjects 
through the acquisition and usage of language. Because art lives across the boundary of the 
Symbolic, Real, and Imaginary, issues of taboo and transgression are of keen interest, which 
brings us to the foremost proponent of transgression: Georges Bataille. There is, perhaps, no 
other theorist who placed such importance on exploring the boundaries of sociocultural order and 
propriety; it is absolutely central to Bataille’s destructive philosophy. 
3.1 Bataille 
 Let us begin by examining some of the affinities between Lacanian theory and Bataille’s 
philosophy. Much as the Lacanian subject is alienated by the Symbolic, Bataille’s subject is also 
defined by a lack. Existence is saturated by a transcendent negativity, which includes anything 
that is not self-contained or self-similar, and it serves to define the subject not by any qualities 
intrinsic to the subject, but by the existence of a negativity that is external to the subject. Bataille 
writes, “Me, I exist—suspended in a realized void—suspended from my own dread—different 
from all other being and such that the various events that can reach all other being and not me 
cruelly throw this me out of a total existence.”577 The subject is a product of the existence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994). 
 
576 Bataillian readings of Merzbow can be found in the following: Paul Hegarty, Noise/Music: A History 
(New York: Continuum, 2008), 153-167; Eugene Thacker, “Bataille/Body/Noise: Notes Towards a Techno-Erotics,” 
in Merzbook: The Pleasuredome of Noise (Melbourne: Extreme, 1999), 57-65. 
 
577 The translator notes that Moi, which he translates as “me,” should carry the psychoanalytic implication 
of ego, or subjectivity. Georges Bataille, “Sacrifices,” in Visions of Excess (1985), 130. 
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something that is not the subject. In life, the subject exists in a state that Bataille calls 
discontinuity—essential difference from other subjects—and in death, the subject re-enters a 
state of undifferentiated being that Bataille calls continuity.578 We could easily refer to the 
Lacanian subject, separated from primordial jouissance, as a discontinuous subject who longs to 
reclaim this lost jouissance through continuity. 
 We have a discontinuous subject divided between what Bataille calls the “general 
economy” and the “restricted economy,”579 a division which functions much in the way that 
Lacan’s subject exists in the Symbolic, but finds traces of the Real. The general economy 
encompasses the aforementioned negativity while the restricted economy exists within the 
general economy and imposes structure, regulation, normativity, and individuality. The general 
economy corresponds closely with continuity, while the restricted economy corresponds to 
discontinuity.580 This divide is similar to the Symbolic with two important differences: the lack 
of the Imaginary and the presence of multiple restricted economies. Because there is no 
Imaginary register, the Bataillian subject is fully cognizant of his or her command of language—
at least in theory—because there is no unconscious force obscuring meaning or slipping in 
unintentional meaning through linguistic figuration. Lacan would consider Batialle to be under 
the delusion of the Ego, but the Bataillian subject is not really the master of his or her domain. 
The subject remains unaware of the general economy and the realm of continuity and can only 
sense them indirectly through certain modes of being achievable most effectively through erotic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
578 Georges Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 1986), 12-25. 
 
579 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: Volume 1: An Essay on General Economy, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York: Zone Books, 1989), 27-44. 
 
580 The terminology is somewhat confusing because Bataille created multiple conceptual clusters over the 
course of his career, often with considerable, but not exact, overlap. The nuances between continuity/general 
economy and discontinuity/restricted economy will become clear as I proceed. For now we may conceive of the two 
pairs as exhibiting a binary relationship and leave it at that. 
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and excessive activity, much like the Real. Although the restricted economy serves to delimit 
possibility through systematization, it is not a monolithic singularity in the way that there is only 
one Symbolic. Rather, there are a series of restricted economies, each fulfilling different 
structural functions, and in this sense, they behave like a Foucauldian discourse. Because Bataille 
is more interested in the division between general and restricted economies than the functioning 
of these discursive formations, he typically refers to the restricted economy in the singular letting 
it stand for the multiple instantiations it might present. 
 Where the restricted economy is a homogenous entity rejecting anything that interrupts 
its ability to function according to the rules and regulation that define it, Bataille describes the 
general economy according to the principles of heterology. Heterology encompasses that which 
the homogenous world must reject—e.g., eroticism, violence, drunkenness, excrement—because 
it suggests a loss of control and the inevitability of death,581 and in this way, it is an almost 
perfect analogue to Kristeva’s concept of abjection. Truth and knowledge—both myths of the 
restricted economy that serve to inhibit and control—have no place in the irrational general 
economy, a realm of vast continuity of being where the individual ceases to have meaning 
independent from the heterogeneous collective. During life, a subject is in a state of discontinuity 
insofar as he or she is fundamentally separate from other living beings; however, the subject 
reenters a state of continuity in death. In this way, Bataille’s idea of discontinuous beings 
searching for lost continuity shares much with the subject’s desire to regain the jouissance 
surrendered upon entering the Symbolic. 
 We arrive now at a critical difference between Lacan and Bataille: Lacan’s ultimate goal 
is to help subjects exist harmoniously within a world governed by the Signifier (the Signifier 
being a symbol of the ultimate structuring power of language), while Bataille’s ultimate goal is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Georges Bataille, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” in Visions of Excess (1986), 140-141. 
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the exactly opposite; he theorizes a system of being and then spends most of his energy on the 
importance of transgressing these very boundaries. This desire to transgress upon a structuring 
system is precisely why Bataille is an excellent choice to pair with Lacan when examining the 
interaction of radical music and expressive noise with conventional modes of musical 
expression. Let us turn to Bataille’s robust theory of transgression to see how it might benefit the 
exegetical task at hand. 
3.1.1 Expenditure and Eroticism 
We might begin by asking why Bataille sees such value in transgression. The answer has 
two dimensions, one economic and the other transcendent. 
The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the 
surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for 
maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a 
system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess 
cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without 
profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.582 
 
The fundamental premise is that the system of production is imperfect because, where every 
participant should be contributing toward an end beyond themselves, Bataille finds that there is 
always a non-productive sector of society; production flows upwards to a ruling class that must 
determine how to release the excess energy of production back into the general economy so that 
the process may continue. The key concept here is that of expenditure, which Bataille specifies 
as inherently wasteful, but necessary, much in the way that desire causes the Lacanian subject to 
devote considerable energy toward orbiting object (a) without ever reaching it. Bataille writes, 
“luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, 
arts, perverse sexual activity…constitute a group characterized by the fact that in each case the 
accent is placed on a loss that must be as great as possible in order for that activity to take on its 	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true meaning.”583 The possibility of great reward is only possible through the possibility of great 
sacrifice. 
Writing from an anthropological perspective, Bataille notes many instances of indigenous 
societies with special rituals for such unproductive expenditures, often taking the form of a 
festival where taboos and prohibitions are set aside temporarily so that pure, unproductive 
indulgence may release the excess energy of production. It was the responsibility of the non-
productive rulers to make these expenditures possible, but as the restricted economy became 
increasingly binding, modernized societies refused to set aside social strictures and thus a new 
form of expenditure was necessary: large-scale warfare. The tremendous loss of life and wealth 
during a world war would make it a Bataillian expenditure par excellence, but Bataille stops just 
short of actually saying this. Seeing two world wars in his lifetime, Bataille felt strongly that 
modern societies needed sufficiently wasteful expenditures so that the expenditure of warfare 
could be avoided. 
One manner of addressing this problem is individualized loss, which brings us to the 
transcendent realm of expenditure: eroticism. Sexual reproduction is distinct from eroticism 
because unlike the former, the latter has no productive value; it is a wasteful expenditure that 
approaches death, the greatest of losses. When two discontinuous beings join together, the self 
falls away and they are granted a foretaste of the continuity of being that is possible only through 
death, hence the connection between sex and death in Bataille’s philosophy. He writes, 
“eroticism…is assenting to life up to the point of death.”584 The closer a subject comes to a total 
loss of self—to death—the more powerful the experience of continuity. For Bataille, eroticism is 
an aspect of what he calls “inner experience,” a loosely defined term that functions similar to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 Georges Bataille, “The Notion of Expenditure,” in Visions of Excess (1986) ,118. 
584 Bataille, Erotism (1986), 11.	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Lacanian unconscious insofar as inner experience reaches a subject at a level beneath conscious 
perception, but also holds considerable power of the subject’s psychical disposition. 
When a subject experiences continuity, it happens through inner experience aroused by 
the heterogeneous matter of the general economy. Eroticism plays such an important role in 
heterology because of its close connection to death, which is itself a pervasive element in the 
heterogeneous. If one were to represent this constellation of eroticism, death, expenditure, 
transgression, heterology, and continuity schematically, we might arrive at the following: 
eroticism leads to an excessive expenditure, which bring heterogeneous elements into play; death 
saturates the heterogeneous elements thereby making them taboo within the restricted economy, 
and thus the erotic activity that creates a loss of the discontinuous self through transgression of 
these taboos brings the subject into a temporary state of continuity.  
3.1.2 Taboo and Transgression 
Taboo and transgression work together and are mutually constitutive in a way similar to 
the intrinsic paradox of jouissance. The system of taboos is established by the strictures of the 
restricted economy helping it to run smoothly by excluding the heterogeneous elements that 
would call its dominance into question. Bataille writes,  
If we observe the taboo, if we submit to it, we are no longer conscious of it. But in 
the act of violating it we feel the anguish of mind without which the taboo could 
not exist. […] The inner experience of eroticism demands from the subject a 
sensitiveness to the anguish at the heart of the taboo no less great than the desire 
which leads him to infringe it. This is the religious sensibility and it always links 
desire closely with terror, intense pleasure, and anguish.585  
 
The taboo, following the principle of expenditure, must remain in effect and the cost of 
transgression must be great in order for the act of transgression to have meaning. There is no 
value in an unintentional transgression because the conscious desire to transgress is what brings 	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about the inner experience that Bataille is after. He continues: “man achieves his inner 
experience at the instant when bursting out of the chrysalis he feels that he is tearing himself, not 
tearing something outside that resists him.”586 In one of Bataille’s regular examples, he argues 
against the idea that societies that practiced human sacrifice did so out of a lack of humanity, 
claiming that they did so because they valued life to highly.  
The efficacy of an expenditure is directly proportional to the wastefulness of the act 
because the feeling of anguish in Bataille’s inner experience is a necessary condition of 
eroticism—assenting to life up to death. Rather than argue for a move back to naturalism and 
animalistic behavior, the taboo must remain taboo. This is why egalitarian attempts to redeem 
expressive noise and situate it alongside conventional music on equal footing are misguided. 
Noise must remain noise if it is to maintain its transgressive power. Bataille writes, “we are 
discontinuous beings, individuals who perish in isolation in the midst of an incomprehensible 
adventure, but we yearn for our lost continuity.”587 Jouissance points to the lack in the signifier 
and endangers the subject’s ability to function within the Symbolic, but Bataille wants us to push 
through the pain to the limits of the death drive, to transgress the Law, thus leading to a place 
where the Lacanian Signifier collapses into the heterogeneous Real of Bataillian continuity. I 
believe we can experience a form of this continuity by transgressing our cultural taboos through 
radical works of art, and indeed, Akita observes that, “shock treatment is another very important 
essence of noise. […] Shock is naturally intertwined with the concept of noise.”588 
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3.2 (Japanese?) Eroticism 
 Akita states, “probably the greatest idea of Surrealism for me is ‘Everything is erotic, 
everywhere erotic.’ For me, noise is the most erotic form of sound…that’s why all of my works 
relate to the erotic.”589 Sexuality may be an important component of Merzbow’s work, but its 
various guises fulfill different functions in his work, and these functions are further complicated 
by an infusion of Western practices, representations, and taboos that mix with conceptions of 
sexuality that are more idiomatic to Japan. He makes a distinction between artistic and 
pornographic representations of sexuality, and these two categories are separated primarily by 
aesthetic criteria rather than issues of morality and ethics; Akita finds redeeming qualities in 
each. The main division is between representations that focus on the genitals and representations 
that focus on other elements, such as ropes. Either way, they are inherently wasteful in a 
Bataillan sense because they do not fulfill the productive function of procreation.  
 Akita often points out the sociocultural differences between Japanese and American 
representations of sexuality. He states that until the end of the Tokugawa era (1603-1868),590 
Japan did not have an institutionalized system of taboos because there was no Christianity to 
circumscribe certain practices as deviant. Nagisa Oshima also attests to this culture of sexual 
freedom prior to the Meiji period (1868-1912), which was subsequently squashed by the 
militaristic political strategy of the Meiji government, as well as the push toward modernization. 
Following World War II, the socioeconomic swing toward the “growth at any cost” philosophy 
of GNPism brought with it a promotion of sexuality, but having left the Edo era concepts of 
sexuality behind during twentieth-century modernization, there was no practice to draw upon. 	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“Society therefore,” writes Oshima, “turned instead to models that had no connection whatsoever 
to the past. People imitated Western (particularly American) sexual culture extremely 
superficially.” 591  Despite the popular myth of bizarre sexual practices in Japan, modern 
conceptions of sexuality were heavily informed by the West. The only significant taboo to 
remain from the period of sexual repression is the censorship of depictions of genitalia, which 
accounts for the strange and sundry representations of sexuality such as sex between women and 
octopi (the genitals are covered by tentacles), kinbaku (the focus is on the ropes, not the 
genitals), and seppuku and hara-kiri (a knife penetrates the abdomen, rather than the 
conventional depiction of genital penetration).592 This taboo may account for Akita’s distinction 
between pornography and erotic art, which is predicated on a focus on either the naked body or 
fetishized elements, respectively. 
  It would appear that Akita does not find practices like kinbaku and seppuku to be 
inherently transgressive, and indeed, he has written a book and numerous articles on various 
forms of Japanese bondage and sadomasochism, detailing their place in legitimate Japanese 
culture throughout history.593 Here, one is tempted to buy into the orientalist myth of a culture of 
perverse pornographic freedom, but this is not exactly accurate. Sandra Buckley writes that while 
acts such as rape and incest are found in the pornography of pre-modern Japan, there are also 
examples where these acts are treated in an unfavorable fashion. She indicates that the same is 
true today. Although pornography, including genres that Akita holds as artistic, is easily 
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accessible through vending machines and shops that surround commercial urban areas, the 
Japanese quietly disapprove of the prominence and accessibility of pornography.594 It appears 
that there are cultural taboos in effect, even if there is virtually no government censorship. 
 It is difficult to accept Akita’s statement that bondage images are neither pornographic 
nor transgressive to him.595 Even if Freud has diluted the concept of perversion to utter 
uselessness, bondage cannot be conceptualized in the same manner as depictions straightforward, 
(ostensibly) consensual sex because the power relationship is foregrounded and involves a binary 
of submission and domination. Not only are there themes of cruelty and violation, but military 
uniforms and paraphernalia often figure prominently in kinbaku imagery as well. Going even 
further, representations of seppuku and hara-kiri must be considered transgressive because they 
relate to ritualized death. Granted, Akita uses these images for specific reasons that may have 
little do to with petty shock value, but two things come to mind: they are indeed shocking to the 
majority of listeners who are unfamiliar with the subtleties of kinbaku, and when considered 
within the context of Merzbow’s project at large, it seems impossible that he does not, at some 
level, use these representations of sexuality for their transgressive quality. After all, the professed 
beauty and profound nationalist honor that accompanies seppuku is only possible if the act is 
genuinely transgressive. If the loss of life is not a wasteful expenditure, then a taboo is not 
broken, and the act becomes mundane. 
 Thus far, I have treated Japanese depictions of sexuality, whether pornographic or 
artistic, as essentially Japanese, but this also requires clarification. Akita has already brought 
Western ideas of sexuality into the discussion, but he also shows that even within a seemingly 	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traditional Japanese practice like kinbaku, the purity is not what is seems. According to Akita, 
Japanese bondage was always concerned with the ropes and the power dynamics between the 
active and passive subjects—undoubtedly due to the influence of the Meiji militarization of 
sexuality—while Western bondage was more focused on various fetishized items such as corsets, 
high-heeled shoes, and all manner of elaborate undergarments. During the Korean War, British 
bondage artist, John Willie, published various pictures in the Japanese “abnormal” magazine, 
Kitan Club, much to the delight of Kitan Club’s readership. Willie, who would go on to publish 
Bizarre (a fetish magazine focusing on women’s clothing), is therefore credited with bringing the 
fetish element to Japanese bondage.596 What had previously focused on rope work now had the 
added dimension of extraneous fetish items forever changing the practice of kinbaku. Buckley 
affirms that the influence of Western pornography remains to this day and contributes both 
content and market structure.597 Thus, we have another argument for reading Merzbow as an 
altermodernist. 
3.3 Eroticism as Metaphor 
Beyond the pictorial issues, we must also consider the metaphorical dimension of 
eroticism apropos of expressive noise. The function of the metaphor is twofold: first, we find 
eroticism used to describe expressive noise and its transgressive quality, and second, we find 
eroticism describing the relationship between the composer and the listener. Akita sees 
pornographic expressions as rich with sociopolitical meaning hiding below the surface.598 He 
writes, “noise is the primitive libido of sound. Similarly, pornography is the primitive libido of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 Merzbow, Music for Bondage Performance, liner notes, Extreme XCD 008, 1991, compact disc. 
 
597 Buckey, Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture, 401. 
 
598 Akita quoted in Woodward, 27. 
 
337	  	  
eroticism. Both are very physical, the lowest material of human expression—primary 
motivations.”599 This “lowest material,” along with the name of Akita’s first record label, Lowest 
Arts and Music, invokes Bataille’s notion of base material, which is the heterogeneous stuff of 
the general economy. Pornography is something that a culture must condemn and cast out to 
maintain the homogenizing taboos that provide structure, much in the way that expressive noise 
is something that a music must condemn and cast out to ensure that its boundaries can continue 
to include what is internally defined as music. Pornography and expressive noise share a similar 
transgressive quality and thus hold a position of importance within Bataille’s philosophy. 
The “primitive libido” of which Akita speaks directs us towards Wilhelm Reich’s concept 
of orgone energy, which Akita uses repeatedly as a simile for expressive noise.600 Reich 
describes orgone energy as “primordial cosmic energy; universally present and demonstrable.”601 
Beginning his career as a psychoanalyst under the teaching of Freud, Reich was trained to see 
sexual abnormalities as leading to psychical strife, and following a series of case studies, he 
became convinced that the central problem of every psychic disturbance was a lack of satisfying 
sexual release that could only be achieved through loving, genital-to-genital induced orgasm.602 
Reich writes, “if every psychic illness has a core of dammed-up sexual excitation, it can be 
caused only by the disturbance of the capacity for orgastic gratification. Hence, impotence and 
frigidity are the key to the understanding of the economy of neuroses.”603 Orgone, in this sense, 
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behaves similarly to Bataille’s idea of expenditure where an excess of production must be wasted 
to maintain a state of equilibrium. Reich writes, “Orgastic potency is the capacity to surrender to 
the streaming of biological energy, free of any inhibitions; the capacity to discharge completely 
the dammed-up sexual excitation through involuntary, pleasurable convulsions of the body.”604 
In essence, this description is a paraphrase of Bataille’s argument for the necessity of 
expenditure that leads to the feeling of continuity. Thus, sexuality and expressive noise are 
similar insofar as they are affective prisms through which we experience extreme phenomena—
expenditure, loss of self, continuity. 
The second metaphorical sense brings Salomé Voegelin’s phenomenological approach to 
noise into play. She writes, 
Noise exaggerates the isolation of my sensorial engagement and tightens the 
reciprocity between the listener and the heard. […] In its insistence that I hand 
over my body to its force, noise cuts the cord to the social and produces a 
euphoria, an ecstasy of freedom in the besieged but autonomous body. The tight 
reciprocity of this existence is made abundantly clear when I cannot hear myself 
anymore. Noise does not accompany me but swallows me.605 
 
I will later argue that we do not yield our powers of perception to the capacity that Voegelin 
claims, but the idea is convincing to a certain extent. The physicality of expressive noise 
experienced at proper volume sets it apart from many types of music. The sheer volume flattens 
space, as the sonic energy swarms the listener in a thick cloud of sound. One may argue that the 
deafening volume at a rock music concert produces the same effect, but virtually all popular 
music contains a repeating rhythmic component, which structures the sound and creates a sense 
of comfort and familiarity within the aural assault. An expressive noise concert with a 
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comparable sound pressure level will, on the other hand, be perceived with greater intensity 
because the lack of repetitive sound restricts the listener’s ability to situate him or herself 
comfortably. Because of the intensity of experience, the listener cannot exist in a space of 
distanced contemplation in the way that one might listen to a work of chamber music. 
 What, then, is the nature of this submission of mind and body? Michel Henritzi suggests 
that “the relationship between the noise performer and the listener…seems to be informed by the 
rituals of sado-masochistic sex, as the audience agrees to submit itself to the sonic pain of white 
noise inflicted by the performers. The body of the listener is thus linked to the SM imagery 
habitually used by some of the musicians.”606 Even if one does not buy into the idea of an 
explicitly denotated sexual listening experience, the listening process is at least partially 
masochistic. Listening becomes a transcendent state where one must be given over entirely to the 
transgressive intensity of the experience. In sum, the listener has a genuine Bataillian erotic 
experience.  
3.4 Art 
Thus far, we have seen how the philosophy of Bataille functions in relation to the various 
manifestations of eroticism present in Merzbow’s work. Various art movements of the twentieth-
century are also important in understanding Merzbow’s aesthetics, and as we will see, the 
centrality of Bataillian eroticism continues. When Akita discusses his aesthetic ideas, he tends to 
refer to theories from the visual arts rather than music, and although he found the style of oil 
painting that he learned in college to be too conservative, it seems that the aesthetics and 
ideologies of Surrealism, Dadaism, and Vienna Actionism inform his music on a conceptual 
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level.607 “My work hung in galleries,” he says, “but exhibiting my work like that didn’t appeal to 
me. […] Working like that was too indirect for my taste. I wanted to show my work to society in 
a more direct way.”608 This sentiment of working directly echoes Hans Arp’s statement, “we 
want to produce directly and without mediation.”609 The idea of direct, unmediated expression is 
absolutely crucial to understanding Merzbow’s work and it is something that we will find in each 
of the artistic movements that follow.   
The common thread between Surrealism, Dadaism, and Vienna Actionism is a 
transgressive element that threatens to subvert the Law, bringing the spectator into the realm of 
jouissance where meaning begins to collapse. Each movement was a reaction against forces of 
sociopolitical control and aesthetic homogenization that the artists railed against in incendiary 
manifestoes. In describing his initial encounters with each of the aforementioned artistic 
movements, Akita uses the same word: “shock.”610 Consequently, the power of shocking art to 
affect a special psychical state is a lesson that Akita has taken to heart and used to great effect in 
his work as Merzbow. 
  If Akita cites these three movements as inspirational, and if these three movements are 
inseparable from their social, political, and aesthetic ideologies, then we find yet another reason 
why Akita’s claim that Japanese noise contains no meaning is untenable, as well as another 
reason to read Merzbow as an altermodernist. Even within a movement such as Dadaism that 
purports to be both nothing and everything, that statement alone is a deliberate anti-foundational 
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stance that must be considered in its social, political, and aesthetic context. A brief survey of 
these three art movements will serve to enrich our readings of Merzbow’s music that will follow 
in section 4.0. 
3.4.1 Dada, Kurt Schwitters, and the Merzbau 
 Because Akita chose to derive the name of his artistic project from Kurt Schwitters’s 
most enigmatic project, Merzbau: The Cathedral of Erotic Misery (1923-1943), let us explore 
the connections between the two artists.611 Much like Akita’s Merzbow project, from the outset, 
the Merzbau is rather inscrutable, a status that is amplified by the poor documentation and 
eventual destruction of the work itself during World War II. At the most prosaic level, the 
Merzbau was a house in Hannover, Germany that was slowly engulfed by an ever-expanding 
installation that combined elements of collage, sculpture, and architecture along with a wealth of 
found materials that Schwitters would add to the project over the course of twenty years. At a 
deeper level, the Merzbau is a signifier without a signified—a collection of fragments held 
together by the gravitational force of Schwitters’s unconscious, a product of obsessive 
compulsion that even the artist himself probably did not fully understand. The Merzbau has 
undeniable authorial intent and there are deliberate thematic elements—eroticism being first and 
foremost—but the meaning is illusive. Seen in this light, this hermeneutic aporia could just as 
easily describe Merzbow’s body of work.  
As for specific connections to Schwitters, Akita explains, 
The thing that I’m into is collection the sounds that I hear around me. For 
instance, sounds from the radio and TV programs. The sounds in and around my 
house, like the sounds in my kitchen. And inner city sounds. I collect all these 
sounds. And I make tapes of them. The concept is very similar to the creations of 
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Kurt Schwitters. Because our works are so similar, I think Merzbow is a very 
suitable name for me.612  
 
In another interview, Akita puts it slightly differently in that he says that he collects “scum” from 
the world around him.613 Recalling Bataille’s base material and Akita’s interest in pornography 
as the dregs of the cultural unconscious, the connection to Schwitters becomes quite clear. Akita, 
like Schwitters, is constructing an oeuvre of enormous proportions, elevating the banal, the 
strange, the erotic, and the transgressive to the level of art. Amidst the Japanese culture of 
reckless capitalist expansion, Merzbow takes the waste of the capitalist machine and turns it into 
art. 
We must also take into account Schwitters’s central concept, which he describes thusly: 
“Merz stands for freedom from all fetters, for the sake of artistic creation. Freedom is not lack of 
restraint, but the product of strict artistic discipline.”614 Akita is undoubtedly inspired by the 
aesthetic exhortation of Schwitters, but he too believes that artistic freedom is not the same as 
abandoning all rules. He states, “I do not think it is easier to make noise than to create harmony 
and scales. […] The reason people choose to do noise is the same reason they choose to play 
classical music, grindcore, or country and western, it’s only a product of individual selection.”615 
The point is notable because when an artist creates a massive oeuvre that is both superficially 
similar and outside the realm of commonly understood expressive culture, there are always 
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suspicions that the work is, at best, easy to produce, or, at worst, just a big joke. This is only 
exacerbated by the tendency of music journalists to ask noise music practitioners if their craft is 
easy.  
Beyond Schwitters, broader concepts from Dadaism also pertain. Near the beginning of 
his Dada Manifesto (1918), Tristan Tzara writes “DADA DOES NOT MEAN ANYTHING,” 
continuing later with the following: 
Every product of disgust that is capable of becoming a negation of the family is 
dada; DADA; acquaintance with all the means hitherto rejected by the sexual 
prudishness of easy compromise and good manners: DADA; abolition of logic, 
dance of those who are incapable of creation: DADA; every hierarchy and social 
equation established for values by our valets: DADA; every object, all objects, 
feelings and obscurities, every apparition and the precise shock of parallel lines, 
are means for the battle of: DADA […]616 
 
If we transpose this to Lacanian terms, Tzara is attempting to dehisce the Symbolic, to reject the 
power of the Signifier to structure experience. To “not mean anything” is to have no existence in 
the Symbolic, for the Symbolic is the realm of structure where the subject must constantly 
attempt to match signifiers with signifieds in a perpetually imperfect play of meaning; Tzara 
endeavors to access the Real. Describing the inspiration that followed an encounter with 
Duchamp’s writing, Akita states, “I found out why Dadaists destroyed all conventional art forms. 
I decided to destroy all conventional music.”617 If the Symbolic is concerned with symbolic 
referentiality, Merzbow goes as far as possible to create a non-referential music, a music that 
signifies as little as possible, which is to say, a noise music. The Dadaist sentiment of “Dada 
means nothing” is also echoed in the statements of noise practitioners who claim that “noise 
means nothing” as well. 	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3.4.2 Surrealism 
Where Dadaists sought to destroy meaning in favor of nonsense, the Surrealists were 
inspired by the possibility of meaning outside of rational thought. It is, perhaps, a matter of 
degrees: non-meaning versus meaning unstructured by consciousness. In his initial Manifesto of 
Surrealism, André Breton writes: 
We are still living under the reign of logic: this, of course, is what I have been 
driving at. But in this day and age logical methods are applicable only to solving 
problems of secondary interest. The absolute rationalism that is still in vogue 
allows us to consider only facts relating directly to our experience. Logical ends, 
on the contrary, escape us. It is pointless to add that experience itself has found 
itself increasingly circumscribed. It paces back and forth in a cage from which it 
is more and more difficult to make it emerge. […] Under the pretense of 
civilization and progress, we have managed to banish from the mind everything 
that may rightly or wrongly be termed superstition, or fancy; forbidden is any 
kind of search for truth which is not in conformance with accepted practices. […] 
For this we must give thanks to the discoveries of Sigmund Freud. […] The 
imagination is perhaps on the point of reasserting itself, of reclaiming its rights. If 
the depths of our mind contain within it strange forces capable of augmenting 
those on the surface, or of waging a victorious battle against them, there is every 
reason to seize them—first to seize them, then, if need be, to submit them to the 
control of our reason.618 
 
In Lacanian terms, Breton wants to allow the unconscious to speak without being filtered 
through the Imaginary. He wants to present the nonsensical, unfiltered messages of the Freudian 
Id that originate independent of the Ego, and he wants to present them as they are with no 
attempt to make them conform to the logic of the conscious mind. In this way, we find 
Surrealists practicing an intuitive art, much like Merzbow’s music is intuitive. “Surrealism for 
me,” says Akita, “was an alternative sensibility, a way of expression that mixed anarchism, 
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alchemy, schizo-paranoia, and fetishism. I was looking for a way of realizing the theory of 
Surrealism as put forward by André Breton and Georges Bataille.”619 
When asked how he creates his work, Akita answered, “Naturally. I’m making music for 
pleasure. I just want to create sound which I like and most sounds that I like are at a very high 
level. When I have them, I just mix them together.”620 This is not to say that Merzbow and the 
Surrealists do not spend a great deal of time creating their work; rather, the creative premises that 
inform the work are allowed to remain intuitive while the artist presents them according to his or 
her aesthetic sensibility, which may in fact be a very time consuming process. Breton defines 
Surrealism as “psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—verbally, 
by means of the written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of thought. 
Dictated by the thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any 
aesthetic or moral concern.”621 Akita writes, “I wanted to compose real surrealistic music in a 
non-musical way. Surrealism is also reaching into the unconsciousness. Noise is the primitive 
and collective [un]consciousness of music. My composition is automatism, not 
improvisation.” 622  The idea of expressive noise as a primitive, collective unconscious is 
reminiscent of Leibniz’s perceptual unconscious that Christoph Cox uses to construct his concept 
of noise. For Cox, noise is a vast expanse, which gives way to music when the noise is filtered 
through the expressive codes of a given culture. Seen in this way, Merzbow’s expressive noise is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Akita quoted in Woodward, 55. 
 
620 Akita interviewed by Jason Gross (December 1997) Perfect Sound Forever, 
http://www.furious.com/perfect/merzbow.html 
 
621 One should note that where Breton writes, “exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern,” it is more 
consistent with his overall concept of surrealism to read this as “exempt from any conscious aesthetic or moral 
concern.” Breton, 1996, 26. 
 
622 Akita quoted in Woodward, 15. 
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constructed from the substance of the unconscious and arrives in the listener’s ears 
unsymbolized, which is to say, it arrives as a token of the Real.  
Akita’s distinction between automatism and improvisation is debatable because some 
may argue that improvisation is indeed an expression of the unconscious. Akita, however, has a 
background in jazz and most likely considers improvisation to be an only semi-spontaneous act 
wherein a musician has the limited freedom of making decisions within a specified set of musical 
and stylistic codes, all within a limited timeframe (i.e., the creative act happens concurrently with 
its realization). In contradistinction, automatism is a process of creation that may extend over a 
long period of development and consciously rejects structural codes. 
3.4.3 Vienna Actionism 
The Vienna Actionists are another reference point for Akita not only because their 
aesthetic is predicated on direct, unmediated expression (in the vein of Dadaism and Surrealism), 
but also because he sees their early explorations of performance art—what they called “material 
action”—as related to sadomasochistic practices in Japan, albeit with an inverted relationship 
where the performers themselves are the masochists.623 In the O.M. Theatre Manifesto,624 
Hermann Nitsch writes 
Through my artistic production (a form of life worship) I take upon myself all that 
appears negative, unsavoury, perverse, and obscene, the lust and the resulting 
sacrificial hysteria, in order to spare YOU the defilement and shame entailed by 
the descent into the extreme. […] Histrionic means will be harnessed to gain 
access to the profoundest and holiest symbols through blasphemy and desecration. 
Blasphemous provocation is tantamount to worship.625 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Woodward, 20. 
 
624 Herman Nitsch, Die blutorgel, self-published, Vienna, 1962; unpaginated. 	  
625 Hermann Nitsch, “O.M. Theatre Manifesto,” in Brus Muehl Nitsch Schwarzkogler: Writings of the 
Vienna Actionists, ed. Malcolm Green, trans. Malcolm Green (London: Atlas Press, 1999), 132. 
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Much like expressive noise and pornography, the Actionists were concerned with things that 
Bataille would label heterogeneous: extreme physical acts, excrement, bodily fluids, violent 
destruction—in sum, Bataillian expenditures. While the Surrealists were usually content to 
dream up transgressive concepts and express them as novels, poetry, or paintings, the Actionists 
enacted these transgressions upon their own bodies, often running afoul of the law in the process. 
Many of these depraved acts were intended to pose devastating ontological queries to the 
art establishment, just as intentional noise throws the boundaries of music into question. Otto 
Mühl, the de facto leader of the Vienna Actionists, writes, “art conceived in this manner cannot 
fail to have an effect on society. People must open their eyes at last. The world-wide 
cretinization of the masses by the pigs of art, religion, and politics can only be halted by the most 
brutal use of all available materials.”626 Again, the immediacy of impact is critical to the power 
of the art. Although one can still be shocked by mere accounts of the material actions 
performed—naked writhing bodies, clawing, biting, screaming, urinating, flagellating, 
defecating, penetrating, even slaughtering a chicken and then pulling its flesh apart with their 
teeth—this is not even close to watching the events unfold in the films of Joerg Siegert or Kurt 
Kren, and even this cannot approach the intensity of seeing the material action performed live.627 
In precisely the same manner, one can read descriptions of Merzbow, but these are 
meaningless when confronted the aural actuality of his work experienced at full volume, and 
despite the relative safety of abstraction offered by expressive noise (for instance, one does not 
witness a man defecating in an art gallery), Merzbow’s sound could be equally disturbing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Otto Muehl, “Material Action Manifesto 1968,” in  Brus Muehl Nitsch Schwarzkogler: Writings of the 
Vienna Actionists, ed. Malcolm Green, trans. Malcolm Green (London: Atlas Press, 1999) ,110. 
 
627 This description refers to the material action, Manopsychotisches Ballet (1970), filmed by Joerg Siegert. 
This and other Actionist films can be found at http://www.ubu.com/film/vienna_actionists.html. 
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some, especially if one experiences the sound in the way that Voegelin describes—i.e., a total 
loss of self. “Mühl’s Material action idea,” says Akita, “was interesting to use as a treatment 
concept of sound. Sound can be treated more physically, destructively in a psychoanalytic 
way.”628 I believe that there are multiple ways of listening to Merzbow, including analytically, 
but if we consider noise from Voegelin’s phenomenological angle, the physical, destructive 
treatment of sound to which Akita refers is an encounter with the Real. Assuming the listener 
experiences the sound at the tacitly recommended level of “well above the threshold of pain,” the 
brute force of the sonic waves hit the listener in a way that does not filter through the Symbolic; 
the sound does not transfer into symbolic meaning here because, much like a kick in the 
stomach, it arrives in extreme, physical excess with an immediacy that defers analysis and 
symbolization until after the experience. When one experiences Merzbow in this manner, it is 
only after the sound stops that one can begin to try to understand what it all meant. 
3.5 Altermodernism and the Radicant Work 
In light of the manifold Western influences evident in Merzbow’s work, one cannot 
simplify his work to that of his ethnicity, and thus it is useful to consider his work in the context 
of altermodernism. Nicolas Bourriaud proposes a subsequent term for the artist in the 
altermodern world: the radicant. Constructing a metaphor from plant biology, he writes,  
The radicant develops in accord with its host soil. It informs to the latter’s twists 
and turns and adapts to its surfaces and geological features. It translates itself into 
the terms of the space in which it moves. With its at once dynamic and dialogical 
significant, the adjective “radicant” captures this contemporary subject, caught 
between the need for a connection with its environment and the forces of 
uprooting, between globalization and singularity, between identity and opening to 
the other. It defines the subject as an object of negotiation.629 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 Akita quoted in Woodward, 20. 
629 Bourriaud, 51. 
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Examining Merzbow as a radicant artist begins to explain how a Japanese artist can borrow from 
Germany (Vienna Actionism, Dadaism, Wilhelm Reich), France (Surrealism), the United 
Kingdom (John Willie’s bondage art), and America (progressive rock, jazz) and combine them 
altogether to form a synthesis that is original and coherent within its heterogeneity. As we have 
seen thus far, post-war Japan was a social, cultural, political, and artistic hybrid, and this is 
evident in Merzbow’s work if one is able to listen beyond the cacophony. 
 Achim Wollscheid, a media artist and Merzbow collaborator, attests to the heterogeneous 
“adaptation and integration of foreign or alien cultural materials” that enter Japan; however, he 
continues, “once caught in the cultural net, the various materials develop a peculiar dumb 
existence of their own, unless formal relations become present”630 This may be true of Japanese 
culture at large, and other Japanese artists certainly echo these sentiments, but this is not what 
radicant art is about. Baudrillard predicted a move toward simulacra in place of content and 
authenticity, and in some cases, shoddy postmodern works do fit his model of depthless surfaces 
thrown together haphazardly; however, where does this leave an artist in the postmodern era who 
borrows from many cultures with a more substantive grounding behind these various elements? 
On the one hand, Akita grew up in a heterogeneous culture moving toward Westernization and 
undoubtedly absorbed elements of Western culture that had become detached from their original 
meanings, but on the other hand, he deliberately sought out the various aesthetic and 
philosophical elements described above. If it were really as simple as a superficial mixing of 
empty cultural signifiers, perhaps Merzbow would in fact be a postmodernist in the sense that 
Baudrillard finds so offensive. I believe there is sufficient evidence that Akita does posses a 
substantive understanding of the non-Japanese elements that contribute to his work, and on those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Achim Wollscheid quoted in Woodward, 54-55. 
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grounds, I find the radicant to be a useful approach to understand his work. Indeed, Merzbow has 
roots in many cultural formations. 
3.6 Animal Rights and Veganism 
The final notable influence on Akita and his work is his advocacy of animal rights and 
veganism. Although it does not fit within the present discussion of eroticism as a central 
influence, inspiration, and metaphor in Merzbow’s work, it is, nevertheless, centrally important 
to his work in the new millennium, and thus we must discuss it along with his other influences. 
Around 2002, Akita began raising bantams, which led to an epiphany regarding the treatment of 
animals by humans, especially in cosmopolitan society. As a result, he became a passionate 
advocate of animal rights and a vegan lifestyle. When considered alongside the philosophical and 
aesthetic dimensions of his previous work, the introduction of veganism into his compositional 
milieu marks an ethical component without precedent in Merzbow’s career. As with many of his 
obsessions, this led to a period of intense study culminating in a book: Watashi no saishoku 
seikatsu (My Vegetarian Lifestyle / Cruelty Free Life).631 Akita has published 14 books since 
1988, but his book on animal rights is unique insofar as it is not only a history, but also a thesis. 
Rather than presenting a more-or-less objective history of transgressive culture as before, Akita 
allows his voice to enter in his promotion of kindness toward animals. As he describes the 
situation, Japan had a long history of vegetarianism dating back to the 7th century when emperor 
Tenmu issued an outright ban on meat consumption during the farming season on the grounds 
that animals were too important to farming to be slaughtered for food. At various points in 
history, Westerners would introduce a carnivorous diet to the Japanese, including Francis 
Xavier’s visit in 1549, but it was not until the Meiji period (1868-1912) that a regular diet of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631 Masami Akita, Watashi no saishoku seikatsu (translated title: My vegetarian lifestyle; English title: 
Cruelty Free Life) (Tokyo: Ohta Publishing, 2005). 
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meat would become widespread.632 In a 2011 interview, Akita notes that there is a small 
movement of vegetarians as part of the Japanese food culture, but there is no real political 
presence for animal rights, an odd fact in light of the international attention that practices such as 
whaling continue to receive.633 
 Up to this point in Merzbow’s career, the concepts at play are abstract, much like 
expressive noise itself; however, the conceptual shift toward advocacy for the ethical treatment 
of animals during his fourth phase is surprisingly concrete and direct. Because the ability of 
music to convey anything other than itself remains a point of contention, the ability of expressive 
noise to convey specifics must surely be in question. On the one hand, there is very little in the 
sound itself to suggest the ethical benefits of a vegan lifestyle, there are no lyrics to convey the 
message, and there is no widely understood cluster of signifiers that are stable enough to support 
the specifics of Merzbow’s message. On the other hand, cover art, album titles, and track titles 
continue to be important in suggesting meaning, and some of his work even uses recognizable 
samples of animal sounds.  
 In some respects, wildlife ethics continue the ongoing exploration of power, both 
conceptually through Akita’s interest in bondage and domination, and psychically through the 
sadomasochistic listening experience. That said, animal rights are special insofar as Merzbow 
finds them vitally important. In his previous work, it would be tough to determine how exactly 
Merzbow feels about culturally aberrant forms of eroticism from an ethical perspective. He tends 
to approach them with fascination and aesthetic appreciation without rendering judgment on 
those practices as they happen outside of expressive culture, which may be art, pornography, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 An outline of Akita’s main points can be found in Thomas Bey William Bailey, Microbionic: Radical 
Electronic Music and Sound Art in the 21st Century (Creation Books, 2008), 78-79. 
 
633 Akita interviewed by Andre Pluskwa, Kochen Ohne Knochen, accessed May 30, 2012. 
http://blog.merzbow.net/?search=Kochen+Ohne+Knochen 
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something in between. With animal rights, however, there is an emotional immediacy in his 
statements that has the potential to cloud our understanding of Merzbow’s work. This is an issue 
that I will develop further in section 4.3 when I discuss Merzbow’s 13 Japanese Birds series. 
4.0 The Expressive Noise of Merzbow 
Faced with a discography of hundreds of albums, where does one begin? As of 2013, 
discogs.com, an excellent music database, lists 320 of Merzbow’s releases, as well as an 
additional 233 appearances on collaborative albums, split releases, and compilation CDs.634 
Moreover, a number of these releases are actually multi-disc box sets including, most notably, 
the 50-CD Merzbox, two fifths of which was a collection of new recordings. In making the 
selections that will follow, I have chosen particular tracks that show Merzbow’s diversity, 
drawing from his most widely available albums whenever possible. I have also tried to represent 
his major stylistic periods, which I will outline below. Periodically, a journalist attempts 
something resembling a top ten list for Merzbow, but these lists can never be more than a mere 
sampling of an oeuvre that most assuredly outstrips the journalist’s experience.635 In working 
with an artist who does not follow traditional genre categories, it becomes difficult to make a 
case for any particular work holding more importance than another; where one might begin with 
the symphonies of a given composer, there is no equivalent feature to define an obvious starting 
point in this case. Although I will make a case for each of the recordings that follow, the reader 
must indulge an inevitable measure of my personal taste in these selections.  
 There is a specious notion that all of Merzbow’s work sounds the same, but in fact, he 
has developed his work through a number of stylistic periods, and my analyses will show that 
there is more difference than one would imagine. Although there is no standardized stylistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 These numbers also exclude the handful of releases Akita has created under aliases such as Pornoise and 
Right Brain Audile. http://www.discogs.com/artist/Merzbow, accessed May 22, 2012. 
635 C.f. David Keenan, “David Keenan Picks the Best of Merzbow,” The Wire 198: 32-3. 
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narrative in place, I see Merzbow’s career in four phases. First comes his experimental phase, 
beginning in 1979 and extending through the 1980s. Here, he is exploring recording techniques 
and media, found sounds, field recordings, tape looping, percussion, and non-standard uses of 
conventional instruments. I feel that it is appropriate to label this first phase experimental 
because of the exploratory nature of his first decade of expressive noise, which is marked by a 
rather diverse array of sound sources and compositional techniques. Second, we have Merzbow’s 
analogue phase, in which he develops his archetypal wall of feedback and distortion. In the 
1990s, he moves away from found sounds, looping, and acoustic instruments and gravitates 
toward guitar pedals and analogue synthesizers, the EMS Synthi A being his staple instrument.636 
Third, we have what is commonly referred to as Merzbow’s “laptop” phase. In the late 1990s, 
Merzbow purchased an Apple computer to create the cover art for his Merzbox and found that 
computer-based audio applications afforded him new avenues of sonic exploration. During this 
period, he returns to the sort of looping that he was exploring during his experimental phase, but 
this time, everything is based in a digital audio workstation rather than a tape deck. Because 
many virtual synthesizers are made to emulate classic analogue gear, the change from analogue 
to digital synthesis is almost inaudible. The difference, however, is in the compositional method 
of creating entire albums from the manipulation of tiny audio samples. Fourth, we find 
Merzbow’s current phase, beginning in 2002, which is marked by a thematic shift to animal 
rights and the promotion of a vegan lifestyle. The computer-based compositional methods of his 
third phase remain in place, but he returns to the sort of field recordings that he explored in the 
1980s, this time taking his samples from the animals that he raises.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636 The Electronic Music Studios (EMS) Synthi A was a small, portable modular analogue synthesizer 
popularized by progressive rock artists in the 1970s, including Pink Floyd and Tangerine Dream. As of 2012, EMS 
continues to produce the Synthi A. As a fan of 1970s progressive rock, it is likely that Akita was exposed to the 
Synthi A sound during his formative years, although the manner in which he uses the synthesizer is very far 
removed than anything Pink Floyd did with it. 
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 Throughout these stylistic periods, there are a number of touchstone recordings from 
which other, more peripheral recordings emerge. This central recording may provide a particular 
production technique, instrument grouping, thematic idea, conceptual approach, sample set, or 
even sonic material borrowed and reworked for a new recording. For example, when Merzbow 
created Ecobondage (1987), the raw materials gave rise to at least three albums, including 
Enclosure/Libido Economy (1987), Vratya Southwards (1987), and Fission Dialogue (1988). 
Similarly, Merzbow generated so much material using the instrument collection and general tone 
of Music for Bondage Performance (1991), that he would later fill 12 CDs, which would 
eventually be released as the box set, Merzbient (2010). The creative circumstances of a given 
moment in Merzbow’s career gave rise to a series of similar works—much like Bach’s 
systematic exploration of the prelude and fugue in The Well-Tempered Clavier—and with that in 
consideration, I have endeavored to write about recordings that represent entire clusters of 
Merzbow’s oeuvre. 
4.1 Ecobondage 
We will begin with the title track on the CD version of Ecobondage, which corresponds 
to the entire side A of the initial vinyl-only release.637 This track has more to do with remarkably 
traditional musique concrète and collage than the blasts of distorted feedback that would define 
Merzbow in the 1990s. The influence of Edgard Varèse and Pierre Schaeffer are particularly 
evident here; however, Merzbow notes that their music “is a little too academic for me. I learned 
musique concrète from material like ‘the Chrome Plated Megaphone of Destiny’ on the Mothers 
of Invention’s Money album, Zappa’s Lumpy Gravy, The Residents’ Third Reich & Roll, 
NWW’s [Nurse With Wound] Sylvie and Babs [The Sylvie and Babs Hi-Fi Companion] as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 Merzbow, Ecobondage, Distemper DISTEMPER 001, 1995, compact disc; Merzbow, Ecobondage, ZSF 
Produkt SH62-01, 1987, LP. 
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as Can’s Tago Mago and Landed, and the Beatles’ Revolution No. 9.”638 Even if he finds 
Schaeffer to be more academic than musical, Merzbow has nevertheless adopted the idea of 
thematically coherent found sounds in the present work. Where Schaeffer was interested in the 
elevation of urban ambience to the level of art, Merzbow takes a cue from Schwitters and builds 
his version of musique concrète from sonic detritus—Bataille’s base material—including 
samples of scrap metal, barking dogs, and general urban noise pollution.  
 According to Schaeffer’s theory of acousmatic listening, sound is perceived differently 
when we cannot visualize its source, whether from seeing the source live, or by picturing it in 
our mind.639 The ideal acousmatic listening experience maximizes the auditor’s alienation from 
the sound sources, forcing him or her to perceive the sounds as pure aural phenomena, 
unattached to any experiential signifiers. Schaeffer names this alien sound phenomenon the objet 
sonore (sonorous object). In theory, the greater the alienation, the more the auditor can focus on 
the sound-in-itself. In practice, Schaeffer recorded sounds on a portable shellac phonograph, 
layered them, and processed them in a way that disguised their literal referentiality. Merzbow 
uses the same technique with a tape recorder and a mixer. He makes field recordings, performs 
on a variety of percussion and junk “instruments,” processes these sounds through effects units 
including a ring modulator and a reverb unit, and he combines them into an aural gestalt.  
 Irrespective of any possible desire on the part of Merzbow to create an objet sonore, as 
listeners and interpreters, we must ask if it is even possible to listen in this fashion. From the 
Lacanian perspective, the primacy of perception proffered by phenomenologists is tantamount to 
a denial of the unconscious. For Lacan, the actuality of experience is a combination of conscious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 Akita quoted in Woodward, 52. 
 
639 Pierre Schaeffer, “Acousmatics,” in Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, eds. Christoph Cox and 
Daniel Warner (New York: Continuum, 2006), 76-81. 
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and unconscious perception and interpretation. Is it really possible to hear anything at all without 
some level of recognition or association, even if the listener cannot place it exactly? In the case 
of “Ecobondage,” there can be levels of recognition—the layperson will be able to pick out the 
origin of some of the sounds, while an expert may be able to reverse engineer all the sounds—
but is there not more to listening than detecting the source? Akita’s references to noise as orgone 
energy, for example, point to a particular psychosexual state of being, thereby creating an 
experience of audition that will affect a listening subject in a powerful manner. Auditory 
claustrophobia could be another state of listening to expressive noise that is potentially 
unfamiliar in source, but familiar in feeling; however, when comparing the sonic density of 
Ecobondage with Pulse Demon, this album is practically ambient. 
 As for the sonic particulars of “Ecobondage,” the following elements that form the 
polyphonic voices include the following: a 6/8 rhythmic pulse played on a resonant piece of 
metal, the sound of metallic scraping, distorted ambient sound, samples of dogs barking, 
fragments of tunes played from turntables at varying speeds, a synthesized drone, and various 
timbres of feedback.640 Overall, there is a constant bed of ambient noise and metallic scraping 
over which a certain sound dominates in the foreground. “Ecobondage” is loosely organized into 
what I hear as five different sections over the course of 30 minutes. The first section (0:00-3:40) 
features a synthesized tone glissing in the low register; the second section (3:40-9:30) features a 
triple rhythm played on a metallic object with fragments of melody from a turntable operated 
manually; the third section (9:30-17:00) is dominated by a synthesized drone, while the rhythmic 
gong motive returns, this time slower and processed through a ring modulator; the fourth section 
(17:00-24:00) has a thinner texture with a rumbling inharmonic drone as the rhythmic motive is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Merzbow lists the following instruments in the liner notes: bowed instruments played with piano wire, 
ring modulator, tapes, feedback mixer, effects, percussion, and turntable; I also detect some synthesizer and guitar 
feedback. 
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now played backward from a tape at approximately half the original speed; the fifth section 
(24:00-30:07) sees the return of the variable-speed, reversed-motion turntable in the foreground, 
which gradually becomes the sole sound source (28:00) by the end. 
 One could interpret this episodic mass of sound as a study in pure timbre, but Akita 
himself indicates that there is more here than that. Regarding his early work from the 1980s, 
Akita states, 
My first motivation to create sound was the ‘anti-use’ of electronic equipment—
broken tape recorders, broken guitars and amps etc. I thought I could tap into the 
secret voice from the equipment itself when I lost control. That sound is the 
unconscious libido of the equipment. I tried to exert control over this with more 
powerful processing. With the Processed Audio Mixer I was able to control 
feedback. The feedback sounds of equipment is a central concept for Merzbow. I 
was an extreme materialist. Feedback automatically makes a storm of noise and 
it’s very erotic like (Reichian) orgone energy or the magnetic expiation of 
electronics.641 
 
The “anti-use” of musical equipment supports my concept of expressive noise as the mutually 
dependent Other of music. Although there are many examples of abused equipment in music—
guitar amplifiers driven to distortion, for example—this practice has more to do with coloring 
explicitly musical sound than misusing the equipment as an end unto itself. If a “use” of musical 
equipment is to make music, then the “anti-use” of equipment must be to make non-music. Non-
music could be many things, but in this case, it is expressive noise. In this quote, we also see 
Akita speaking metaphorically about the “secret voice” of the electronics that he used. 
Figuratively speaking, if the secret voice of a tape player is audible only when the equipment is 
malfunctioning, then this is tantamount to accessing the unconscious of the machine. This 
colorful metaphor parallel’s Merzbow’s own views of noise and music, where music is the 
structure and noise is the beyond of structure that exists as a potential threat to the smooth 
functioning of the system. 	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Eroticism functions on two levels in Ecobondage: at the thematic level, we find an 
elaborate poster featuring sadomasochistic imagery, folded and bundled with the original vinyl 
release; and at the conceptual level, we find Merzbow creating the conditions for a libidinal 
economy of expressive noise. Apropos of Merzbow’s reference to Wilhelm Reich, we might 
figuratively consider electronics as filled with potential energy, dammed up by the limited 
release of conventional use, waiting to explode in an orgasmic burst of noise. Akita further cites 
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish as an inspiration for Ecobondage, a word that he 
translates as “bondage economy.”642 If the electronics are crammed with orgone energy, then 
Merzbow’s role as artist is the management of this sexualized energy, attempting to keep it in 
check while occasionally allowing orgasmic detonations of aural energy. Amidst the ruble of 
malfunctioning machines, found sounds, and junk, Ecobondage unfolds like an orgy of base 
material. 
4.2 Pulse Demon 
In many ways, Pulse Demon is the quintessential Merzbow album.643 It is perhaps the 
most concentrated example of the deafening swarm of acoustical noise, feedback, and distortion 
that defines Merzbow’s sound to the casual listener. It is also among the most monolithic works 
in his extensive oeuvre, with every second filled to maximum density to the point that very little 
emerges beyond the cacophony, thus making it an extremely difficult work to talk about. Here, 
more than with any other album, one is tempted to consider the expressive noise as pure 
experience beyond comprehension, but if we resist this urge, a number of issues begin to appear. 
 I propose two ways of listening to expressive noise that approaches a theoretical 
maximum of non-musicality: first, one may listen analytically, searching for form, patterns, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Akita quoted in Woodward, 47. 
 
643 Merzbow, Pulse Demon, Release Entertainment RR 6937-2, 1996, compact disc. 
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familiarity, and technical explanations regarding the sound production method; second, one may 
listen holistically; no less actively, but with a broader scope appreciating large-scale movement 
and overall affect, often searching for meaning through metaphor. Typically, those who have 
written on Merzbow begin with the tacit assumption that there is nothing in the sound other than 
randomness and chaos, but if we listen analytically, this is far from true. We must not mistake a 
lack of musical logic for a lack of a unique internal logic within expressive noise. As long as we 
insist on trying to hear expressive noise as “strange music,” we are doomed to repeat the myth of 
the ineffability of Merzbow. In describing “sonic noise,” Voegelin writes, 
Noise is formless yet spatial in its concentration on the listening body. It avoids 
the autonomy of category by being its dialectical opposite, but demands aesthetic 
autonomy in its sheer insistence on being heard, alone. In noise I hear nothing but 
the phenomenon under consideration. I cannot even hear myself but am immersed 
in a sonic subjectivity, more felt than heard.644 
 
The physicality of expressive noise is central to its essence, and the raw power of the sound does 
tend to flatten any sense of space that one typically finds in music; however, Voegelin 
relinquishes too much agency as a listener. To hear nothing but the sonic phenomenon is to deny 
the considerable power of the mind (both conscious and unconscious) to find meaning beyond 
pure timbre. Even if a hypothetical listener was completely without sonic index—an impossible 
reality to anyone who has ever heard distortion in heavy metal or even radio static—this does not 
preclude the possibility of a phenomenological reference point. 
 To illustrate these two modes of listening, let us take the track “Spiral Blast” as an 
example. Starting with the analytical perspective, we notice some general features right away. 
Every sound here is driven to distortion beyond all recognition of its source. Merzbow lists 
metals, noise electronics, audio generators, shortwaves, synthesizers, and tapes in the album 
credits, but the sources are almost irrelevant. Under normal musical circumstances, distortion is 	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an additive process wherein a sound is transformed, but in this case, the distortion is so intense 
that any semblance of the original waveform disappears and the focus becomes the 
electroacoustic effect itself. The one original source that matters here is that of acoustical noise 
(e.g., white noise, pink noise), which has a stable essence and remains recognizable, even as it 
goes through the reductive process of acoustic filtration. Hegarty writes, “Analogue equipment 
can be overdriven, brought to noise, and layers of their sound recombined without suggesting 
tonal relations between separate parts. The limitations of the machinery are precisely what allow 
the possibility of a going-beyond (like transgression’s relation to taboo).”645 The sounds are 
aurally transgressive against the auditor, but they are intrinsically transgressive against 
themselves as well. The excess is only possible because the electronic equipment can be abused 
and made to fulfill an unintended function. In a dazzling display of Bataillian eroticism, the 
correct function of Merzbow’s electronics is obliterated by the wasteful expenditure of 
expressive noise. 
 From a synchronic perspective, we find difference created out of register, where high and 
low register sounds jump out synecdochically from amidst the clamor. Beyond the foregrounded 
high and low register sounds, it becomes quite difficult to differentiate between sounds. One has 
the sense of a general fullness, but describing the actual acoustic phenomena of the fullness 
exceeds the faculties of conscious perception, a point I will discuss from the holistic listening 
position. I believe, however, that explaining exactly what is happening is far less important than 
explaining how it functions. 
From a diachronic perspective, there is interplay between periodic and aperiodic 
sounds—bristling distortion versus the shriek of feedback. Lest we endorse the conventional 
wisdom that holds Merzbow as random, unstructured noise, we must resist the urging of 	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Voegelin to capitulate to the phenomenological experience, for careful listening reveals a 
surprisingly lucid three-part form. During the first part, Merzbow introduces the sounds and 
modification techniques that will continue in the following sections, each in a discrete block 
immediately adjacent to the next. We hear blocks of filtered white noise, a steady bass tone, 
amplitude modulation in the subharmonic spectrum (i.e., tremolo), and thick bands of distortion. 
The second part (ca. 1:00-3:35) features the steady bass tone introduced in the first part as an 
ascending ostinato lasting around five seconds. This ascending bass ostinato is the central theme 
of “Spiral Blast,” beginning imperceptibly and repeating until it is not only present, but also 
dominant in the texture. Merzbow transitions seamlessly between the techniques of the first 
section as the higher voice in the second section, moving between feedback, filtered noise, and 
tremolo, acts in a crazed counterpoint to the bass ostinato. The third part arrives abruptly (3:36-
4:30) with the total disappearance of the ostinato. At this point, the texture is dramatically 
thinned to the point that we notice tiny slices of silence in between high-pitched vibrato. Finally, 
a looped sample—sped up to the point of unintelligibility—arrives to form the basis for the final 
minute of “Spiral Blast,” broken up by periodic noise blasts. Compositional logic suggests that 
the sped up loop is probably the bass ostinato returning, but this is impossible to verify. 
The inclusion of music terminology is not meant to suggest that we view expressive noise 
as “strange music,” as I have argued above, but I do mean for them to suggest that fundamental 
aesthetic principles (e.g., formal design, form, repetition) are evident here. While none of these 
principles are necessary conditions for art, it is important to understand their function in at least 
some of Merzbow’s expressive noise. It is very easy to stop listening at the timbral level, but this 
misses a depth that has escaped many listeners. One could also argue that the above analysis 
demystifies Merzbow to the extent that it comes under the power of the signifier—moving from 
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the Real to the Symbolic—and that I have turned the expressive noise into music through some 
sort of hermeneutic alchemy. This too misses the point of what I am arguing. The goal of a fuller 
understanding of expressive noise on its own terms should not imply an ontological shift, 
necessarily.  
 Changing now to a holistic listening position, the first thing we notice is the volume, 
which would almost go without saying for a work of expressive noise if not for the fact that 
Merzbow intentionally recommends a mastering level of 1-2dB higher than the industry standard 
to his mastering engineers.646 As described above, due to the use of all of the PML, and due to 
the nature of the recorded sound, Pulse Demon will play both objectively and subjectively louder 
than a conventional CD. A listener may choose to enervate the work by drastically lowering the 
volume to begin and gradually increasingly it over time, but then the listener will lose the 
transgressive power of the listening experience. The shock of the initial loudness is a remarkable 
effect that does not wear away as quickly as one might think, for Merzbow’s expressive noise is 
always in excess of expectations. The Real comes into play when the subject has an experience 
that is not mediated by the Symbolic—in this case, a CD that is surprisingly and uncomfortably 
loud—and this shock to the senses is only intensified by the lack of any accumulation of volume; 
the sound simply starts, blasting us from the very first second as if being hit by a truck that is 
already speeding along at 60 miles per hour. The effect of the immediate sonic explosion also 
serves to keep us off balance well into the track because there is a constant deferral of aural 
recovery—there is literally no time to stop and contemplate what has happened before something 
else, equally jarring, occurs.   
 Moving on from the initial moment of listening, we are faced with a growing sense of 
bewilderment as it becomes apparent that the aural actuality of “Spiral Blast” is not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 Woodward, 55. 
363	  	  
relentless in its denial of any surface-level musical logic, but is constantly shifting faster than we 
can comprehend. We can detect levels of macrostructure through analytical listening, but there is 
the sense that there is an extant microstructure beyond our conscious perception—the 
background fullness of indefinable acoustical energy. In addressing a striking, yet unfathomable 
and seemingly unordered aesthetic phenomenon, Jean-François Augoyard and Henry Torgue 
speak of the sharawadji effect—something that is “unexpected and transports us elsewhere, 
beyond the strict representation of things, out of context. In this brutally present confusion, we 
lose both our senses and our sense.”647 
The sharawadji effect was first introduced in Europe in the 17th century by travellers 
attempting to describe the beautiful and perceptually random gardens of China, but reintroduced 
in the sense that Augoyard and Torgue propose, it is a perfect term to describe the effect of 
confronting the Real in art. Although the mind boggles at the thought of comprehending 
expressive noise in the structural manner that we often employ when listening to music, the 
sharawadji effect puts a label on the effect of pleasurable surrender to the Real. It is the Kantian 
sublime; the boundless, seemingly formless object of indescribable power. From a Lacanian 
perspective, we might understand the sharawadji effect as operating directly on the unconscious. 
Linguistic statements often go unrecognized by the conscious mind, but are understood perfectly 
by the subject’s unconscious; likewise, expressive noise may confound one’s ability to explain 
its effect, but it is, nevertheless, a powerful experience filled with meaning at an unconscious 
level. 
 Once we combine excessive volume with the sharawadji effect, we arrive at something 
loud, baffling, and compelling that is imbued with a quasi-sadomasochistic libidinal energy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Jean-François Augoyard and Henry Torgue, Sonic Experience: A Guide to Everyday Sounds (Montreal: 
McGill Queen’s University Press, 2005), 117-123. 
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Naturally, one could listen to “Spiral Blast” at low volume, thereby conquering the sonic energy, 
but the listening experience is so much greater when one fully submits to the work, 
acknowledging the psychical and physical transgressions and embracing them. Bataille found 
marital sex used for procreation to be the opposite of eroticism because it is both condoned by 
the restricted economy and intentionally productive. Eroticism is the result of friction with the 
restricted economy that results in a wasteful expenditure, and therefore, to listen to Merzbow 
quietly is to render the expressive noise polite and impotent. 
 Bataille’s transgressive, pornographic literature communicates a sense of the general 
economy by depicting bizarre erotic expenditures, but understood through Lacanian theory, 
Bataille has not actually transcended the Symbolic because he must use language to 
communicate his ideas. This is the basic problem that Lacan finds in trying to speak about the 
Real, which leads him to search for non-linguistic models (e.g., algebra, topology) of 
understanding. Unlike Bataille, Merzbow is not beholden to the almighty Signifier and what 
Merzbow lacks in the specificity of language, he makes up for in the power of experience. 
Merzbow bypasses language in a radical manner that dehisces the listening subject’s Symbolic, 
allowing the Real to appear. His expressive noise, therefore, is not a symbolic description of 
transgression like we find in Bataille, but rather it is the transgression itself. 
4.3 Karasu: 13 Japanese Birds Part 4 
The work of Merzbow’s fourth phase presents a new set of difficulties because, at one 
level, he appears to be doing something completely different (i.e., making music about 
something comparatively tangible), but as significant as this move toward a concrete conceptual 
center is, his expressive noise continues to find its power through transgression. It would be easy 
to contrast Merzbow’s first three phases with his fourth phase using the absolute/ program music 
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distinction, as his music now appears to be explicitly about animal rights. Following this line of 
reasoning, one would conclude that from the 1980s to 2002, Merzbow’s work was pure noise 
with no meaning other than its own sound color, while from 2002 onward Merzbow’s music is 
finally about something other than itself. Not only is this a superficial distinction, but it also fails 
to say anything interesting about either side of his oeuvre. Worst of all, it suggests a sonic 
cathexis to an aural actuality that, in truth, has not changed a great deal either in terms of 
compositional style or in terms of physical and psychical listener experience. If the crazed 
intensity of Bloody Sea (2006) is heard as a scream of anguish regarding the slaughter of whales, 
and if the sound of Bloody Sea is not drastically different than Venereology (1994), does that not 
imply that the motivation for Venereology was also anger, and if so, what was the object of the 
anger? This goes against anything Akita has said regarding his own work, for he constantly 
returns to the idea that his expressive noise is simply different than mainstream music. Heavy 
metal bands may use loudness and distortion to signify power, anger, grief, or violence, but it is a 
mistake to generally apply this same process of musical signification to Merzbow’s expressive 
noise, especially because the expressive noise is far more sonically transgressive than heavy 
metal. He may borrow some of the codes of heavy metal, but the idea of suddenly hearing 
Merzbow as a one-man metal band with noise generators instead of guitars truncates the 
hermeneutic process. 
Some have argued that noise is inherently malleable and will adapt to any sort of program 
that one wants to place on it.648 This argument seems to concede that any possibility of meaning 
in expressive noise is necessarily extrinsic, but as long as we continue to read expressive noise as 
strange music, we will be blind to the unique experience it provides. When one insists on a rigid 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning, it quickly spirals out of control. If we hold 	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the narrow view that denotational meaning is paramount, then we must lessen the importance of 
meaning created through experience that cannot be described through linguistic units, and we 
further ignore the possibility of meaning decoded by the unconscious completely beneath the 
level of conscious perception. Moreover, when we apply the same rationale to linguistics, we 
find that the signified/signifier relationship is no less sacrosanct thereby leaving us in 
hermeneutic void.  
 How then might we interpret Merzbow’s fourth phase? Perhaps his stance on animal 
rights is a framing device functioning similar to an expressive title given to a piece of music or a 
painting. It suggests a context for interpretation without rigidly determining meaning, which is to 
say that even though a specific ethical stance is different from a general idea of eroticism through 
sound, they function in a similar manner. Merzbow encourages thought about animal rights 
while we experience his expressive noise, even if he does not necessarily wish to represent it 
sonically. Where Ricoeur describes music exhibiting a certain existential-ontological mood or 
humor in lieu of denotational reference,649 we can say the same about the way that Merzbow’s 
ostensive content is manifest in the aural actuality of his music. 
 We might consider the countercultural component of veganism in Japan. Because there 
was no widespread movement supporting animal rights and a vegan lifestyle in the early 2000s 
when Merzbow was first exploring these themes, his condemnation of animal products goes 
against mainstream society, much in the way that his expressive noise goes against mainstream 
music. I am not sure that veganism and expressive noise are comparable in terms of transgressive 
power, but they may originate from the same kernel of rebellion within Merzbow. For example, 
on the track “Bird Killer Governor Ishihara Deserves to Die” on Kamo: 13 Japanese Birds Part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 See chapter one, pages 16-17. 
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6, Merzbow states, “A Tokyo Governor named Ishihara is promoting the extermination [of] 
savage doves and crows. I [have] written a protest song for this shit policy.”650 Despite the 
egalitarian motives of Merzbow’s vegan turn, his message continues to be powerfully riotous.  
Once Merzbow transitioned to a computer-based setup, his move toward animal rights 
activism soon followed, and so I will examine a selection from his 13 Japanese Birds cycle as a 
way of talking about both issues. While there are no direct or explicit music/noise connections, 
Merzbow cites Olivier Messiaen’s Catalogue d’Oiseaux (1958) as the central inspiration.651 Both 
are expansive, thirteen-part works by men who have a particular fondness for birds, Messiaen 
being an avid ornithologist and Merzbow raising a sizable number of birds in a pergola on his 
property.652 I would even argue that in a very few places, Merzbow creates aestheticized 
birdsong similar to the way Messiaen transposed birdsong to Western music notation. Beyond 
that, we are faced with the difficulty of reading a specific ethical stance from the abstraction of 
expressive noise. Merzbow frames the issue with evocative track titles including, “Requiem for 
the 259,000 Quails Culled at a Farm in Toyohashi,” “Once the Human Meat Is Done, Cut It Up 
and Mix with the Vegetable Curry,” and “Burn Down Research Facilities,” as well as with his 
cover art, but as with Pulse Demon, the listener remains under the power of the sharawadji 
effect.653  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650 Roger Batty, “The Birds of Noise,” Musique Machine, December 20, 2009, accessed May 31st, 2012, 
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651 Ibid. 
 
652 “Currently I have bantams, fantails pigeons, Ukokkei fowls (silky fowl) and duck. Some of them were 
brought in from hospitals and other activists. They are domestic poultry as well as ornamental birds. I keep them in a 
pergola. They are part of my family. While I’m away on tour, my family takes care of them.” Akita interviewed by 
Andre Pluskwa, Kochen Ohne Knochen, accessed May 30, 2012. 
http://blog.merzbow.net/?search=Kochen+Ohne+Knochen 
 
653 These titles come from parts five, six, eleven, and twelve, respectively. 
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Each of the thirteen parts was recorded within the span of thirteen months and there is a 
strong sense of continuity between them, especially because of the use of live drums on each 
volume. I have chosen part four simply out of personal preference, but this analysis could apply 
to much of the more than thirteen hours of music contained within the cycle. Karasu is the 
Japanese word for crow, which presents two possible directions based on species: the common 
crow, often considered a pest due to its resilience in an urban environment and its tendency to 
cover said environments with excrement; 654  and the raven, with its sinister presence in 
mythology. Merzbow appears to evoke both of these species of corvus simultaneously. The 
album covers of the cycle range in tone, but Karasu is easily the most disquieting with its 
featureless silhouettes perched overhead on a black and white picture of a desolate, leafless tree. 
At the same time, Merzbow seems to want to redeem the common crow stating, “people hate 
these birds and abuse them because they are considered harmful birds. But it’s very insignificant 
harm, as all they do is shit and scatter garbage. I think human beings cause more environmental 
disruption.”655 Thus, Merzbow encourages us to hear the expressive noise as both sinister and as 
a vigorous defense of a harmless bird. 
The cycle as a whole revisits some elements from Merzbow’s musical past, including live 
drum set, heavy metal, and a healthy dose of free jazz, all of which are evident in Karasu, and all 
of which reinforce Merzbow radicantism.656 One of the most notable features is the sense of 
spaciousness that is occasionally present. The typical Merzbow recording is completely dry, with 
no added reverb effects to suggest physical space. The listener is confronted by overwhelming 
presence. However, there is a rare sense of spaciousness at various points on each of the three 	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655 Ibid. 
 
656 Merzbow, Karasu: 13 Japanese Birds Part 4, Important Records IMPREC241, 2009, compact disc. 
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long tracks—“Argus,” “Stone the Crows,” and “Morgue.” At times, the mix sounds open, with 
each element occupying its own space, which allows the listener to perceive depth and timbral 
distinction in a way that is very different from the constant onslaught of frequencies that make 
listening to Pulse Demon so taxing. The expressive noise retains its transgressive power, but at 
the same time, the sharawadji effect is somewhat lessened by the clarity of the mix. At other 
times, the sounds fill up the space and create the claustrophobic sensations that typify 
Merzbow’s sound, but when the more lively, spacious sound is paired in the same track with the 
more dry, dead sound, each sonic presentation is affected. 
On a conventional recording space is used to suggest a live performance, and even if the 
musicians recorded their parts at different times in sound isolation booths, the producer will 
carefully craft the spatial sound architecture so as to suggest live performance. By moving 
between live sound and dead sound, Merzbow foregrounds a musical technique that, much like 
acoustic noise, is supposed to remain hidden.  
The free jazz influence manifests most clearly in Merzbow’s drum set performances, 
which ground the listener in something sonically familiar, despite its arrhythmic nature. His style 
evokes free jazz drummers such as Han Bennink and Rashid Ali with a barrage of non-metric 
thunder that forcefully propels a general sense of rhythmic drive without suggesting any 
localizable rhythmic pattern.657 Akita recalls, “I saw the Cecil Taylor Unit during 1973 in Tokyo. 
It was my first time and I was very shocked, they played a one and a half hour piece called 
‘Akisakila.’ […] ‘Akisakila’ was one of the greatest noise experiences I’ve ever had.”658 
Merzbow’s drum set work resembles that of free jazz drummers on a moment-to-moment basis, 
but if we take the entirety of an extended track like “Argus” (19:40) into consideration, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 Han Bennink is cited as an influence in Woodward, 10.  
 
658 Akita quoted in Woodward, 45. 
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becomes evident that his performance also moves in stages, similar to his performances on 
electronics. The majority of Merzbow’s albums from his analogue phase onward reflect a pattern 
of creating a timbral configuration and moving it through multiple stages, transforming the 
timbral landscape through varying sound production techniques. In much the same way, 
Merzbow’s percussion performances move through stages, at some points concentrating on a 
collection of toms, at other points focusing on bass drum and ride cymbal, or any combination 
thereof.  
As for the general sonics, the first six minutes involve drums working in tandem with a 
low frequency ostinato to form a chaotic substratum over which the middle and high frequency 
bands come into play, changing at a much faster rate. One could almost hear this as a standard 
guitar, drums, and bass configuration with free jazz sensibilities, pulverized by Merzbow’s 
expressive noise aesthetic. Another novel feature is the presence of discernible frequencies from 
some of the synthesized sounds. Throughout most of his analogue phase, Merzbow favors 
inharmonic sounds, but in his third and fourth phases, pitched sounds begin to appear, albeit not 
in any determined harmonic relationship and not with any artificial octaval divisions. He tends to 
sweep these pitched sounds through the frequency spectrum, sliding from frequency to frequency 
without landing anywhere in particular. An interesting product of the presence of simple 
waveforms is that in the upper frequency range, they begin to sound like birdsong. The rapid 
fluctuations of pitch within a limited range, coupled with the track titles and imagery, evokes a 
certain avian essence, even if the pitch contour does not resemble anything found in nature. The 
crow’s call, after all, is but a humble utterance: caw. 
 “Stone the Crows,” the second track on Karasu, is different and is actually instructive in 
understanding Merzbow’s compositional logic. It is easy to get lost in the barrage of noise on 
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CDs like Pulse Demon because there is so much timbral similarity. An astute listener may pick 
up on some repeating motives or the transition from one sound source to another, but it is 
difficult to keep track of the shifts because the varying noise sources blend together into a mass 
unless one is an extremely attentive listener. On “Stone the Crows,” Merzbow uses some clear 
tones, often separated by register. Through the piece, we can usually discern an unusually clear 
low and high register with the middle space taken up by the typical filtered noise. Because of the 
clarity of tone, it is easier to differentiate between motives, and one can observe how Merzbow 
shifts between them. 
The longest section occurs around the 18-minute mark and involves an ostinato made of a 
looping rhythm and a downward sweeping tone. This is unusually easy to hear because the 
texture has thinned substantially. We hear the loop enough times to become familiar with it 
before other noisier sounds enter and occupy the foreground. From here, Merzbow allows the 
subsequent sounds to dominate the texture, although if one listens carefully to the submerged 
background sounds, the ostinato is continually present until the about the 24-minute mark. This 
same sort of introduction and buildup occurs again and again in the track (and in Merzbow’s 
work in general), although it is usually harder to hear because the previous section overlaps the 
new section by up to 30 seconds.  
Finally, we must consider how Merzbow’s previous sources of inspiration figure in his 
newfound fascination with animal liberation. The Vienna Actionists did slaughter animals during 
some of their material actions, but they did so in the processes of renouncing their humanity, 
regressing to a sort of pre-Symbolic state favored by the Surrealists, thereby highlighting 
humankind’s latent animal viciousness lurking under the power of a society beholden to the 
Signifier. Perhaps Merzbow’s automatism is his way of experiencing (and providing to the 
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listener the experience of) Bataillian continuity—bursting through the walls of the restricted 
economy into the realm of animalistic instinct. It can never be a complete regression, however, 
because animal sexuality is the polar opposite of eroticism as Bataille defines it. To surrender 
one’s humanity completely is to destroy the Lacanian Law and to cease to exist, for the 
transgression inherent in a momentary refusal of social, moral, and ethical strictures requires a 
countering taboo if it is to have meaning. Perhaps Merzbow’s fourth phase is an attempt to go 
beyond the societies that subjugate animals—to transport the listener to a place beyond the 
restricted economy to show that it is possible, and to show that the walls of the restricted 
economy are not as unimpeachable as one might think. If one can transcend them through erotic 
expenditure, maybe one can transcend them in the tangible realm of animal rights. 
5.0 Conclusion 
Far from an impenetrable, empty sonic presence, we find many approaches toward an 
understanding of the radical music of Merzbow. Most broadly, Lacan’s concept of desire and the 
Law create a framework for understanding the transgressive power of expressive noise, 
especially as Merzbow uses it. Through a traumatic encounter with the Real, we are confronted 
with the sort of erotic and transgressive release of energy that Bataille conceptualized. 
Merzbow’s expressive noise pushes us beyond structure, beyond the Symbolic, into the realm of 
jouissance where we confront the terrifying and endlessly enticing unknowable beyond.  
 On a more specific level, the culturally and morally transgressive practices of modernist 
art movements such as the Dadaists, Surrealists, and Actionists help us to understand some of the 
aesthetic motivations behind Merzbow’s work. He brings these cultural renegades together to 
create a truly radicant mélange, confounding and enthralling us in equal measure. By tracing 
Merzbow’s influences through the artistic philosophies of these radical movements, we begin to 
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understand something of both Merzbow’s philosophy of noise and music, and the reason for the 
sounds that he creates. His shift in focus toward animal rights adds a new conceptual layer to the 
post-2002 works, but rather than abandoning the sonic practice of the first two decades of his 
career, he continues to explore these avenues, now with a more explicitly stated message. 
 By spending time on an examination of the concept of noise, as I have done in chapter 
two, and revisiting the concept of expressive noise in the context of Merzbow’s music and 
attitudes toward the concept of noise, we can move beyond the term “noise music,” without 
hiding behind it, vaguely, as if everyone already understood what it meant. Expressive noise 
describes a very powerful experience, but unlike some who have chosen to hold fast to 
phenomenological description, I believe that the perceptual component is inextricably tied to the 
greater conceptual issues behind the sonic expression. Far from being music “about” sound or 
noise, the Bataillian erotic dimension offers both a powerful listening experience and an 
interesting message about music and its limits. 
 My discussion of Merzbow as a radical composer situates him within the general field of 
music as a nomadic force creating disruptions along the outer conceptual shell of music. By 
combining the various facets of his work that I have explored in this chapter, we can better 
appreciate his work qua music, as well as his contribution to musical art on a broader scale. As 
one of the most radical of radical composers, Merzbow challenges fundamental conceptions of 
music, just as he challenges the listener to experience the jouissance of expressive noise. 
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Concluding Remarks 
I can still remember discovering the music of John Zorn, Diamanda Galás, and Merzbow 
during my teenage years. Although I had grown accustomed to music that was ostensibly 
shocking—typically from a moralist perspective—like that of Nine Inch Nails and Rammstein, 
the impact of hearing Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow for the first time was altogether different. It was 
more than loud guitars or obscene lyrics; it was a true musically transgressive aural ambush. 
Although I had neither the musical experience nor the conceptual framework to appreciate what 
exactly was so wonderfully disquieting, I found it to be incredibly compelling. The crazed 
energy of Zorn was a sensory overload, the maniacal shrieking of Diamanda Galás was actually 
alarming, and my first encounter with Merzbow involved a moment of serious panic when I 
thought that surely my speakers had been ruined by the initial blast of noise. This music, along 
with a great deal of other radical music that I would discover during this period all held an 
intangible element of danger and fascination—an intangible feeling that would last for years. 
What exactly made this music so compelling and yet so utterly unfathomable? I struggled 
for years to answer that question. After more than a decade of devouring any even tangentially 
relevant interviews, articles, and books on these composers, I was not finding satisfying answers 
as to why this music was so uniquely able to delight and perplex. Certainly the mystery of it 
drew me in, but I always felt somewhat discouraged at the same time because it was apparently 
impossible to move beyond the rather crude level of: “this freaks me out, and I love it.”  
 By the time I embarked on my graduate work in musicology, I was still listening to this 
music, as enamored of it as ever, and I was frustrated by the general lack of scholarly attention 
and the insufficiencies of any available methodologies to come to terms with this music. Even 
though some scholars had begun to write about Zorn, the directions of their research did not lead 
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to the sort of interpretive answers for which I had been searching. It was now possible to find 
Zorn albums in certain non-specialty record shops, and it was not impossible to find others who 
had heard of Merzbow (even if they had not actually heard Merzbow), but the general 
recognition of Zorn, Galas, and Merzbow as leading figures in what was loosely referred to as 
“experimental” or “avant-garde” music had not translated into scholarly attention or interpretive 
methods that led to increased understanding in the realm of musical meaning. With Zorn and 
Merzbow serving as widely recognized leaders of their respective musical milieus, and with 
Galás earning recognition in a more singular, but no less important capacity, I felt sure that I 
could not be the only one who wanted to engage with this music at a deeper level. Thus, this 
study began partially out of passion, partially out of necessity.  
While the scant amount of scholarly attention devoted to Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow was 
part of the problem, the other main issue was methodological. Few of the existing approaches 
toward musical understanding seemed to move beyond the boundaries of the particular analytical 
techniques used (e.g., cultural analysis, literary analysis, historical analysis, syntactical pitch 
analysis), if indeed they could be used at all when attempting to understand radical music. 
Moreover, otherwise valuable methodologies like socio-historicism tended to shrink and collapse 
into virtual irrelevancy when confronting this music, for where a socio-historicist reading of a 
work of more conventional music could use an already existing vocabulary to tie contextual 
issues to musical features in a rigorous, substantive manner, this method failed to inform more 
than context without the ability to describe music in terms of pitch, harmony, rhythm, and form. 
In sum, the absence of appropriate interpretive techniques compelled the creation of new musical 
concepts. 
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One of the primary issues in coming to terms with the heterogeneous musical expressions 
of artists such as Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow is the apparent inability to consider the work of any 
given radical composer as anything but its own, unique and disparate expressive form. Without a 
set of reference points, it is impossible to unite the work of composers like Zorn, Galás, and 
Merzbow except through their difference from conventional modes of musical expression. 
Through the category of radical music, I offer a unified discursive space, which thereby allows 
comparative study both between radical music and conventional music, and between various 
types of radical music.  
On first listen, the music of Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow does appear to be disparate, but 
upon closer examination, their respective expressive languages, unique as they may be, share a 
number of features at a deeper conceptual, if not always sonic, level. During the genesis of the 
concept of radical music, I considered a wide array of features potentially present in the work of 
radical composers, and ultimately, eight features emerged as most frequently occurring in the 
music of Zorn, Galás, Merzbow, and others: 
1) Intrinsic transgression 
2) Extremism 
3) Important conceptual components 
4) Lack of institutional support 
5) The centrality of timbre 
6) The focus on recordings over scores 
7) Cultural hybridity 
8) Important extra-sonic elements 
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These features are not a rubric for determining the radicalism of a given work or composer; 
rather, they are a set of reference points based on commonly occurring features that allow us to 
consider diverse forms of radical musical expression in relation to one another. The variegated 
landscape of radical music requires a certain amount of conceptual fluidity and the ability to 
tolerate expansion and evolution. Undoubtedly, the above list of features will be expanded in 
accordance with the needs of future studies, just as some of the features may not be useful or 
applicable depending upon the requirements of the work at hand. 
 Once the concept of radical music was in place, the next dilemma hindering the 
understanding of radical music was the rather amorphous delineation amongst concepts of 
musical sound, non-musical sound, and noise. Because radical music so frequently involves 
sonic and extra-sonic elements that are far beyond what can unproblematically be identified as 
musical, it has been necessary to develop a concept that allows one to speak about the 
relationship of music, non-music, and noise with more precision. 
 To remedy this problem, I have proposed the concept of expressive noise, which provides 
a way to think about the transgressive qualities of radical music in terms of both sonic features 
and aesthetic and cultural deviance. Through the concept of expressive noise, we can begin to 
speak about certain features of radical music that, until now, have not had any sort of common 
terminology through which to discuss and compare. After surveying many previous conceptions 
of noise, I arrived at the following six categories within which definitions tend to fit: acoustic, 
communicative, subjective, symbolic, transcendent, and phenomenological. Expressive noise 
potentially includes any of these dimensions either as singular entities or in various 
combinations, again, according to the requirements of the work at hand. Like radical music, 
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expressive noise should be considered a fluid concept with the potential for expansion and 
change in accordance with the needs of a particular interpretation. 
 The various facets of radical music and expressive noise come together within my 
approach to musical hermeneutics—the thick interpretation. When one’s goal is to craft a 
compelling interpretation, it seems most prudent to consider as many perspectives and 
approaches as the work demands; however, my proposal of a thick interpretation hermeneutic is 
not an invitation to practice a sort of haphazard theoretical bricolage where bits of ideas are 
excerpted free of their theoretical context and thrown together in a mélange of surfaces. Rather, a 
successful thick interpretation must be theoretically rigorous, and one must take great care in 
finding and demonstrating affinities between the various theoretical concepts that come into 
play, as I have tried to do in each of my case studies. 
 Finally, in this study, I sought to provide an extended, theoretically rigorous introduction 
of Lacanian concepts to music. Although there have been some applications of Lacan to music in 
recent years, there has not been anything involving a systematic introduction to his basic ideas 
within the musicological discourse. Despite the pervasive (and specious) notion that Lacanian 
theory is both inscrutable and insular, I have shown how it can function alongside other 
theoretical paradigms and contribute productively toward a compelling thick interpretation. 
Moreover, it has proven to be a particularly valuable theoretical system when grappling with any 
sort of non-standard, transgressive, or bizarre mode of expression. Because the theory is focused 
so squarely on making sense of the nonsensical, it is apropos when facing a musical expression 
that confounds any conventional path toward understanding. 
 Ultimately, the success of a thick interpretation, as well as the advantages of using 
Lacanian theory, will be judged by the cogency of the interpretations to which they lead. In each 
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of my case studies, the concepts of radical music and expressive noise provided a discursive 
environment from which to begin crafting my thick interpretations, while various Lacanian 
concepts provided ways of understanding some of the more bizarre sonic elements that had, until 
now, vigorously resisted explanation.  
 John Zorn’s Astronome is a gauntlet of screaming, distortion, and animalistic aggression, 
and at around forty-five minutes in length, the work challenges the listener to persevere through 
seemingly unending intensity. From this position, merely listening to the work in its entirety is 
difficult enough without even attempting to understand what one is hearing. The intensity of the 
volume and the aggressive tone of the music scarcely leave room for one to collect enough 
coherent thoughts to reflect on what is happening; however, after constructing a thick 
interpretation, the work began to unfold revealing hidden layers of meaning changing Astronome 
from a mere “vocalise opera” to a fascinating meditation on, and ritual for, creativity itself. 
Zorn’s dedicatees—Edgard Varèse, Aleister Crowley, and Antonin Artaud—each contributed to 
various facets of the interpretation in both musical and thematic capacities. The addition of the 
writings of Paracelsus as well as Zorn’s own musings on the act of artistic creativity led to the 
metaphor of artistic creation as an alchemical process. The addition of Lacan’s concept of the 
Real then tied everything together because it showed that the trauma of the work is not merely 
aesthetic, but is also a psychical trauma enacted upon the auditor. With these elements in play, I 
concluded that Astronome is both about a ritual of creativity and is the purification ritual of 
creativity itself. 
 On first listen, Diamanda Galás’s Wild Women with Steak Knives is ostensibly a formless 
expanse of bizarre vocal sounds, but a hermeneutic approach uncovered a surprising level of 
meaning within the work. While textual analysis and Galás’s history of social activism suggested 
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a connection to feminine (if not explicitly feminist) philosophy on a somewhat explicit level, 
there are very few actual linguistic elements in the work, and thus an interpretation based solely 
upon these few textual clues would be rather unconvincing, especially if there was no way to tie 
them to the aural actuality of the work. In light of the fact that the bulk of Galás’s vocal 
expression in Wild Women consists of nonsense sounds, Lacan’s concept of feminine jouissance 
helped reveal these sounds as an expression beyond the Symbolic, which was further supported 
by the feminine philosophies of Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva. On one level, the theoretical 
paradigms of Cixous and Kristeva are antithetical to those of Lacan, but further analysis 
demonstrated a surprisingly harmonious relationship between Cixous and Kristeva’s concepts of 
femininity and Lacan’s concept of sexuation. All three thinkers contributed toward the idea of a 
radical mode of feminine expression that transcends normative phallogocentrism, and in this 
way, the nonsense vocal utterances began to take on meaning apart from their timbral makeup. 
Finally, Galás’s connection to Maniat lament practices, and specifically the concept of ponos, 
tied the various textual and psychoanalytic elements together to create a coherent and 
illuminating thick interpretation leading to an understanding of the work as a subversive 
expression of feminine power—an écriture féminine—that is also about feminine power.  
 Merzbow poses the greatest challenge because his work is so actively contrary to 
conventional music both in terms of the absence of traditional musical features and in terms of 
his anti-musical compositional intent. Throughout his career, Merzbow has remained steadfast in 
his musical iconoclasm issuing forth sonic challenges to anyone who might define music by any 
sort of convention of tonality, beauty, or even musicality. While this assessment is valid, it belies 
the fact that Merzbow has created a unique and carefully considered expressive language that is 
much larger than the sort of straightforwardly anti-musical readings that are often used to explain 
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away his music in lieu of actually confronting it. I found that Lacan’s theory of desire and the 
Law created an interesting framework for understanding Merzbow’s use of expressive noise. 
With the addition of Georges Bataille’s theory of erotic transgression, I could then read 
Merzbow’s work as an expression of jouissance—an aural erotic experience that transcends the 
Symbolic and brings the auditor into a traumatic encounter with the Real. Merzbow’s aesthetic 
influences range from mid-twentieth-century Modernist movements (e.g., Dadaism, Surrealism, 
Actionism) to Japanese eroticism (especially kinbaku and pornography), and these all serve to 
further illuminate the way that he conceives of his work paradoxically as both music and 
transgressive anti-music. 
  
Directions for Future Study 
During the course of this project, a number of tangential issues arose that were beyond 
the scope of the project, but would merit further study. One such issue concerns Lacanian theory. 
In a future study, it would be useful to explore additional Lacanian concepts and their 
relationship to musical expression. My introduction to Lacanian theory in chapter one must be 
considered preliminary because even though the concepts introduced and used in the above case 
studies contributed toward successful thick interpretations, it was beyond the scope of the present 
study to provide an exhaustive survey of Lacan’s work. Although I introduced the most critical 
and pertinent elements of Lacanian theory, there is much work yet to be done in transposing 
psychoanalytic concepts to musicological hermeneutics.  
A clear direction for further research would be the application of the thick interpretation 
hermeneutic to other radical works not limited to those by Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow. 
Composers and bands such as Mika Vainio, Ryoji Ikeda, Sunn O))), and Hijokaidan would all 
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benefit from this approach. Each radical composer will require a unique hermeneutic 
construction, but the tools and concepts described herein will provide a foundational method, and 
from the framework provided in the present study, future thick interpretations can be constructed 
by changing the particulars according to the needs of the work at hand. 
Beyond the work of artists who self-identify as musical composers, it would also be 
interesting to apply the concepts of radical music and expressive noise to those who self-identify 
as “sound artists.” Irrespective of the usefulness and legitimacy of sound art as a concept or 
disciplinary category, scholarship on the work of artists such as Janet Cardiff, Bill Fontana, and 
Christian Marclay could potentially benefit from the expanded notion of music that radical music 
and expressive noise provide. As I have argued in the previous pages, the general idea of music 
can be broad enough to encompass a great deal of expressive sonic practices that share very few 
features with what is conventionally considered to be musical expression, and as such, I see no 
reason that a field recording by Stephen Vitiello or a sound installation by Max Neuhaus cannot 
be understood as musical expression, so long as they are not subjected to a rubric of melody, 
harmony, and rhythm. 
The concepts of radical music and expressive noise were created to address theoretical 
lacunae that constrained the possibilities of understanding and interpretation of certain streams of 
music, but they also have potential value to the field of music in general. Because they address 
the very fringes of musical practice, they also provide a way of thinking about the conceptual 
periphery of music, which therefore has implications for how one conceives of music that is not 
radical. In a future study, it would be interesting to explore the ramifications of a more clearly 
defined musical periphery on more centrally situated musical expression. I no longer feel that it 
is necessary to be an apologist for radical music, but this hardly constitutes a discursive victory 
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for aberrant forms of sonic expression. At this time, it has been absolutely necessary to create the 
new discursive space that is radical music because the existing hermeneutic models no longer 
served the sort of music I brought to them; however, with time and increased scholarly attention, 
a future comparative study between radical and conventional music may expose our conventional 
conceptions of music more as discursive constructs and less as the timeless criteria that they 
continue to function as. As long as the discourse of Western music maintains its conceptual 
continuity based around melody, harmony, rhythm, form, and timbre, the concept of radical 
music will be necessary. Should this view change, a future study might reveal these forms of 
sonic expression as only apparently oppositional.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Perhaps the final question is: have I found answers to satisfy my long quest for greater 
understanding of this difficult and obscure music? Would my thick interpretations have seemed 
suitably compelling to a listener like my former self, enraptured by the music and hungry for a 
better understanding of it? While I do not attempt explain the function of every sound in every 
work in the way that a syntactical pitch analysis could, in theory, explain the reason for every 
note in a Bach fugue, I found a way to make sense of each composer’s expressive style in a 
manner that related directly to actual sonic features of the work without resorting to glossing 
over the aural actuality as a mere consequence of some more easily expressible explanation at 
the level of general compositional concept. I found a way to understand why their music sounds 
the way it does, and that, after all, was one of my most pressing questions. I approached the work 
looking for deeper meaning, and in each case I was able to find it. 
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Each of my case studies wrestled with works that were difficult to explain through any 
sort of existing methodology, but by constructing a thick interpretation, the works began to open 
up and reveal a new depth of meaning. It is my hope that if the reader has found the concepts of 
radical music, expressive noise, and thick interpretations convincing, he or she will adapt these 
ideas to fit the needs of future projects. Above all, I hope that, whatever the value of any 
methodological innovations offered, the reader has gained a new appreciation for the work of 
Zorn, Galás, and Merzbow, insofar as their exquisite music is the sine qua non of this entire 
project. 
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Appendix A — The Borromean Knot 
The Borromean knot is a topological figure that Lacan uses to explain the 
interrelationship of the three orders of the psyche: the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary 
(hereafter, the RSI). Where Lacan used linguistics to speak metaphorically about the RSI, he 
found knot theory useful insofar as it moved beyond representation—the Borromean knot is the 
structure itself. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The properties of the knot are such that if one of the rings is broken, the formation dissolves and 
thus demonstrates the interdependence of the RSI. As Malcolm Bowie puts it, “everything that 
exists ex-ists—has its being in relation to that which lies outside it—and dichotomies and 
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complementarities are no exception to the rule.”659 The features that each order excludes serve to 
define the RSI, and thus they do not function as discrete, autonomous units. 
It is also apt insofar as none of the orders take hierarchical precedence over the others. 
Should the Borromean knot become untied and the rings broken, the subject’s psyche collapses 
into psychosis; however, a forth ring, known as the sinthome, may artificially hold the knot 
together in an ad hoc capacity providing the subject with something that he or she may use to 
artificially maintain psychical constitution. This could take the form of a drug addiction, any 
manner of compulsive behavior, or even artistic expression. 
The three orders are easily distinguished, but a bit of commentary is necessary to explain 
the significance of the overlapping regions. First, there is the region between the Imaginary and 
the Symbolic, which is where we find meaning. Recall the subject who supposes his or her 
enunciations to originate in the Imaginary (the level of ego), when in fact that subject has been 
tricked and the meaning actually originates in the Symbolic. Second, the region between the 
Symbolic and the Real shows “Phallic Jouissance” (represented by Jϕ in Lacanian algebra), 
which exists in the Real, but is limited by the Symbolic by the instantiation of the signifier of the 
name-of-the-father. Jϕ thus represents the subject’s loss upon the acquisition of language. Third, 
the region between the Imaginary and the Real shows the “Jouissance of the Other” (represented 
by JA). This is a special non-phallic jouissance available only to women. For Lacan, all men are 
subject to the phallus—the master signifier—because of the castration complex, but not all 
women are subject to the phallus, and thus can create an alternate discourse. Finally, object (a) 
appears in the center of the Borromean knot representing the unattainable object of desire that 
drives the subject’s psyche.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Routledge, 1991), 194. 
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